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TELEGRAM NO 285 OF 7 JUNE

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UKDEL VERSAILLES TEL NO 10 OF 6 JUNE: FALKLANDS:

SECURITY COUNCIL

1. AS SOON AS I WAS AWARE OF THE OUTCOME OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE OF 4 JUNE I SOUGHT AN INTERVIEW WITH VICE MINISTER SUNOBE WHOM I SAW TODAY.

2. I TOLD SUNOBE THAT ACTING ON PERSONAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOU I HAD TO EXPRESS ASTONISHMENT AND DISMAY THAT JAPAN HAD FINALLY DECIDED TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF A RESOLUTION WHICH HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION, POLAND AND PANAMA BUT NONE OF OUR FRIENDS AND THAT BY DOING SO SHE HAD ENSURED THAT THE RESOLUTION SECURED THE NECESSARY NINE VOTES TO FORCE US TO VETO. I SAID THAT HAVING EXPRESSED OUR POSITION CLEARLY AT THE TIME OF THE ORIGINAL DRAFT AND HAVING BEEN TOLD THAT THE JAPANESE WOULD ABSTAIN ON THIS I WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED BEFORE THE DECISION ON THE SUBSEQUENT ONE.

3. SUNOBE REPLIED THAT THE JAPANESE DECISION HAD FINALLY BEEN TAKEN IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH PARIS AND THAT THEIR DELEGATE'S STATEMENT HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEIR VOTE WAS LINKED TO THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ARGENTINA WOULD WITHDRAW ITS FORCES WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME. THIS AND THE EXPLICIT REFERENCE IN THE REDRAFT TO SCR 502 HAD FORMED THE BASIS FOR THE JAPANESE DECISION. SUNOBE APPEARED NOT A LITTLE EMBARRASSED HIMSELF IN HAVING TO CLING TO THIS LINE AND WAS CLEARLY DISMAYED BY THE STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH REACTION TO THE VOTE.

4. I STRESSED THAT THE VOTE HAD NOT BEEN UNDERSTOOD

SCR 572 HAD FORMED THE BASIS FOR THE JAPANESE DECISION. SUNOBE APPEARED NOT A LITTLE EMBARRASSED HIMSELF IN HAVING TO CLING TO THIS LINE AND WAS CLEARLY DISMAYED BY THE STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH REACTION TO THE VOTE.

4. I STRESSED THAT THE VOTE HAD NOT BEEN UNDERSTOOD IN BRITAIN OR BY THE PRIME MINISTER OR YOURSELF. YOU HAD RECEIVED NO ADEQUATE EXPLANATION FROM MR SUZUKI OR MR SAKURAUCHI . I SAID THAT WE HAD THEREFORE NOW ENTERED A NEW SITUATION AND THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I SAW THE NEED FOR JAPAN TO PICK UP THE PIECES. I SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THE JAPANESE MIGHT NOW REINFORCE THEIR DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINES TO COMPLY WITH SCR 572 AND WITHDRAW. ALTERNATIVELY THEY MIGHT MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT AGAIN UNDERLINING THAT NO NEW CREDITS WOULD BE GRANTED TO ARGENTINA AND THEY MIGHT EVEN NOW CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. FINALLY THEY MIGHT THINK WHETHER IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO RESPOND TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S SECOND LETTER TO MR SUKUKI (YOUR TELNO 162 OF 28 APRIL) EXPLAINING THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT POSITION SO THAT THERE COULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING.

5. ALTHOUGH THE JAPANESE EXPLANATIONS OF THEIR VOTING DECISION CONTINUE TO BE UNSATISFACTORY, THE MFA CAN NOW BE IN NO DOUBT OF YOUR STRONG FEELINGS AND OF YOUR DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THEY HAD FAILED TO REACT AFTER YOUR PERSONAL INTERVENTION WITH MR SAKURAUCHI LATE ON 4 JUNE.

CORTAZZI

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