



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

ILEA

For this meeting you have the following papers

- (i) The paper by Bowden et al - Flag A.
- (ii) A DES note on the feasibility of (i). This follows a meeting with Sir Keith in the Department - Flag B
- (iii) A DES note on direct elections - Flag C
- (iv) A Cabinet Office brief - Flag D.

There is a short pre meeting with Oliver  
Return at 11.30.

AT

5/3



## DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

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FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Andrew Turnbull Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

5 March 1984

*Dear Andrew,*

ILEA

As requested in your letter of 27 February, I am attaching as background for the Prime Minister's meeting tomorrow a short note setting out the issues on direct election versus nomination of ILEA councillors.

My Secretary of State thought that the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Environment might also find it helpful to have the attached note by officials, which gives a preliminary assessment of the main features and implications of the scheme to devolve more power to the boroughs that has been suggested by the three London MPs.

I am copying this letter to John Ballard (Department of the Environment).

*Yours,*

*Elizabeth*

MISS C E HODKINSON  
Private Secretary

The Bowden Scheme for ILEA

1. The paper dated 21 February by Mr Bowden and his colleagues proposes, in essence, that the ILEA's functions should be reallocated as follows:

- (1) Responsibility for higher and (post-18) further education (including adult and youth) and for special schools, to be discharged by a new-style ILEA (ILEA(NS)) acting as a single authority for inner London.
- (2) Responsibility for school education (other than special schools) and pre-19 further education to be discharged by the inner London boroughs, each of which could, if it wished, act jointly with one or more other such boroughs.

2. The intention is to make the boroughs have the effective direction and control of policy for, and management of, school education (except special schools). That intention is incompatible with allocating certain functions to the ILEA(NS) as proposed in the paper:

- (1) There can be only one authority formally employing staff with the ultimate power to appoint, dismiss, deploy, settle conditions of service; that authority must, under the Bowden scheme approach be the borough.
- (2) The main responsibility for in-service training goes with responsibility for employing teachers and for the curriculum. It must therefore be allocated to the boroughs.
- (3) School inspectors need to be answerable to the authority which controls the schools ie the boroughs.

Moreover since responsibility for allocating the resources made available to the borough by the ILEA(NS) must rest with the borough, it is more convenient that the borough should pay the bills for which it is responsible, including the staff salary bill (a mechanical operation which is readily integrated with the borough's other payroll functions).

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3. The scheme entails two awkward discontinuities between the boroughs and ILEA(NS):

- (1) Practical and educational arguments are against putting special and other schools under different authorities. Special arrangements would be needed to mitigate, for example, the professional isolation of the special schools.
- (2) The boroughs would have to exercise their duty to provide further education for those aged 16-18 by the purchase of places but without any direct control over the provision made. Policy liaison between boroughs and ILEA(NS) might be difficult on this.

4. The financial proposals solve a familiar difficulty of breaking up ILEA by maintaining the very important mechanism for equalising rateable resources in inner London created by the existence of a uniform education rate for inner London. But they entail certain controversial consequences:

- (1) The authority which spends the rate is not the one which determines and levies it; the body of ratepayers affected by the spending authority's policies and performance is different from the body of ratepayers on whom the rate would be levied (eg a borough's "education rebate" would benefit only a small fraction of the ratepayers who paid the rate originally). Moreover, the rate spending authority cannot ask its own ratepayers to contribute more to education than it receives from the rate-levying authority if it thinks extra money is needed and can be justified. (It may be impossible to enforce a prohibition on applying to education rates levied by the borough.) In some, the normal mechanism by which a local authority is financially accountable to its ratepayers no longer operates either in respect of ILEA(NS) or the boroughs.

- (2) The minimum and maximum share of the budget of the ILEA(NS) which it has to hand over to the borough is determined by the Government, and, given rate-capping, the balance of the budget will be similarly subject to central control.
- (3) The Government also determines how much of that share ILEA(NS) has to give to each borough, since the statutory formula (using for example the same factors as for the distribution of rate support grant) determines precisely the distribution of the sum allotted by the ILEA(NS) for borough purposes.

