

CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 241800Z
FM LUANDA 241510Z AUG 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 411 OF 24 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK MAPUTO

ANGOLA/NAMIBIA/CUBA: PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

1. PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS SUMMONED ME TODAY FOR 45 MINUTES ALONE EXCEPT FOR AN INTERPRETER.
2. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AND THE AMBASSADOR'S SPECIAL RETURN TO DELIVER IT. HE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO TRANSMIT THE REPLY TO MR KENNEDY BUT IN VIEW OF THE URGENCY OF WHAT HE HAD TO SAY HAD SUMMONED ME.
3. HE COMMENTED ON NEW YORK. INDICATIONS THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE AND THAT ONLY TWO MAIN ISSUES REMAINED: THE ELECTION SYSTEM AND DATE FOR A CEASEFIRE. ALL OTHERS HAD BEEN AGREED WITH SOUTH AFRICA ACCORDING TO THE CONTACT GROUP. THIS WAS POSITIVE NEWS. BUT ACCORDING TO INDICATIONS RECEIVED DISCUSSIONS ON IMPLEMENTATION WOULD NOT GO FORWARD WITHOUT A SOLUTION TO THE PRESENCE OF CUBANS IN ANGOLA. IN THAT CONTEXT THE ANGOLANS HAD HAD RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR WISNER AND THE PRESIDENT HAD ALSO DISCUSSED THIS IN MAPUTO THE DAY BEFORE WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL. BECAUSE MACHEL HAD RECEIVED MESSAGES FROM THE U S AND BRITAIN ABOUT THE CUBAN PRESENCE HE WOULD ALSO BE CONTACTING HEADS OF U S AND BRITISH MISSIONS IN MAPUTO. ON THE CUBAN ISSUE ANGOLA'S STAND WAS VERY CLEAR AND HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO THE AMBASSADOR WHEN HE HAD BROUGHT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE.
4. PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS WISHED ME TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING TO THE PRIME MINISTER.
5. ANGOLA DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY AN ISSUE WAS BEING MADE OF WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS. WHY HAD IT BEEN TRANSPOSED INTO A PROBLEM? IN ANGOLA'S VIEW THERE NEVER HAD BEEN A PROBLEM. ANGOLA HAD NEVER SAID THAT THE CUBANS WOULD NEVER LEAVE. THE CUBANS THEMSELVES HAD ALSO NEVER SAID THAT. FOR ANGOLA THE ISSUE HAD NEVER BEEN A PROBLEM BECAUSE THEY HAD NEVER BEEN ALLOWED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE IN PEACE. WHENEVER ANGOLA HAD INTENDED TO REDUCE CUBAN FORCES SOUTH AFRICA HAD INTENSIFIED MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS HAD HAPPENED IN 1976 IN PRESIDENT NETO'S TIME WHEN THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD INTENSIFIED AGRESSION WHEN HE WAS TALKING TO CASTRO. IN 1980 AFTER A PROGRAMME OF WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH CUBA SOUTH AFRICA HAD ATTACKED LUBANGO.
7. IN THIS STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS ANGOLA OF COURSE LACKED CONFIDENCE BECAUSE OF SUCH PAST ATTACKS. WHO COULD ASSURE ANGOLA TODAY AGAINST ATTACK?
8. ANGOLA OBSERVED THAT NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT HAD ADVANCED TO SUCH A STAGE THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. ANGOLA WAS READY TO GIVE HER FULLEST CONTRIBUTION, EG AS REGARDS SWAPO AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 435. IF THIS HAPPENED A NEW SITUATION WOULD BE REACHED.

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9. THE ANGOLANS HAD SAID TO THE RECENT U S DELEGATION THAT UNDER THE NEW CONDITIONS DURING PHASE III ANGOLA COULD CONSIDER MAKING A FIRST WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS, EG WHEN SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN NAMIBIA WERE REDUCED TO 1500 AND THE OTHERS HAD WITHDRAWN SOUTH OF THE ORANGE RIVER. AS REGARDS THE REMAINDER OF CUBAN TROOPS THAT WOULD DEPEND ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE SITUATION. THERE WOULD BE U N TROOPS IN NAMIBIA AND A COMPLICATED SITUATION: ANGOLA DID NOT KNOW HOW THE SITUATION WOULD DEVELOP ALTHOUGH THEY WANTED EVERYTHING TONO GO WELL.

