

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR EVANS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
  
HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/S AM D  
HD/FID (2)  
HD/DEFENCE DEPT  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/ERD  
HD/ECD(E)  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MR ILETT ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLER )  
  
SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OFFICE  
DIO )

MR M. PATTISON ) FID  
MR C. ROTH ) ~~WAGDA~~, ODA  
  
MR A TITCHENER )  
MR C W ROBERTS , IAT ) DOT

GRS 1100  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 040830Z  
FM WASHINGTON 040010Z NOV 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3550 OF 3 NOVEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

*[Handwritten signature]*  
0230/04

MY TELNO 3529: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.  
1. FOLLOWING UP MY BRIEF DISCUSSION WITH EAGLEBURGER YESTERDAY, MI-  
NISTER SPOKE TO HIM AGAIN THIS MORNING TO UNDERLINE THE STRENGTH  
OF OUR OBJECTIONS BOTH TO THE WAY THE AMERICANS HAD PROCEEDED  
AND TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THEIR DECISION. HE SAID FIRST THAT WE HAD  
BEEN ASSURED ALL ALONG THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT WORK ACTIVELY  
WITH THE ARGENTINIANS FOR A RESOLUTION WHICH THE U.S. COULD ACCEPT.  
WE NOW HAD CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAD ON THE CONTRARY DONE JUST  
THAT.  
  
2. ANOTHER OBJECTION WAS THAT WE HAD NOT SEEN A TEXT OF THE  
REVISED DRAFT UNTIL AFTER WE HAD RECEIVED THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE  
TELLING THE PRIME MINISTER OF HIS DECISION TO ACCEPT IT. THOMAS  
SAID THAT THE LEAST WE COULD HAVE EXPECTED WAS THAT THE AMERICANS  
WOULD HAVE LET US KNOW IN ADVANCE THAT THE LATIN AMERICANS HAD

~~WOULD HAVE LET US KNOW IN ADVANCE THAT~~ THE LATIN AMERICANS HAD NOW AMENDED THE TEXT SUFFICIENTLY TO MEET AMERICAN OBJECTIONS, AND THAT THEY FELT COMPELLED, GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF RESTORING THEIR RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, TO GIVE THEIR SUPPORT TO THIS AMENDED DRAFT. AT THE VERY LEAST THEY SHOULD HAVE GIVEN US THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS OUR VIEWS ABOUT IT BEFORE THE PRESIDENT MADE HIS DECISION. INSTEAD OF THAT, THE U.S. DECISION HAD BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED NATIONS, AND INDEED IN THE US PRESS, ALMOST AT THE SAME MOMENT AS WE WERE TOLD ABOUT IT. THIS WAS NO WAY TO TREAT AN ALLY. HE TOLD EAGLEBURGER THAT I FELT I HAD BEEN PERSONALLY DECEIVED OVER THIS WHOLE PROCESS.

3. THOMAS THEN WENT THROUGH OUR OBJECTIONS OF SUBSTANCE TO THE DRAFT:

(I) THE CLAIM THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF A COLONIAL SITUATION WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE UN IDEAL OF UNIVERSAL PEACE WAS A TRAVESTY. THE ONLY THREAT TO PEACE IN THE AREA HAD ARISEN FROM THE DESIRE OF THE ARGENTINES TO LIBERATE THE FALKLANDS AGAINST THE WISHES OF THEIR INHABITANTS.

(II) THE REFERENCES TO EARLIER RESOLUTIONS ENTIRELY PREJUDGED THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, WHICH WAS SPECIFICALLY WHAT SHULTZ AND OTHERS HAD TOLD US THE US WOULD NOT SUPPORT.

(III) THE REFERENCE TO A DE FACTO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WAS A CHARADE: IT WAS SIMPLY NOT SUPPORTED BY WHAT ARGENTINE SPOKESMEN HAD BEEN SAYING.

(IV) THE REFERENCE TO THE QUOTE INTERESTS UNQUOTE OF THE ISLANDERS WAS A SMOKE SCREEN. IT WAS A TRANSPARENTLY INADEQUATE REFERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THE ARGENTINIANS HAD THEMSELVES SHOWN BY THEIR INVASION HOW THEY INTERPRETED THE QUOTE INTERESTS UNQUOTE OF THE ISLANDERS.

(V) OPERATIVE PARA 1 WAS A PIECE OF WEASEL WORDING WHICH CLEARLY CALLED FOR RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY. THIS AGAIN WAS ONE OF THE THINGS WHICH WE HAD BEEN ASSURED THE US WOULD NOT SUPPORT.