5. By itself the scheme does not reduce administrative costs, but multiplying the responsible authorities could increase them:

- (1) Common services eg legal, architectural and financial now centralised on County Hall would remain to be performed but would need to be separately provided both by the boroughs and by ILEA(NS).
- (2) The administration of schools functions such as school meals and transport, buildings' maintenance and repair; staffing; and resource allocation is presently carried out wholly by County Hall, not by the ILEA divisions. These functions will need to be split up between the boroughs with the risk of losing any economies of scale.

6. The educational benefits of breaking up the present single schools authority are uncertain. The performance of the schools may improve in some boroughs, but is likely to become worse in others. The disruption of transferring important educational responsibilities to authorities with no experience of them is likely to impair school performance for several years.

7. Since there will be so little linkage between the functions of ILEA's successor authorities, the issue of how they might be constituted is, in principle, simple.

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- (1) The natural course for ILEA(NS) is to make it either a joint board, consisting of borough nominees, as proposed for the joint board in "Streamlining the Cities"; or to make it consist of directly elected members; or to adopt a combination of these two methods.
- (2) The boroughs would have to discharge their responsibilities for school education in the same way as they discharge all their functions viz through the borough's council. But it would be natural to require the boroughs, who would have many of the functions of a LEA, to operate through an Education Committee in respect of their education functions in the manner of a LEA.
- (3) Joint education committees for all school functions have no precedent: where they exist to run major institutions they have often proved a source of friction. If individual boroughs are left to decide whether to come together for education purpose (and if they do, whether subsequently to revert to "independent" status) the system could prove unstable. An alternative is to legislate ab initio for certain boroughs to be permanently combined for education purposes, any subsequent changes requiring further legislation.


8. The proposed reallocation of ILEA' functions is intended to be radical and to give to the boroughs those functions on which the debate about ILEA has focused over the last few years. Certain consequences follow:-

- (1) The proposals differ so much from the Government's hitherto published ones that substantial new consultation is needed.
- (2) Since the proposals entail breaking up ILEA in respect of those of its responsibilities which teachers, parents and others most care about, the controversy about breaking up ILEA will be revived.

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- (3) The legislation, while readily avoiding hybridity, will be complex.
  
- (4) Because the abolition of the GLC entails the abolition of ILEA, it seems inescapable that those parts of the Abolition Bill which will deal with them would have to be put back a year ie until the 1985/6 Session to accommodate the resolution of certain difficulties in the scheme (for example the financial mechanism issues in para 4 above), fresh consultation and working out the details of the break-up of ILEA. In consequence the transition period between the expiry of the mandate of the GLC and ILEA in May 1985 and the establishment of the permanent new regime will be lengthened from one to two years.

5 MAR 1984





C O N F I D E N T I A L

Direct election of the members of the successor authority to ILEA

1. If the members of the education authority for inner London replacing ILEA were to be directly elected, the authority would not be a joint board, as now proposed, but would be something like the School Boards which existed before 1902.

2. The main considerations for preferring direct election to a nominated joint board are:-

- (a) It is favoured by the great majority of responses to the White Paper (246 to 3 out of specific comments received up to 10 February) including the ILEA Conservative Group and 10 of the 12 inner London boroughs. At least 6 of the 12 inner London Conservative MPs are in favour.
- (b) Accountability to the electorate would be beyond question.
- (c) Members could not be overburdened or distracted by their additional role as borough councillors.
- (d) There would be less risk of "second eleven" councillors: in choosing appointees to the joint board the boroughs might wish to keep their best people back for borough work. (But good people determined to serve on the joint board could probably get their way.)
- (e) The simplicity and wide acceptability of direct elections should ease the passage of the Abolition Bill.

3. The considerations against direct elections are:

- (a) There would not be the discipline of balancing the competing claims of services on what ratepayers might

be asked to pay (but rate-capping and statutory consultation with boroughs on the budget weakens this argument).

- (b) Elections on a separate day from borough elections involve extra cost; but if they were held on the same day, voters might be less likely to be guided by their judgment of the education authority's performance.
- (c) Elections held on a separate day might produce a very low turn-out, with bizarre results, eg leading to a hung authority incapable of consistent and resolute action.
- (d) Direct elections for ILEA might lead to requests for direct elections to the other single service joint boards (fire in London, and fire, police and public transport in the MCCs). We would have to argue that education was a special case and that the White Paper had not elicited the same pressure for direct elections for other services.

