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MY TELNO 953 TO FCO AND TELECON RENWICK/GORE-BOOTH:  
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S SPEECH: DISARMAMENT

1. FULL TEXT OF MITTERRAND'S SPEECH NOW TO HAND.

PASSAGES ON DISARMAMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS :

" EACH OF US, I BELIEVE, IS CONVINCED THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF A NEW WORLD WAR WOULD BE INCALCULABLE AND DOUBTLESS IRREPARABLE. BUT PEACE AMONG NATIONS CAN ENDURE ONLY ON A BASIS OF GENUINE EQUILIBRIUM. HISTORY HAS TAUGHT US THIS. THROUGH RESPECT FOR THIS GOLDEN RULE, THE RIGHTS OF ONE AND ALL ARE RECONCILED WITH INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY. ESTABLISHING THESE BALANCES OR REESTABLISHING THEM WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN BROKEN, GUARANTEEING THEIR STABILITY, GRADUALLY REDUCING FORCES TO EVER-LOWER LEVELS AND VERIFYING AT ALL TIMES THE INFORMATION PROVIDED --THIS IS THE APPROACH, THE ONE APPROACH POSSIBLE, TO THE PROBLEMS WE FACE.

IN THE RECENT PAST THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE AMERICANS ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION, KNOW AS SALT, HAVE MADE IT POSSIBLE TO LIMIT CERTAIN TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND TO SLOW DOWN, QUALITATIVELY, THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE. BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE HAVE WITNESSED AN ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE DESTRUCTIVE CAPACITY OF THESE ARMS, AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS AND AN IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR ACCURACY.

THUS THE TWO SUPERPOWERS EACH HAVE A CENTRAL  
NUCLEAR SYSTEM OF 2,000 TO 3,000 LAUNCHERS CARRYING 8,000 TO 9,000 WARHEADS. THESE ARE ABLE TO REACH AND DESTROY EACH OTHER, IF I MAY SAY SO, SEVEN OR EIGHT TIMES OVER.

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ONE OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA FOCUSES, AS YOU KNOW, ON THE REDUCTION OF "INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC" ARMS WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING ABOUT A BALANCE BETWEEN AMERICAN AND SOVIET ARMS.

FRANCE HOPES THAT THIS NEGOTIATION IS SUCCESSFUL. BUT FOR THE TIME BEING WORLD OPINION IS FOCUSED ON THE OTHER NEGOTIATION, ON WHAT IS CALLED THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY VIEW ON THIS WITH THE UTMOST CLARITY.

FOLLOWING A CONTINUOUS ESCALATION ALL ACROSS THE EUROPEAN SOIL, A NEW SITUATION HAS BEEN CREATED WHEREBY THE SOVIET UNION, AND IT ALONE, HAS A SIZABLE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE ON OUR CONTINENT, WITH TRIPLE-WARHEAD MISSILES WHICH ARE MOBILE AND ACCURATE AND HAVE A RANGE OF APPROXIMATELY 5,000 KILOMETERS. SINCE THEY CANNOT CROSS THE ATLANTIC, THEIR ONLY POSSIBLE TARGET IS THE NATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE. THE SAME REASONING HOLDS TRUE FOR THE MISSILES DEPLOYED IN THE ASIAN TERRITORY OF THE U.S.S.R. AND POINTED AT THE NEIGHBOURING STATES IN THIS REGION. FRANCE WELCOMED THE OPENING IN GENEVA OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS TYPE OF WEAPON BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES AS A VERY POSITIVE ACT, COMING AS IT DID AFTER THE UNITED STATES HAD ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD INSTALL PERSHING 2 AND CRUISE MISSILES IN VARIOUS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS OF THE END OF THIS YEAR, IN APPLICATION OF THE "TWO-TRACK" DECISION TAKEN BY THE MEMBER STATES OF THE NATO INTEGRATED MILITARY COMMAND, OF WHICH FRANCE IS NOT A MEMBER. I WILL NOT REVIEW ALL THE ASPECTS OF A DEBATE WHICH I HAVE DISCUSSED ELSEWHERE AND WHICH DOES DIRECTLY COMMIT FRANCE, EVEN IF FRANCE IS CONCERNED, BUT I WISH TO CLARIFY MY COUNTRY'S POSITION IN THE FACE OF THE PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH SOME SORT OF EUROMISSILE EQUILIBRIUM.

