



010
MO 11/2/2

Prime Minister

39

Avail comments from other
Ministers ?

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A.F.C. $\frac{1}{6}$

les

ms

PRIME MINISTER

MOLESWORTH : THE SECOND GLCM BASE

On 17th June 1980 the Government announced that the 160 Cruise missiles to be based in the United Kingdom would be located at the RAF bases at Greenham Common in Berkshire (96 missiles) and Molesworth in Cambridgeshire (64 missiles). If we are to adhere to the target date of full deployment by 1988 (to which the US will attach great importance) then overt preparations for the construction work required at RAF Molesworth, such as site surveys and consultations with local planning and highways authorities, must begin very soon - desirably this month. Given the obvious political sensitivity of such steps, I have reviewed in detail the requirement for a second GLCM base. I believe that, before proceeding, we should look again at the alternative option of concentration at RAF Greenham Common.

2. You will recall that the original US proposal for the deployment of the UK-based Cruise missiles was for concentration on a single site at RAF Greenham Common. Ministers accepted the US position that there was no overriding military case in favour of two bases rather than one. The Government took the view, however, that split deployment was preferable in political terms, particularly since concentration at Greenham Common was judged to be unacceptable in the Newbury area, given the proximity of Aldermaston and Burghfield, and the local hostility to the earlier proposed deployment of USAF tanker aircraft at Greenham Common. The US authorities acceded to this view (HMG having agreed to provide a UK element for a Joint Defence Force and to make a £4M contribution in cash or kind to their additional costs) and by mutual agreement RAF Molesworth - a disused RAF site - was selected as the second base. It was recognised that Molesworth had



certain disadvantages, notably the absence of infrastructure or a runway, but these were not considered insuperable.

3. In the light of subsequent events, and in particular the scale and pattern of anti-nuclear movement activity experienced at RAF Greenham Common, some of the shortcomings already evident in respect of RAF Molesworth now appear more significant. The site is totally unfenced and the first construction programme must involve the construction of a new perimeter fence. There are very likely to be continual attempts at disruption of this work and to prevent this there will be considerable calls on MOD and civil police resources. There could be a running battle for some years before missiles were delivered. The absence of a runway will mean that all equipment, including missiles and warheads, will have to be air-delivered to the USAF base at RAF Alconbury and moved by road over the intervening 10 miles.

4. A second, possible advantage of concentrating GLCM deployments at one base is that it would be more cost effective should there eventually be an arms control agreement under which less than the 160 GLCMs were deployed in this country. It is, of course, impossible at present to predict the likelihood of this happening: we cannot assume that because the Russians have walked out of the Geneva talks, negotiated limits on INF will not be reached by 1988. While this is a consideration to be borne in mind, it is not an argument which could be used publicly because it would encourage those in the other INF basing countries who would like to argue that construction of the Belgian, Dutch and FRG cruise missile sites need not be hurried.

5. From very discrete enquiries with the US authorities, it appears that it would still be feasible to concentrate all the UK-based Cruise missiles at RAF Greenham Common. This would have some advantages both to the Americans whose manpower requirements would be somewhat reduced, and to us in that we would face a lower bill than at Molesworth for the infrastructure which it is our obligation under the standard NATO



arrangements to provide. On the basis of statements made to us by the US authorities, it does, however, appear that because of the way in which RAF Greenham Common was developed following the decision to go for a split-base deployment, about 25 acres of additional land might be required to site the new GLCM facilities. The land in question is common land owned by Newbury District Council who would be unlikely to be willing to part with it. They might equally be unwilling to grant the necessary planning clearances in respect of additional GLCM facilities. We could, therefore, be faced with a need to use my compulsory purchase powers; and because of the need to avoid delay, to decide from the outset not to allow recourse to the appeals system in respect of objections to purchase or planning. In the case of acquisition, the appeals system in contested compulsory purchase cases involves the Lord Chancellor, while in respect of planning matters the Secretary of State for the Environment is responsible; their consent to such a course of action would thus be vital.

6. We need to consider the political implications of a change of plan in terms of the possible reaction at the local, national and international levels. In terms of local politics, we already own the land at Molesworth and the necessary preparations for deployment could be presented as no more than following through an announced decision; whereas the steps required in respect of land to concentrate at Greenham Common would mean an immediate political row locally. We might for some time lose the valuable co-operation with Newbury District Council which we currently enjoy in respect of eviction of peace camps and land transfer arrangements we are discussing with them to increase our security at the base's main gate. Local residents might also view with scepticism the claim that the deployment of an additional 64 cruise missiles to Greenham Common did not increase the risk to the Newbury district. The Thames Valley Police authority is also likely to be hostile. At Molesworth the local planning authority is not thought to be hostile to deployment and the local MP, John Major, has been helpful. (though of course they have yet to experience the consequences in terms of disruption in proceeding with deployment there).



