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PS/ NO. 10. DOWNING STREET.

FM MEXICO CITY 132200Z JULY 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 549 OF 13 JULY

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BRASILIA, CARACAS, BOGOTA, QUITO, LIMA, SANTIAGO, LA PAZ, MONTEVIDEO, ASUNCION, PANAMA CITY, SAN JOSE, TEGICIGALPA.

MY TELNO 542: MEXICAN INITIATIVE ON FALKLANDS

1. TODAY MANUEL TELLO (MEXICAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER) GAVE ME AN ACCOUNT OF THE VISIT OF THE TWO ARGENTINE EMISSARIES (LISTRE AND QUIJANO) TO MEXICO ON 12 JULY. THE TEXT OF A COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED BY THE MEXICAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS IN MIFT.
2. TELLO SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESENT AT ALL THE MEETINGS WITH THE ARGENTINES EXCEPT THAT WITH THE PRESIDENT WHICH HAD BEEN FORMAL IN CHARACTER. QUIJANO AND LISTRE HAD THROUGHOUT SHOWN THEMSELVES TO BE REASONABLE AND REALISTIC MEN. THEY HAD MADE NO ATTEMPT TO BEEF UP THE MEXICAN PROPOSAL FOR A GENERAL ASSEMBLY ITEM ON THE FALKLANDS WITH REFERENCES TO BRITISH COLONIALISM OR ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS, AND HAD DECLARED THEMSELVES FULLY CONTENT WITH MEXICAN TACTICS. TELLO EXPLAINED THAT THESE WERE TO GET ALL LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS TO SIGN A LETTER CALLING FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK. THIS LETTER WOULD BE DELIVERED TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL BEFORE 21 AUGUST. THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE TO DRAFT SOME EQUALLY NON-COMMITTAL RESOLUTION (TELLO ACKNOWLEDGED THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT) WHICH COULD BE APPROVED BY A SOLID MAJORITY IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
3. TELLO SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES CLEARLY HOPED THAT THESE TACTICS WOULD NOT MEET WITH OUTRIGHT BRITISH OPPOSITION. IN THIS RESPECT QUIJANO HAD REFERRED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR TODAY. TELLO ADDED THAT SOONER OR LATER WE WOULD HAVE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE ARGENTINES OVER THE FALKLANDS, AND THAT IF THIS DANGEROUS PROBLEM WERE TO BE RESOLVED THE MEXICANS BELIEVED THAT THEIR APPROACH WAS THE BEST AVAILABLE. NO ONE EXPECTED RESULTS SOON: THEY WOULD PROBABLY TAKE YEARS.
4. I ASKED WHETHER THE ARGENTINE EMISSARIES HAD GIVEN ANY INDICATION OF WHAT THEY THOUGHT ANGLO/ARGENTINE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE ABOUT. AS TELLO WELL KNEW, OUR OWN PRIORITIES WERE QUITE DIFFERENT, AND THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF OUR DISCUSSING SOVEREIGNTY WITH THE ARGENTINES. ONE DAY WE MIGHT BE READY TO TALK TO THE ARGENTINES ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FALKLANDS AND ARGENTINA, IF ONLY TO PICK UP THE BITS OF WHAT HAD BEEN BROKEN BY THE ARGENTINE INVASION. TELLO REPLIED THAT QUIJANO AND LISTRE HAD NOT MENTIONED ANY PRE-CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATION. THEY HAD NOT OF COURSE RENOUNCED THEIR OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS, BUT THEY WERE REALISTIC ENOUGH TO KNOW THAT THIS

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WAS NOT A SUBJECT WHICH THE BRITISH WOULD DISCUSS. WHEN I REPEATED MY QUESTION ABOUT AN AGENDA, TELLO MENTIONED THE QUOTE NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS UNQUOTE TO WHICH I HAD REFERRED, AND ADDED THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME FORM OF UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT OR TRUSTEESHIP OVER THE ISLANDS. WHEN I SAID I SAW NO MORE PROSPECT OF OUR DISCUSSING THAT THAN SOVEREIGNTY, HE SAID THAT THE MAIN THING WAS TO GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. THE STING HAD TO BE DRAWN FROM A DISPUTE WITH IMPLICATIONS NOT ONLY FOR BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA BUT FOR HEMISPHERIC RELATIONS AS A WHOLE.

5. I ASKED WHETHER THE MEXICANS HAD ANY NEWS OF THE ATTITUDE OF OTHER LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS. HE SAID THAT THE RESULT OF THE MEETING WITH THE ARGENTINES YESTERDAY SHOULD RALLY THE WAIVERERS BEHIND THE MEXICAN INITIATIVE. HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT ALL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WOULD NOW AGREE TO GO FORWARD.

6. I REMARKED THAT THE LATEST DECLARATIONS FROM BUENOS AIRES WERE MUCH LESS REASONABLE THAN THE LINE TAKEN BY QUIJANO AND LISTRE. ALTHOUGH WE WERE NOW RETURNING THE PRISONERS, THE ARGENTINES STILL SEEMED TO BE TALKING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH TROOPS FROM THE ISLANDS AS A CONDITION FOR FULL ABANDONMENT OF HOSTILITIES. TELLO SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN ANY SUCH DECLARATIONS (THEY ARE IN THE MEXICAN PRESS THIS MORNING): BUT HE COULD NOT EXCLUDE AN ARGENTINE CAMPAIGN FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY. FOR EXAMPLE HE THOUGHT THEY MIGHT TRY HARD TO GET SOME ENDORSEMENT OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY AT THE MEETING OF NON-ALIGNED HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. THIS WOULD THEN FORTIFY THEIR POSITION AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY LATER THAT MONTH.

7. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

TICKELL

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