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OO FCO (DESKBY 070300Z)

F-7 JUN 1982

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CONFIDENTIAL


DESKBY 070300Z (FCO)

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 070220Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 949 OF 6 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.



UKDEL VERSAILLES TEL NO 002 TO ME: FALKLANDS.

1. I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT 2300Z THIS EVENING (6 JUNE), I.E. ONE HOUR BEFORE HIS DEADLINE. HE HAD NOT BY THEN HEARD FROM THE ARGENTINES. DE SOTO TOLD US THAT COSTA MENDEZ RETURNED TO BUESNOS AIRES LAST NIGHT (5 JUNE) AND THAT HE THOUGHT THE ARGENTINES HAD BEEN WORKING ALL DAY ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSAL.
2. I SAID THAT YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD STUDIED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MESSAGE VERY CAREFULLY. YOU ADMIRER HIS PERSISTENCE AND THE QUALITY OF THE EFFORT HE AND HIS STAFF HAD MADE TO FIND A LAST-MINUTE SETTLEMENT. BUT FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE YOU HAD A SINGLE OBJECTIVE, NAMELY TO BRING ABOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL BY ONE WAY OR ANOTHER AND AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE GROUND WAS NOW TOO COMPLEX TO MAKE IT PRACTICABLE FOR A THIRD PARTY TO INTERVENE. YOU COULD NOT AT THIS STAGE ACCEPT AN INTEGRATED PACKAGE INVOLVING MANY OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS. NOR AT THIS STAGE COULD YOU COMMIT YOURSELVES TO ANY PROPOSITIONS ABOUT THE REDUCTION OF UK FORCES OR ABOUT LONG TERM SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE UN'S OR ANYONE ELSE'S AUSPICES. THESE WERE MATTERS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT AFTER WE HAD REPOSSESSED THE ISLANDS.
3. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE HAD BECOME DISILLUSIONED BY THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE LAST TWO MONTHS. OUR PROPOSALS OF



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3. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE HAD BECOME DISILLUSIONED BY THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE LAST TWO MONTHS. OUR PROPOSALS OF 17 MAY HAD REQUIRED YOU TO MOVE VERY FAR: THE ARGENTINE REACTION HAD INCREASED OUR DISILLUSION. MOST RECENTLY OUR COMPLETE LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE ARGENTINES HAD BEEN COMPOUNDED BY THE NON-ALIGNED COMMUNIQUE WHICH HAD JUST BEEN DRAFTED IN HAVANA. THIS HAD BEEN AN ARGENTINE TEXT. IT SHOWED ABSOLUTELY NO DISPOSITION ON ARGENTINA'S PART TO COMPROMISE. NOR HAD WE RECEIVED ANY PRIVATE INDICATION FROM THE ARGENTINES TO CORROBORATE WHAT SOME OF OUR FRIENDS WERE TELLING US ABOUT THEIR DESIRE TO CLIMB DOWN. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND YOU WERE NOT PREPARED TO TAKE ANOTHER CHANCE WHICH WOULD INVOLVE THE RISK OF RE-INVOLVING OURSELVES IN INTERMINABLE NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAD REACHED THE POINT WHERE THE ONLY PRACTICABLE WAY OF BRINGING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE AND ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WAS THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT.

4. IT WAS CLEAR THAT NONE OF THIS CAME AS ANY SURPRISE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HE SAID THAT HE HAD FELT HE HAD TO MAKE ANOTHER TRY. HIS MANDATE REMAINED IN EXISTENCE. THE WEATHER SEEMED TO HAVE IMPOSED A LULL ON THE FIGHTING IN EAST FALKLAND AND HE HAD THOUGHT THAT THIS MIGHT GIVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY. HE INDICATED THAT HE AGREED WITH MUCH THAT I HAD SAID ABOUT THE RELUCTANCE OF THE ARGENTINES TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. WHEN ROS CAME TO SAY GOODBYE YESTERDAY (5 JUNE) PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD REHEARSED THE WHOLE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH HIM AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT IN HIS (PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S) VIEW THE ARGENTINES HAD MISSED AN OPPORTUNITY.

5. DURING THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE LEBANON, MRS KIRKPATRICK ASKED ME WHETHER WE WERE GOING TO ACCEPT PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S INITIATIVE. I SAID THAT WE WERE NOT AND BRIEFLY EXPLAINED WHY. SHE REACTED GLUMLY AND SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT NOTHING WOULD DO FOR US OTHER THAN TO BUNDLE THE ARGENTINES OFF THE ISLANDS. BUT SHE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO PUT ME UNDER PRESSURE.

6. DE SOTO HAS SINCE TOLD US THAT THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE WAS NEGATIVE. HE WOULD NOT REVEAL THE DETAILS, SAYING THAT HE HAD NOT GIVEN THEM DETAILS OF OUR REPLY.

PARSONS

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