7. At the national level, we would also face a very difficult task in terms of public presentation. The anti-nuclear movement would undoubtedly claim that their activities forced us to change our plans to develop Molesworth: a claim which might be uncomfortably close to the truth. In order to avoid reinforcing such a claim we would need to justify a change of plan by stressing, for example, the economic advantages of concentration.

8. In terms of the impact on our allies, I believe that the US Administration would be prepared to accept whatever solution we judged to be preferable in terms of domestic political considerations provided that the 1988 deployment date was not put at risk.

A British decision to abandon the development of Molesworth might possibly have an adverse influence on the Dutch Government prior to its own decisions (for good or ill) on the INF deployment, and coupled with an adverse Dutch decision, might also create problems for the Belgians. Concentration at Greenham Common would leave the Federal Republic of Germany as the only country hosting more than one INF base. However, provided that any UK announcement was coupled with a clear commitment to deploy 160 missiles to the announced timetable (in the absence of an arms control settlement calling for a lesser level of deployment), I would not regard such considerations as overriding. The timing of informing our allies of any change would need to be judged in the light of developments in Holland.

9. The arguments are finely balanced. Faced with what is effectively a choice between a good deal of immediate local political difficulty at Greenham Common or a possibly running sore at Molesworth, I am inclined to favour the option of concentration. In 1980 it may have seemed that the existence of a second base would be helpful to the Government in dissipating local political opposition; in 1984 it seems to me that the build up of a second base may provide a second centre of protest rather than dissipate the support enjoyed by the anti-nuclear movement, and present us with security problems we could



do without. I should welcome the views of my colleagues on whether concentration at RAF Greenham Common is on balance the better course, recognising the need in that case to ensure that there is no delay on account of objections should further land have to be acquired.

10. I am copying this minute to the other members of MISC 7, to the Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Environment, and to Sir Robert Armstrong. In view of its obvious sensitivity I should be grateful if any further circulation of this minute within Departments could be strictly limited.

WJA

Ministry of Defence
1st June 1984

SLHAAN

vsc



c. MISC 7
LPO
FCO
HMT
(MOD)
HO
DOE
LCO
CO
Sir P.C.

53

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 June 1984

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

The Prime Minister has considered the various comments by colleagues on the Defence Secretary's minute of 1 June on the question of a second GLCM base at RAF Molesworth, and also his subsequent minute of 25 June.

The Prime Minister agrees that the Attorney General's advice should be sought on the matters raised by the Lord Chancellor in his minute of 20 June.

The Prime Minister has asked that the Defence Secretary should produce a further paper which would, in more detail:

- a) consider the cost and time constraints of the alternative deployment options.
- b) examine the military factors at stake in the choice between deploying cruise missiles from either one or two bases, particularly in the light of American views reported in your letter of 4 June to Roger Bone.
- c) assess the practical implications of postponing a decision until after the Summer Recess as

Handwritten initials

-2-

proposed by the Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary

The Prime Minister would wish the paper to be available in time for a ministerial meeting before the Summer Recess to resolve the differences of view.

The Prime Minister does not want the circle of those aware that these problems are being addressed to be widened, at least at this stage. This will inevitably place limits on the evaluation of the scope for further scope for building at the Greenham Common site proposed in paragraph 3 of the Defence Secretary's minute of 25 June. But the Prime Minister hopes that this aspect will nonetheless be addressed as fully as possible in the further paper which she has requested.

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of the earlier correspondence.

C.D. POWELL

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.



de vsc
CSFC. 52

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. HATFIELD
CABINET OFFICE

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

The Prime Minister has seen Sir Robert Armstrong's minute on this subject of 22 June. The Prime Minister agrees that further ministerial discussion should take place in OD with the addition of the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Environment. She has instructed that the papers should go round under the most highly restricted procedure, that is to Ministers and Permanent Secretaries only.

C.D. POWELL

29 June 1984

MS.

SECRET
CMO/UK EYES ONLY

57A



COPY NO. 1499

PRIME MINISTER

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

I have seen Michael Heseltine's minute to you of 25 June.
I would support his proposal that his officials, with the
American authorities should carry out an evaluation.

Copies of this minute go to recipients of earlier correspondence
including the Attorney General.

PJ

P J

28 June 1984

28 JUN 1984

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51

PRIME MINISTER

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

A You agreed that the Defence Secretary should be asked for a further paper on the lines suggested by Sir Robert Armstrong.

B There is now a further minute from the Defence Secretary in which he suggests a hard look at whether there really is no alternative way of proceeding by building within the present site at Greenham Common to a completion date of no later than mid-1988.

There seem to me two problems with his proposal:

- a) A largish team would have to visit the site to conduct the evaluation and as Mr Heseltine recognises this would inevitably widen the circle of those aware that the problem is being addressed.
- b) The evaluation would not be ready until the end of next month, which would effectively postpone Ministerial consideration until the autumn.

