

PS  
 PS/LADY YOUNG  
 PS/MR LUCE  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR J BULLARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR JENKINS  
 MR CARTLEDGE

MR COLES NO 10 DOWNING ST  
 MR BLELLOCH DUS(P) MOD  
 HD/DS17 MOD

HD/DEF DEPT  
 HD/ACDD  
 HD/SOV D  
 HD/NAD  
 HD/WED  
 RESIDENT CLERK

SECRET

FROM UKDEL NATO 161608Z MAY 84  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 245 OF 16 MAY  
 AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DS12 AND DS17) ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS BONN  
 COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON LUXEMBOURG OSLO OTTAWA PARIS REYKJAVIK  
 ROME WASHINGTON MADRID UKDEL VIENNA MOSCOW

DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE, 16 MAY: RESTRICTED SESSION  
 SUMMARY

1. RESTRICTED SESSION OF DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE MINISTERIAL  
 DOMINATED BY STRONG APPEAL TO DUTCH TO STAND FIRM ON INF  
 DEPLOYMENT. SPADOLINI (ITALY) MADE A REASSURING STATEMENT ABOUT  
 ITALIAN FAITHFULNESS TO 2-TRACK DECISION. ENGELL (DENMARK)  
 MADE SHORT EMOLLIENT STATEMENT ABOUT FOLKETING RESOLUTIONS ON  
 INF.

DETAIL

2. RESTRICTED SESSION OPENED WITH MEASURED STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN  
 OF MILITARY COMMITTEE ON THE MILITARY IMBALANCE BETWEEN NATO AND  
 THE WARSAW PACT, STRESSING THE NEED FOR NATO TO HAVE A CORRECTLY  
 BALANCED RANGE OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES. AMONG OTHER POINTS, HE  
 MENTIONED THE NEED TO LEARN FROM THE RECENT MAJOR SOVIET NAVAL  
 EXERCISE, BOTH IN RELATION TO NATO REACTIONS AND DECISION-MAKING,  
 AND MILITARILY; AND HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE  
 INFRASTRUCTURE.

3. WEINBERGER (US) REFERRED TO HIS RECENT ANNUAL REPORT TO  
 CONGRESS ON BURDEN-SHARING, THE CONCLUSION OF WHICH WAS THAT ALL  
 COUNTRIES SHOULD DO MORE. HE EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE  
 PACKAGE OF FORCE GOALS ADDRESSED TO SOME COUNTRIES FELL SHORT  
 OF THE 3 PER CENT AIM, WHICH SHOULD BE EASIER TO MEET NOW THAT THE  
 RECESSION WAS ENDING. HE DESCRIBED INFRASTRUCTURE AS THE LITMUS

RECESSION WAS ENDING. HE DESCRIBED INFRASTRUCTURE AS THE LIVING  
TEST OF ALLIED COOPERATION, IMPORTANT, NOT LEAST, IN PROVIDING  
FACILITIES ESSENTIAL TO US REINFORCEMENTS AND IN THE CONTEXT  
OF RESISTING ISOLATIONIST PRESSURES IN THE US.

4. SJAASTAD (NORWAY) EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVEMENTS  
IN CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE AND PARTICULARLY OF INFRASTRUCTURE. IT  
WAS IMPORTANT TO BRING HOME TO THE US CONGRESS THE SIGNIFICANT  
CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH THE EUROPEANS MADE TO THEIR OWN DEFENCE.

5. SPADOLINI (ITALY) SAID THAT ITALY HAD NOT PROPOSED ANY  
MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND REMAINED ENTIRELY FAITHFUL TO  
THE NATO LINE AND TO HER NATO COMMITMENTS. SHE HAD MET HER  
COMMITMENT OF DEPLOYING A FIRST FLIGHT OF OPERATIONAL CRUISE  
MISSILES BY 1 APRIL 1984 AND PREPARATIONS WERE IN HAND FOR THE  
REMAINING FLIGHTS. ITALY WOULD LIKE INF NEGOTIATIONS TO RESUME  
BUT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE DAY WHEN THEY COULD DO SO DID NOT  
APPEAR TO BE CLOSE. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS MUST CONTINUE AT ALL LEVELS  
TO REOPEN DIALOGUE AND ACHIEVE A BALANCE OF FORCES AT THE LOWEST  
LEVEL.

6. ENGELL (DENMARK) SAID THAT THE FOLKETING RESOLUTION OF 3 MAY  
DID NOT ENVISAGE ANY UNILATERAL DANISH STEPS. THE GOVERNMENT  
WERE STUDYING THE RESOLUTION IN ORDER TO DECIDE IN WHAT FORUM  
IT SHOULD BE PURSUED. HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT A SOLUTION TO THE FUNDING  
OF INF WOULD BE FOUND CONSISTENT WITH THE TERMS OF THE FOLKETING  
RESOLUTION OF 10 MAY.

7. WORNER (FRG) SAID THAT THERE WAS AN IMPORTANT CONNECTION  
BETWEEN THE WILLINGNESS OF THE USSR TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS AND  
THE STRENGTH OF NATO. THE LATTER WAS A CONDITION OF THE FORMER.  
NATO MUST NOT APPEAR TO SEEM UNDER TIME PRESSURE.