10. SECONDLY THEY HAD DISCUSSED WALVIS BAY WITH THE AMERICANS. ANGOLA ACCEPTED THAT IT WOULD BE A SOUTH AFRICAN ENCLAVE POST INDEPENDENCE BUT WANTED TO BE SURE THAT NO FORCES FROM THERE WOULD ATTACK ANGOLA. THE FACT WAS THAT WITHIN NAMIBIA THERE WOULD STILL BE THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS POST INDEPENDENCE.

11. A THIRD FACTOR EXPLAINED TO THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN THAT AFTER INDEPENDENCE THE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD ONLY BE STRONG POLITICALLY. AS A NEW GOVERNMENT THEY WOULD HAVE NO ARMED FORCES, POLICE, SECURITY FORCES OR BORDER POLICE AND IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO ACHIEVE THEM.

12. FOR OBVIOUS REASONS ANGOLA WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL OF THE REMAINDER OF CUBAN TROOPS WHICH ACTED AS A DETERRENT. AFTER INDEPENDENCE NAMIBIA WOULD ESTABLISH NORMAL RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA AND A MODUS VIVENDI WOULD BE CREATED WITH REGARD TO SOUTH AFRICA.

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14. IF THERE WAS EXTERNAL AGRESSION ANGOLA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DEFEND HERSELF. IF BRITAIN WAS ATTACKED BY FOREIGN FORCES SHE COULD CALL ON HER FRIENDS IN NATO. FEW COUNTRIES COULD DEFEND THEMSELVES. IN THE FALKLANDS ISSUE WE HAD HAD AT LEAST THE POLITICAL SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES. ANGOLA LIVED IN FRIENDSHIP WITH OTHER COUNTRIES: THEY HAD CALLED ON THEIR FRIENDS TO GUARANTEE THEIR SOVEREIGNTY. ANGOLA WAS NOT ALIGNED AND RELATIONS BETWEEN ANGOLA AND CUBA WERE ON THE BASIS OF TWO NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. ANGOLA WAS NOT A MEMBER OF THE WARSAW PACT. ANGOLA HAD ASKED FOR EXTERNAL MILITARY SUPPORT IN 1975 BECAUSE SOUTH AFRICA HAD INVADED, AN EXTERNAL FORCE. WITHOUT EXTERNAL AGRESSION AND INTERFERENCE ANGOLA COULD SOLVE HER PROBLEMS.

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17. I PROMISED TO TRANSMIT THESE MESSAGES URGENTLY. I APOLOGISED THAT THE AMBASSADOR WAS NOT ABAILABLE PERSONALLY. NEVERTHELESS THE PRESIDENT COULD REST ASSURED THAT OUR FULLEST EFFORTS WERE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST IN ACHIEVING A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT AND PEACE. THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE AMBASSADOR'S SPECIAL RETURN WERE CLEAR INDICATIONS OF OUR TOTAL COMMITMENT.

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21. SEE COMMENT IN SECOND IFT.

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PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

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S/MR ON LOW

PS/PJS

SIR J LEAHY

SIR J ALLINSON

MR SCURIE

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21. SEE COMMENT IN SECOND IFT.

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Luanda message to
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DESKBY 241800Z
FM LUANDA 241530Z AUG 62
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 412 OF 24 AUGUST
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT

US/ANGOLA: PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

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2. THE PRESIDENT ALSO WISHED ME TO CONVEY THAT HE AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MEETING OF MILITARY OFFICIALS IN CAPE VERDE TO FINALISE DETAILS OF THE PROGRAMME OF THE PERIOD OF CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION.
3. GRATEFUL WASHINGTON INFORM THE STATE DEPARTMENT. I DID NOT ASK ABOUT TIMING OR PRACTICAL DETAILS AS REGARDS CAPE VERDE. YOU SHOULD ALSO TELL THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE CAPE VERDE AMBASSADOR DELIVERED A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT YESTERDAY FROM PRESIDENT PEREIRA OF CAPE VERDE.