*Amend
not*

You may wish the evaluation to be conducted on a more restricted basis than this, even accepting that it may be less complete, at least until ministers have considered the issue again.

Agree letter to Defence Secretary's Private Secretary attached?

C.D.P.

28 June 1984

SWHAPP

DRAFT LETTER

CHARLES POWELL TO RICHARD MOTTRAM (MOD)

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

The Prime Minister has considered the various comments ^{by colleagues} on the Defence Secretary's minute of 1 June on the question of a second GLCM base at RAF Molesworth, and also his subsequent minute of 25 June.

The Prime Minister agrees that the Attorney General's advice should be sought on the matters raised by the Lord Chancellor in his minute of 20 June.

The Prime Minister has ~~also~~ asked that the Defence Secretary should produce a further paper which would, in more detail:

- a) Consider the cost and time constraints of the alternative deployment options.
- b) Examine the military factors at stake in the choice between deploying cruise missiles from either one or two bases, particularly in the light of American views reported in your letter of 4 June to Roger Bone.
- c) Assess the practical implications of postponing a decision until after the Summer Recess as proposed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

The Prime Minister would wish the paper to be available in time for a ministerial meeting before the Summer Recess to resolve the differences of view.

While the further paper by the Defence Secretary would need to evaluate the possibilities of proceeding by building within the present site at Greenham Common, as proposed in paragraph 3 of his minute of 25 June, the Prime Minister would not wish this evaluation to be conducted in such a way as to widen significantly the circle of those aware that the problem is under consideration.

(Should attempt to)
~~as to widen significantly the circle of those aware that the problem is under consideration.~~
 being addressed - even if this means that the evaluation would be incomplete.

The further paper by the Defence Secretary

The Prime Minister does not want the circle of those aware that these problems are being addressed to be widened, at least at this stage. This must restrict the

scope for building at the Greenham Common site proposed in paragraph 3 of the Defence Secretary's minute of 25 June. The Prime Minister hopes that this aspect will be

addressed as fully possible in the further paper which she has requested.

I am sending copies of this letter to [most members of recipients of earlier correspondence].

DRAFT LETTER

CHARLES POWELL TO RICHARD HATFIELD

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

The Prime Minister has seen Sir Robert Armstrong's minute on this subject of 22 June. The Prime Minister agrees that further ministerial discussion should take place in OD with the addition of the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Environment. She has instructed that the papers should go round under the most highly restricted procedure, that is to Ministers and Permanent Secretaries only.

UR.

I will talk Ho AM

SO

MR. BUTLER

The Prime Minister may wish to be aware that, commencing within the next twenty-four hours, there is to be a further off-base deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles.

It is intended that this will be a more extended deployment than those previously, subject to review as events unfold. The plans have been agreed between the Home Secretary and the Defence Secretary.

MK

DUTY CLERK
25 June 1984



B

49A (1)

Prime Minister

C D ?

MO 11/2/2

PRIME MINISTER

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

I am grateful for the comments on my minute to you of ^{In CP Blue B} 1st June about Molesworth. It may be helpful if I suggest how we might now proceed.

2. The comments by colleagues I think well illustrate that from the political point of view the arguments are, as I suggested earlier, finely balanced. The issues that would potentially tip the balance are those identified by the Secretary of State for Environment, that is in obtaining new land at Greenham Common and the problems which would flow from a technical point of view in building on it. If the Greenham Common alternative would put back the development by some 2 years or so, then I think that we should have to rule it out.

3. Before doing so, I believe that we should go somewhat beyond the present preliminary assessments we have made and take a hard look at whether there really is no alternative way of proceeding by building within the present site at Greenham Common to a completion date of not later than mid-1988 for an IOC at the end of that year. I recognise some of the difficulties to which Patrick Jenkin has rightly drawn attention would still remain but the crucial ones would be avoided. If you are content, I would propose to invite my officials together with his and with the American authorities urgently to carry out such an evaluation by no later than the end of next month. This work would obviously need to be conducted at a suitably high level. We should have to allow the team to visit the site and to carry out all the consultations necessary properly to underpin their conclusions, accepting that this must inevitably widen the circle of those aware that the problem is being addressed.



4. In parallel, I would propose to seek the views of the Attorney General on the matters most helpfully raised by the Lord Chancellor in his minute to you of 20th June. I would then make firm recommendations to you as to how we should proceed.

5. I am copying this to the recipients of my minute of 1st June, and to the Attorney General (with the earlier correspondence).

MA

Ministry of Defence
25th June 1984

Deference fin F Pt 4)



A

26 JUN 1984



SECRET

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~836 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 11/2/2

25th June 1984

*Butler
25/6*

*passed on to
Party in Fountainsbleau
25/6.*

*Duty Clerk
W. J. M. K. E.*

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the following message to be passed by secure communications for the attention of Robin Butler or Charles Powell:

"From PS/Defence Secretary

The Prime Minister may wish to be aware that commencing within the next 24 hours there is to be a further off-base deployment of Ground Launched Cruise Missiles. It is intended that this will be a more extended deployment than those previously, subject to review as events unfold.

