

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N G LENNOX
LORD BRIDGES
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

HD/PUSD (2)
HD/S AM D
HD/FALKLANDS UNIT (2)
HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/ERD
HD/ECD(E)
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR)
MR ILETT) TREASURY
MR LITTLER)
MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
SIR M PALLISER)
MR A D S GOODALL) CABINET OFFICE
DIO)

ROOM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

Mr. COLIN ROTH, LAEPD, ODA
Mr. BORDEN, LAEPD, ODA

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BRASILIA 14:2205Z JUL 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 319 OF 14 JULY

MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. IN THE COURSE OF MY CONVERSATION WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON ABOUT THE MEXICAN INITIATIVE ON THE FALKLANDS, I ASKED HIM HOW THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT VIEWED THE BALANCE SHEET OF THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT.
2. GUERREIRO SAID THAT THINGS HAD NOT TURNED OUT AS BADLY IN ARGENTINA AS THEY HAD FEARED. THEY HAD BEEN APPREHENSIVE THAT THINGS WOULD SPIN OUT OF CONTROL AND THAT SOME LEFT-WING POPULIST OR NEO-PERONIST REGIME MIGHT TAKE OVER IN ARGENTINA, WITH HORRENDOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR EVERYBODY. THE PRESENT ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT SEEMED TO BE THE LEAST BAD SOLUTION THAT ONE COULD POSSIBLY HAVE HOPED FOR.
3. TURNING TO THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, GUERREIRO SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD BEEN MISGUIDED IN PLACING TOO MUCH FAITH IN THE EFFICACY OF THE TIAR. THE TREATY MIGHT CONCEIVABLY OFFER SOME PROTECTION TO THE SMALL FRY IN CENTRAL AMERICA IF THEY GOT INTO COLLISION WITH THEIR NEIGHBOURS. BUT IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO

~~SOME PROTECTION TO THE SMALL FRY IN CENTRAL AMERICA IF THEY GOT~~
INTO COLLISION WITH THEIR NEIGHBOURS: BUT IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO
SUPPOSE THAT IT COULD AFFORD ANY PROTECTION TO THE BIG BOYS LIKE
BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA, WHO COULD NOT CONCEIVABLY COME UNDER THREAT
OF AGGRESSION FROM THEIR NEIGHBOURS (SIC). THE FALKLANDS
CONFLICT HAD NOT DAMAGED THE TIAR: IT HAD MERELY SHOWN UP ITS
THREADBARE CHARACTER.

4. I THEN ASKED THE MINISTER WHETHER HE THOUGHT THAT RELATIONS
BETWEEN BRAZIL AND BRITAIN HAD BEEN AFFECTED BY THE CONFLICT.
HE SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT, IN ANY SUBSTANTIVE DEGREE. OF COURSE,
THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT HAD VIEWED THE MATTER FROM A DIFFERENT
STANDPOINT TO THAT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT: BUT THEY HAD BEEN
AT PAINS TO KEEP COOL HEADS AND VIEW THE DISPUTE WITHOUT EMOTION.
I SAID THAT, FOR MY PART, I SHARED THE MINISTER'S VIEW. FAR FROM
BEING IMPAIRED, I THOUGHT THAT OUR RELATIONS HAD STOOD THE
OCCASIONAL STRESSES AND STRAINS VERY WELL. FOR THE FUTURE,
WE MUST ALL HOPE THAT THE UPWARD CURVE IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS-
SHIP WHICH HAD MATERIALISED IN THE MONTHS PRECEDING THE
ARGENTINE INVASION OF 2 APRIL COULD BE RESUMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
GUERREIRO SEEMED DISPOSED TO AGREE WITH THIS, THOUGH HE ADDED THE
CAVEAT THAT WE WOULD DO WELL TO AVOID ANY OVER-DRAMATIC
INITIATIVE IN THE COMING MONTHS (MY TELNO 289 REFERS).
5. OUR CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO THE PROPOSED VISIT BY
MR ONSLOW (SEE MIFT).

HARDING

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SENT/RECD AT 14:2305Z AD/RR