

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

SERIAL NO.

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GRS 266
 CONFIDENTIAL
 FM FCO 051045Z NOVEMBER 1983
 TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1046 OF 5 DECEMBER
 INFO MOD DS17

MIPT: INF: ANDROPOV'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY:

'THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 24 NOVEMBER.

AS I MADE CLEAR IN MY LETTER TO YOU OF 27 SEPTEMBER, WE CANNOT ACCEPT THAT YOU SHOULD MAINTAIN A MONOPOLY OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE WHILE INSISTING THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD NOT INSTALL MISSILES OF THIS NATURE. WE HAVE BEEN FORCED TO DEPLOY AMERICAN CRUISE MISSILES IN THIS COUNTRY BY THE MASSIVE BUILD-UP OF YOUR SS20 FORCE. WE WOULD HAVE MUCH PREFERRED NOT TO DEPLOY THEM BUT SO FAR IT HAS NOT PROVED POSSIBLE TO REACH THE NECESSARY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT IN GENEVA.

WE DEEPLY REGRET YOUR DECISION TO SUSPEND THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE MISSILES. WE FOR OUR PART WOULD WISH THE INF TALKS IN GENEVA TO BE RESUMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND WELCOME THE UNITED STATES' PREPAREDNESS TO DO SO AT ANY TIME. OUR FIRST PRIORITY REMAINS A BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT TO REDUCE AND IF POSSIBLE ELIMINATE THE MISSILES IN QUESTION, WORLDWIDE. IT REMAINS OUR EARNEST HOPE THAT THE TALKS CAN ACHIEVE SOON THE SORT OF SUCCESS THAT WOULD ENABLE US TO HALT OR, PREFERABLY, REVERSE OUR PLANS FOR DEPLOYING CRUISE MISSILES HERE.

I HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR INTEREST IN A BETTER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND WOULD NATURALLY WISH TO SEE AN IMPROVEMENT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. PROGRESS IN THE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA WOULD OF COURSE BE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THIS.'

HOWE

LIMITED

DEF D

SOV D

ACD D

NEWS D

EED

WED

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR WRIGHT

MR CARLEDGE

MR JENKINS

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VC

5 December 1983

Mr. Andropov's Message of 24 November

Thank you for your letter of 2 December to John Coles. The Prime Minister agrees the draft reply to Mr. Andropov subject to the following being substituted for the first sentence of the second paragraph:

"As I made clear in my letter to you of 27 September, we cannot accept that you should maintain a monopoly of intermediate range missiles in Europe while insisting that the Americans should not instal missiles of this nature."

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the amended message to be despatched.

D BARCLAY

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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LS



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Attached is a draft message
for you to agree to send
Mr Andropov

Mr Cates has not seen
the Foreign Office submission.

SPeary

Duty Clerk.

2.12.83

Agreed as amended
no

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 December 1983

Dear John,

Mr Andropov's Message of 24 November

Sir Geoffrey Howe has been considering whether it would be right for the Prime Minister to reply to the message from Mr Andropov on INF which was delivered here on 25 November (enclosed).

The short message enclosed the public statement, in Andropov's name, on 24 November, the main points of which were:

- (a) to reaffirm the Soviet decision to break off the Geneva talks;
- (b) to abrogate the Soviet Union's freeze on the deployments of SS20s in Soviet Europe;
- (c) the acceleration of the previously announced preparatory work for the installation of new Soviet missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia;
- (d) plans to deploy missile systems in ocean areas and seas that will directly threaten the United States.

The one additional point in Andropov's message was the linkage between the INF issue and bilateral relations. This was not surprising. Such references are an almost obligatory feature of the official Soviet response to any unwelcome action by a foreign government. Of the other Heads of Government to receive messages (to our knowledge the German Chancellor, President Mitterrand and the Prime Ministers of Italy, The Netherlands and Denmark) Mr Craxi has replied (publishing the exchange); so have the Danes - the Germans are likely to reply soon.

/There is

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There is no over-riding reason for the Prime Minister to reply. But, on balance, Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that a short firm response would be appropriate. For presentational reasons there would be some merit in showing that we had responded; simply to ignore a message from Andropov might sit ill with the Prime Minister's stated aim of maintaining a dialogue with Moscow. It might also be useful to tell them that the Prime Minister had replied firmly.

/ I enclose therefore a draft reply. If the Prime Minister agrees we would, after transmission, inform NATO partners of its gist. We would not propose that the reply should be released publicly (although it can be if the Russians themselves go public).

Yours ever
[Signature]

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Mr Andropov

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your message of 24 November.

CAVEAT.....

