



Prime Minister.

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A.S.C. 17/1

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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARYINF - SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS

Your office wrote to mine on 19th December about the OD(D) discussion on shorter range systems. As that letter related to comments that John Stanley made at OD(D), I have considered the matter further with him and can now elaborate a little further.

2. We are of course fully aware that in the INF negotiations, the NATO position has been that agreement on an equal number of Long Range INF warheads, or the elimination of LRINF weapons altogether, is not enough and would have to be accompanied by collateral constraints on the shorter range INF missiles. There is however virtually no awareness of this publicly. The public impression is that if the Soviets offered to accept the zero option or equal LRINF numbers on both sides - which I appreciate is very unlikely at present - an agreement would be concluded on that basis. We and the Americans would be in some difficulty in saying at that stage that implementation of, say, an agreement on the zero option was in fact dependent on a further agreement on the collateral constraints. I suggest therefore it will be prudent as and when the INF negotiations resume to make it clear publicly that, as far as the West is concerned, constraints on the shorter range systems are an integral part of the LRINF negotiations. Obviously we should not do this in a fashion which makes it appear that we are inserting new "conditions" into the NATO negotiating stance. I believe however that this point can gradually be made without risking this sort of misunderstanding and that, in developing the Alliances presentational line, we should have this specific point in mind.



3. On the other points in your Private Secretary's letter, it is indeed the case that the number of SS20 warheads now deployed facing West (729) is much greater than the number of SS12/22 warheads. There are currently some 76 SS12/22 launchers in the Soviet Union west of the Urals which could be brought forward into Eastern Europe, though it should be borne in mind that each launcher probably has at least one refire missile immediately available and that the yield of an SS12/22 is up to 3 times greater than an SS20 warhead. Some account in addition has to be taken of the SS1 (SCUD) which is to be replaced by the SS23 with a range of 350kms. There are 264 SS1s with Soviet forces in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Western part of the Soviet Union, and a further 82 with the national forces of the first 3 of those countries. Production of SS23 for SCUD replacement has already started and is expected to reach a peak output of around 400 a year in a few years time. SS1/23's range gives it target coverage over the whole of West Germany and parts of northern France, Belgium and the Netherlands without moving from Warsaw Pact territory while SS12/22's range covers all but the western and northern extremities of Great Britain and France. It could thus in theory reach many of the high value NATO targets in the area covered by SS4, 5 and 20. SS12/22 and SS1/23 are mobile and are launched from vehicles; this would reduce their vulnerability to NATO weapons systems.

4. These points will be covered in more detail at the presentation we are giving to Richard Luce.

5. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

huff

Ministry of Defence

16th January 1984

DEFENCE : INF PC 4

7 JAN 1984





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 December 1983

N. B. P. R.

Dear Richard,

INF: Shorter Range Systems

A.S.C. 19
12.

I understand that during OD(D) earlier this week a suggestion was made that even if we had been able to secure agreement on the INF negotiations on SS20s we should have been no better off because of Soviet ability to cover a comparable range of targets in NATO Europe with the Scud/SS23 missile and the Scaleboard/SS22 missile.

Sir Geoffrey Howe thought it might be helpful to clarify this point. It is not in practice true that under any INF agreement to which the United States would have put its name the Russians would have been free to deploy forward in Eastern Europe large numbers of such shorter range missiles and to restore the target coverage formerly provided by the SS20s. As the texts annexed to this letter show, it has been a cardinal feature of the Alliance position since 1979 to insist on so-called "collateral constraints" on such shorter range Soviet INF missiles, precisely to prevent Soviet circumvention of an INF agreement. The Russians themselves agreed in principle earlier this year that there should be constraints on such missiles, the details to be decided when the central issues of the negotiations were resolved. Our respective Departments explained this to Ministers of State in a parallel submission of July this year.

The draft US Treaty on INF tabled at Geneva in February 1982 would have limited the number of SS12/22 missiles to those deployed as of 1 January 1982, namely around 100 missiles. Even if all such single warhead missiles were deployed in Eastern Europe (as NATO's plans have always assumed they would be), it is difficult to see how they could duplicate the target set of 729 SS20 warheads so long as the numbers remain limited and the development of other comparable missiles is precluded. Nor does the modernisation and replacement, within existing numbers, of the Scud by the SS23 do much to change the picture.

/A further

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A further relevant point is that the limited number of such shorter range Soviet systems permitted within the provisions of the US draft Treaty would themselves be vulnerable to NATO forces, together with their nuclear storage sites, in so far as they were based forward in Eastern Europe. In that respect also the position is quite different from that of the SS20s based far back in the Soviet Union in a 'sanctuary' beyond the reach of NATO's LRINF.

I am copying this letter to John Coles at No 10 and to David Goodall at the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

R C Mottram Esq
PS/Secretary of State for Defence

DEFENCE
INF PT 4

15 1983





With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Attachment to Peter Ricketts' letter of 19/12 : INF: SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS

Hm Foxester 19/12

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

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/ 12.
p.a.