4. If we adopted direct elections, problems of timing arise. If we legislate in the main abolition Bill, the directly elected authority could not take over until April 1986 following elections in the autumn of 1985, leaving a transitional ILEA appointed by the boroughs between May 1985 and April 1986. If we could legislate this session we could hold elections in May 1985 and do away with the transitional ILEA. But this would greatly complicate the abolition paving legislation and prejudice introduction before Easter. An alternative would be separate legislation brought forward on its merits, irrespective of abolition. This would have the very great merit of reducing further the GLC's role and hence the case for its continued existence.

5. One member per inner London parliamentary constituency would yield too small an authority (29) for the work to be done.

Double-member constituencies, though weakening accountability, might be preferable. Creating new constituencies involves timing problems with the Local Government Boundary Commission.

6. One possibility would be a mixed arrangement eg on the lines of ILEA's present composition, with a majority of directly elected members and one member nominated by each borough (plus up to 3 from the City of London to reflect its large financial contribution to inner London education).



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PRIME MINISTER

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Inner London Education Authority  
(ILEA)

BACKGROUND

The Government's Election Manifesto said, in the context of abolition of the Greater London Council and the metropolitan county councils, that:

'Services which need to be administered over a wider area - such as police and fire, and education in inner London - will be run by joint boards of borough or district representatives'.

2. The Government's plans were set out in more detail in the White Paper 'Streamlining the Cities' (Cmnd. 9063), paragraph 2.20 of which said:

'Education in inner London is the responsibility of the Inner London Education Authority, a special committee of the GLC. The Government consider that a unitary education service, administered by a single education authority, offers at present the best prospect of meeting the educational needs of inner London and improving the standards and cost-effectiveness of the service. Whether that prospect will in practice be realised depends upon the performance of the new single authority; and the Government therefore propose to make the authority subject to review in the light of experience. In order to secure that education policies are developed within the context of the totality of demands being made on inner London ratepayers, the Government propose that the new single authority should be a



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joint board composed of elected representatives nominated by the inner London borough councils and the Common Council. The new authority will thus be based on the boroughs; and the Government will consider whether, within these general arrangements, ways can be found to increase the involvement of the individual borough councils in the educational provision made for their areas.'

3. It has been suggested that these proposals do not go far enough in the direction of giving powers over education to the London boroughs. You are holding a meeting tomorrow to discuss a paper by three London MPs which proposes to give the boroughs extensive powers over nursery, primary and secondary education in inner London. It also raises the question of the constitution of ILEA and borough education committees.

Powers of ILEA and London boroughs

4. Not all the details of the proposals by the three MPs are clear from their paper; but the broad outlines are as follows.

(a) ILEA would remain responsible for higher, further and adult education and for special schools; for certain financial services (including payment of staff); for the central inspectorate; for most aspects of in-service training; and for support services.

(b) The boroughs would become individually responsible for nursery, primary and secondary education. This responsibility would extend to the organisation of schools; the appointment, promotion and dismissal of staff (including head teachers), and the release of staff for in-service training;



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articles and instruments of Government and the appointment of governors; curriculum, administration and discipline; most services other than teaching; and the funding of voluntary schools.

(c) At least the bulk of finance for education would continue to be raised by ILEA, which would set its budget (subject to rate-capping) and decide how large a proportion of that budget should be devoted to normal under-19 education. This would be distributed to the boroughs according to a statutory formula. Each borough would be entitled to spend less than its allocation and to distribute the savings to its rate-payers. (It is not clear to what extent, if at all, the boroughs could supplement their allocations from ILEA). The boroughs would reimburse ILEA for all salaries and redundancy payments (since ILEA would be responsible for paying staff). The boroughs would own the schools for which they were responsible and be entitled to retain the proceeds of any disposals. (It is not clear whether they would also be responsible for financing new school building.)

#### Constitution of ILEA and borough education committees

5. Paragraph 3.5 of Cmnd. 9063 proposed that the smallest inner London borough council should nominate three members, and that the others should nominate additional members in proportion to the size of their electorate. The Common Council should also appoint three members. This would result in a board of about 50 members: the White Paper argued that a body of about the size of the present ILEA (48 members) was needed to cope with the workload.

6. The three MPs appear to regard an approach on these lines as acceptable. But they suggest as an alternative direct election of persons to serve both as members of ILEA and as members of their borough's education committee.