The plans have been agreed between the Defence Secretary and the Home Secretary."

You will appreciate the need to handle this carefully.

(R C MOTTRAM)
Private Secretary

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-753 0000



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25 JUN 1984

A • 48A
Prime Minister

Ref. A084/1822

MR POWELL

with COP/BoT
Yes - in more detail
looks with the cost

Agree:
Yes 1) seek Attorney's advice?
2) ask Defence Secretary for further paper?
3) further Ministerial discussion before recess in OD + Home Sec. & Mr. Jenkin?
C.D.P. 22/6
Yes - papers
to go round under the most.
highly resister
proceeding
Minister
or Pen key
only
no

Molesworth: Second GLCM Base
New alternative
adapted to Greenham

With the receipt of the Lord Chancellor's minute dated 20 June, we have now seen comments from all those who received copies of the Secretary of State for Defence's minute of 1 June about GLCM basing in the United Kingdom. Ministers are divided: the Lord President and the Secretary of State for the Environment favour continuing with the plan for two bases; the Secretary of State for Defence, in his original minute, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary favour concentrating on Greenham Common, although Sir Geoffrey Howe favours putting off a decision until after the Summer Recess in order to avoid adding to the difficulties which our Alliance partners face in carrying forward their own deployment schedules in the particularly sensitive period immediately ahead; the Home Secretary finds the political arguments evenly balanced but considers that the right course from the point of view of policing would be to concentrate on Greenham. The Lord Chancellor has raised a number of legal points on which you will no doubt wish to seek the Attorney General's advice.

2. A Ministerial meeting will be needed before the Summer Recess to resolve these differences of view. The political and policing issues have been fully explored in the papers, and the only aspects which require clarification (apart from the legal issues raised by the Lord Chancellor) relate to the cost and time constraints of the alternative deployment options and also to the military factors at stake in the choice, given the American views reported in Mr Mottram's letter of 4 June to Mr Bone.

I suggest therefore that, in advance of a Ministerial meeting, the Secretary of State for Defence should be invited to produce, in consultation with the Secretary of State for the Environment, his best estimate of the relative costs and timescales of implementing the two deployment options, together with advice on the practical implications of postponing a decision until after the Summer Recess as proposed by the Foreign and Commonwealth

Secretary. The Secretary of State for Defence's further minute should also set out the military factors involved in the choice between deploying these Cruise missiles from either one or two bases and any further views which he wishes to put forward in the light of the points made by colleagues on his original minute.

3. As to the form of the Ministerial meeting, the choice rests between OD and a more restricted meeting of Ministers covering the augmented MISC 7 addressees of the recent correspondence. Although the sensitive nature of the subject and the paramount need to avoid leaks argue in favour of the more restricted forum, the previous decisions on this issue were taken in OD, and, given the high political profile of any change in present plans, it is possible that the matter may need to be referred to Cabinet after the initial Ministerial discussion. I recommend therefore that this question should be discussed in the wider forum provided by OD, with the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Environment being invited to attend. I believe that further papers should continue to be circulated on a CMO basis, and you might invite Mr Heseltine to proceed accordingly.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

22 June 1984

Defence
INF 104



CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: . 4

THE RT. HON. LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE, C.H., F.R.S., D.C.L.

48



HOUSE OF LORDS,
SW1A 0PW

SECRET - UK EYES A - CMO

Copy No. 1 of 9

Prime Minister

MOLESWORTH: The Second GLCM Base

1. You have asked for comments on the issues raised in Michael Heseltine's minute to you of 1 June.
2. In his minute Michael says that to avoid delay it may be necessary to decide from the outset not to allow recourse to the appeals system in respect of objections to purchase or planning. In his reply of 12 June 1984 Patrick Jenkin wrote that both the compulsory purchase order and planning clearance would be open to legal challenge by way of judicial review.
3. I understand that Michael Heseltine's view is that the use of his powers under the Defence Acts 1842 - 1873 would attract the extra-statutory procedure introduced by Christopher Soames in his Written Answer of 6 March 1959 ("the Soames procedure") under which I appoint a person to inquire and I regulate the inquiry.
4. Unfortunately it appears that the Soames procedure was a temporary one dealing with particular circumstances at the end of the War period when section 23 of the Defence Act 1842 was in abeyance and seems to have been rendered inapplicable here by the end of the "War period" on 31 December 1960 and the consequent revival of s.23 of the Defence Act 1842. I do not believe that it has ever applied to acquisitions under that section which are certified by a Lord Lieutenant and supported by a warrant from the Treasury and where it was held (per Tomlin, J. in Hutton v. The Attorney-General [1927] 1 Chancery 427 at p.439) that "The question of necessity or expediency must in many cases be largely a question of policy, and it is difficult to suppose that it was ever the intention of the Legislature that a question of policy, possibly vital to the defence of the kingdom should be debated before a tribunal at the instance of an individual whose land the state sought to acquire in the general interest and for the protection of the state."
5. Whilst it is for Michael Heseltine to decide I think it is also arguable that the "Circular 7 of 1977" planning procedure for Ministers might also be totally excluded from the outset where the acquisition is so certified and warranted "in the general interest and for the protection of the state" without attracting the possibility of judicial review.
6. I suggest that the Attorney General might consider these matters before we reach final conclusions.