I SHOULD LIKE TO RECALL IN THIS CONNECTION THE FACT THAT FRANCE HAS HAD A NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCE FOR A QUARTER OF A CENTURY, A FORCE THAT IS DEFENSIVE BY ITS VERY NATURE VIS-A-VIS ANY EVENTUAL AGGRESSOR. THIS FORCE FORMS A COMPLETE ENTITY AND CONSTITUTES A CENTRAL DEFENSE SYSTEM FOR MY COUNTRY WHICH IS INDISPENSIBLE FOR ITS SECURITY. A FEW FIGURES WILL SUFFICE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS DEFENSIVE NATURE: I MENTIONED JUST NOW THAT EACH OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS CURRENTLY HAS BETWEEN 8,000 AND 9,000 WARHEADS. FRANCE HAS 98. THIS IS SUFFICIENT, CERTAINLY, FOR DETERRENCE BUT RULES OUT ANY OTHER USE.

FURTHERMORE, THESE 98 MISSILES ARE PART OF A STRATEGIC, NOT TACTICAL, CONCEPT OF DEFENSE: THEY ARE PART OF AN INTERMEDIARY CONCEPT, TO USE THE EXTREMELY PRECISE VOCABULARY USED BY THE SOVIET AND AMERICANS WHEN THEY DISCUSS THEIR AFFAIRS. MOREOVER, IT WOULD BE PARADOXICAL FOR A COUNTRY, MINE, TO BE SUBJECT TO A CONFERENCE IN WHICH IT DOES NOT PARTICIPATE AND WHICH WOULD DISCUSS, WITHOUT OUR CONSENT, STRATEGIC WEAPONS, IN PARTICULAR UNDERWATER STRATEGIC ARMS, WHICH NEITHER THE AMERICANS NOR THE RUSSIANS, WHO HAVE A GREAT MANY MORE OF THEM, ARE DISCUSSING BETWEEN THEMSELVES, AT LEAST NOT AT THIS CONFERENCE.

ONE CAN COMPARE ONLY THAT WHICH IS COMPARABLE: IT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO INCLUDE THE CENTRAL DEFENSE SYSTEM ON WHICH THE INDEPENDENCE AND SURVIVAL OF MY COUNTRY REST WITH THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS, WHICH IN THEIR CASE MERELY COMPLEMENT THEIR FORMIDABLE STRATEGIC ARSENALS. SINCE IN CONCRETE TERMS WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A REQUEST ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION, ON WHAT GROUNDS DOES THIS COUNTRY EXPECT FRANCE TO RENOUNCE SOMETHING SO VITAL, I REFER TO ITS NATIONAL DEFENSE? OF COURSE, WE ARE TOLD THAT THIS IS NOT THE AIM OF THE PROPOSAL, AND I WOULD LIKE TO BELIEVE IT. WE ARE ASSURED THAT INCLUSION OF THE FRENCH FORCE IN THE GENEVA TALKS WOULD NOT LEAD TO ANY REDUCTION IN IT. BUT ONCE FRANCE ENTERS INTO AN EQUATION IN WHICH IT HAS NO PART, WOULD IT NOT BE EXPOSED TO THE RISK OF SEEING THE MODERNIZATION OF ITS DEFENSE COME UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS, AND WOULD IT NOT BE ASSUMING A RESPONSIBILITY IT REJECTS --THAT OF UPSSETTING WORLD EQUILIBRIUM?