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MAIN ISSUES

7. As the three MPs recognise, their proposals are a radical departure from Cmnd. 9063 (and indeed, the Manifesto). They could clearly not be accepted without full consideration by Ministers collectively. The main purpose of tomorrow's meeting will therefore be to consider whether they are sufficiently promising for further work on them to be commissioned.

8. The main relevant considerations seem to be as follows.

(i) What are the educational merits of the proposed new organisation?

(ii) Does the proposed new organisation seem likely to be workable?

(iii) Would it have significant implications for the Government's other abolition proposals?

Educational merits

9. This is an aspect on which the Secretary of State for Education and Science and Mr Dunn will be able to give detailed advice. However, the proposal appears to meet some of the main concerns that have been expressed in previous discussions.

(a) Higher and further education in London would continue to be organised on a basis wider than the individual boroughs.

(b) There would be explicit provision for cooperative arrangements between more than one borough.



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(c) The financial arrangements would offer incentives to cost-effectiveness.

Organisational aspects

10. The meeting will wish to explore a number of questions here.

(a) Would it be reasonable to make ILEA responsible for raising at least the great bulk of the finance for nursery, primary and secondary education when it would have virtually no control of their management? Would ILEA, for example, have to find the money to fund a new way of organising schools that was significantly higher than the average, or a curriculum with higher unit costs? (Both matters would be for the boroughs). Would the division of responsibility for appointment and management of staff and responsibility for paying them be viable: you will recall that somewhat similar proposals for making the Exchequer responsible for teachers' pay have previously been rejected as unworkable.

(b) One of the advantages of the proposals is that they would retain the ILEA precept and so reduce the burden that would otherwise probably fall on the London rates equalisation scheme (cf. paragraphs 5.5 and 5.6 of Cmnd. 9063). Indeed, so far as nursery, primary and secondary education were concerned, ILEA would have little of substance to do except act as a machine for financial redistribution. But would the richer London boroughs accept the system if its proceeds could be used to enable other boroughs to pay a 'dividend' to their ratepayers? Similarly, would it be accepted that individual boroughs should be entitled to the proceeds of disposing of property the purchase of which had been funded by all inner London ratepayers?





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(c) There would be obvious objections to allowing ILEA to decide on the distribution of funds between individual boroughs: as the three MPs imply, the distribution formula would probably have to be laid down in statute (or perhaps it might be determined by, or subject to the approval of, the Secretary of State). But this would be a novel constitutional arrangement: central Government or Parliament laying down in detail how a local body (either directly elected or appointed from persons directly elected) and raising all its funds locally, should spend those funds on a service for which neither central Government nor Parliament had any direct managerial responsibility or involvement.

#### Implications for other abolition proposals

11. Education in inner London is sui generis; and transferring further powers to the boroughs would be fully in accordance with the spirit of the Government's proposals on abolition of the GLC and the metropolitan county councils. Nevertheless, Ministers will wish to consider whether abandoning the proposal to run education in inner London through a joint board might be thought to indicate doubts about the ability of joint boards to run services such as fire and the police.

#### Timetable

12. The meeting will also need to bear in mind the constraints of the legislative timetable. Parliamentary Counsel has already expressed concern that many policy decisions necessary for the abolition legislation have yet to be taken. The legislation is bound to be long, complicated and controversial; and it should be introduced as early as possible in the 1984-85 Session of Parliament. If policy on education in inner London is thrown into the melting pot, there could be a serious threat to the timetable.



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13. One possibility, if Ministers regarded the proposals as attractive, but not so compelling as to merit immediate adoption, would be to have them worked out as a possible input to the review of the working of ILEA to which the Government is committed under paragraph 2.20 of Cmnd. 9063.

#### Constitution of ILEA

14. As noted earlier, one of the approaches suggested by the three MPs seems to coincide quite closely with the Government's existing proposals. Ministers have previously considered and rejected the alternative of direct elections to ILEA. As the MPs say, if the Government's proposals relating to the powers and future of ILEA are to be significantly changed, it may be better to defer decisions on constitution and appointments until decisions have been taken on powers and functions. But there is one point that Ministers may wish to consider in any event. If the Government were to modify its proposals in the direction of giving ILEA fewer powers and responsibilities, it might seem odd to give ILEA the additional authority that would presumably attach to appointment by direct election. It would seem more logical to maintain broadly the existing approach to appointments.