/...

SECRET - UK EYES A - CMO

7. I am copying this minute to members of MISC 7, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for the Environment and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

8. I think I shd: add that in this minute I have dealt only with the technicalities. I am not sure that any of these procedures designed to avoid judicial review cd: be justified politically. But until we have the Attorney's view as to the legalities we cannot come to a rational conclusion on this.

H: of S^r M.

20 June 1984

Defense : Deployment Pt 4



CONFIDENTIAL

F

SECRET

UK EYES A CMO



Await Julian
note on living
from RGD
15/6

47

Prime Minister

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLOM BASE

You invited comments on Michael Heseltine's minute of 1 June on this subject.

The political arguments seem to me evenly balanced: concentration at Greenham would no doubt be claimed as a victory by the Peace Movement, but the difficulties - especially for the police - spelt out in paragraph 3 of Michael Heseltine's minute are important. The major task of constructing the fence would be easy to obstruct and could well revive the flagging fortunes of the peace camps. A key factor, which must surely be fully assessed, is the possible technical problem over building at Greenham to which Patrick Jenkin refers.

Solely from the point of view of policing, however, I am clear that the right course would be to concentrate at Greenham. Thames Valley Police have handled a difficult situation with tact and skill, and are now very experienced at it. We should no doubt have difficulties with the Police Authority over costs; but I think all of that is better than starting the protest in a new place and, as it happens, in a police area where resources are rather more thin on the ground than they are in the more densely populated Thames Valley.

I am sending a copy of this minute to those who had copies of the original minute of 1 June.

L.B.

15 June 1984

SECRET

UK EYES A CMO

Defence



INT

Pt 4





SECRET

C
Original of 7 46

To await Defence Secretary's further comment on timing. Bu as soon as available.

COP. 13/6

Prime Minister

MOLESWORTH THE SECOND GLCM BASE

You have asked for comments on the issues raised in Michael Heseltine's minute to you of 1 June.

What I have to say reflects the balance of advantage in the factors of relevance to the PSA. There are no other DOE considerations to which I would wish to draw attention. You have presumably already considered the possibility that any proposal to set aside the normal provision for objectors to both the CPO and planning clearance at Greenham Common could be open to legal challenge by way of judicial review. Your own legal advisers will be aware of the risk.

Molesworth is a green field site where we already know the problems. External road access would need improvement; Francis Pym's apparent undertaking that no housing would be built at Molesworth could be awkward; and there would be time-consuming procedures in closing up or diverting public rights of way. But if these can be resolved PSA could, within a year, have the site fenced and ready for the main contract to be let in Summer 1985 which might, with an accelerated programme permit an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) by the end of December 1987. If we were to defer a decision until after the summer break, as Geoffrey Howe has suggested there would be a corresponding delay in the operational date of the base.

Greenham Common on the other hand presents quite serious

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problems. The site itself is restricted, with steep contours at either side. I note that some 25 acres of additional land would be needed. I assume this is for the main GLCM facilities. There may also be an additional land requirement for other additional personnel-related and technical facilities. Even if it is possible to acquire the land, it would be difficult and expensive to provide all the extra facilities, since we would have to build around an already operational Base and would also have to contend with steep contours and made-up land which would require special foundation treatment. Possibly more seriously, it could put back the development by some 2 years or so.

On balance I am inclined to agree with Willie that we should stick to Molesworth. Technically it is better and it also avoids the use of controversial powers of acquisition. Greenham Common is feasible but not within anything like the same time frame and only at the cost of extra land, construction costs and risk to the existing capability while work is in progress.

I am sending copies of this minute to Members of MISC 7 and Quintin Hailsham, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

PJ

P J

12 June 1984

SECRET

DEFENCE : INF : 104



SECRET

UK EYES A

CMO

45

Ref.A084/1662

MR COLES ✓

The Defence Secretary will comment again on the timing considerations.

D.U. when he does.

A.F.C. $\frac{P}{6}$

Molesworth: The Second GLCM Base

The Secretary of State for Defence minuted the Prime Minister on this subject on 1 June. The Lord President, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer have now commented. The Lord President favours sticking to two bases; the Chancellor of the Exchequer favours concentrating on Greeham Common; the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary favours putting off a decision (but favours concentrating on Greenham Common on merits).

