

26 MAY

UNCLASSIFIED

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 TO IMMEDIATE F C G  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 858 DATED 26 MAY 82  
 AND TO IMMEDIATE C O I  
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

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MY TWO IPTS: FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 26 MAY:

I SHOULD FIRST LIKE TO EXPRESS THE VERY HEARTFELT APPRECIATION OF MY DELEGATION TO THOSE NON-ALIGNED DELEGATIONS WHICH HAVE WORKED SO HARD TO PRODUCE A TEXT OF A RESOLUTION WHICH HAS JUST COMMANDED UNANIMITY IN THE COUNCIL.

MY DELEGATION VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION JUST ADOPTED AS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 505. WE DID SO BECAUSE IT CONTAINS A CLEAR REAFFIRMATION OF SCR 502. IT REGISTERS BEYOND DOUBT THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS HAVE BEEN AND WILL BE CONCENTRATED ON ENSURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502. THIS IS THE KEY TO THE RETURN OF PEACE TO THE REGION WHICH ALL OF US SO DEVOUTLY WISH. IN PARTICULAR THIS KEY LIES IN THE SECOND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH OF SCR 502, NAMELY THE UNCONDITIONAL DEMAND FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

MY DELEGATION WILL CERTAINLY COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS RENEWED MISSION. IN THE LIGHT OF CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE BY DELEGATIONS IN THE DEBATE AND IN EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE THIS MORNING, I MUST MAKE CLEAR, SO THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO MISUNDERSTANDING, THAT FOR OUR PART THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE CONDITION FOR A CEASEFIRE IS THAT IT SHOULD BE UNEQUIVOCALLY LINKED WITH AN IMMEDIATE COMMENCEMENT OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. THE HISTORY OF THE LAST TWO MONTHS HAS DONE NOTHING TO CREATE BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA. FIRST, ARGENTINA INVADDED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WITHOUT WARNING WHILE NEGOTIATIONS WERE STILL IN PROGRESS AND IN DEFIANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S APPEAL OF 1 APRIL. SECONDLY, WE HAVE EXERTED OURSELVES TO THE UTMOST IN SIX ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CRISIS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE ARGENTINE INVASION: IN EVERY INSTANCE WE HAVE FOUND AT THE END THAT WE HAVE TRAVELLED IN A CIRCLE OR RATHER THAT WE HAVE NEVER

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MR PRESIDENT THE COUNCIL SHOULD ALSO BE QUITE CLEAR ON ANOTHER POINT. THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED SINCE THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPORTED TO THE COUNCIL ON 21 MAY. OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF SCR 502 IS PLAINLY STATED. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. WE CANNOT NOW ACCEPT THAT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL BE LINKED IN ANY WAY TO PARALLEL BRITISH WITHDRAWAL.

MR PRESIDENT, WE DO NOT MINIMISE THE DIFFICULTY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S TASK. BUT, I WOULD BE THE LAST TO UNDERESTIMATE HIS GREAT SKILL AND DEVOTION. IF ANYONE CAN SUCCEED IN THE TASK BEFORE HIM, IT IS OUR SECRETARY-GENERAL. I SHOULD LIKE AGAIN TO ASSURE THE COUNCIL THAT MY DELEGATION WILL COOPERATE WITH HIM TO THE FULL.

MR PRESIDENT, I CANNOT CONCLUDE THIS STATEMENT WITHOUT EXPRESSING A LITTLE SURPRISE AT THE EXPLANATION OF VOTE OF THE DISTINGUISHED PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR. ON 1 APRIL THE SOVIET UNION JOINED IN THE CALL BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE. ON 2 APRIL ARGENTINA DID USE FORCE. THIS WAS REGISTERED IN SCR 502 WHICH THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT OPPOSE. I AM STILL WAITING TO HEAR A FIRM CONDEMNATION OF THIS FIRST USE OF FORCE FROM THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION. HE HAS ADOPTED, IF I MAY SAY SO, SOMETHING OF A ONE-EYED STANCE THIS MORNING: NOT SEEING THE USE OF FORCE BY ARGENTINA BUT FOCUSING WITH ONE EYE ON THE UNITED KINGDOM'S ACTIONS IN EXERCISE OF OUR RIGHT TO SELF DEFENCE.


PARSONS

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 262125Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 856 OF 26 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, DUBLIN,  
MADRID, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, AMMAN, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY,  
GEORGETOWN, WARSAW, TOKYO, UKDEL NATO.