#### HANDLING

15. It will probably be convenient to divide the meeting into two main parts:

- (i) organisation of nursery, primary and secondary education in inner London; and
- (ii) constitution of ILEA.

The Secretary of State for Education and Science might be invited to open each part of the discussion; Mr Dunn will



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no doubt be able to give further details of the three MPs' proposals. The Secretary of State for the Environment will wish to comment from the standpoint of the Government's general proposals on abolition; he may also wish to draw attention to possible consequences for the legislative timetable of any big change of plan.

Mr Jenkins is in  
to House; N. Waldgrave  
is coming instead.

#### CONCLUSIONS

16. You will wish the meeting to decide whether the proposals from the three MPs seem worth pursuing as a basis for further work as regards either or both of:

(i) the organisation of education in inner London;  
and

(ii) the constitution of ILEA.

If they are considered worth pursuing, it is likely to be appropriate to ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science to take the lead in arranging for further work. The appropriate forum for collective discussion, at least initially, seems to be the Ministerial Group on the Abolition of the GLC and the Metropolitan County Councils (MISC 95).

*M.S.B.*

M S BUCKLEY  
Cabinet Office.

5 March, 1984

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✓  
cc Mr Lehin

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

27 February 1984

ILEA

Three London MPs came to see the Prime Minister recently to urge that, within ILEA, more power be devolved to the boroughs. The Prime Minister asked them to set out their views on paper and at greater length. This they have now done and you already have a copy of their paper. Before deciding whether to pursue their ideas, the Prime Minister would like to hold a meeting with your Secretary of State and Mr. Dunn.

She has suggested that such a meeting could also consider the related question of the way in which the Board of ILEA is constituted. I understand that this is principally a matter for the Secretary of State for the Environment. I would be grateful, therefore, if John Ballard, to whom I am copying the Bowden/Stevens/Wheeler paper, could let me know whether his Secretary of State is content with a joint meeting and, if so, whether a short note can be produced setting out the issues on direct election versus nomination of ILEA councillors.

A meeting has been arranged for 6 March. <sup>yes</sup> Could you and John Ballard confirm that this is acceptable? In view of the sensitivity of these issues, I would be grateful if the MPs' paper could be made available only to those officials who need to know of it.

I am copying this letter to John Ballard (Department of the Environment).

Andrew Turnbull

Miss Elizabeth Hodkinson  
Department of Education and Science.

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PRIME MINISTER

c.c. Oliver Letwin

ILEA: DEVOLUTION TO BOROUGHES

The three London MPs have produced their study on the possibility of devolving more power to the boroughs within the ILEA structure. It was produced with the help of Oliver Letwin and Stuart Sexton in DES.

Though Bob Dunn may feel that the scheme is feasible, the formal view of the Department, as represented by the views of the Secretary of State, is that the earlier consultation paper represents the most that can be achieved.

Before you talk to the MPs again, you will probably want to hold a meeting with Sir Keith and Bob Dunn to decide whether to pursue these ideas.

Yes [initials]

In addition to the distribution of responsibilities within ILEA, there is the question of the way in which the board of ILEA is constituted. Both Sir Keith and Patrick Jenkin may wish to give further thought to the direct election of ILEA councillors. The responses to the consultation process have revealed substantial support for this. You might, therefore, like the meeting to cover this issue as well and to include Patrick Jenkin.

Wavy line

If time can be found, the Policy Unit would be willing to go through the MPs' paper with you.

Agree:

(i) A meeting with Ministers?

Yes

(ii) Both responsibilities within ILEA and the constitution of ILEA be on the agenda?

Yes

Do you want an internal briefing first?

Yes

AS

[initials]

A

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PRIME MINISTER

ILEA

Following our recent meeting I now attach a paper prepared by Martin Stevens, John Wheeler and Gerry Bowden.

— — —  
I shall, of course, be discussing this paper with Keith.

—————  
*Bob Dunn*

BOB DUNN

23 February 1984

SECRET AND PERSONAL

PRIME MINISTER

ILEA: DEVOLUTION TO BOROUGHES

At our recent meeting in the House of Commons, we discussed the future of the ILEA. You asked us to consult with Bob Dunn about the feasibility of devolving power over inner London schools to the boroughs.

