

cc/c

Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Do you wish to

London SW1A 2AH

telephone Mr. Lubbers tonight

or early tomorrow morning?

31 May 1984

A.F.C. 2/5.

ms

Dear John,

Netherlands and INF

E Thank you for your letter of 22 May to Roger Bone, recording the Prime Minister's agreement to postpone further consideration of an approach to Mr Lubbers. Until today the advice from The Hague had remained that a Dutch Cabinet decision about basing cruise missiles in the Netherlands was not imminent: (it had been intended that a total of 48 missiles would be deployed between 1986-1988). The picture has now changed, and the Embassy have this morning reported that there is a fair chance of Mr Lubbers insisting upon a decision at his Cabinet meeting at 10.00am (London time) tomorrow, 1 June (I enclose a copy of the Hague telegram number 197).

We have been told this (in confidence) by a senior Dutch official, a US official and a member of the other party in Mr Lubbers' coalition government. The details of the solution for which Mr Lubbers will be seeking agreement, if he goes ahead, are not available: but his proposal is likely to incorporate some, if not all, of the following elements:

- a Dutch promise to take a proportionate share of cruise missiles following a US/Soviet INF arms control agreement;
- a Dutch promise to decide in 1988 whether or not to accept cruise missiles if there were no arms control agreement by then. (In the meantime the Netherlands would not drop any of its existing nuclear defence tasks);
- between 1986 (when the Dutch should begin to deploy cruise missiles) and 1988 the Dutch would be prepared, in a crisis, to have 32 cruise missiles flown into the Netherlands. Preparations at their designated cruise missile site would therefore go ahead.

We have consulted Sir Geoffrey Howe in Washington on HM Ambassador The Hague's proposal that the Prime Minister should telephone Mr Lubbers late today or early tomorrow, 1 June. We have just received his reply in Washington telno 1703 enclosed.

/Sir Geoffrey



Sir Geoffrey sees some value in a telephone message as the Ambassador suggests. He considers that the Prime Minister should not seek to comment on particular elements of the Dutch plan but couch her message in general terms.

As you will see, Sir Geoffrey has summarised the points which he believes the Prime Minister should make to Mr Lubbers; these are a condensed and updated version of the speaking note enclosed with Roger Bone's letter of 11 May.

/ For convenience I enclose a version of these points in a form which the Prime Minister could use in speaking to Mr Lubbers.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram in the MOD.

*Yours ever,*

*Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



## SPEAKING NOTES FOR USE WITH MR LUBBERS

1. I fully appreciate the great difficulty in which the Netherlands Government finds itself placed in trying to reconcile the various conflicting domestic political currents on this matter. We have been following developments closely and sympathetically.

2. I welcome and appreciate the view expressed by Mr Van den Broek to the North Atlantic Council yesterday [30 May] that the interest of the Alliance as a whole must come first. At this important and perhaps historic moment for the Alliance I therefore hope that, whatever the Dutch Government's decision, it will

- (i) give absolutely no encouragement to the Russians in their long-term aim of splitting Alliance solidarity on the issue and causing further turbulence between the United States and her European Allies;
- (ii) will reaffirm unambiguously the continuing Netherlands Government's support for the fundamental principles of the 1979 dual track decision and for its continuing implementation by the Alliance.

WONFO 034/31

ZZ FCO

OO UKDEL NATO

OO THE HAGUE

OO BONN

OO BRUSSELS

OO MODUK

GRS 410

SECRET



**FLASH**

*Ho/Defence Dept  
Ho/WED  
Ho/Secret Dept  
Ho/ACDD  
Ho/WAD  
PS  
PS/Lessy Young  
Sir J Pullar  
Mr Wright  
Mr Jenkins*

FM WASHINGTON 311425Z MAY 84

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1703 OF 31 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, THE HAGUE, BONN, BRUSSELS AND MODUK DS17

FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY OF STATE

HAGUE TELNO 197: NETHERLANDS/INF

1. I SEE SOME VALUE IN A MESSAGE BY TELEPHONE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO LUBBERS TODAY, AS SIR PHILIP MANSFIELD SUGGESTS. BUT I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE BEST FOR ANY SUCH MESSAGE TO BE COINED IN GENERAL TERMS AND NOT TO APPEAR TO BE PASSING JUDGEMENT ON PARTICULAR ELEMENTS

IN THE CDA PLAN (HAGUE TELNO 195). THE NUB OF THE DIFFICULTY WITH THE CDA PLAN LIES IN THE PROVISION FOR CRISIS DEPLOYMENT ONLY OF ANY CRUISE MISSILES TO THE NETHERLANDS IN THE PERIOD

1986-89 AND THE POSSIBLE DANGEROUS EFFECT THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE, IF ACCEPTED BY THE ALLIANCE, ON OTHER BASING COUNTRIES SUCH AS BELGIUM AND GERMANY. THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES WHO ARE THE PEOPLE PRIMARILY CONCERNED SEEM UNDECIDED ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH THIS IN TALKING TO THE DUTCH, AND THIS IN TURN INHIBITS US.