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MY TELNO 854: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

## SUMMARY

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS MORNING (26 MAY) UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED AS SCR 505 THE IRISH DRAFT AS AMENDED BY THE NON-ALIGNED AND OURSELVES. THE JAPANESE DID NOT PRESS THEIR DRAFT TO A VOTE. STATEMENTS WERE MADE IN THE DEBATE BY THE FRG (QUITE GOOD) AND YUGOSLAVIA (NON-ALIGNED MUMBO-JUMBO). IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE, SPAIN, PANAMA (AT LENGTH), CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION COMPLAINED THAT THE DRAFT DID NOT GO FAR ENOUGH. MRS KIRKPATRICK (USA) SPOKE ABOUT THE AMERICANS' HEMISPHERIC CONCERNS. MY VERY FIRM EXPLANATION OF VOTE PRODUCED LITTLE REACTION FROM THE ARGENTINES BUT A TROUBLE-MAKING INTERVENTION FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

## DETAIL

2. THE ARGENTINES INFORMED OTUNNU (UGANDA) FIRST THING THIS MORNING THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT THE DRAFT AS IT HAD EMERGED LAST NIGHT. OTUNNU OBTAINED AGREEMENT THAT THE REVISED DRAFT SHOULD BE SPONSORED BY GUYANA, IRELAND, JORDAN, TOGO, UGANDA AND ZAIRE. THE COUNCIL DULY MET AT 1630Z TO HEAR TWO LATE SPEAKERS IN THE DEBATE (FRG AND YUGOSLAVIA) AND TO VOTE.

3. VAN WELL (FRG) SAID THAT THIS WAS A WAR WHICH SHOULD NEVER HAVE HAPPENED. THE FRG RECOGNISED THAT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS HAD BEEN AN IMPORTANT NATIONAL CONCERN OF THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE FOR MANY YEARS. BUT ARGENTINA HAD DEFIED THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WHEN IT CHOSE TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE BY FORCE. ITS INVASION WAS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CHARTER AND HAD LED THE UK TO INVOKE ITS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 51. THE FRG ATTACHED THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE. IT APPEALED URGENTLY TO BOTH SIDES TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. IT ENDORSED WHAT BELGIUM HAD SAID ON 23 MAY

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4. KOMATINA (YUGOSLAVIA) MADE A TYPICALLY NON-ALIGNED SPEECH, FULL OF QUOTATIONS FROM VARIOUS NON-ALIGNED STATEMENTS. HE HARDLY MENTIONED THE UK AND DID NOT MENTION THE ARGENTINE INVASION AT ALL. HE DID, HOWEVER, EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR SCR 502 AS THE MOST APPROPRIATE MEANS OF SOLVING THE CRISIS.

5. DORR (IRELAND) THEN GAVE VENT TO A LONG AND REPETITIVE JUSTIFICATION OF IRELAND'S CALLING OF THE COUNCIL AND TABLING OF ITS DRAFT RESOLUTION ON 24 MAY. HE CLAIMED FULL CREDIT FOR THE OUTCOME, DESCRIBING THE NEW DRAFT AS A "SLIGHTLY REVISED VERSION" OF THE IRISH TEXT (WHICH ROSENSTOCK (USA) SAID IN A STAGE WHISPER WAS LIKE SAYING THAT A CASTRATO WAS A SLIGHTLY REVISED MALE) THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD SET THE SECRETARY-GENERAL A VERY DIFFICULT TASK BUT IRELAND HOPED THAT HE COULD FIND A BASIS ON WHICH THE PARTIES COULD STOP THE FIGHTING AND RESUME NEGOTIATIONS.

6. CTUNNU (UGANDA) THEN INTRODUCED THE NEW DRAFT WITH ADMIRABLE BREVITY. THE DRAFT ATTEMPTED TO EXPRESS THOSE AREAS OF CONSENSUS WHICH, IN THE CO-SPONSORS' VIEW, HAD EMERGED IN THE DEBATE, VIZ A DEEP CONCERN AT THE CONTINUED FIGHTING, A WISH FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO RENEW HIS EFFORTS AND A DESIRE THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD INITIATE MEASURES WHICH WOULD BRING AN END TO THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES. HE HOPED THAT THE DRAFT WOULD MAKE A MODEST CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS PEACE.

7. DE PINIES (SPAIN), IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE, EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THE DRAFT DID NOT ORDER A CEASEFIRE OR GIVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL A MORE PRECISE MANDATE. BUT SPAIN WOULD NEVERTHELESS VOTE IN FAVOUR.

