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MIPTE FALKLANDS: BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS

1. BOLLOWING IS TRARSLATION OF TEXT REFERRED TO IN MIPT.

BEGINS THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT IS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED AT THE ATTITUDE ADOPTED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN PRESSING FORWARD TO A HILITARY SOLUTION WHICH WOULD IMPLY A HUNILIATING DEFEAT FOR

ARGENTINA.

THIS ATTITUDE CREATES A SITUATION WHICH AGGRAVATES, IN AN UNPREDICTABLE MANNER, THE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS IN INTERNAL TERMS IN ARGENTINA AND IN ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR LATIN MIGRICA, FOR THE RELATIONS OF THE LATTER WITH THE UNITED STATES AND FOR THOSE WITH THE WESTERN MORLD. IN THESE COMPLTICHS,



THERE WILL INEVITABLY BE A SERIOUS DESTABILISATION OF THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN ARGENTINA, PROBABLY ACCOMPANIED BY A RADICALISATION WHICH COULD AFFECT THE MOST VULNERABLE COUNTRIES IN THE RESION.

THE STATEMENTS OF DEFENCE MINISTER AMADEO FRUGOLI AND THE MESSAGE SENT BY PRESIDENT GALTIERI TO PRESIDENT REAGAN INDICATE THAT THE RISKS FLOWING FROM THE GROWING ARGENTINE PERCEPTION THAT ITS TRUE FRIENDS AND ALLIES ARE THE SOVIET UNION, CUBA AND NICARAGUA SHOULD NOT BE UNDER-ESTIMATED. HE HAVE REASONS, BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM DUCKOS AIRES, TO BELIEVE THAT THERE MAY ALREADY EXIST A DECISION OF THE JUNTA IN FAVOUR OF RAPPROACHEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION, IN THE EVENT THAT THE CONFLICT, AS IT EVOLVES, CONTINUES TO PUSH THE ARGENTINES INTO A CORNER FROM THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY POINT OF VIEW

SUCH A PROBABILITY IS DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE PARTICULAR INTERESTS OF BRAZIL AND TO THE GENERAL INTERESTS OF THE WEST, WHICH INCLUDES GREAT BRITAIN HERSELF.

LIKEWISE, FROM THE BRITISH POINT OF VIEW IT SEEMS TO US THAT
THE DANGER EXISTS, IN THE EVERT OF ARGENTINE/SOVIET
MILITARY COLLABORATION (EVEN IF IT WERE RESTRICTED TO LOGISTIC
SUPPORT AND THE PROVISION OF EQUIPHENT) THAT THE CONFLICT
WILL CONTINUE — ALBEIT WITH LATENT KILITARY POSSIBILITIES—
EVEN IN THE HYPOTHESIS OF A TOTAL DEFEAT OF THE ARGENTINE
TROOPS ON THE ISLANDS. IN THIS EVENTUALITY, THE BRITISH WOULD
BE OBLIGED TO MAINTAIN PERMAHENTLY A COSTLY MILITARY
APPARATUS IN THE ARCHIPELAGO, WITH THE RISK OF EVENTUAL HUMAN
AND MATERIAL LOSSES, INCLUDING AMONG THE LOCAL CIVIL POPULATION.
THERE IS, MOREOVER, THE ADDITIONAL DANGER OF AN ESCALATION WITH
UTTERLY DISASTROUS RESULTS IN THE EVENT THAT THE UK DECIDES
TO RIPOSTE BY ATTACKING THE CONTINENTAL BASES OF THE ARGENTINE
AIR FORCE.

ALARMING THOUGH THEY MAY BE, SUCH HYPOTHESES ARE IN NO WAY EXAGGERATED, SINCE THEIR PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY MENTIONED IN STATEMENTS BY THE HIGHST ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES.

THE BRAZILIAN GOERMENT HOPES, THEREFORE, THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, IN THE LIGHT OF THE VERY FAR-REACHING INTERESTS WHICH URITE US, WILL BE ABLE TO ACT WITH NECESSARY SPEED IN GROER TO AVOID SUCH A SITUATION CONING TO PASS, AND TO ADOPT A POLITICAL

UNITE US, WILL BE ABLE TO ACT WITH HECESSARY SPEED IN ORDER
TO AVOID SUCH A SITUATION CONTROL TO PASS, AND TO APOPT A POLITICAL
AND RECOTTATING STANCE WHICH HOULD PERKIT AN HONOURABLE AND
REASONABLE SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT CRISIS.

ENDS.

HARDING

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