We have now considered the matter, and have concluded that it would be feasible to devolve effective powers over schools to the boroughs, whilst leaving some central services and other powers in the hands of the new ILEA.

Though we talk, throughout, of the 'boroughs', we assume that each borough would be entitled, if it so wished, to combine with its neighbour or neighbours to form a joint education committee. This would be particularly likely to occur in Fulham & Hammersmith, and Kensington & Chelsea, which are already combined to form a single ILEA division. Given this permission to combine, the boroughs or combinations of boroughs would, in almost all cases, be able to take over most of the ILEA divisional officers, and could thereby avoid the need for massive redundancies or wholly new bureaucratic structures.

1. POWERS REMAINING WITH THE ILEA

Our aim is to reap the maximum political benefit with the minimum political fuss. We therefore recommend that a single Inner London Education Authority should remain, under its present name, and that it should be allowed to retain those of its powers and duties that are least politically sensitive. The new ILEA would continue to control:

- higher education;
- further education;
- adult education;
- the youth service;
- special schools;
- central financial services, including payment systems for staff;
- the central inspectorate;

(2)

- in-service training,  
(subject to conditions given below);
- support services, including statistics,  
libraries and transport;  
(subject to conditions given below).

## 2. POWERS DEVOLVED TO THE BOROUGHES

Finance for Schools. Our aim is to ensure that the boroughs can exercise effective control over their own nursery, primary and secondary schools. To this end, we should give them real financial power.

The ILEA would apply a rate by direct billing, and would set its total budget, subject to rate-capping. It would then determine the proportion of that budget, and the share of the reserve fund, to be devoted to normal under-19 education. (To avoid any chance of the authority abusing the power, it might be wise to set upper and lower limits on the proportion devoted to such education in statutory regulations.)

The ILEA would distribute the allocated funds to the boroughs, according to a statutory formula, taking into account GRE factors. The boroughs would then be free to spend these funds as they saw fit. (Pupils belonging to one borough, but educated in another, would be covered by the normal recoupment procedures.)

To provide the boroughs with a real incentive to be cost-effective, we suggest that they should be allowed to save as much of their allotted education funds as they are able, and that they should have the right to distribute these saved funds to their own borough's ratepayers in the form of an 'education rebate'.

Ownership of Schools. The ownership of functioning schools and related property, and of any disused schools not being employed for other purposes, would be statutorily transferred to the boroughs. The recipient boroughs would be entitled to sell off any unnecessary property, and would be allowed either to retain the proceeds or to distribute them in the form of a 'capital rebate' to ratepayers. (This would give the sensible boroughs an incentive to sell off the unwanted assets more rapidly than the ILEA has been willing to do.)



(3)

Specific Powers. The boroughs would control:

- (i) The organization of schools. A borough would have authority to propose changes in the size and type of its schools, subject only to the Secretary of State - who would, of course, consider all proposals on their educational merits. The ILEA would have no veto.
- (ii) Appointment and in-service training of staff. The ILEA would remain the nominal employer and paymaster of its staff, but a borough would be given the statutory authority that a normal LEA at present possesses to appoint, promote and dismiss all staff in its nursery, primary and secondary schools, though ILEA inspectors might be consulted as at present. (The most important effect of the change would be to give the boroughs power over the appointment and dismissal of heads.) The borough would be compelled to reimburse the ILEA for all salaries and redundancy payments. The borough would decide which, if any, of its teachers should be released for ILEA in-service training; and it would have a power, though not a duty, to provide additional or replacement training of its own.
- (iii) Articles and Instruments of Government. The borough would have the same responsibility for providing articles and instruments of school government in its area that a LEA normally has.
- (iv) Appointment of Governors. All but one of the LEA-nominated governors would be appointed by the borough, which would be statutorily obliged to ensure that the numbers of LEA governors representing political parties were proportional to the political composition of the borough council. The remaining one governor would be appointed by the ILEA. (We believe that this last move would be a fairly harmless and politically astute concession.)
- (v) Curriculum, Admissions and Discipline. The borough would take on the ILEA's powers over curriculum, admissions, and discipline, subject only to present statutory procedures and to the powers of governors and head teachers.
- (vi) 16-19 Education. The borough would provide education for 16-19 year olds, either in borough schools or by purchasing places in FE colleges run by the ILEA or other education authorities.