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MR A J S GOODALL CABINET OFFICE

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

PS
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

~~SIR L ALLISON~~

MR SQUIRE

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Luanda: Comment
on Dos Santos
interview

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MY TELNO 411: PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS:COMMENT

1. I DID NOT ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ADDRESSED ORALLY WITHOUT NOTES TO THE PRIME MINISTER WERE ALSO INTENDED FOR THE AMERICANS AS A FOLLOW UP TO THE WISNER VISIT. I ASSUME FROM THE CONTEXT (IE EXPLAINING WHAT HE HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS) THAT IT WAS NOT BUT WISNER MAY GIVE A CLEARER INDICATION OF NEXT STEPS WHEN BRIEFING THE CONTACT GROUP.
 2. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE HAD MADE AN IMPACT. YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER A FURTHER ENCOURAGING REPLY.
 3. PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL EXPLANATION OF THE ANGOLAN POSITION MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO HIS DISCOVERY THAT WE HAD LOBBIED MACHEL. NEVERTHELESS DOS SANTOS WAS IN GOOD HUMOUR AND VERY RELAXED AND REASONABLE EVEN CHUCKLING AT SOME POINTS WHEN DESCRIBING THE COINCIDENCES BETWEEN ATTEMPTS AT CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AND RENEWED SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACKS.
 4. THE EXACT SCENARIO AS PAINTED IN PARA 15 OF T U R WAS NOT CLEAR BUT EVEN TO SAY THAT ANGOLA WOULD CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL OF SOME CUBANS WHEN SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES HAD REACHED 1500 STRONG WITHIN NAMIBIA IS A REAL ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER SEEMS AN APPEAL TO US TO UNDERSTAND ANGOLA'S WORRIES AND THE LIMITS TO THE CONCESSIONS SHE CAN REASONABLY MAKE.
 5. YOU WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO CONSIDER WHATEVER BRIEFING THE AMERICANS HAVE GIVEN IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON BEFORE DECIDING THE LINE TO TAKE WITH THE AMERICANS. ON THE FACE OF IT THIS IS REAL PROGRESS AND WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THEM NOT TO PUSH TOO MUCH FURTHER.
- FCO PLEASE PASS

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Angola

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PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY

MR A J S GOODALL CABINET OFFICE
PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

~~SIR J ALLINSON~~
MR. SQUARE

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1. I DID NOT ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ADDRESSED ORALLY WITHOUT NOTES TO THE PRIME MINISTER WERE ALSO INTENDED FOR THE AMERICANS AS A FOLLOW UP TO THE WISNER VISIT. I ASSUME FROM THE CONTEXT (IE EXPLAINING WHAT HE HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS) THAT IT WAS NOT BUT WISNER MAY GIVE A CLEARER INDICATION OF NEXT STEPS WHEN BRIEFING THE CONTACT GROUP.
 2. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE HAD MADE AN IMPACT. YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER A FURTHER ENCOURAGING REPLY.
 3. PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL EXPLANATION OF THE ANGOLAN POSITION MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO HIS DISCOVERY THAT WE HAD LOBBIED MACHEL. NEVERTHELESS DOS SANTOS WAS IN GOOD HUMOUR AND VERY RELAXED AND REASONABLE EVEN CHUCKLING AT SOME POINTS WHEN DESCRIBING THE COINCIDENCES BETWEEN ATTEMPTS AT CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AND RENEWED SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACKS.
 4. THE EXACT SCENARIO AS PAINTED IN PARA 15 OF T U R WAS NOT CLEAR BUT EVEN TO SAY THAT ANGOLA WOULD CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL OF SOME CUBANS WHEN SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES HAD REACHED 1500 STRONG WITHIN NAMIBIA IS A REAL ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER SEEMS AN APPEAL TO US TO UNDERSTAND ANGOLA'S WORRIES AND THE LIMITS TO THE CONCESSIONS SHE CAN REASONABLY MAKE.
 5. YOU WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO CONSIDER WHATEVER BRIEFING THE AMERICANS HAVE GIVEN IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON BEFORE DECIDING THE LINE TO TAKE WITH THE AMERICANS. ON THE FACE OF IT THIS IS REAL PROGRESS AND WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THEM NOT TO PUSH TOO MUCH FURTHER.
- FCO PLEASE PASS

DEWAR

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