

OO SEOUL

OO WASHINGTON

OO BONN

OO BRUSSELS

OO ROME

OO UKDEL NATO

OO MODUK (FOR DS 17 AND DUS (P))

GRS 500

DESKBY 241145Z

SECRET

FM THE HAGUE 241115Z APRIL 84

TO IMMEDIATE, FCO DESKBY 241145Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 143 OF 24 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE SEOUL (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY) WASHINGTON
 BONN BRUSSELS ROME UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (FOR DS 17
 AND DUS (P))

MY TEL NO. 142

NETHERLANDS/INF

SUMMARY

1. SEE BELOW FOR AN ACCOUNT OF US/NETHERLANDS DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT SINCE THE END OF MARCH, AND MIFT FOR A SUMMARY OF THE LATEST NETHERLANDS PRESS REPORTS.

DETAIL

2. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS OF A BRIEFING GIVEN US THIS MORNING BY THE US EMBASSY (WHO ARE ALSO INFORMING THE BELGIAN, FRG AND ITALIAN EMBASSIES) :

- (A) FOLLOWING THE DEFENCE POLICY STEERING GROUP MEETING OF 31 MARCH (OUR TEL NO. 114) THE DUTCH FLOATED WITH THE AMERICANS THE SO-CALLED "CRISIS DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT" (IE A PLAN WHICH WOULD INVOLVE BRINGING CRUISE MISSILES INTO THE NETHERLANDS ONLY IN TIME OF CRISIS). THE US HAVE SINCE HAD A NUMBER OF MEETINGS WITH THE DUTCH - THE US EMBASSY WILL NOT SAY AT WHAT LEVEL - IN ORDER TO "EXPLORE" THE CONCEPT (NOT REPEAT NOT TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT IT).
- (B) THE US LINE IN THE TALKS HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY NEGATIVE, WITH HEAVY STRESS ON THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE PLAN (A SERIOUS DEPARTURE FROM THE 1979 DECISION, A BAD PRECEDENT IN VARIOUS RESPECTS ETC). THE AMERICANS HAVE SOUGHT TO MOVE THE DUTCH IN THE DIRECTION OF A PACKAGE INVOLVING DEPLOYMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS.
- (C) THE DUTCH HAVE PRESENTED THEIR PLAN AS THE AGREED VIEW OF THE LEADING CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT AND LIBERAL MINISTERS, WITH THE INFORMAL GLOSS (PRESUMABLY FROM THE MFA) THAT IT IS THE MOST DE RUITER CAN BE MADE TO ACCEPT.
- (D) IN THE PROCESS OF THESE TALKS THE AMERICANS HAVE COME TO REALISE THAT THE DUTCH ARE NOT EVEN FULLY COMMITTED, UNDER THEIR NEW PLAN, TO CONSTRUCTION OF A COMPLETE INF BASE AT WOENSRECHT, OR TO ACCEPTANCE OF A FULL US MILITARY PRESENCE THERE IN PEACETIME. DE RUITER PLAINLY STILL HAS RESERVATIONS

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(E) AS TO WHERE TO PUT THE MISSILES, THE DUTCH HAVE MADE NO SUGGESTIONS, ARGUING THAT THIS IS FOR THE US TO DECIDE. THE AMERICANS HAVE INDIGNANTLY REBUTTED THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT.

THE DUTCH STRESSED THAT THEY SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE PROPOSED PLAN, AND MADE PLAIN THAT THEY HAD VIRTUALLY GIVEN UP THE IDEA OF AN ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE. THEY STRONGLY IMPLIED THAT DE RUITER WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY SCHEME PROVIDING FOR CONSTRUCTION AT WOENSDRECHT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CRISIS DEPLOYMENT OPTION, AND ADDED THAT DE VRIES (CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT FLOORLEADER IN THE SECOND CHAMBER) HAD SAID THAT THE ONLY ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE ACCEPTABLE TO HIS FRACTIE AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR THE DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE ONE CLEARLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION (SIC).

(G) THE US UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE LIBERAL MINISTERS (VAN AARDENNE AND KORTHALS ALTES) TAKING THE LEAD ON THIS SUBJECT HAD IN EFFECT BEEN TELLING LUBBERS THAT ANY SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. THE VVD PARLIAMENTARY PARTY HAD HOWEVER BEEN TAKING A MUCH HARDER LINE, AND NOW APPEARED (SEE MIFT) TO HAVE FORCED THEIR MINISTERS INTO LINE.

(H) THE US EMBASSY SENSE THAT WASHINGTON IS NOW POISED TO TURN DOWN THE 'CRISIS DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT' OUTRIGHT, PERHAPS IN THE CONTEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN LATER THIS WEEK.