2. There is no overriding military case in favour of two GLCM bases rather than one for the deployment of the 160 Cruise missiles to be located in the United Kingdom. The Americans would prefer us to stick to two sites partly on grounds of dispersing the risk, and partly on political grounds: they fear that a decision by us could significantly affect the attitude of those NATO partners who may be faltering in their resolution about INF deployment (though the force of this seems to be limited, so long as we stick to our commitment to deploy our full quota of 160 missiles in the United Kingdom, and the Dutch have, in any case, now taken their decision to deploy in the absence of an INF arms control agreement and if the Soviet Union deploy any further SS20 missiles). Given the doubts about the strategic value of GLCM, there is much to be said on merits for not spending money and resources on the development of a second site for which there is no overriding military case.

3. But it is the domestic political considerations which will determine the decision. When Ministers decided in May 1980 that there should be two cruise missile bases in the United Kingdom (OD(80) 14th Meeting, Item 1), they did so on the basis of clear advice from the then Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Pym) that:

UK EYES A

CMO

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"In terms of domestic policies, however, I am clear that it would not be acceptable to have only one base and that it would be preferable to have a minimum of three. The Ministers in my Department agree with this view but believe that two bases would be tolerable. Michael Jopling and the Whips, with whom I have shared this problem, are of the same opinion."

The political situation is now different from what it was in 1980. The choice is between going ahead with Molesworth, and creating a focus for a second "Greenham women" type of running protest, with additional policing problems because of the need to move all the equipment in by road; and concentrating at Greenham Common, would probably save some money, but would probably mean the compulsory acquisition for Newbury District Council of 25 acres of additional land, and the loss of their goodwill and perhaps of their co-operation in dealing with the eviction of the peace camps at Greenham Common. The abandonment of Molesworth would no doubt be hailed as a "victory" by the anti-cruise protest movement.

4. The balance of political considerations may look different later in the year, if by then Mr Lubbers has secured Parliamentary endorsement for his Government's decision. There is therefore a good deal to be said for deferring a decision until the autumn, as the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary suggests. It might then be easier to decide in favour of concentration at Greenham Common, which is the way the balance of argument seems (just) to point.

RIA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

7 June 1984

DEFENSE
INF
K4

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COMMONS

SECRET

E

SECRET UK EYES A CMO

44

Await remaining replies

2nd
6/6



PM/84/92

PRIME MINISTER

Molesworth: The Second GLCM Base

1. You have asked for comments on the issues raised in Michael Heseltine's minute to you of 1 June. *file with HSC.*

2. On the domestic arguments for and against retaining the second GLCM site, I do not wish to do more than recall that my preference when we discussed the question in 1980 was to limit the cruise missile deployments to one base. But clearly we face substantial presentational difficulties in changing course at this point and reverting to a single base only. These difficulties have to be taken seriously, even if Michael Heseltine is right in suggesting (and he may well be) that the picture may look different by the end of the decade in East/West or arms control terms. I agree with him that if we were later to find that less than the full 160 GLCMs were required in the UK, a single base could well be more cost effective, and involve less political risk.

3. The key questions seem to me to be timing and political impact. I think we must assume that a decision to abandon Molesworth would quickly become known. As

/Michael


SECRET UK EYES A CMO



Michael Heseltine's minute clearly recognises, such a decision could easily become caught up in the Netherlands INF debate. Despite the Dutch Government's decision on 1 June, the controversy is by no means over in the Netherlands. Lubbers still has to prevail in a [now over] parliamentary debate later this month. We hope that the Dutch problem will not infect Belgian or German attitudes to their own deployment schedules. If it became known during this sensitive period that we were changing our basing plans, this could well add to the pressures on the Alliance. These arguments have been put strongly to us by the US Ambassador (who spoke separately to Michael Heseltine and myself) and by senior State Department officials in the margins of the North Atlantic Council.

4. Against this background, I firmly believe the safest course would be to defer further Ministerial consideration of this question until after the Summer break. I cannot believe that the practical exigencies are so pressing as to require an immediate decision. The wider Alliance dimension points strongly to postponement, thereby scotching any chances of a damaging leak.

5. I am copying this minute to the other members of MISC 7, to the Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for the Environment and to Sir Robert Armstrong.


(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

6 June 1984

Defence: INF Deployment Pt 4.

D

43



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

5 June 1984

The Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine MP
Secretary of State for Defence

Alan Michael

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

Thank you for sending me a copy of your minute of 1 June to the Prime Minister.

On financial grounds alone, concentration on Greenham Common seems the better choice: I shall be interested to see the figures when your officials have worked them out. And I agree with your judgement that the political arguments on balance point the same way.

I also agree that whatever we decide, skilful presentation will be essential. But at least we will have the advantage of the initiative.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, to the other members of MISC 7, Quintin Hailsham, Leon Brittan, Patrick Jenkin and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

NIGEL LAWSON

Nigel Lawson

840

Defense PT 4
Deployment of INF

00 1984



B 42



PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

5 June 1984

Avail better regis

AS 5/6

Dear Michael

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

I have seen your minute to the Prime Minister of 1 June. I accept that the arguments are finely balanced. My preference however is to stick to Molesworth. My main reason is that it is usually wrong to change difficult decisions since it portrays uncertainty.