8. MR HESELTINE SAID THAT NO MEMBER OF NATO COULD MOUNT A CREDIBLE  
DEFENCE IN ISOLATION FROM ITS ALLIES; ALL WERE INTERDEPENDENT.  
SOLIDARITY MUST BE PRESERVED IN THE EYES OF THE USSR. IN THE UK,  
AS IN OTHER COUNTRIES, THERE WERE PRESSURE GROUPS TRYING TO  
UNDERMINE NATIONAL RESOLVE. A FIRST SMALL CONCESSION BY ONE  
COUNTRY TO SUCH PRESSURE COULD BE THE BEGINNING OF AN UNRAVELLING  
PROCESS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. HE WAS CONSTANTLY ASKED WHY THE UK  
WAS DOING MORE THAN OTHER COUNTRIES; NO DOUBT MR WEINBERGER  
EXPERIENCED THE SAME DIFFICULTY. HE THEREFORE STRONGLY WELCOMED  
MR SPADOLINI'S ASSURANCE OF SOLIDARITY. WORNER AGREED. WHEREAS  
THE PEACE MOVEMENT AS SUCH IN THE FRG HAD LOST MOMENTUM, THERE  
WAS A GROWING THREAT FROM THOSE WHO ADVOCATED A NEW NATO STRATEGY.  
IN THE FACE OF SUCH DEVELOPMENTS IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR POLITICAL  
LEADERS TO SHARE THE POLITICAL AND EVEN MORAL BURDEN AND TO  
DEMONSTRATE THEIR SUPPORT FOR NATO'S STRATEGY, TO WHICH THERE WAS  
NO PRACTICABLE ALTERNATIVE.

9. UP TO THIS POINT, DE RUITER (NETHERLANDS) HAD REMAINED  
CONSPICUOUSLY SILENT BUT KRIEPS (LUXEMBOURG) ADDRESSED A STRONGLY  
WORDED APPEAL TO THE NETHERLANDS TO STAND FIRM ON INF DEPLOYMENT.  
IT WAS IMPORTANT, NOT SO MUCH TO REPROACH THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT,  
BUT TO LET THEM KNOW THAT THE PROBLEM OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THE  
NETHERLANDS WAS A CRUCIAL ONE FOR THE WHOLE ALLIANCE. VREVEN  
(BELGIUM) ASSOCIATED HIMSELF FULLY WITH KRIEPS' REMARKS, AS  
WELL AS THOSE OF WORNER AND MR HESELTINE.

10. DE RUITER SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND THE CONCERN, BUT  
THE NETHERLANDS HAD RESERVED FOR THEMSELVES A SPECIAL POSITION  
IN RELATION TO THE 2-TRACK DECISION. THEY STILL HAD TO TAKE A  
DECISION. PREPARATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT WERE ON SCHEDULE AND A  
DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. THE SOLIDARITY AND

DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. THE SOLIDARITY AND  
COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, AND HE  
WOULD RELAY HIS NATO COLLEAGUES' CONCERN TO HIS GOVERNMENT.  
BUT HE EMPHASISED THAT THE POLICY OF THE NETHERLANDS WAS  
IN NO WAY ANTI-NUCLEAR. THE NETHERLANDS WANTED A REAL AND IMPORTANT  
SHARE IN THE ALLIANCE'S NUCLEAR POLICY. THE ARGUMENT WAS ONLY  
ABOUT THE PARTICULAR IDENTITY OF THE DUTCH NUCLEAR TASKS.  
11. DE RUITER'S STATEMENT MET A STRONG, AND IN THE CASE OF  
LUNS, EMOTIONAL RESPONSE. LUNS DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE  
NETHERLANDS COULD HAVE DELAYED UNTIL NOW A DECISION WHICH WAS  
SUPPOSED TO BE BASED ON THE DEGREE OF PROGRESS OF THE INF TALKS;  
NO-ONE COULD POSSIBLY CLAIM THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY SUCCESS WHAT-  
SOEVER IN THOSE TALKS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT  
TO SHOW LEADERSHIP AND PRESENT THE COUNTER-ARGUMENTS TO THE  
PEACE MOVEMENTS. DE MOTA PINTO (PORTUGAL) SAID THE ALLIANCE  
MUST SHOW RESOLVE AND UNITY. MR HESELTINE SAID THAT IT WOULD  
SIMPLY NOT BE CREDIBLE TO THE BRITISH PUBLIC, AND NO DOUBT THE  
PUBLIC OF OTHER COUNTRIES, THAT THE DUTCH COULD BE - AS DE RUITER  
CLAIMED - IN FAVOUR OF THE ALLIANCE'S NUCLEAR POLICY IF THEY  
FAILED TO GO AHEAD WITH DEPLOYMENT OF INF. SUCH A DECISION WOULD  
BE A VERY GREAT VICTORY FOR THE ANTI-NUCLEAR GROUPS. THE  
UNRAVELLING EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE FELT IN THE UK,  
AND WOULD NOT STOP AT INF. BLAIS (CANADA) ENDORSED THE APPEAL  
TO THE NETHERLANDS. DE RUITER PROTESTED AT THE SUGGESTION THAT  
DUTCH POLICY WAS SIMPLY A PASSIVE RESPONSE TO PRESSURE. NUCLEAR  
ISSUES HAD LONG BEEN A LIVELY POLITICAL ISSUE, NOT LEAST IN HIS  
OWN PART. LUNS URGED THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT NOT TO  
REMAIN SILENT IN THE FACE OF AN IMMORAL LINE OF ARGUMENT BY  
THE PEACE GROUPS. SPADOLINI RE-EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR SOLIDARITY  
AND TO PRESERVE THE US NUCLEAR GUARANTEE.  
12. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSION, WEINBERGER WELCOMED THE  
DEGREE OF UNANIMITY EXPRESSED, AND CALLED UPON THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT  
TO GIVE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.

GRAHAM  
BT

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SENT AT 161716Z JW