42 IMMEDIATE ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL PS (6) PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2) PS/MR 3 PS/MR ONSLOW PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE PS/PUS MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD MR BULLARD SIR I SINCLAIR PS/CHANCELLOR MR GIFFARD TREASURY MR WRIGHT MR ILETT MR LITTLER MR ADAMS LORD N GORDON LENNOX MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY LORD BRIDGES MR URE SIR R ARMSTRONG MR GILLMORE CABINET OFFICE SIR M PALLISER HD/PUSD (2) MR WADE-GERY HD/S Am D MR FULLER SAPU/DIO HD/DEFENCE D DIO HD/NEWS D HD/ERD Room 8 FOR MODUK CIN C FLEED HD/ECD(E) HD/UND HD/PLANNING STAFF HD/WED

[Passed to E.R.]
[Typists a.a.]

ADVANCE COPY

CONFI DENTI AL

EMERGENCY UNIT

RESIDENT CLERK

FM PARIS 121115Z JUN82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 620 OF 12 JUNB2



MY TELNO 616 (NOT REPEATED) : FALKLANDS: FRENCH ATTITUDE

1. IN THE COURSE OF MY CALL ON HIM YESTERDAY (11 JUNE) GUTMANN,
SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE QUAI, REITERATED FRENCH VIEWS ON THE NEED
FOR THE UK TO SHOW MAGNANIMITY AFTER THE RECAPTURE OF PORT
STANLEY.

- 2. WHEN I WARNED HIM A PROPOS OF THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE ARMS EMBARGO THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE TALKING IN TERMS OF CONTINUING HOSTILITIES AFTER PORT STANLEY, GUTMANN SAID THE FRENCH REALISED THIS. HOWEVER HE HAD TO TELL ME THAT A MOMENT WOULD COME WHEN BRITAIN MIGHT NO LONGER FIND THE SAME FRIENDLY UNDERSTANDING. HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT THE UK ATTITUDE WOULD BE AFTER PORT STANLEY. HE REFERRED TO MITTERRAND'S STATEMENT (MY TELNO 61¢) THAT THE ARGENTINES SHOULD NOT BE HUMILIATED.
- 3. I SAID WE HAD NO INTENTION OF HUMILIATING THE ARGENTINES: IT WAS SIMPLY A MATTER OF RECOVERING THE WHOLE OF THE FALKLANDS AND PREVENTING FURTHER ATTACKS ON OUR FORCES. THE QUESTION WAS

3. I SAID WE HAD NO INTENTION OF HUMILIATING THE ARGENTINES:
IT WAS SIMPLY A MATTER OF RECOVERING THE WHOLE OF THE FALKLANDS
AND PREVENTING FURTHER ATTACKS ON OUR FORCES. THE QUESTION WAS
RATHER ONE OF WHETHER THE ARGENTINES WOULD TRY TO KEEP UP THEIR
ATTACKS.

4. GUTMANN QUERIED THIS. IT OUGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR BRITAIN TO COME
TO SOME ARRANGEMENT WITH THE ARGENTINES WITHOUT DRIVING THEM BY
FORCE OFF THE LAST SQUARE METRE OF THE ISLANDS. THE ATMOSHPERE
BETWEEN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICAN COULD BE POISONED FOR YEARS
IF BRITAIN DID NOT SIEZE THE RIGHT POLITICAL MOMENT TO BEGIN
WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION. THE ARGENTINES WOULD OBTAIN INCREASING
SUPPORT. LATIN AMERICA AND THE THIRD WORLD WOULD PROGRESSIVELY
RALLY BEHIND THEM AND THE UK WOULD IN THE END BE TOTALLY
ISOLATED. I SAID THIS WAS A MISREADING OF THE SITUATION. THERE
> YEBEXSEERSDTBXXNERENOEOXEGERTTHA SABEREATERDONEDCOUNTELRES

- WHETHER WE WOULD BE READY TO NEGOTIATE ON THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLANDS, OR DID WE NOW INTEND TO KEEP THEM FOREVER? I REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE NOW THAT WE HAD PAID A HEAVY PRICE TO END THE ARGENTINE OCCUPATION.