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8. ILLUECA (PANAMA) SPOKE IN SIMILAR TERMS BUT AT GREAT LENGTH. HE ALSO COMPLAINED THAT THERE WAS NO MENTION OF DECOLONISATION NOR AN APPEAL TO MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE PERMANENT MEMBERS, TO REFRAIN FROM SUPPLYING ARMS TO EITHER ARGENTINA OR THE UK (A REFERENCE, AS HE EXPLAINED, TO REPORTS IN TODAY'S AMERICAN PRESS OF US RESUPPLY OF MISSILES AND OTHER ITEMS TO THE UK). IT SEEMED THAT THE DRAFT WAS THE ONLY VIABLE POSSIBILITY FOR THE COUNCIL AT THIS TIME. PANAMA WOULD NOT THEREFORE OPPOSE IT. BUT SHE RESERVED THE RIGHT TO CALL FOR A FURTHER MEETING AS NECESSARY. ILLUECA WAS ON HIS BEST BEHAVIOUR, THOUGH HE NEARLY BECAME CARRIED AWAY BY HIS OWN RHETORIC ON ALLEGED US ARMS SUPPLY TO THE UK.

9. LING QING (CHINA), SPEAKING IN HIS NATIONAL CAPACITY, ALSO REGRETTED THAT THE DRAFT DID NOT CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE OR CONFIRM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ACHIEVEMENTS SO FAR AS A BASIS FOR HIS NEW EFFORTS. BUT THE DRAFT COULD BE REGARDED AS A STEP FORWARD AND CHINA WOULD SUPPORT IT.

10. THE VOTE WAS THEN TAKEN. ALL VOTED IN FAVOUR AND THE DRAFT WAS ADOPTED BY SCR 505 (1982). THERE WERE ONLY TWO MINOR CHANGES TO THE TEXT IN MY TELNO 848 BUT FOR THE RECORD, AND AT THE EMERGENCY UNIT'S REQUEST, THE TEXT AS ADOPTED IS IN MIFT.

11. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SPOKE NEXT. HE THANKED THE COUNCIL FOR ITS SUPPORT AND FOR THE RENEWED CONFIDENCE SHOWN IN HIM. HE RECOGNISED THE DIFFICULTIES THE COUNCIL FACED BUT HE FEARED THAT THE RESOLUTION DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR OR PRECISE GUIDANCE FOR THE PARTIES OR FOR HIM. THE EARLY ACHIEVEMENT OF A CEASE FIRE AND RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. BUT HE WOULD DO ALL HE COULD. HE URGED THE PARTIES TO RECOGNISE THAT A LASTING SOLUTION COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. THE FIRST REQUIREMENT WAS A CEASE FIRE. A RESTORATION OF PEACE COULD THEN BE ACHIEVED "IN CONSONANCE" WITH SCR 502 AND HIS EARLIER EFFORTS.

12. NISIBORI (JAPAN) SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT PRESS FOR HIS DRAFT TO BE VOTED ON AS ITS MAIN IDEAS HAD BEEN INCORPORATED IN SCRO 505.

13. TROYANOVSKY (USSR), IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE, QUOTED AT LENGTH FROM THE TASS STATEMENT OF 23 MAY. ON THAT BASIS THE SOVIET UNION HAD VOTED IN FAVOUR IN SPITE OF THE DRAFT'S SHORTCOMINGS. HE CONFIRMED SOVIET DISSATISFACTION WITH SCR 502 BECAUSE IT ENTIRELY DISREGARDED THE DECOLONISATION ASPECT. THE RUSSIANS FAVOURED AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE.

14. MRS KIRKPATRICK (USA) SAID THAT SHE HAD ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT THIS CONFLICT WAS ESPECIALLY POIGNANT AND PAINFUL FOR THE UNITED STATES. THE USA WELCOMED THE RESOLUTION AND PLEDGED ITS SUPPORT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. SHE COULD ASSURE ILLUECA THAT THE AMERICANS HAD THE DEEPEST RESPECT FOR ALL THEIR NEIGHBOURS IN THE HEMISPHERE. THE UNITED STATES WAS PART OF THE HEMISPHERE; THE SOONER THE CONFLICT WAS ENDED, THE SOONER THE AMERICANS WOULD BE ABLE TO JOIN LATIN AMERICA IN BUILDING THE HEMISPHERE'S FUTURE.

