

NVFC 209/27

CO F C O DESKBY 270300Z


GRS 1200

27 MAY 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 270300Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 270121Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 869 DATED 26 MAY 82  
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON



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MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. THE DEBATE COULD HAVE BEEN WORSE IN TERMS OF THE VIOLENCE OF THE RHETORIC. APART FROM ILLUECA AND ONE OR TWO OTHER NASTIES, THE LATIN AMERICANS STATED THEIR POSITIONS IN REASONABLE LANGUAGE. WE OWE A LOT TO THE OLD COMMONWEALTH, KENYA, GUYANA AND BELGIUM FOR THEIR ROBUST SUPPORT; SLIGHTLY LESS TO THE FRG, LITTLE OR NOTHING TO THE REST OF OUR PARTNERS WHO SPOKE, INCLUDING FRANCE; THE US STATEMENT WAS TOO EVEN HANDED FOR OUR LIKING. HOWEVER TO A GREATER OR LESSER EXTENT, ALL THESE STATEMENTS OFFSET THE LATIN AMERICAN BARRAGE AND ILLUECA DAMAGED HIS OWN SIDE.

2. THE FACT THAT WE EMERGED WITHOUT HAVING TO VETO, WHICH SEEMED MOST UNLIKELY AT THE OUTSET, WAS DUE TO A NUMBER OF FACTORS - THE FIRMNESS WITH WHICH WE STATED OUR OWN POSITIONS BOTH PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY; THE RELUCTANCE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO ALLOW A VETO SITUATION TO DEVELOP BOTH BECAUSE OF BASIC SYMPATHY FOR US AND BECAUSE THEY REALISED THAT A DEADLOCK WOULD EFFECTIVELY DEAL THE UN OUT OF ANY FURTHER USEFUL ROLE IN THE CRISIS; THE IRISH TACTICS WHICH THE NON-ALIGNED FOUND BOTH IRRITATING AND UNACCEPTABLE; AND THE LATIN AMERICAN DESIRE TO GET OUT OF THE COUNCIL IN ORDER TO LEAVE THEIR HANDS FREE FOR THE OAS MEETING IN WASHINGTON ON 27 MAY. CTUNNU (UGANDA) MADE AN ENORMOUS CONTRIBUTION BY THE SKILL, PATIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING WITH WHICH HE NEGOTIATED THE DRAFT TO A POINT WHERE WE COULD ACCEPT IT. IT IS IRONIC, IN THE LIGHT OF MY EXPERIENCE HERE, THAT OUR BEST SUPPORT SHOULD HAVE COME FROM AMERICANS, ASIANS AND CARIBBEANS WITH OUR PARTNERS AND ALLIES



MY EXPERIENCE HERE, THAT OUR BEST SUPPORT SHOULD HAVE COME FROM  
AFRICANS, ASIANS AND CARIBBEANS, WITH OUR PARTNERS AND ALLIES  
EITHER USELESS OR ACTIVELY UNHELPFUL. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT  
IRELAND WAS PREPARED TO PUSH US TO A VETO WITH FULL FORE-  
KNOWLEDGE THAT THEIR DRAFT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

3. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? I BELIEVE THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE  
COUNCIL WOULD BE ONLY TOO HAPPY FOR PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO TAKE A  
FULL WEEK BEFORE REPORTING; THEY HAVE HAD ENOUGH OF THE FALKLANDS  
FOR THE TIME BEING AND REALISE THAT THE COUNCIL IS POWERLESS  
TO STOP MILITARY ACTION. HOWEVER, FROM PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S MANNER  
THIS EVENING (NOT THAT HE WAS IN THE LEAST UNFRIENDLY) HE IS NOT  
GOING TO ALLOW HIMSELF TO BE USED SIMPLY AS A VEHICLE FOR BUYING  
TIME, AND HE WAS SEVERELY SHAKEN BY MY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE  
REFUSAL TO CONTEMPLATE PARALLEL WITHDRAWAL - THE ONLY NEGOTIATING  
CARD WHICH HE MIGHT HAVE HELD.

4. BY TOMORROW (THURSDAY) EVENING HE IS LIKELY TO BE FACED WITH  
THE FOLLOWING SITUATION:

(A) ON OUR SIDE, INSISTENCE ON IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL  
ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, LEADING TO A RESUMPTION OF BRITISH  
ADMINISTRATION OF THE FALKLANDS, WITH NO PARALLEL BRITISH  
WITHDRAWAL OR UN INVOLVEMENT.

