



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister (2)

18 April 1984

To note.

Joe John,

Dms
19/4Chemical Weapons: US Draft Treaty

Today Vice President Bush tabled at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva the text of the US draft Treaty on chemical weapons, as foreshadowed in President Reagan's announcement of 5 April. I enclose the text of the statement issued by FCO News Department in Mr Luce's name at 1230 hrs today, welcoming the US initiative. I also enclose a background note on the state-of-play in the CD negotiations.

The text of the draft treaty, received late yesterday afternoon, follows closely the contents of the draft on which we were consulted by the US on 4 April in London and later in NATO. We provided considered views at short notice, and some of our comments have been taken into account, particularly on the relationship between the principal organs responsible for implementing the Convention and on definitions of chemical weapons. The Russians and others are likely to be hostile to the US proposal - described by the US as the "open invitation" to inspection - that there should be no exceptions to unrestricted challenge inspection; FCO and MOD officials are considering its implications for our own security interests.

Nevertheless, the US draft Treaty represents a major Western contribution to the Geneva negotiations. While we and our European allies may continue to have reservations about the extent of verification, it will be important to maintain overall Alliance solidarity behind the US initiative if the negotiations are to succeed.

The negotiations will adjourn on 26 April, to resume on 12 June until the end of August. We shall have further consultations with the Americans not only on aspects of their text but on tactics to be pursued when the negotiations resume in June. We shall also discuss with them what steps might be taken to maintain the negotiating momentum during the Autumn, when the Conference on Disarmament adjourns for the UN General Assembly.

/I am

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I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosures
to Richard Mottram (MOD) and David Goodall (Cabinet Office).

Two -

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'R B Bone'.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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cc: Sir P. Croad.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 April, 1984

Chemical Weapons: US Draft Treaty

The Prime Minister has seen and noted your letter of 18 April to John Coles on the above subject.

DAVID BARCLAY

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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STATEMENT BY MR LUCE

WEDNESDAY 18 APRIL 1984

Today the United States Vice-President Mr George Bush has tabled at the 40-Nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a draft treaty for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. We and our other NATO allies were consulted on the draft treaty. And, as the Prime Minister told the House of Commons of 5 April, the British Government warmly supports this latest initiative. We hope it will hasten progress towards early agreement on a comprehensive and verifiable ban on the manufacture, stockpiling and use of these appalling weapons of mass destruction. The British Government have played a leading role in the international efforts to achieve such a ban. At the CD negotiations we have made a series of proposals on monitoring of compliance, on verification of non-diversion of civil chemicals into illicit chemical weapons stockpiles, and on challenge inspection in cases of suspected non-compliance: I tabled this latest initiative in Geneva on 14 February. At a time when chemical weapons have recently been used, it is more important than ever that we should secure a comprehensive ban. Agreement on a treaty would constitute a significant advance in practical arms control, and a major contribution to international security.



CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS

Western Aims

1. In the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, we are trying to negotiate a total, worldwide ban on the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and the destruction of present holdings. The key elements in this ban will be:

- (i) declarations by all parties of current stockpiles and production facilities;
- (ii) agreement to destroy over a ten-year period such stockpiles and facilities;
- (iii) acceptance of arrangements to verify the above destruction procedures;
- (iv) acceptance of verification that CW will not be produced in civil chemical industries, and that the permitted small-scale production facilities (designed purely for defensive purposes) are not being diverted to other ends; and
- (v) the establishment of a Consultative Committee, an Executive Council, a Technical Secretariat, and a fact-finding panel.

History of Negotiations

2. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 banned the use of CW (interpreted by many in the West as meaning the first use); but it made no provisions for other constraints on CW. Various efforts to achieve a comprehensive ban were made after the Second War, culminating in a UK draft Treaty submitted to the (then) CCD in 1976. This however was almost immediately overtaken by US/Soviet agreement to initiate bilateral negotiations on a total ban. These began in 1977 and were suspended in 1980, following lack of success largely due to Soviet refusal to accept the necessary degree of verification.

3. Since 1980, key dates have been:

1982 February: UK paper to CD on compliance;

June: Gromyko statement to UN Special Session, accepting principle of on-site inspection but emphasising need for voluntary nature and inspection quotas;

July: Soviet working paper containing these proposals;

/1983



1983 January: Prague Declaration, advocating CW-free zone in Europe;

February: Vice-President Bush presents US Detailed Views to CD;

March: Mr Hurd presents UK paper to CD on Non-Production (ie non-diversion of civil chemicals into illicit weapons production);

April/June: Other working papers on CW tabled at CD by West and non-aligned;

July: US paper on Stockpile Destruction presented to CD;

August: UK second paper for CD on Non-Production;

November: US-sponsored visit for all CD members (only Romania attended from East) to stockpile destruction facility at Tooele;

1984 January: Soviet repeat of CW-free zone in Europe proposal;

US announcement at CDE of full draft Treaty to be tabled in CD;

February: Mr Luce tabled UK paper on Challenge Inspection;

Soviet acceptance of continuous on-site inspection (OSI) for stockpile destruction;

CW negotiations resumed in CD;

18 April: Bush tabled US draft Treaty.

State of Negotiations

4. Whereas in 1983 we trod water while the Russians refused to reveal further details of their negotiating hand, in 1984 the negotiations have already achieved a new momentum. The US announcement of their draft Treaty provided a higher profile; the UK paper on challenge inspection was warmly welcomed both in the CD and in the UK; and the Russians made one concession in dropping their demand for quota inspection and accepting the principle of routine OSI on a mandatory, not voluntary basis. They earlier accepted the principle of challenge inspection as well, but continue to insist that this can only be conducted on a voluntary basis. The US draft Treaty should maintain this new momentum and ensure that the negotiating initiative remains with the West. Reports of CW use (by Iraq) in the Gulf War, confirmed and condemned by the UN, have also highlighted the dangers of unrestrained CW capabilities; and have focussed more public interest and attention on the issue, including the CD negotiations.

/Verification



Verification

5. The verification provisions for any CW ban will be the key factor in its acceptability to the West. They will provide special problems since we are breaking new ground in arms control by trying to eliminate an entire area of weaponry which has already been well developed and which is closely linked with continued production for civil purposes. Moreover, CW are easily concealed and transported.

6. In Western proposals we are seeking to verify:

- (a) initial declarations of stockpiles and production facilities;
- (b) the destruction of stockpiles;
- (c) the elimination of production facilities;
- (d) non-production of CW under the guise of the civil chemical industry; and
- (e) the operation of permitted facilities.

7. We conceive of two means of verifying these elements:

- (i) routine on-site inspection of various degrees of stringency. In the case of item (a)-(c) above, the need for inspection arrangements should decrease over the ten-year period while destruction was taking place. Inspection for items (d) and (e) above would however continue indefinitely;
- (ii) challenge inspection. This would impose on all parties the acceptance of ad hoc inspection in cases of suspected non-compliance which were not resolvable by other inspection means.

8. The current US proposals envisage mandatory acceptance, at short notice, of inspection on demand of all military and Government-related facilities. This sweeping provision is sure to provoke a hostile Soviet reaction; other CD members may also be reluctant to grant such comprehensive access to sensitive facilities to international inspection teams. The Americans claim that, given the special problems of a CW ban, only such a comprehensive regime would be adequate to meet their concerns. They have however made it clear that they are ready to consider any other proposals which could in sum have an equivalent effect. The successful resolution of this issue, in the course of further negotiations, will be the key to the achievement of an acceptable and enduring Treaty.

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