B C

~~In response I must restate that, as made clear~~
 in my letter to you of 27 September, ~~it is simply not~~
~~possible for us to accept that you should maintain a~~
~~monopoly of intermediate range missiles in Europe while~~
 insisting that the Americans should not install
 missiles of this nature. We have been forced to deploy
 American cruise missiles in this country by the massive
 build-up of your SS20 force. We would have much
 preferred not to deploy them but so far it has not
 proved possible to reach the necessary arms control
 agreement in Geneva.

We deeply regret your decision to suspend the
 Geneva negotiations on these missiles. We for our part
 would wish the INF talks in Geneva to be resumed as
 soon as possible and welcome the United States
 preparedness to do so at any time. Our first priority
 remains a balanced and *verifiable* agreement to reduce and
 if possible eliminate the missiles in question,

/worldwide.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

worldwide. It remains our earnest hope that the talks ^{can} could achieve soon the sort of success that would enable us to halt or, preferably, reverse our plans for deploying cruise missiles here.

I have made clear our interest in a better relationship between East and West and would naturally wish to see an improvement in our bilateral relations. Progress in the arms control negotiations at Geneva would of course be a significant contribution to this.

MF

RECEIVED
29 NOV 1983
MRS. PRIME MINISTER,

B (317)
Unofficial translation

I am addressing you in connection with the decision taken in Great Britain to start the deployment of American medium-range nuclear missiles on the territory of your country.

Our political assessment of this step as well as the enumeration of counter-measures which the Soviet Union has been forced to take are contained in the enclosed text of the Statement.

We have only to regret that your Government has made a choice in favour of the further sharpening of the situation and it has been done deliberately with the knowledge of the consequences which the decision taken in London will inevitably lead to.

The conclusion follows from this that the British Government just like the US Government preferred the road quite opposite to the accord on the reduction of the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe, the road leading to the increase of this level and thus leading to the growth of the military danger.

We also cannot help coming to the conclusion that your Government does not value the maintaining of good relations with the Soviet Union based on confidence. It is clear that we have to take it into account in our policy.

However we would not like to regard the situation arisen as irreversible. If another, realistic approach towards the security matters prevail in the West, and if the NATO countries show their readiness to return to the situation which existed before the beginning of the deployment of American missiles in Europe, you can be sure that it would find the appropriate response from our side.

Yours respectfully,

Y. ANDROPOV

24th November, 1983

STATEMENT

BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE,
PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDIUM
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR YURI ANDROPOV

The leadership of the Soviet Union has already brought its assessments of the militaristic course of the present American administration to the notice of Soviet people and other peoples, and warned the governments of the United States and Western countries coming out at one with it about the dangerous consequences of this course.

But Washington, Bonn, London and Rome did not heed the voice of reason - the deployment of American medium-range missiles is beginning on the territory of the FRG, Britain and Italy. Thereby the appearance of American "Pershings" and cruise missiles in the European continent is becoming an accomplished fact.

For almost forty years - longer than ever before in modern history - Europe is living in the conditions of peace. This has become possible owing to the consistent peace-loving policy of the countries of the Socialist community, the efforts of the continent's peace-loving forces and also the realistic position of sober-minded politicians in the West. The approximate balance of military forces, including nuclear ones, between the states of the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Treaty states, that has formed in Europe, objectively served the cause of European security and stability.

Now the United States and NATO as a whole are taking the step directed at tipping the scales in their favour. The nuclear missiles that are being deployed near the borders of the Soviet Union and its allies are not at all intended for the defence of Western Europe - no one is threatening it. What will grow with the deployment of American missiles on European soil is not the security of Europe but the real danger that the United States will bring catastrophe upon the peoples of Europe.

During the two World Wars the flames of destruction spared the territory of the United States of America. Now, too, the people in Washington would like to think that by deploying their medium-range missiles in Europe and thus creating an additional nuclear threat to the socialist countries they would be able to divert the return strike from their house. As to the security of the West European allies of the United States, it appears that it interests the American leaders only to the extent to which the West Europeans will be able by their lives, by their cities to lessen the retribution for the United States, should Washington give in to the temptation to unleash nuclear war in the illusory hope of winning it.

The deployment of the American nuclear missiles in Western Europe is by no means a step prompted by a reaction to some supposedly existing concern in the West about the present alignment of forces of the sides in Europe. Many times, using concrete figures, it was proved - and this is accepted by many politicians and specialists in the West - that at present a rough parity continues to exist in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty as regards medium-range nuclear weapons, while NATO has a considerable edge in terms of nuclear warheads. So if anybody has cause to be concerned it is the Warsaw Treaty countries which are being threatened by the military machines of the NATO states.