EXPLANATION OF US DRAFT TREATY

THE DRAFT TREATY ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TABLED BY THE UNITED STATES PROVIDES FOR LIMITS ON SOVIET SHORTER-RANGE INF MISSILES. SUCH MISSILES, IF LEFT UNCONSTRAINED, COULD UNDERCUT AN AGREEMENT APPLYING ONLY TO LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES. SPECIFICALLY, ARTICLE IV OF THE US DRAFT TREATY LIMITS THE NUMBER OF SS-12/22 AND SS-X-23 MISSILES TO THE NUMBER DEPLOYED ON JANUARY 1, 1982. ARTICLE IV FURTHER PROVIDES THAT THE RANGE OF THE SS-12/22 AND SS-X-23 SHALL NOT BE INCREASED. WHILE REPLACEMENT OF THE SS-12/22 AND SS-X-23 BY NEW SYSTEMS OF COMPARABLE RANGE AND CAPABILITY IS PERMITTED, IT MUST TAKE PLACE ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS. FINALLY, MIRVING THE SS-12/22, SS-X-23 OR ANY REPLACEMENT MISSILE IS PROHIBITED.

AFTER CONSIDERING THESE PROVISIONS AND OTHERS FOR POSSIBLE INCORPORATION IN THE DRAFT TREATY, WE DECIDED THAT THE LIMITATIONS IN ARTICLE IV WERE SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT THE AIMS OF THE TREATY, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE, I.E., THE ELIMINATION OF ALL LRINF MISSILES.

1. IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS TREATY, THE NUMBER OF MISSILES DEPLOYED OF THE TYPES DESIGNATED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AS THE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) (END UNDERLINE), THE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) (END UNDERLINE), AND THE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) (END UNDERLINE), WHICH ARE KNOWN TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS, RESPECTIVELY, THE SS-12/22, AND THE SS-23, SHALL NOT BE INCREASED ABOVE THE NUMBER DEPLOYED AS OF JANUARY 1, 1982.

AS SPECIFIED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.

2. THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS OF GLCMS OF SUCH TYPES DEPLOYED SHALL NOT BE INCREASED ABOVE THE NUMBER DEPLOYED AS OF JANUARY 1, 1982, AS SPECIFIED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.

3. THE NUMBERS OF ADDITIONAL MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS OF EACH TYPE SHALL NOT BE INCREASED ABOVE THE NUMBERS OF MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS IN EXISTENCE AS OF JANUARY 1, 1982. AS SPECIFIED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.

4. THE MAXIMUM RANGE CAPABILITY OF GLCMS OF SUCH TYPES SHALL NOT BE INCREASED.

5. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO FLIGHT-TEST, PRODUCE, OR DEPLOY NUCLEAR ARMED GLCMS OR NUCLEAR ARMED GLCMS OF TYPES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF THE RANGE OF THE GLBM DESIGNATED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AS THE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) (END UNDERLINE), WHICH IS KNOWN TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS THE SS-12/22, BUT NOT CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF THE RANGE OF THE GLBM DESIGNATED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS THE PERSHING II, WHICH IS KNOWN TO THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AS THE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) (END UNDERLINE), THE RANGES OF WHICH ARE SPECIFIED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.

6. NUCLEAR ARMED GLCMS OR NUCLEAR ARMED GLCMS OF TYPES CAPABLE OF A RANGE COMPARABLE TO THE RANGES OF THE TYPES OF MISSILES REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 1, AND LAUNCHERS OF SUCH MISSILES, MAY BE FLIGHT-TESTED, PRODUCED, OR DEPLOYED BY THE PARTY POSSESSING THE MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 ONLY AS REPLACEMENTS FOR THE MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF THIS ARTICLE. THE REPLACEMENT AND DESTRUCTION OF MISSILES AND

LAUNCHERS PURSUANT TO THIS PARAGRAPH SHALL BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES TO BE AGREED UPON IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.

7. MISSILES OF TYPES SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 6 OF THIS ARTICLE SHALL NOT BE EQUIPPED FOR OR FLIGHT-TESTED OR DEPLOYED WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS.

8. IF A GLBM OR GLCM IS SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 5 OR 6 OF THIS ARTICLE, THEN ALL GLBMS OR GLCMS OF THAT TYPE SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 5 OR 6 OF THIS ARTICLE.

9. THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE SHALL APPLY TO THOSE GLBMS AND GLCMS, AND THEIR LAUNCHERS, WHICH ARE:

- (A) OPERATIONAL;
- (B) IN RESERVE, IN STORAGE, OR MOTHBALLED;
- (C) UNDERGOING OVERHAUL, REPAIR, MODERNIZATION, OR CONVERSION;
- (D) USED FOR TESTING AND TRAINING.

MISSILE SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLE IV:

MISSILES LAUNCHERS

(SS-12/22) LOCATIONS:

- . LOCATION A
- . LOCATION B

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.


(SS-23) LOCATIONS:

- . LOCATION A
- . LOCATION B

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THE MAXIMUM RANGE CAPABILITY OF THE MISSILE DESIGNATED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AS THE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) (END UNDERLINE) WHICH IS KNOWN TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS THE SS-12/22, IS 925 KILOMETERS.

THE MAXIMUM RANGE CAPABILITY OF THE MISSILE DESIGNATED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AS THE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) (END UNDERLINE) WHICH IS KNOWN TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS THE SS-23, IS 500 KILOMETERS.



" Geographical asymmetries created the potential for the Soviets to offset limitations on LRINF to some degree by forward deployment or additional numbers of shorter range systems consideration should be given to the possibility of collateral restraints on shorter range systems to supplement limitations on long range missiles".

(NATO Integrated Decision Document, 12 December 1979)