

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (40)

PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PMS ← PS/MR RIFKIND

SIR J BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N GORDON LENNOX
LORD BRIDGES
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

HD/PUSD (2)
HD/S A & D
HD/DEFENCE D
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/BCD (E)
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF

Ha WED
EMERGENCY UNIT ✓
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }
MR ILETT } TREASURY
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY }
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }
DIO }

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

RR TRAFFIC RELAY

GRS 410
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN 161713Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 575 OF 16 JUNE
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO ATHENS
UKREP BRUSSELS EMBASSY BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE DUBLIN
LUXEMBOURG PARIS ROME
INFO SAVING OTTAWA TOKYO CANBERRA WELLINGTON OSLO UKMIS GENEVA
BERNE

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 049: FALKLANDS: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

1. THIS MESSAGE WAS DELIVERED LAST NIGHT, BUT THE GERMANS HAVE NOT YET TAKEN ANY DECISION.

2. AS I TOLD MALLABY BY TELEPHONE, I WAS CONCERNED THAT THE GERMANS MIGHT TURN OUR MESSAGE ON ITS HEAD AND ARGUE THAT WE WERE ENDEAVOURING TO USE THE PLIGHT OF THE PRISONERS TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL ENDS. IN A LONG TELEPHONE CONVERSATION I HAVE HAD WITH GORENFLOS, MFA DEPUTY SECRETARY RESPONSIBLE FOR LATIN AMERICA, THIS VIEW WAS UNFORTUNATELY MORE THAN CONFIRMED. HE ARGUED THAT, APART FROM OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE GENEVA AGREEMENT, WE WOULD SURELY NOT BE PREPARED TO ALLOW THE ARGENTINES TO DIE OF EXPOSURE OR MALNUTRITION IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL OBJECTIVE.

AND THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD NEVER ATTACK ANY SHIP THAT WE MIGHT USE TO TRANSPORT ARGENTINE PRISONERS HOME. HE SAID THAT, AS PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD TOLD SCHMIDT IN NEW YORK, IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THE ARGENTINE JUNTA TO TAKE A DECISION ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AT PRESENT: THEY WERE NOT CAPABLE OF DECISION. HE ALSO NAUSEATINGLY REPEATED THE

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ABOUT MAGNAMINITY IN VICTORY.

3. I REBUTTED ALL THESE ARGUMENTS STRONGLY, EMPHASISING THAT THE COMMANDER WAS FACING AN EMERGENCY SITUATION AND THAT WE WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE FOOD AND SHELTER FOR THE UNEXPECTEDLY VAST NUMBER OF PRISONERS; THAT WE COULD NOT RISK SENDING SHIPS TO TAKE OFF PRISONERS WHILE THE ARGENTINES REFUSED TO GIVE ANY UNDERTAKING CONCERNING THEIR SAFETY AND THAT THE SITUATION WAS SO BAD AND URGENT THAT EVEN LEAVING OTHER POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS APART, WE WOULD CERTAINLY NOT NOW START NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THIS ISSUE. I DOUBTED WHETHER THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT GAVE A DAMN ABOUT THE FATE OF THEIR PRISONERS: THEY WOULD PROBABLY BE HAPPY TO EXPLOIT THEIR PLIGHT IF THEY COULD. WHAT WE LOOKED FOR WAS HELP FROM OUR ALLIES TO PERSUADE THE ARGENTINES TO MAKE POSSIBLE A REPATRIATION OF THE CONSCRIPTS WHO WERE IN A TERRIBLE STATE. I CANNOT SAY HOW MUCH OF AN IMPRESSION I MADE BUT AT LEAST I INCULCATED A SENSE OF URGENCY.

4. WE HAVE LEARNT ON A PERSONAL BASIS FROM A SOURCE IN THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE THAT DISCUSSION AT THE FEDERAL CABINET THIS MORNING DID NOT ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE PRISONERS, BUT CONCENTRATED ON THE REFERENCE IN HMG'S MESSAGE TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT (YOUR TELNO 147 TO BRUSSELS) TO GETTING OUR PARTNERS TO BRING ECONOMIC MEASURES TO AN END WHEN HOSTILITIES WERE ENDED. IT APPEARS THAT MINISTERS WERE UPSET BY THIS PASSAGE, AND THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT IT.
FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

TAYLOR

NNNN

SENT AT 161810Z LCD