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CONFIDENTIAL

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IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1036 OF 21 JUNE 1982  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: FALKLANDS

1. MANY OF THE PRESSMEN AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE AT MIDDAY ON 23 JUNE WILL BE UN SPECIALISTS AND THEY MAY INCLUDE SOME ARGENTINES. THEY WILL PROBABLY CONCENTRATE THEIR QUESTIONS ON THE UN ASPECTS OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. THERE ARE THREE POINTS ON WHICH THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS:

- (A) THE PRESENT STATUS OF SCR 502;
- (B) OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE ARGENTINE LETTER OF 18 JUNE;
- (C) THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MANDATE UNDER SCR 505.

NEGOTIATIONS UNDER SCR 502

2. THE LINE OF QUESTIONING HERE WILL BE THAT SCR 502, WHICH WAS DRAFTED BY THE UK, REMAINS IN FORCE AND IS MANDATORY. SUCH RESOLUTIONS CANNOT BE UNILATERALLY TAKEN OFF THE TABLE. HOW THEREFORE CAN WE JUSTIFY OUR REFUSAL TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS AS CALLED FOR BY OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3? THE MAIN POINTS TO BE MADE IN REPLY ARE CONTAINED IN YOUR GUIDANCE TELNO 133. BUT IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE UNILATERALLY "TEARING UP" SCR 502. HER LINE MIGHT BE THAT OF COURSE WE WANT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO OUR DIFFERENCES WITH ARGENTINA. BUT SCR 502 LAYS DOWN NO TIMETABLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AND IT WAS NOT WE WHO BROKE OFF THE PREVIOUS DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS, NOR WE WHO REFUSED TO IMPLEMENT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF SCR 502, NOR WE WHO ARE NOW REFUSING TO CEASE HOSTILITIES AS REQUIRED BY OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1. THE PRIME MINISTER COULD GO ON TO MAKE THE POINTS ABOUT ITS BEING UNREALISTIC, AFTER ALL THAT HAS HAPPENED, TO EXPECT US TO SIT DOWN AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH THE ARGENTINES AT THIS TIME: THE SITUATION HAS RADICALLY CHANGED SINCE 3 APRIL BECAUSE OF ARGENTINE'S REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW AS DEMANDED BY THE RESOLUTION. BUT I RECOMMEND THAT SHE SHOULD AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT RESUMPTION OF THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS IS RULED OUT FOR ALL TIME. AN APPARENT REJECTION BY US OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER SCR 502 WOULD PUT A WEAPON IN OUR ENEMIES' HANDS IN NEW YORK AND COULD EVEN PRECIPITATE AN EARLY RETURN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, LEADING POSSIBLE TO A FURTHER VETO OR VEToes. BETTER

... WOULD EVEN PRECIPITATE AN EARLY RETURN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, LEADING POSSIBLE TO A FURTHER VETO OR VEToes. BETTER TO AVOID THIS IF POSSIBLE.

ARGENTINE LETTER OF 18 JUNE.

3. AS REPORTED IN MY TELNO 1031, THE ARGENTINES ARE MOUNTING A PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN OVER THEIR LETTER. IT MAY BE PUT TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THIS CONSTITUTED AN UNDERTAKING BY THE ARGENTINES TO CEASE HOSTILITIES AND THAT IT IS UNREASONABLE THEREFORE FOR US TO CONTINUE TO INSIST ON A FURTHER SUCH UNDERTAKING BEFORE LIFTING THE EXCLUSION ZONES, ETC. I RECOMMEND THAT IN REPLY THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD POINT UP THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE ARGENTINE LETTER ("DE FACTO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES") AND PARAGRAPH 11 ("TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES"). IN PARAGRAPH 11 THE ARGENTINES SPECIFY CONDITIONS FOR A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES) WHICH ARE TOTAL UNACCEPTABLE. THE ARGENTINES KNOW THAT IF THEY UNEQUIVOCALLY AGREE TO CEASE HOSTILITIES WE WILL LIFT THE EXCLUSION ZONES AND OUR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THAT IS THE ONLY QUID PRO QUO ON OFFER. WE CANNOT ACCEPT THEIR NOTE, HEDGED AROUND AS IT IS WITH TENDENTIOUS RHETORIC, AMBIGUITIES AND UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS, AS A SURE GUARANTEE THAT THEY ACCEPT A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

SECRETARY GENERAL'S MANDATE

4. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE ASKED WHAT VIEW WE NOW TAKE OF THE MANDATE GIVEN TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL BY SCR 505 AND WHETHER WE ARE EXPECTING FURTHER INITIATIVES BY HIM. BY THE TIME OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THE PRIME MINISTER WILL HAVE HAD HER MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL. I RECOMMEND THAT AT THE END OF IT SHE AND PEREZ DE CUELLAR SHOULD AGREE ON A LINE TO TAKE WITH THE PRESS ABOUT THEIR CONVERSATION.

PARSONS

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