(B) ON THE ARGENTINE SIDE, WILLINGNESS FOR A CEASEFIRE  
WITH A MILITARY FREEZE IN SITU OR MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL COUPLED  
WITH THE RE-OPENING OF A NEGOTIATING PROCESS BASED ON THE  
SUBSTANCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PREVIOUS EFFORTS. (THIS IS  
OF COURSE GUESSWORK BUT SUCH A POSITION WOULD EMERGE  
NATURALLY FROM ARGENTINE STATEMENTS IN THE DEBATE).

5. MY PRESENT FEELING IS THAT, IN THIS SITUATION, PEREZ DE CUELLAR  
MIGHT GIVE IT ANOTHER 24 HOURS TO ENABLE US FORMALLY TO COMMENT  
ON WHATEVER FORMAL RESPONSE HE GETS FROM THE ARGENTINES - AS  
OPPOSED TO WHATEVER LISTRE TOLD HIM OFF THE CUFF THIS EVENING.  
ASSUMING THAT WE TELL HIM THAT OUR POSITION IS UNCHANGEABLE, I  
BELIEVE THAT HE WILL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY  
COUNCIL (PROBABLY ON FRIDAY EVENING BUT POSSIBLY TOMORROW  
THURSDAY) THAT HE CANNOT MAKE ANY PROGRESS WITH HIS MISSION IN  
THE LIGHT OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE TWO PARTIES, PARTICULARLY OURS.

6. THE LIKELIHOOD THEN IS THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL RECALL THE  
COUNCIL THE NEXT DAY. A NUMBER OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN  
MINISTERS WOULD STILL BE IN WASHINGTON FOR THE OAS MEETING,  
AND MIGHT DESCEND ON THE COUNCIL FOR ITS RESUMED SESSION.



COUNCIL THE NEXT DAY. A NUMBER OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD STILL BE IN WASHINGTON FOR THE OAS MEETING, AND MIGHT DESCEND ON THE COUNCIL FOR ITS RESUMED SESSION.

7. EVENTS WOULD THEN MOVE FAST. ONE CLEAR THREAD THAT RAN THROUGH JUST ABOUT ALL THE STATEMENTS IN THE DEBATE, INCLUDING THOSE FROM COUNTRIES WELL DISPOSED TO US, WAS THAT AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE MUST BE BROUGHT ABOUT BEFORE THE HOSTILITIES ESCALATED FURTHER, THUS PRECIPITATING THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN LATIN AMERICA AND THE WEST TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED IN PREVIOUS TELEGRAMS.

8. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE COULD WELL BE FACED BY SATURDAY OR SUNDAY WITH HAVING TO VETO A STRAIGHTFORWARD CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE, COMBINED WITH A RENEWAL OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MANDATE TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE SOME KIND OF INTERIM ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. WE WOULD ATTRACT BLAME FOR THE FAILURE OF HIS PRESENT EFFORTS BECAUSE OF OUR REFUSAL TO ENTERTAIN THE CONCEPT OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL, THUS LEAVING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WITH NO BASIS ON WHICH TO NEGOTIATE.

9. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, I WOULD EXPECT US TO BE VERY ISOLATED. I WOULD BE MOST DUBIOUS, TO SAY THE LEAST, ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE FRENCH STANDING BY US, ALSO THE AMERICANS UNLESS THE PRESIDENT WAS PREPARED TO GIVE A DIRECT INSTRUCTION TO MRS KIRKPATRICK. I AM CERTAIN THAT THE REST OF THE COUNCIL WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A RESOLUTION.

10. THE ONLY POSSIBILITY I SEE TO BUY MORE TIME, IE THE FULL WEEK WHICH PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAS BEEN GIVEN BY THE COUNCIL, WOULD BE FOR ME TO SUGGEST TO HIM THAT HE SHOULD PERSONALLY GO TO LONDON AND BEUNOS AIRES SO THAT HE COULD REPORT TO THE COUNCIL THAT HE HAD CARRIED HIS ENDEAVOURS TO THE HIGHEST LEVEL ON BOTH SIDES. HE MIGHT BE RELUCTANT TO DO THIS - IT IS NOT HIS STYLE - AND MIGHT SUGGEST THAT HE SHOULD SEND SEPARATE ENVOYS TO EACH CAPITAL, AN IDEA WHICH HE HAD IN MIND IN THE CLOSING DAYS OF THE LAST ROUND. EVEN THIS WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF BUYING A FEW MORE DAYS.

11. PEREZ DE CUELLAR, AT THIS AFTERNOON'S MEETING, INSISTED THAT HE SHOULD GIVE BOTH PARTIES TWENTY-FOUR HOURS TO COME UP WITH ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS WHICH HE HAD POSED. I HAVE THEREFORE ARRANGED TO MEET HIM AT 2000Z TOMORROW 27 MAY.