4. ALL IN ALL, THOMAS SAID THAT THE US WOULD NEVER HAVE ACCEPTED SUCH AMBIGUOUS AND PREJUDICIAL LANGUAGE IN A UN RESOLUTION ON A MATTER OF IMPORTANCE TO ITSELF. WE FOUND IT INCOMPREHENSIBLE THAT THEY SHOULD DO SO ON A MATTER OF SUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE UK.

5. EAGLEBURGER DID NOT ATTEMPT TO REFUTE ALL THESE POINTS AND WAS CLEARLY DISMAYED BY THE FORCE OF OUR REACTION. HE SAID OUR VIEWS ON ALL THESE ISSUES HAD BEEN ABUNDANTLY MADE CLEAR ON FREQUENT OCCASIONS IN WASHINGTON AND THEY HAD TRIED TO TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT IN REACHING A DIFFICULT DECISION. AS FAR AS HE KNEW THERE

ACCOUNT IN REACHING A DIFFICULT DECISION. AS FAR AS HE KNEW, THERE HAD BEEN NO QUESTION OF AMERICANS OFFICIALS DOING ANYTHING MORE THAN EXPLAINING TO THE ARGENTINES WHY THE EARLIER DRAFT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. IF WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT AMERICANS HAD DONE MORE THAN THAT, HE WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW IT. (THOMAS REPLIED ON THIS POINT THAT HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO REVEAL SOURCES BUT THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR DOUBT ABOUT THEIR RELIABILITY). THE ONLY OTHER POINT OF SUBSTANCE THAT EAGLEBURGER REFERRED TO WAS THE PASSAGE IN THE PREAMBLE ABOUT CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. HE FELT THAT THIS WAS THE STRONGEST COMMITMENT WE HAD YET HAD FROM THE ARGENTINIANS THAT THEY WOULD NOT LAUNCH ANOTHER ATTACK.

6. AT THE END OF THE DISCUSSION, EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK WOULD BE MAKING A STATEMENT IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BE MORE TO OUR LIKING THAN THAT US VOTE. THOMAS SAID THAT WE STILL HOPED THAT THE US VOTE WOULD BE CHANGED IN THE LIGHT OF THE ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAD PUT TO THE PRESIDENT. IF IT CAME TO A SPEECH BY MRS KIRKPATRICK, HOWEVER, THE IMPORTANT THING FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WAS THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE MADE UNTIL AFTER THE VOTE HAD BEEN TAKEN AND THAT IT SHOULD THEN MAKE VERY STRONGLY THE POINTS ABOUT THE SELF-DETERMINATION, NON USE OF FORCE, ETC, TO WHICH WE BELIEVED THE AMERICANS STILL ATTACHED IMPORTANCE.

7. EAGLEBURGER SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED BACK TO SAY THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO MRS KIRKPATRICK WHO HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SIR J THOMSON EARLIER IN THE DAY ON THE SAME SUBJECT. SHE HAD TOLD EAGLEBURGER THAT SHE DID NOT INTEND TO SPEAK EXCEPT IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE AND THIS WOULD NOT UNTIL AFTER THE VOTE HAD BEEN TAKEN. HE HAD AGREED WITH HER THAT SHE WOULD INCLUDE THE MAIN POINTS MADE IN THE PRESIDENT'S MOST RECENT MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER (NOT YET RECEIVED HERE) INCLUDING NON-USE OF FORCE, NO PREJUDICE ON THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF DETERMINATION (THOUGH NOT USING THIS PHRASE). IN ADDITION, MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD DECIDED NOT TO MAKE THE SPEECH HERSELF BUT TO LEAVE THIS TO ONE OF HER DEPUTIES. THIS WAS PARTLY IN RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT SHE RECOGNISED SHE WAS NOT THE MOST POPULAR FIGURE IN LONDON AND PARTLY TO ENSURE THAT DUE ATTENTION WAS PAID TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE US STATEMENT RATHER THAN TO THE PERSON MAKING IT. (THIS PRESUMABLY MEANS THAT SHE FEELS IT WOULD BE BAD FOR HER OWN RELATIONS WITH HER ARGENTINIAN FRIENDS IF SHE WERE PERSONALLY ASSOCIATED WITH IT).

8. I SHALL BE SEEING SHULTZ ON FRIDAY ON ANOTHER MATTER AND WILL ASK FOR A FEW MINUTES ALONE WITH HIM TO GO OVER THIS GROUND AGAIN. I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT HE SHOULD BE HIMSELF IN NO DOUBT

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ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF YOUR FEELINGS ON THIS QUESTION, ON THE  
SUBSTANCE, ON THE HYPOCRACY AND ON THE DECEPTION.

WRIGHT

BNNH