15. I MADE A VERY STRONG EXPLANATION OF VOTE AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TELNO 463 (TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT TO YOU, WASHINGTON AND COI ONLY).

16. LISTRE (ARGENTINA) THANKED ALL CONCERNED. BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURE "OF MORE THAN ONE PERMANENT MEMBER" THE COUNCIL HAD NOT BE ABLE TO ACT AS IT SHOULD HAVE DONE AND HAD TRANSFERRED THE PROBLEM TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. ARGENTINA WOULD RESUME THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FIRM PURPOSE OF ENSURING THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND WITHOUT ANY PRE-CONDITIONS. THE COUNCIL HAD HEARD HOWEVER THAT OTHERS WOULD INSIST ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS.

17. TROYANOVSKY (USSR), IN RIGHT OF REPLY TO MY CRITICISM OF THE RUSSIANS IN MY EXPLANATION OF VOTE, SAID THAT I HAD FAILED TO TAKE NOTE OF THE CALL FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN SCR 502 AND OF THE STATEMENT IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF SCR 505 THAT THE SECRETARY SHOULD BEAR IN MIND HIS STATEMENT OF 21 MAY. I HAD AGAIN PUT FORWARD AN ULTIMATUM AND THIS RAISED DOUBTS ABOUT THE SINCERITY OF MY VOTE IN FAVOUR.

18. I DECIDED NOT TO PROLONG THE PROCEEDINGS BY AN EXCHANGE WITH TROYANOVSKY AND SIMPLY SAID THAT I JUDGED THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD PREFER ME TO PURSUE IN PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS OUR DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF THESE, AS OF OTHER, RESOLUTIONS.

19. COMMENT FOLLOWS.

CC LUXEMBOURG


26 MAY 1982

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UNCLASSIFIED

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 262104Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 857 DATED 26 MAY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PEKING, MADRID, ALL EC POSTS, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, AMMAN, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW, TOKYO, UKDEL NATO, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, ASUNCION, BOGOTA, QUITO, LIMA, LA PAZ, SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, PORT OF SPAIN, MEXICO CITY, MONTEVIDEO, TEGUCIGALPA, CARACAS, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, HAVANA, BRIDGETOWN, KINGSTON, DACCA, LAGOS, NEW DELHI, YAOUNDE, DAKAR, ADDIS ABABA, JAKARTA, BAGHDAD, MASERU, MAPUTO, MOGADISHU, COLOMBO, DAMASCUS, BELGRADE, LUSAKA, ALGIERS, LUANDA, BAHRAIN BELMOPAN, GABORONE, RANGOON, NICOSIA, SANA'A, CAIRO, BANJUL, TEHRAN, ABIDJAN, NAIROBI, KUWAIT, TRIPOLI, LILONGWE, KUALA LUMPUR, VALLETTA, PORT LOUIS, RABAT, KATHMANDU, MUSCAT, ISLAMABAD, DOHA, JEDDA, FREETOWN, SINGAPORE, KHARTOUM, DAR ES SALAAM, TUNIS, ABU DHABI, CARACAS, HARARE, ANTANANARIVO, LIBREVILLE, MONROVIA, VICTORIA, VILA.

MIPT( NOT TO ALL) FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF SCR 505 (1982) WHICH WAS ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 26 MAY BEGINS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 502 (1982) OF 3 APRIL 1982,

NOTING WITH THE DEEPEST CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) HAS SERIOUSLY DETERIORATED,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2360TH MEETING ON 21 MAY 1982, AS WELL AS THE STATEMENTS IN THE DEBATE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

CONCERNED TO BELIEVE IS A MATTER OF THE GREATEST URGENCY

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2360TH MEETING ON 21 MAY 1982, AS WELL AS THE STATEMENTS IN THE DEBATE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

CONCERNED TO ACHIEVE AS A MATTER OF THE GREATEST URGENCY A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

1. EXPRESSES APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE EFFORTS WHICH HE HAS ALREADY MADE TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982), AND THEREBY TO RESTORE PEACE TO THE REGION;

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES BEARING IN MIND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982) AND THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN HIS STATEMENT OF 21 MAY 1982;

3. URGES THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION WITH A VIEW TO ENDING THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES IN AND AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS);

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ENTER INTO CONTACT IMMEDIATELY WITH THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO NEGOTIATING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASE-FIRE, INCLUDING, IF NECESSARY, ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISPATCH OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE;

5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT AN INTERIM REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IN ANY CASE NOT LATER THAN SEVEN DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

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