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MIPT
NETERLANDS/INF : LATEST PRESS REPORTS

1. SEVERAL PAPERS REPORT THAT INTENSIVE TALKS OVER THE HOLIDAY PERIOD BETWEEN THE LEADING CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT AND LIBERAL MINISTERS HAVE FAILED TO PRODUCE AGREEMENT. THIS IS VARIOUSLY ATTRIBUTED :

- (A) TO VAN DEN BROEK, SAID TO BE FIGHTING HARD AGAINST THE CRISIS DEPLOYMENT PLAN.
- (B) TO STIFF LIBERAL (VVD) OPPOSITION TO THE PLAN. VAN AARDENNE KORTHALS ALTES ARE SAID TO HAVE STRESSED THE CO-RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NETHERLANDS FOR THE 1979 DOUBLE DECISION, AND TO HAVE LEVELLED A NUMBER OF CRITICISMS AGAINST THE PROPOSED SCHEME.

2. NIJPELS (LIBERAL FLORRLEADER IN THE SECOND CHAMBER) MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN AN INTERVIEW IN THE ''NRC HANDELSBLAD'' OF 21 APRIL :

- (A) IF YOU LOOK AT ALL THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE CRISIS DEPLOYMENT PLAN THEN ''IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT THE WHOLE THING IS ENTIRELY HYPOTHETICAL (.....). A PLAN OF THIS KIND SIMPLY DOES NOT FIT THE COMMON DEFENCE POLICY THAT WE HAVE KNOWN FOR 35 YEARS IN THE ALLIANCE. IT CREATES THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE NOT WILLING TO SHARE THE RESPONSIBILITIES INVOLVED IN NATO MEMBERSHIP.''
- (B) ECONOMIC POLICY IS CERTAINLY OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR THE LIBERALS AND WE WOULD CERTAINLY LIKE THIS COALITION TO RUN ITS FULL COURSE (TILL 1986), BUT ''THERE ARE LIMITS, FOR INSTANCE IF THE THE NETHERLANDS SHOULD ADOPT AN ISOLATED POSITION WITHIN NATO, OR DECIDE UNILATERALLY TO GIVE UP NUCLEAR TASKS : WE MUST NOT TAKE ANY STEPS ON A PATH LEADING ULTIMATELY TO NEUTRALITY (.....). THE VVD HAS MADE IT COMPLETELY CLEAR THAT A NO TO DEPLOYMENT IS UNACCEPTABLE. AND WE HAVE ADDED THAT SO FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED DISCUSSION MUST COVER A PACKAGE INVOLVING ALL ELEMENTS OF NUCLEAR DEFENCE POLICY. IT IS NOW UP TO THE CABINET TO DISTILL OUT OF ALL THAT A BALANCED COMPROMISE ACCEPTABLE TO OUR NATO PARTNERS.''
- (C) '' THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UK AND THE FRG SHOWS THAT ONCE THE DEPLOYMENT DECISION IS TAKEN, THEN THE SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC DISCUSSION AND COMMOTION FALL TO PERFECTLY TOLERABLE LEVELS.''
- (D) ''HISTORY SHOWS THAT POLITICAL COURAGE IS ALWAYS REWARDED. I THINK THAT THE 9-14 CDA MEMBERS OF THE SECOND CHAMBER OPEN SQUARE BRACKET CAUSING THE PROBLEM CLOSE SQUARE BRACKET AND ALSO THE RELEVANT MINISTERS NEED TO REMEMBER THIS.''

3. THE SAME INTERVIEW WAS ATTENDED BY VOORHOEVE, ONE OF THE LEADING VVD SECOND CHAMBER DEFENCE SPECIALISTS, WHO COMMENTED AT ONE POINT AS FOLLOWS : ''A NO TO DEPLOYMENT WOULD...

3. THE SAME INTERVIEW WAS ATTENDED BY VOORHOEVE, ONE OF THE LEADING VVD SECOND CHAMBER DEFENCE SPECIALISTS, WHO COMMENTED AT ONE POINT AS FOLLOWS : "A NO TO DEPLOYMENT WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE NETHERLANDS MUST ACCEPT CO-RESPONSIBILITY FOR A DECISION THAT WAS DIFFICULT TO TAKE, BUT THAT WAS AND REMAINS NECESSARY FOR THE ALLIANCE AND ITS POLICY OF PEACE AND SECURITY. FOR US THAT IS A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE, WHICH IS WHY WE CANNOT ACCEPT A NO TOUCHED UP WITH SOMETHING EXTRA ON THE CONVENTIONAL SIDE AND WITH THE RETENTION OF THE PRESENT NUCLEAR TASKS".

4. SEVERAL PAPERS ALSO REFER TO A RECENT OPINION POLL SUGGESTING THAT A COLLAPSE OF THE PRESENT CABINET OVER THE INF ISSUE WOULD COST THE CDA A SUBSTANTIAL CHUNK OF ITS SUPPORT, THE LARGE MAJORITY OF WHICH WOULD GO TO THE VVD.

CCN PARA 2 SUB-PARA A LINE 2 : THING IS ENTIRELY ETC ..

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