

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES

IMMEDIATE

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
MR BARRETT  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/PUSD (2)  
MR REED, PUSD  
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING-STREET (2 copies)

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG

PS/SIR M PALLISER

PS/SIR A DUFF

MR WADE-GERY

MR FULLER

MR COLVIN

MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-  
MENTS STAFF

CABINET  
OFFICE

DIO

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD

DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

SECRET

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 311426Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 895 DATED 31 MAY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

WASHINGTON TELNOS 1968-1964: FALKLANDS

1. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE IDEAS IN HAIG'S PAPER (WASHINGTON TELNO 1964) WOULD BE INFINITELY BETTER FOR US THAN ANY ANALOGOUS FORM OF UN INVOLVEMENT.

2. I HAVE A STRONG FEELING THAT, AS THE MILITARY SITUATION WORSENS FOR ARGENTINA, THEY WILL INCREASE THEIR EFFORTS TO INVOLVE THE UN IN ORDER TO FORTIFY THEIR POSITION ON SOVEREIGNTY FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PHASE FOLLOWING ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.

3. I REMEMBER TELLING MR LUCE IN FEBRUARY THAT WE MUST NEVER LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT, ALTHOUGH WE WERE ABLE TO USE THE UN TO OUR ADVANTAGE OVER SELF-DETERMINATION FOR BELIZE, THE OPPOSITE WOULD ALWAYS BE TRUE OF THE FALKLANDS, HOWEVER ILLOGICAL THIS MIGHT SEEM.

4. I TALKED TO A LOT OF MY FRIENDS IN THE NAM BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE FOR THIS WEEK'S MINISTERIAL MEETING IN HAVANA. THE MORE MODERATE PROMISED TO HELP OVER THE COMMUNIQUE IN REGARD TO



4. ~~I TALKED TO A LOT OF MY FRIENDS IN THE NAM BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE FOR THIS WEEK'S MINISTERIAL MEETING IN HAVANA. THE MORE MODERATE PROMISED TO HELP OVER THE COMMUNIQUE IN REGARD TO THE USE OF FORCE BY ARGENTINA, THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502, PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ETC. BUT THEY WERE ALL ADAMANT THAT THERE COULD BE NO GOING BACK ON EARLIER NAM PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY. IF YOU ADD THE NON-NAM LATIN AMERICAN MEMBERS TO THE NAM MEMBERS/OBSERVERS, THIS MEANS THAT THERE ARE PROBABLY BETWEEN 110 AND 120 GA VOTES FOR ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY.~~

5. ANY UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE PRESENT CRISIS IS BOUND TO REFLECT THIS FACT IN SOME WAY OR OTHER, AND THE ARGENTINES WOULD EXPLOIT THE FACT OF A UN PRESENCE IN THE ISLANDS AND UN INVOLVEMENT IN NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS APPROPRIATE.

6. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, IT IS THEREFORE VERY MUCH IN OUR INTEREST TO KEEP THE UN RIGHT OUT OF THE ACT, AND TO TRY TO SETTLE THE PROBLEM ON A WESTERN HEMISPHERE BASIS WITH THE HELP OF A POWERFUL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY AS WELL AS THE US. IF BRAZIL WERE INVOLVED, THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT COULD DO MUCH TO STOP THE VARIOUS UN ORGANS FROM SHOUTING FROM THE TOUCH LINES.

PARSONS

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