 WE WOULD ULTIMATELY WANT A MODUS VIVENDI IN THE REGION BUT I COULD NOT FORESEE THE FORM OR CONTENT OF AN EVENTUAL NEGOTIATION. GUTMANN COMMENTED THAT IT WAS A MISTAGE TO TRY TO DECIDE IN ADVANCE WHAT WOULD EMERGE FROM A NEGOTIATION: THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO START TALKING. DORIN ALLUDED TO OUR INTENTION TO HOLD ARGENTINE PRISONERS UNTIL A CEASE-FIRE AND ASKED IF WE DID NOT FEAR THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD RETALIATE BY HOLDING BRITISH SUBJECTS IN ARGENTINA. I SAID THAT I HOPED THE REGIME WOULD STILL HAVE SUFFICIENT CONCERN FOR ITS INTERNATIONAL POPULATION TO REFRAIM FROM TAKING CIVILAN HOSTAGES.
 - 6. GUTHANN REPEATED THAT THE UK MUST NOT HUMILIATE THE ARGENTINES. WHAT BRITAIN SAID AND DID AFTER RECOVERING PORT STANLEY WOULD BE CRUCIAL.
 - 7. COMMENT. THE DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISER AT THE ELYSEE HAD SPOKEN TO US IN SIMILAR TERMS ON 1¢ JUNE. THERE IS CLEARLY A FEELING ABROAD, WHICH IS NOT LIMITED TO THE QUAI, THAT BRITAIN SHOULD CALL A HALT TO THE FIGHTING AFTER PORT STANLEY AND THEN INITIATE SOME FORM OF NEGOTIATION WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CONCESSIONS ON SOVERIEGNTY. THERE IS ALSO A DISPOSITION TO ACCEPT THE ARGENTINE CASE ON SOVERIEGNTY AND TO REGARD AN EVENTUAL TRANSFER EVEN NOW AS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME. THE POINTS I PUT TO GUTMANN

7. COMMENT, THE DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISER AT THE ELYSEE HAD SPOKEN TO US IN SIMILAR TERMS ON 16 JUNE. THERE IS CLEARLY A FEELING ABROAD, WHICH IS NOT LIMITED TO THE QUAI, THAT BRITAIN SHOULD CALL A HALT TO THE FIGHTING AFTER PORT STANLEY AND THEN INITIATE SOME FORM OF NEGOTIATION WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CONCESSIONS ON SOVERIEGNTY. THERE IS ALSO A DISPOSITION TO ACCEPT THE ARGENTINE CASE ON SOVERIEGNTY AND TO REGARD AN EVENTUAL TRANSFER EVEN NOW AS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME. THE POINTS I PUT TO GUTMANN SHOULD HAVE MADE SOME IMPRESSION ON HIM BUT WE MUST EXPECT THE FRENCH TO CONTUNUE TO ARGUE FOR EARLY FACE—SAVING CONCESSIONS.

8. I DO NOT THINK WE CAN AVOID DETAILED ARGUMENT ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY FOR MUCH LONGER. IT WOULD BE HEPLFUL TO HAVE IN RESERVE A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORICAL DOSSIER WHICH WE CAN DRAW ON AS NECESSARY TO REFUTE ARGENTINE ARGUMENTS WHICH EVIDENTLY COMMAND SOME FRENCH SYMPATHY. WE CAN MAKE THE OBVIOUS DEBATING POINTS ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO FRENCH AND OTHER FRONTIERS IF THE HISTORY OF THE LAST 15¢ YEARS WERE BRUSHED ASIDE, BUT DOCUMENTATION FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO 1833 MAY ALSO BE REQUIRED.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT AT 121207Z SM/DA

CAN I HAVE A RERUN OF PARA 4. LINE 10 TO PARA 5. PSE KKK

YUPP TIC

WERE SIGNS THAT EVEN SOME OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WERE TAKING THEIR DISTANCE NOW ARGENTINA'S DEFEAT LOOKED

5. DORIN, DIRECTOR FOR THE AMERICAS, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT ASKED

ETC ETC OK K

THATS GREAT TA KK