

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES.

(47)

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO]

[TYPISTS]

IMMEDIATE

PS
 PS/MR HURD ← ps/M' RIFKIND
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/LORD BELSTEAD
 PS/PUS
 SIR J BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR GILLMORE
 MR URE
 MR BARRETT
 HD/S AM D
 HD/DEF D
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 HD/UND
 ED/NEWS D
 HD/ERD
 HD/PUSD
 MR REED, PUSD
 (EMERGENCY ROOM)
 RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)~~
 PS/S OF S DEFENCE
 PS/HOME SECRETARY
 PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)
 PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
 PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
 PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
 PS/SIR M PALLISER
 PS/SIR A DUFF
 MR WADE-GERY
 MR FULLER
 MR COLVIN
 MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-
 MENTS STAFF
 DIO
 MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
 DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CABINET
OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 190240Z JUN 82
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1024 OF 18 JUNE 1982
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. AT MIDDAY TODAY (18 JUNE) REUTERS CARRIED A REPORT FROM BUENOS AIRES THAT ARGENTINA HAD ASKED THE UNITED NATIONS TO NEGOTIATE A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES. AS FAR AS WE CAN DISCOVER HERE, THIS IS A REFERENCE TO THE LATEST IN THE SERIES OF LETTERS THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA (LISTRE) HAS BEEN SENDING TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. A SUMMARY TRANSLATION IS IN MIFT. I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS IS EVIDENCE OF A DECISION BY THE ARGENTINES TO RETURN TO THE COUNCIL; IT CONTAINS A LOT OF RHETORIC AND NO SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR A COUNCIL MEETING. LISTRE HAS NOT SEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. NOR DO I THINK THAT THE TWO PARAGRAPHS RELATING TO A CESSATIONS OF HOSTILITIES AMOUNT TO ANYTHING NEW.

2. I HAD IN ANY CASE BEEN INTENDING TO SEE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TODAY TO EXPLAIN TO HIM, WITH BRUTAL FRANKNESS, THE IMPOSSIBILITY

... INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES AT

2. I HAD IN ANY CASE BEEN INTENDING TO SEE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TODAY TO EXPLAIN TO HIM, WITH BRUTAL FRANKNESS, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF OUR AGREEING TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES AT PRESENT. I HAD HEARD THAT HE HAD BEEN DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF REOPENING NEGOTIATIONS DURING CALLS HE HAD RECEIVED FROM HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS ETC IN CONNEXION WITH UNSSD II AND THAT HE HAD RECEIVED SOME ENCOURAGEMENT. E.G. FROM SCHMIDT.

3. I SAW HIM TWICE THIS EVENING DURING THE COUNCIL'S PROCEEDINGS ON LEBANON. I TOLD HIM THAT, IN ADVANCE OF THE PM'S VISIT, I WANTED TO SPEAK TO HIM. I WOULD NOT MINCE MY WORDS. BRITAIN AND THE ISLANDERS HAD GONE THROUGH A VERY TESTING EXPERIENCE. THERE HAD BEEN AN UNPROVOKED INVASION, THE ARGENTINES HAD REFUSED OR EVADED ALL ATTEMPTS TO GET THEM TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502 PEACEFULLY. WE HAD HAD TO FIGHT. WE HAD SUFFERED SIGNIFICANT HUMAN LOSSES AND LOSSES OF MATERIAL IN MAKING A MONUMENTAL EFFORT WHICH HAD CAUGHT THE IMAGINATION OF THE WHOLE COUNTRY. THE ISLANDERS HAD HAD AN APPALLING EXPERIENCE, DETAILS OF WHICH WERE NOW BEGINNING TO EMERGE. WE HAD BEEN OBLIGED FULLY TO DEFEAT THE ARGENTINES IN THE FIELD IN ORDER TO REPOSSESS THE ISLANDS. EVEN THEN THE ARGENTINES HAD SHOWN AN INDIFFERENCE TO THE WELLBEING OF THEIR OWN TROOPS WHICH HAD FURTHER REVOLTED BRITISH OPINION.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND IT WAS ABSOLUTELY AND TOTALLY OUT OF THE QUESTION THAT WE SHOULD SIT DOWN TO DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES THROUGH ANY THIRD PARTY IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS OR ANYTHING ELSE. THIS REPRESENTED NOT JUST THE FIRM VIEW OF MY GOVERNMENT BUT THE STRONGLY HELD VIEW OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE AS A WHOLE. IT WAS NO GOOD TALKING OF EXCHANGING A FULL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES FOR AN OPENING OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. IF WE COULD NOT GET AN UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES OUT OF ARGENTINA, WE WOULD HAVE TO LIVE WITH THIS. IF ANYONE BROUGHT A RESOLUTION TO THE COUNCIL PROPOSING A START OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. I WAS IN NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER THAT WE WOULD VETO IT, HOWEVER HARD THIS MIGHT LOOK IN UN TERMS. WHAT WE NOW NEEDED WAS A LONG COOLING OFF PERIOD WITH NO OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE WHILE WE RESTORED NORMAL LIFE TO THE ISLANDS.

5. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WELL UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION. HIS PROBLEM WAS THAT HE HAD A MANDATE AND COULD NOT SIMPLY IGNORE IT. HE WOULD HAVE TO SAY SO TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND ASK HER HOW LONG SHE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BEFORE WE COULD CONTEMPLATE ANY KIND OF NEGOTIATION. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE ARGENTINES (HE, LIKE ME, REGARDED LISTRE'S LATEST NOTE - MIET - AS RHETORIC) NOR FROM ANYONE ELSE IN THE

UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE ARGENTINES (HE, LIKE ME, REGARDED LISTRE'S LATEST NOTE - MIFT - AS RHETORIC) NOR FROM ANYONE ELSE IN THE COUNCIL. BUT THERE WAS NO KNOWING WHEN SOMEONE E.G. THE RUSSIANS, PANAMA, SPAIN, WOULD ASK HIM WHAT HE WAS DOING ABOUT HIS MANDATE. HE ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD NOT SPRING ANY SURPRISES ON US. HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THE WHOLE SUBJECT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

6. I TOLD URQUHART AFTERWARDS OF THE ABOVE CONVERSATION. HE SAID THAT HE WAS GLAD I HAD SPOKEN AS I HAD. HE HAD BEEN PRESENT AT ALL PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S RECENT MEETINGS. A NUMBER OF VISITORS, INCLUDING REAGAN/HAIG, SCHMIDT (RATHER OFFENSIVELY TO US), AND TRUDEAU HAD BEEN WRINGING THEIR HANDS ABOUT THE NEED TO HEAL THE BREACH BETWEEN THE WEST AND LATIN AMERICA AND ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE BRITISH TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY ETC. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD TOLD EACH OF THEM THAT, IN HIS JUDGEMENT, THE ARGENTINES HAD BEEN IN THE WRONG FROM THE START, THAT THEY HAD BEEN VASTLY MISTAKEN NOT TO ACCEPT OUR OFFER OF 17 MAY "WHICH INVOLVED MAJOR CONCESSIONS WHICH HE KNEW WE HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO MAKE", THAT ARGENTINA HAD WRECKED HIS NEGOTIATIONS, THUS LEAVING US NO CHOICE BUT TO REPOSSESS THE ISLANDS BY FORCE.

7. SINCE DRAFTING THE ABOVE I HAVE SEEN WASHINGTON TELNO 2190 WHICH REINFORCES MY JUDGEMENT THAT THE TIME HAD COME TO SPEAK PLAINLY TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR.

PARSONS

NNNN