- with AG -

I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, members of MISC 7, the Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary, the Environment Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

John
Lillic
[Signature]

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP

H

SECRET

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alt



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~9307622~~ 218 2111/3

Prime Minister.

To note that incident

MO 11/2/2

As you may raise this with you.
I think you would be wise not
to commit yourself. It is a
difficult decision.

4th June 1984

A.S.C. 4/6

New Rye,

MOLESWORTH

I should record that the US Ambassador called on instructions on the Defence Secretary this morning, at short notice, to talk about Molesworth. Mr Price said that he understood that we were coming down in favour of concentrating our cruise missile deployment at Greenham Common rather than establishing a second base at Molesworth. The US Authorities would on balance prefer the two site solution. This avoided putting all our eggs in one basket and made dispersal in a crisis easier. They were particularly concerned about the political implications of a change of plan at this stage: there could be a disproportionate impact on less steadfast Allies. The US Authorities were worried about possible leaks, particularly as it was known in the Congress that we were looking again at the Molesworth option.

The Defence Secretary said that no decision had been taken to change the plan but he was currently consulting his colleagues about the best way forward. The military arguments were not clear cut either way and he recalled that the Americans had themselves earlier been in favour of a one site solution. The key question to be addressed was which alternative gave the least impetus to the peace movement. He recognised that a change of plan could be seen as a victory for them. Equally they might be given a new lease of life by the opportunity to attack a new base in a new area. The aim should be to avoid cruise missile deployments being a major issue by the time of the next General Election and this might be easier with concentration rather than establishing a new site. But he recognised that the arguments were finely balanced.

In further discussion, it was recognised that, once we had reached a view, there would need to be careful consultation over the timing and presentation of any announcement. It was clear that the Americans were particularly concerned about the timing aspect.

R Bone Esq



I was subsequently told by the US Embassy that this issue is included in the list of topics on which President Reagan is being briefed for his meeting with the Prime Minister. I am therefore copying this letter to John Coles, No 10 as well as to Richard Hatfield in the Cabinet Office.

Yours etc,

Richard Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)

bc P.C.

JP



40

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 June 1984

Dear Richard,

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

BF || The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 1 June. She would be grateful for comments from the other Ministers to whom it was circulated before taking a view on this matter.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of other members of MISC 7, and of the Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary, the Environment Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever

Lol Gles.

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CRUISE MISSILES

A brief for the debate on Cruise
missiles in the House of Commons
on Wednesday 23rd May 1984

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CRUISE MISSILES

1. Soviet superiority and the SS20

The Soviet Union retains a clear and worrying superiority in European land-based intermediate nuclear systems. The 1984 Defence White Paper estimates that the Soviet Union has 4,437 INF systems to NATO's 901. This imbalance in Europe grew steadily between 1977 and 1983 as the Soviet Union deployed 243 SS20 missiles, each with three warheads, aimed at Western Europe. Each of these warheads is 36 times more deadly than the Hiroshima atom bomb. Each one would be able to strike nearly any target in Western Europe. (There are also 135 more SS20s in the Far East).

2. NATO's response

In response to this growing Soviet threat, NATO decided in December 1979 to deploy 572 Cruise and Pershing II missiles in certain Western European countries from 1983 in default of a satisfactory arms control agreement with Moscow by then.

Under the plan, 96 Cruise missiles would be based in West Germany, 160 in the United Kingdom, 112 in Italy, 48 in Belgium and 48 in the Netherlands. 108 Pershing II missiles would be based in West Germany.

In view of the lack of success of the disarmament negotiations (see section 4), the first flight of Cruise missiles was deployed at Greenham Common at the end of 1983. This decision was approved by the House of Commons by a majority of 144 on 31st October 1983. The initial flights of Pershing II missiles in West Germany and Cruise missiles in Italy have also been deployed. At the moment, there are a total of 41 Cruise and Pershing missiles deployed in the three countries. Belgium and the Netherlands are due to take their missiles later in the 1980's subject to the final decision of their governments.

3. The need to modernise NATO's forces

As well as a response to the Soviet deployment of SS20s, the cruise missile programme should be seen as a modernisation of an increasingly obsolete nuclear defence capability. NATO's equivalent nuclear forces are older as well as less numerous than the Soviet equivalent. For a long time it consisted of British Vulcan bombers and American F111 aircraft based in Britain. The Vulcans have now been withdrawn and the F111s have become both more vulnerable to attacks on their airfields and less able to penetrate Soviet defences.

4. The Geneva disarmament negotiations

In November 1981, arms control talks opened between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva. The United States, with the full support of other NATO countries, put forward the 'zero option', whereby NATO would abandon its plan to deploy cruise and Pershing missiles from Western Europe from 1983, provided

that the Soviet Union agreed to dismantle its equivalent missiles (the SS20s and older missiles called SS4s and SS5s).

