

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) :
0700 HOURS, 6 JUNE 1982

Vulcan Aircraft

- A. (FCO tel. No.169 to Brasilia) 1. The Brazilian Ambassador was summoned by the PUS yesterday morning and asked that the Brazilian Government should stand by the earlier decision to allow the Vulcan to leave Rio de Janeiro. It was stressed that this matter was a political issue to which the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State attached very great importance. The Ambassador said that he had no firm instructions and would convey this request to his Government. No final decision had yet been taken, but Brazil wanted to maintain friendly relations with the UK. The PUS drew the Ambassador's attention to the transit of Argentine war supplies through Recife and expressed his surprise that Brazil kept such close company with the present Libyan regime. Sr Campos denied having information about this.
- B. (Brasilia telno:250 to FCO) 2. HM Ambassador subsequently reported on his meeting with the Brazilian Foreign Minister during which he handed over the bout de papier. The aircraft will not be released until Legal Advisers have reached a decision: they are due to resume their deliberations tomorrow. The missile will definitely not be released until the end of the hostilities. When asked whether the authorities would have impounded any Argentine military equipment transitting Brazil, the Foreign Minister said that such an action would be unlikely. HMA made the point that the impounding of the aircraft was being used as a propitiatory offering to Argentine/Brazilian relations. The Foreign Minister did not deny this. Although the Brazilians will be seriously worried by the fact that any impounding of the aircraft will have a serious effect on Anglo/Brazilian relations, HMA is not confident that they will allow the Vulcan to depart until the fighting on the Falklands has ended.
- C. (Brasilia telno.252 to FCO)

Non-Aligned Meeting : Havana

- D. (Havana telno.172 to FCO) 3. The Non-Aligned meeting has been extended by a day and will finish probably late on Saturday, 5 June. Agreement on a text on the Falklands was reached within the Latin American group only after long and difficult discussions. The draft text deploras the military operations being carried out by a large UK military contingent with US support: refers to the battle against colonialism as a basic NAM principle: and reaffirms 'solidarity with Argentina in its efforts to end an outdated colonial presence'. Attempts to establish bases in the Falklands are condemned and the US is asked to stop support for Britain. Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad entered reservations to the draft and have managed with African support to include references to Security Council Resolutions 502 and 505. The price was acceptance of the statement deploring use of veto proposed by the PLO with Cuban support. Following the UK veto in the Security Council, Cuba, Argentina and other Latin Americans stepped up pressure on the moderates.
- E. (Havana telno.003 to UKMIS New York) 4. The text is an improvement on the earlier Argentine/Cuban draft as references to UK aggression and illegal action have been removed. However all blame is laid on the UK. Highly

publicised presence of Costa Mendez with Cuban backing, Latin American pressure, crucial timing of UK veto, and exhaustion of delegates are likely to contribute to acceptance of the text when it is submitted for Ministerial approval some time later today.

HMS Hydra

- F. (Montevideo telno.432 to FCO) 5. HMS Hydra was due to enter the Port of Montevideo today in order to permit some 50 British walking wounded and stretcher cases to be repatriated to the UK. During the night HM Ambassador to Uruguay reported serious difficulties with the Uruguayans who objected, presumably at the prompting of the Argentines, to Hydra using the main navigational channel in the River Plate (jointly controlled between Argentina and Uruguay under the River Plate Treaty). More seriously the Argentines were arguing that the British wounded should be interned in Montevideo according to a legalistic interpretation of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the armed forces at sea.
- G. (Montevideo telno.433 to FCO) 6. Fortunately, Miss Hutchinson later reported that after lively negotiations through the Uruguayans both problems had now been resolved and the Argentinians had climbed down. We congratulated Miss Hutchinson on her achievement.
- H. (Montevideo telno.434 to FCO) 7. After continued pressure from HM Embassy, Washington, the State Department have instructed the American Embassy in Brasilia to raise this question with the Brazilian authorities in a low key.
- I. (FCO tel. No.339 to Montevideo) 8. The Secretary-General has sent identical messages to the Prime Minister and Galtieri putting forward a 'new' plan for ceasefire and Argentine withdrawal. Sir A Parsons comments that Points 4-7 of the Secretary-General's latest plan would draw us back into the morass from which we emerged on 20 May. Sir A Parsons recommends a reply by 8.00 pm New York time (ie. midnight Zulu, 1.00 am BST).

Arms Supplies to Argentina on the Libyan Air Bridge via Brazil

- J. (Washington telno.2042 to FCO) 7. After continued pressure from HM Embassy, Washington, the State Department have instructed the American Embassy in Brasilia to raise this question with the Brazilian authorities in a low key.

UN Secretary-General


- K. (UKMIS New York telno. 944 to FCO) 8. The Secretary-General has sent identical messages to the Prime Minister and Galtieri putting forward a 'new' plan for ceasefire and Argentine withdrawal. Sir A Parsons comments that Points 4-7 of the Secretary-General's latest plan would draw us back into the morass from which we emerged on 20 May. Sir A Parsons recommends a reply by 8.00 pm New York time (ie. midnight Zulu, 1.00 am BST).
- L. (UKMIS New York telno. 945 to FCO).

Comment

9. The NAM action is over, although a telegram of thanks to selected moderates might be in order. At leisure, we shall have to consider the implications of Brazil's attitude on the Vulcan. And we are revising our procedures on repatriation of wounded in the light of the Montevideo telegrams.

10. But the most urgent action required on overnight developments is to prepare instructions for Sir A Parsons on the Secretary-General's latest initiative. There seems little doubt that his ideas will have attractions for many, including most of our friends and Allies.

6 June 1982


R M Jackson
Emergency Unit