2. A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD THEREFORE MAKE THE FOLLOWING GENERAL POINTS:

(A) HMG APPRECIATES THE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN WHICH THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT FINDS ITSELF PLACED IN TRYING TO RECONCILE THE VARIOUS CONFLICTING DOMESTIC POLITICAL CURRENTS ON THIS MATTER. WE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY AND SYMPATHETICALLY;

(B) WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL TO HAVE BEEN KEPT SO FULLY INFORMED BY DUTCH MINISTERS ABOUT THEIR THINKING;

(C) WE WELCOME AND APPRECIATE THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY VAN DEN BROEK (WASHINGTON TELNO 169) TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL YESTERDAY THAT THE INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE MUST COME FIRST. AT THIS IMPORTANT AND PERHAPS HISTORIC MOMENT FOR THE ALLIANCE WE THEREFORE HOPE THAT WHATEVER THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT'S DECISION IT WILL

(I) GIVE ABSOLUTELY NO ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE RUSSIANS IN THEIR LONG TERM AIM OF SPLITTING ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY ON THE ISSUE AND CAUSING FURTHER TURBULENCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND HER EUROPEAN ALLIES,

(II) WILL REAFFIRM UNAMBIGUOUSLY THE CONTINUING NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 1979 DUAL TRACK DECISION AND FOR ITS CONTINUING IMPLEMENTATION BY THE ALLIANCE.

WRIGHT



10 DOWNING STREET

John: int

Fro have 'phoned re  
their letter of 21 May.

Depending on advice  
from the Hague  
(telegram coming  
tonight) they think  
it would now be  
appropriate for the  
PM to speak to  
Mr Lubbers tomorrow.  
(Fro will be in touch  
with you on this).

Peter 30/5

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*De Ks*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

22 May 1984

NETHERLANDS AND INF

Thank you for your letter of 21 May. The Prime Minister agrees that further consideration of an approach by her to Mr. Lubbers should be postponed for the time being.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

*A. J. COLES*

Roger Bone Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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ce P.C. (1)

Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Agree no telephone call to

Mr. Lubbers for the time

21 May, 1984

being. A.S.C. 2/5.

New John,

Mussard

Netherlands and INF

In my letter of 11 May I said that Sir Geoffrey Howe believed that a personal message from the Prime Minister to Mr Lubbers would be valuable, enclosed a possible speaking note and suggested that the Prime Minister should await the outcome of a meeting of NATO Special Consultative Group on 15 May. Subsequent to that meeting, we spoke on the telephone and I explained that Sir Geoffrey Howe was planning to speak to the Dutch Foreign Minister, Mr van den Broek, in the margins of the OECD Council in Paris this week. The question remains as to whether the Prime Minister should now be advised to speak to Mr Lubbers.

The Dutch Representative at the Special Consultative Group meeting was unable to add much to our knowledge of developments in The Hague; nor was Mr van den Broek in Paris, although he plainly appreciated and understood our reasons for and the extent of our concern, which was underlined by Sir Geoffrey Howe. Yet more pressure has been brought to bear on the Dutch through the discussion at this week's meeting of NATO Defence Ministers at the DPC. The question was one of the major items addressed, not only privately but in the press conference afterwards. The Defence Secretary was able to emphasise the extent to which we regarded the forthcoming Dutch decision as of importance to the Alliance as a whole, and Britain in particular. You may have seen telegram number 252 from UKDEL NATO reporting Mr Heseltine's statement at the press conference. By way of follow-up to the discussions in Brussels and Paris the Dutch will have seen the Prime Minister's reply to Mr Edward Leigh MP at Question Time on 17 May and Bryan Cartledge has spoken to the Dutch Ambassador here, drawing his attention to the text of Mr Heseltine's statement at the press conference in Brussels and the Prime Minister's reply in the House.

In these circumstances Sir Geoffrey Howe feels that we have done all we reasonably can for the time being to remind the Dutch of our close interest in a positive outcome to the debate in the Netherlands on INF basing. We would prefer therefore to hold over the possibility of a telephone call from the Prime Minister to Mr Lubbers; there will very probably be a peg on which we can hang such an approach before the Dutch Parliamentary debate on Deployment now scheduled for 18 June, and perhaps before the NATO Ministerial meeting in Washington on 29/31 May. Sir Philip Mansfield in The Hague favours this course. He reports (in telegram number 175 from The Hague, copy enclosed) that a majority of followers of Mr Lubbers' Christian Democratic

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party are in favour of deployment according to the latest opinion poll and that Dutch business interests are urging Mr Lubbers to come to the right decision. Sir Geoffrey Howe's advice is that we should let these forces work further on Mr Lubbers and his colleagues before making use of an approach by the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD).

*See on*  
*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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