

425. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, March 4, 1983, 2020Z

59308. Subject: FCO Minister of State Cranley Onslow's February 18 Call on Assistant Secretary Enders.

1. Secret-Entire text.

2. Summary: ARA Assistant Secretary Enders's meeting with FCO Minister of State Cranley Onslow February 18 focussed on Belize and Argentina. On Belize, Onslow indicated HMG firmness on decision to withdraw UK garrison and welcomed Enders's suggestion that an internationally guaranteed freeze on boundary questions be explored as a possible way out. Onslow urged denial of US arms to Guatemala and indefinite hold on certification and arms sales to Argentina. End summary.

3. FCO Minister of State Cranley Onslow called on Assistant Secretary Enders of ARA Bureau February 18. Accompanying Onslow were British Embassy DCM Thomas and First Secretary French. Participants on the US side were ARA/SC and ARA/CEN Directors Smith and Johnstone and UK Desk Officer Hughes. Summary of discussion follows.

[Omitted here is discussion of Belize.]

5. Argentina/Falklands: Exchange on Falklands/Malvinas issue was relatively abbreviated because of press of follow-on appointments. In response to question, Enders observed that it was impossible to predict with certainty the views of the post-election government in Argentina, adding that, of course, policy changes also could result from the next British election. Minister Onslow replied that Mrs. Thatcher might well be returned, but that in any event, no British Government would change the current position on the sovereignty issue "within the next five years," regardless of "international pressure." Enders commented that, in all probability, neither would any new Argentine Government. If such conditions prevailed, they noted that the chances of progress toward bilateral solution seemed extremely slim. Enders said prolonged stalemate raised difficulties and urged that HMG carefully weigh situation and consider, for example, whether some form of multilateral involvement might not offer a way out. Following our

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830119-0467. Secret; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Belize and for information to Guatemala City, Buenos Aires, and Brasilia. Drafted by P.D. Hughes (EUR/NE); cleared by Dobbins, J. Binns (EUR/NE), C. Johnstone (ARA/CEN), N.S. Smith (ARA/SC), and T. Coony (ARA/BR); approved by Enders.

1982 experience, Enders said, renewed direct involvement was not attractive to us but other formulas might be useful. Onslow asserted that the British do not particularly like the idea of either UN trusteeship or the prospect, for example, of Antarctic Treaty involvement.

6. Onslow also raised briefly the question of US certification and future arms sales to Argentina. (He had not at this point talked to Under Secretary Eagleburger.)² Onslow said that while the UK realized that the US might view certification and arms sales as a means of establishing good relations with a new Argentine Government, HMG would be strongly critical if actual arms sales were concluded. Enders responded that arms sales and certification were two very different issues. ARA/SC Director Smith observed that Argentina had made extensive purchases from European suppliers and that we did not expect that Argentina would purchase significant new arms systems from the United States, but primarily ship and aircraft replacement parts. Ambassador Enders stated that as yet we had no fixed view on certification timing, but that we would discuss the issue with HMG when we had a clearer idea of when and how we should proceed.³

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the economic situation in Brazil.]

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² No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

³ Onslow followed up on the subject of Argentine certification with Streator on March 8, at which time he "outlined in detail British concerns that the U.S. might certify human rights progress in Argentina prematurely" and "strongly recommended that Enders visit London in April." (Telegram 5164 from London, March 10; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830132-0936)