(4)

- (vii) Other Services. The borough would also finance and statutorily be responsible for: meals, milk, repairs, maintenance, cleaning, welfare benefits, the careers service, enforcement of attendance via the EWS, and transport. But a borough might well choose to contract with the ILEA or with private firms to provide any or all of these services.
- (viii) Funding of Voluntary Schools. Voluntary schools - both aided and controlled - would be maintained by the borough. (This would enable sensible boroughs to end the ILEA's present policy of antagonism to the voluntary sector.)

#### 4. CONSTITUTION OF THE ILEA AND BOROUGH EDUCATION COMMITTEES

The new ILEA could be constituted in two ways:

- either as an authority composed of persons specifically elected on a constituency basis both as the members of their borough education committee and as their borough's representatives on the ILEA;
- or as a joint board composed of delegated borough councillors.

If the joint board solution is preferred, the boroughs could:

- either be equally represented (eg by three members each);
- or be represented proportionally to population.

Under any of these arrangements, the boroughs would have their own education committees, which might be composed:

- either of those who had been specifically elected to serve both as the borough's education councillors and as its representatives on the ILEA, together with co-opted members;
- or of a full complement of borough councillors.

We believe that decisions between these constitutional options could be left until a decision has been made about the principle of devolution.

(5)

In either case, the Borough's education committee would comprise the same individuals who, together, form the ILEA. Whereas, at present, the ILEA Schools Committee - dealing with 1,000 schools - relies unduly on officers' advice, we would be devolving responsibility for their local areas to those ILEA members most familiar with them. This can rightly be presented as a move towards greater democracy.

If ILEA members are to be elected - ordinarily on the same date as Borough Council elections - they can be made ex officio voting members of their Borough Councils, and thus subject to the conflicting demands of other spending committees.

5. TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Since the GLC will be under the control of the boroughs from the end of the present administration in 1985 until the new arrangements come into effect in 1986, it will be natural, during the same period, to leave the present ILEA administrative structure intact and to give the transitional GLC administration control over it.

In 1986, the devolved system of school administration could be introduced; and the ILEA could be transformed either into a joint board or into an authority composed of members specifically elected to serve as their borough's education committee members as ILEA representatives.


The transitional administration would have responsibility, through its Staff Commission, for ensuring that any ILEA officers made redundant by the devolution of control over the schools, were properly looked after.

6. A NEW CONSULTATIVE PAPER

The proposals outlined in this minute are too radical a departure from the White Paper to be presented as the Government's response to the present consultation exercise. They would have to be announced in a new Consultative Paper, in which the Government would need to describe the reasons for its change of heart. This would, of course, present problems of presentation; but we consider that, with skilful drafting, such problems could be overcome.

P.P. B.B.

GERRY BOWDEN MP

  
MARTIN STEVENS JP MP

  
JOHN WHEELER JP MP

21st February, 1984.

Prime Minister

MEETING WITH MARTIN STEVENS AND JOHN  
WHEELER - TUESDAY 31ST JANUARY 1984  
AT 4.00 P.M.

---

I attach a copy of a letter which Martin  
Stevens and John Wheeler sent to the  
Chief Whip in December. They are coming  
tomorrow to put their views about ILEA  
to you.

Bob Dann will also be coming to the  
meeting, but there will be no officials  
present, and the meeting will be an  
informal one.

MICHAEL ALISON  
30.1.84



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

21st December, 1983.

Inner London Education Authority

You asked for a written note on our case for the direct election - on a constituency basis - of future members of the ILEA.

Inner London has been a single education authority since 1870. There is a strong case, which the Government have accepted, for maintaining the ILEA as a unitary authority, incorporating the inspectorate; research and statistics; Teachers Centres; negotiating responsibilities, for example, with the Diocesan Boards; special schools; further and higher education; adult education; property management; procurement; finance and inter-borough equalisation schemes; and indoor and outdoor sports facilities.

What is needed is greater accountability, and - for teachers, no less than pupils - an end to the imposition of a single Far Left educational philosophy on the thousand-odd schools in the area.

