

#### 401. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 9, 1982, 0403Z

285386. Joint State/Defense message. Subject: Resumption of Military Intelligence Exchange With Argentina. Ref: (A) State 247107 DTG 020416Z Sep 82;<sup>2</sup> (B) Buenos Aires 5222 DTG 091546Z Sep 82;<sup>3</sup> (C) London 19432 DTG 031700Z Sep 82.<sup>4</sup>

1. S—Entire text.

2. For Buenos Aires: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is authorized to resume the military intelligence exchange with Argentina, under terms of National Disclosure Policy—One (NDP-1)<sup>5</sup> when the Ambassador deems it appropriate and with the Ambassador's approval of each exchange. Please advise when exchange is reinitiated.

3. For London: At your discretion, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that we intend to resume our military intelligence exchange with the Argentines. The intelligence exchange will consist as in the past primarily of items drawn from [*less than 1 line not declassified*] intelligence summary dealing with Soviet activities in the Western Hemisphere, as well as information on Cuba and Nicaragua. Under the terms of NDP-1, Argentina is not authorized to receive information on non-Communist

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom Political Files, Lot 89D489, Falklands—Telegrams 1982. Secret; Priority. Sent for information to the Department of Defense, USSOUTHCOM, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Drafted by C.S. Shapiro (ARA/RPP); cleared by Bosworth, Raphael, D.W. Cox (ARA/RPP), K. Smith (EUR/NE), S. Smith (ARA/SC), R. Wharton (INR/IC/CD), C. Brown (DOD/ISA/IA), and McManaway; approved by Eagleburger.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 247107 to Buenos Aires, September 2, the Departments of State and Defense jointly informed the Embassy that the Department of State and [*text not declassified*] "which was interrupted by the outbreak of hostilities with the United Kingdom." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820455-0839)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 5222 from Buenos Aires, September 9, Shlaudeman advised: "Given the sensitivities involved, I think it would be best to defer approaching the British on this issue [resumption of intelligence sharing] until the dust settles after the removal of our hold on the small FMS pipeline." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820467-0050)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 19432 from London, September 3, the Embassy recommended: "If we are going to make commitments to resume [*text not declassified*]" with Argentina, "we should talk to the British first. They will want to know that such an exchange can be handled in a way that does not threaten the British military position in the South Atlantic." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820460-0818)

<sup>5</sup> NDP-1 established policies and procedures for the disclosure of classified U.S. military information to foreign governments and international organizations, pursuant to National Security Decision Memorandum 119, "Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations," July 20, 1971.

governments unless a specific determination has been made that such a disclosure will result in significant benefit to US objectives. FYI: Exceptions to NDP-1 must be approved at the inter-agency level in Washington.

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