

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

(46(38)) ADVANCE COPY

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MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

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MR ILETT } TREASURY
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE
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MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }
DIO }

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RESIDENT CLERK

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MEXICO CITY 160030Z JUNE 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 480 OF 15 JUNE

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BRASILIA

MY TELELETTER OF 8 JUNE TO WHITE (NOT TO ALL): MEXICO AND THE FALKLANDS.

1. I SAW MANUEL TELLO (DEPUTY MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER) THIS MORNING. HE HOPED THAT SUCH COUNTRIES AS VENEZUELA AND GUATEMALA WITH TERRITORIAL CLAIMS HAD TAKEN NOTE OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN THE FALKLANDS.

2. TELLO SAID THAT THE MEXICANS WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR ANY INDICATION OF OUR THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS.

I SAID THAT ONCE HOSTILITIES HAD STOPPED, WE WOULD FIRST HAVE TO CLEAR UP THE MESS LEFT BY THE ARGENTINES, AND RESTORE THE ISLANDERS' DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. A SUBSTANTIAL BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE WOULD CLEARLY BE NECESSARY. WE DID NOT KNOW WHAT ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE DIRECTING WHAT ARGENTINE POLICY EVEN A WEEK FROM NOW.

3. TELLO SUPPOSED WE WOULD NOT WISH TO MAINTAIN A SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY PRESENCE FOR LONG. IN HIS VIEW TO BRING IN THE AMERICANS AND ESTABLISH A MILITARY BASE IN THE ISLANDS WOULD BE (AS HE HAD SAID TO ME BEFORE) "A HISTORIC ERROR" BOTH FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR BRITAIN IN THEIR FUTURE RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA. THE IDEA OF A WIDER BASED FORCE TO GUARANTEE THE INTEGRITY OF THE ISLANDS BRISTLED WITH DIFFICULTIES. IF SUCH A FORCE WERE TO HAVE INTERNATIONAL BACKING, OR BETTER STILL OPERATE UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUTHORITY, IT WOULD NEED AT LEAST THE ACQUIESCENCE OF ARGENTINA AND HER FRIENDS. IN OTHER WORDS SOME FORM OF NEGOTIATION INVOLVING ARGENTINA WOULD BE NECESSARY SOONER OR LATER. THE CHOICE WAS BETWEEN RESUMPTION OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK. THE LATTER WOULD BE PREFERABLE AS IT WOULD ITSELF ACT AS A DETERRENT TO FUTURE ARGENTINE MILITARY ACTIONS.

4. I SAID THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO THINK ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES. THEY HAD CAUSED THE LOSS OF MANY LIVES, WASTED VAST RESOURCES AND DONE ENORMOUS DAMAGE. WE WERE MORE INCLINED TO SEND THEM THE BILL THAN TO JOIN THEM IN A COSY CHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE. WE ACCEPTED FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE ISLANDS, IF NECESSARY ON OUR OWN, BUT WOULD NOT RULE OUT ASSOCIATING OTHER COUNTRIES. TELLO SAID THAT MEXICO WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO A MULTINATIONAL FORCE. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES THE BRAZILIANS MIGHT BE WILLING TO DO SO.

5 I LATER GAVE TELLO THE TEXT OF YOUR MESSAGE TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ON THE CEASEFIRE (YOUR TELNOS 147 + 148 TO LIMA). HE PROMISED TO CONVEY IT IMMEDIATELY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER. THE MEXICANS WOULD CONSIDER URGENTLY WHAT ACTION THEY COULD TAKE TO HELP.

TICKELL

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