MY COUNTRY IS INDEPENDENT. ITS DETERRENT FORCE IS UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE COMMAND OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, FRANCE'S LOYALTY TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE DOES NOT UNDERMINE ITS AUTONOMY. WE RESPECT THE GREAT RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND HOPE TO PRESERVE THE CENTURIES-OLD GOOD RELATIONS WHICH JOINS US. MY COUNTRY HAS NEITHER THE INTENTION NOR THE MEANS --AND IT DOES NOT DESIRE THEM --TO IMPOSE ITS WILL BY FORCE OF ARMS. IT HAS THE WEAPON TO INSURE ITS OWN DEFENSE. NOTHING MORE, NOTHING LESS. IT WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE ALLOWED TO HAVE A MONOPOLY OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE, AS IS THE CASE TODAY. IT HOPES THAT MUTUAL CONCESSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTNERS IN GENEVA WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO END THIS MONOPOLY WHILE CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR A NEW EQUILIBRIUM --SOMETHING I FERVENTLY HOPE FOR.'

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'' BUT IT IS TIME TO RETURN TO THE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMAMENT IN THE WORLD. WE CANNOT REJECT THE IDEA THAT THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD, WHEN THE TIME COMES, DISCUSS TOGETHER A LASTING LIMITATION OF THEIR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. IT IS APPROPRIATE THEREFORE TO SET FORTH CLEARLY THE CONDITIONS FOR PROGRESS IN THIS AREA.

THE FIRST PRESUPPOSES THE CORRECTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE, QUALITATIVELY AND QUANTITATIVELY, WHICH SEPARATES THE WEAPONS OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS FROM THOSE OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A COUNTRY THAT WOULD RISK DEPLOYING THIS WEAPON TO ASSERT ITS POWER AND A COUNTRY THAT WOULD BE FORCED TO USE IT FOR ITS VERY SURVIVAL.

THE SECOND CONDITION FOLLOWS FROM THE CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE EXISTING AMONG CLASSIC --OR MORE PROPERLY-- CONVENTIONAL FORCES, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN EUROPE: DIFFERENCES WHICH ARE ENHANCED, I FEAR, BY THE EXISTENCE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WHOSE MANUFACTURE AND STOCK-PILING SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY BANNED BY CONVENTION.

MY THIRD CONDITION IS AN END TO OVERARMAMENT IN ANTI-MISSILE, ANTI-SUBMARINE AND ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONRY. ANOTHER IMPERATIVE IS TO SAFEGURAD PEOPLE FROM THREATS FROM OUTER SPACE. WILL SPACE BECOME ANOTHER ARENA FOR THE UNLIMITED GROWTH OF OLD TERRESTRIAL ANTAGONISMS? SPACE IS BY ITS VERY NATURE THE COMMON PATRIMONY OF MANKIND. WE WOULD BETRAY THE INTEREST OF OUR PEOPLES WERE WE NOT TO DEFINE A RIGHT WHICH PRESERVES IT IN TIME.

YET, THERE IS NOTHING TO HALT THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-MISSILE WEAPONS IN SPACE, NOR TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF SATELITES, SINCE ONLY ARMS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, THAT IS TO SAY NUCLEAR ARMS, ARE BANNED BY THE TREATY OF 1967. AN

*Amendment which*

WOULD FORBID THE PLACING IN ORBIT OF ALL TYPES OF WEAPONRY, WHICH ORGANISE THE PROGRESSIVE WITHDRAWAL OF ARMS ALREADY IN ORBIT AND WHICH WOULD CALL FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION WOULD GIVE THIS TREATY ITS TRUE FORCE.

IN ANOTHER AREA, AND DESPITE THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THESE TESTS, FRANCE HAS DECIDED TO OPEN ITS UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TEST SITE NEXT MONTH TO A FACT-FINDING VISIT BY FOREIGN SCIENTISTS FROM COUNTRIES IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC. I HOPE THIS EXAMPLE WILL BE FOLLOWED.''