Neither can the Soviet Union and other countries of the Socialist community, when evaluating all this, turn a blind eye to the fact that Washington has also declared a "crusade" against socialism as a social system and that those who have now issued the orders for the deployment of new nuclear arms on the threshold of our house are basing their practical policy on this reckless premise. It appears that by deploying the "Pershing-2"s and cruise missiles in Europe the governments of a number of NATO countries would want to create a concrete nuclear-missile foundation for this adventuristic premise.

Can the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries ignore this danger? No, they cannot. That is why the highest party and state leaders of seven Socialist countries declared at their meeting in Moscow on June 28, 1983 that under no circumstances will they permit a military superiority of the NATO bloc over the countries of the Warsaw Treaty.

When confirming their consent to the deployment of American missiles in their countries the governments of the FRG, Britain and Italy could not but know that the United States did not want from the outset the attainment of a mutually acceptable accord on nuclear arms in Europe and did everything at the talks in Geneva and outside them to prevent such an accord. Likewise they could not but know that the Soviet Union and its allies would definitely take the necessary measures to safeguard their security, to prevent the United States and NATO as a whole from upsetting the existing rough balance of forces in Europe.

It was also clearly stated by us that the appearance of new American missiles in Western Europe would make impossible a continuation of the talks that were being conducted in Geneva on nuclear arms in Europe.

The decisions taken during the past few days by the governments of the FRG, Britain and Italy unequivocally show that contrary to the will of their own peoples, contrary to the interests of the security of their countries and contrary to the interests of European and universal peace these governments have given the green light to the deployment of American missiles. Thereby they have assumed together with the government of the United States the entire responsibility for the consequences of the myopic policy about which the Soviet Union had warned in advance.

Having thoroughly weighed all the aspects of the obtaining situation the Soviet leadership adopted the following decisions:

First. Since by its actions the United States has torpedoed the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable accord at the talks on questions of limiting nuclear arms in Europe and their continuation in these conditions would only serve as a cover for the actions of the United States and a number of other NATO countries directed at undermining European and international security, the Soviet Union considers its further participation in these talks impossible.

Second. Being cancelled are the Soviet Union's unilateral obligations which had for their purpose the creation of more favourable conditions for success at the talks. Thereby the moratorium on the deployment of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR is abrogated.

Third. On agreement with the governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia the announced preparatory work to deploy on the territory of these countries operational-tactical missiles of increased range, that was started some time ago, will be accelerated.

Fourth. Since by deploying its missiles in Europe the United States increases the nuclear threat to the Soviet Union, the corresponding Soviet systems will be deployed with due account for this circumstance in ocean areas and in seas. By their characteristics these systems of ours will be adequate to the threat which American missiles that are being deployed in Europe create to us and our allies.

It goes without saying that other measures, too, will be taken to ensure the security of the USSR and other countries of the Socialist community.

As we commence the fulfilment of the decisions adopted by us we state that the counter-measures from the Soviet side will be kept strictly within the limits that will be dictated by the actions of the NATO countries. The Soviet Union, and

we stress this again, does not strive for military superiority, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary to prevent the military balance from being disrupted.

Should the United States and other NATO countries display readiness to return to the situation that existed before the commencement of the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union will also be prepared to do this. In that event our earlier proposals on questions of limiting and reducing nuclear arms in Europe would become valid again. In that case, that is on condition of the restoration of the former situation, the USSR's unilateral obligations in this field would also become effective again.

The Soviet Union declares with all firmness and in no uncertain terms that it remains committed to the principled course of ending the arms race, first off all the nuclear arms race, of lessening and ultimately totally removing the threat of nuclear war. It will further exert every effort for the attainment of these lofty aims.

The Soviet Union continues to come out for the most radical solution of the question of nuclear arms in Europe. It repeats its proposal to make Europe free of nuclear weapons altogether, both medium-range and tactical.

The Soviet leadership calls on the leaders of the United States and the West European countries to weigh once again all the consequences with which their own peoples and the whole of mankind are being threatened by the fulfilment of the plans to deploy new American missiles in Europe.

As it is we are living in too brittle a world. That is why responsible statesmen must evaluate the developments and adopt a rational decision. It is human reason alone that can and must save mankind from the grave danger. We call on those who are pushing the world along the road of the ever more dangerous arms race to give up their vain hopes of thus achieving military superiority in order to dictate their will to other peoples and states.

The Soviet Union is convinced that peace can be strengthened and the security of peoples guaranteed not by way of building up

and inventing ever new types of armaments but, on the contrary, by way of reducing the existing armaments to immeasurably lower levels. Mankind has too many tasks which are not being solved only because colossal material, intellectual and other resources are being diverted. And from this viewpoint, too, the attainment of accords on a radical reduction of nuclear and other arms would be a boon for all peoples.

The Soviet leadership declares that in fulfilment of the Soviet people's will it will further do everything to ward off the danger of war and to preserve peace for the present and coming generations.