Under the present arrangements, where GLC representatives for the Inner London Boroughs form the majority of the ILEA's membership, it is a matter of luck whether or not they have a special interest in Education. Bryn Davies, ILEA Leader 1981-1983, stated in his election campaign that he 'disliked children and knew nothing of education'. But would things be better with an all-Borough-Council membership? Councillors are already overworked, and face new burdens with the ending of the GLC. The best among them will be Committee Chairmen. Those allocated to the ILEA are likely to include a high proportion of duds - and Left-Wing duds at that.

The direct election of one or more ILEA members per constituency will mean:

1. that candidates will be likely to have special knowledge of, and interest in, education.
2. they will be less likely to have conflicting local government responsibilities.

(2)

3. they will include a higher proportion of Conservatives than would be the case if they were to be nominated by the Boroughs.
4. they would be more accountable, since we would expect their rate demands to be distributed independently of Borough and Police rates.

We also believe strongly that day-to-day responsibility for running Secondary, Primary and Nursery schools - including the appointment of Heads - should be divolved to the Boroughs, who could form partnerships with other Boroughs if they choose. (e.g. Kensington & Chelsea plus Hammersmith & Fulham already comprise Division 1, one of the ILEA's ten fully-staffed Divisions.)

We have reason to believe that parents and the teachers' unions would accept this. In addition:

1. Three or four of the local bodies would be Conservative-dominated, thus giving a real choice to teachers and parents alike.
2. Better results, at lower costs, from Conservative areas would gradually force Labour boroughs to move towards more effective (and therefore more popular) educational methods.
3. Disciplinary decisions, in Conservative areas, would once again be matters for individual heads. It would also be for each Borough to decide whether it wished to recommend pupils for grant-aid to attend independent schools. We would like to see the Careers Officers appointed locally, to reduce their present negative attitude towards employment.
4. In Conservative boroughs, we could begin the long fight back towards the concept of teaching as a vocation (from which unsuitable individuals could be ejected.) We could also seek to re-establish the Work Ethic.
5. Decisions affecting individual schools and pupils would be taken locally, and not duplicated - slowly and expensively - by interference, as at present, from County Hall.

(3)

We have discussed these issues several times with Keith Joseph, and have also asked Michael Alison to arrange for us to see the Prime Minister. We have the support of members of the Inner London Group of Conservative MP's, the Conservative GLC Councillors and the Conservative Inner London Boroughs, for these two suggestions.

We must tell you that many of us would find it difficult to support the Government's present proposals.

Best wishes.



John Wheeler

Martin Stevens

The Rt. Hon. John Wakeham, M.P.

Peter Brooke  
Bob Inman

OR

MICHAEL

Sorry - did we  
take first,  
please?  
Five later  
development!  
Ten

Could you possibly have  
a word with David Barclay?  
He would like to know whether  
a DES Minister should be  
present at the meeting  
tomorrow. Originally you  
said that there would be  
no need. Is it purely  
political? Will the PM  
need any form of briefing?

30/1

← No. →



31/1/84

✓  
Fr House of Commons.

10th January 1984

Thank you for your letter of 19th December, asking whether you and John Wheeler could come to see the Prime Minister. Would 4.00 p.m. on Tuesday, 31st January, be convenient for you both?

Perhaps you could kindly let me know by telephoning my secretary, Mrs Tessa Gaisman, on 930-4433.

MICHAEL ALISON

Martin Stevens Esq JP MP

B/F.

~~Thes or Thuss~~  
~~with Jan~~  
Thes. 31st

28th December 1983

I am just writing to acknowledge your letter of 19th December, addressed to Mr Michael Alison.

Mr Alison is, as present, away from the office. However, I will make sure that he sees your letter, and its enclosure, as soon as he returns, and I know that he will be in touch with you about the possibility of your coming to see the Prime Minister.

Tessa Gaisman (Mrs)  
Political Office

Martin Stevens Esq JP MP

From: Martin Stevens, J.P., M.P.



House of Commons  
London SW1A 0AA  
Private Secretary: 01- 219 5476

19th December, 1983.

Our ref: GOV/83

*See Michael*

Inner London Education Authority

With reference to my request for a meeting with the Prime Minister last October, you may like to see the attached copy of the letter John Wheeler and I have today sent to the Chief Whip.

We take the matters discussed very seriously, and shall be grateful for an opportunity to present our arguments to the Prime Minister.

All best wishes.

*Yours  
Martin*

The Rt. Hon. Michael Alison, MP