At first, the Soviet Union proposed a freeze on all missile deployments at existing levels, which would of course have left the Soviet Union with a monopoly of land-based medium-range missiles in Europe. However, in December 1982, Mr Andropov suggested that the Soviet Union would reduce the number of Soviet intermediate range missiles to the number of nuclear missiles deployed by Britain and France. However, Britain and France have always regarded their deterrents as independent and strategic and therefore not part of the balance of intermediate range weapons.

The victory of the centre-right coalition in the West German General Election on 6th March 1983 was an encouraging endorsement of NATO policy on the Cruise missile issue, which had played a major part in the election campaign. However, the Russians continued to rule out any idea of accepting the zero option. So on 30th March 1983, President Reagan, with the full support of other NATO countries, put forward a new compromise proposal. The key passage in his statement was as follows:

"When it comes to intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than to have some. But, if there must be some, it is better to have a few than to have many. If the Soviets will not now agree to the total elimination of these weapons, I hope that they will at least join us in an interim agreement that would substantially reduce these forces to equal levels on both sides. To this end ... we are prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched Cruise missiles provided the Soviet Union reduces the number of its warheads on longer-range INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis".

Unfortunately, the Russians showed no interest in such compromises and on the 23rd November 1983, following the decision of the German Bundestag to support the deployment of the first Pershing missiles, the Soviet Union withdrew from the Geneva talks. (The Russians also said that they would deploy new shorter range tactical nuclear missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia as a response to Cruise and Pershing. These missiles are the 300-mile range SS23s and the 540-mile range SS22s.) Mr Richard Luce, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, deplored the Soviet action and pointed out that:

"The Russians may seek to justify their interruption of the talks by the final preparations for initial Western INF deployment. But the House will recall that the West has remained at the conference table while the Soviet Union has increased its own deployment of SS20s by over 40 per cent ...

I wish to emphasise that the Alliance remains ready to halt

or reverse at any time the deployment of the missiles if only we can secure an agreement with the Soviet Union that would allow us to do so" (Hansard, 23rd November 1983, Col1328).

5. Reduction in nuclear warheads

As part of the NATO 1979 agreement, it was decided that for each of the 572 new warheads to be deployed, one existing warhead would be withdrawn from NATO stocks. Mr Heseltine has pointed out that:

"In practice we have gone far further than that. In 1980 we completed withdrawal of 1,000 warheads ... we have now decided as a result of our further work to reduce our stockpile by a further 2,000 warheads, including those required to make way for Cruise and Pershing warheads ... (Thus) the net reduction in nuclear warheads in Europe will be 2,400, bringing their number to the lowest level for 20 years" (Hansard, 31st October 1983, Col. 630).

6. The "Dual Key"

There has been considerable debate about arrangements for the control of Cruise missiles, while they are deployed in this country. The Government remains fully satisfied with the existing arrangements which have applied for other American nuclear weapons, based in the United Kingdom, for many years. As the Prime Minister has said:

"the use of United States bases in an emergency in the United Kingdom would be a matter for joint decision by Her Majesty's Government and the United States government in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time" (Hansard, 18th January 1983, Col. 168).

She later stated that the arrangements had been reviewed again by the British and United States Governments:

"we are satisfied that they are effective. The arrangements will apply to United States Cruise missiles based in the United Kingdom whether on or off bases. The effect of the understandings and arrangements for implementing them is that no nuclear weapon would be fired or launched from British territory without the agreement of the British Prime Minister" (Hansard, 12th May 1983, WA, Col. 435).

Labour and Social Democratic leaders now call for a dual key. But when they were ministers in Labour Governments, they were quite satisfied with the existing arrangements for the control of American bases for the nuclear F111 American bombers and Poseidon submarines.

7. Misconceptions about Cruise missiles

It is commonly stated by members of the CND that the Cruise missile is a first strike weapon, that the United States is trying to impose it on the West Europeans, and that the Americans are

thinking of fighting a limited nuclear war. These assertions are entirely false.

Quite apart from the fact that NATO strategy is defensive, Cruise missiles are too slow to be used as a first strike weapon. It would take three or four hours for a cruise missile to travel from England to Moscow. The Russians would know if they were launched and would have plenty of time to retaliate. Furthermore, the number of Cruise missiles to be based in Europe is much smaller than the total number of Soviet strategic missiles, many of which are out of range. Finally, the mobile Soviet SS20s are, once deployed, virtually invulnerable to pre-emptive attack.

So far from the United States trying to impose the Cruise missiles on Europe, it was in fact the Europeans (and particularly the former West German Chancellor Herr Schmidt) who first suggested the introduction of Cruise missiles into Europe in order to deter the Russians from thinking they could seize Western Europe and present the Americans with a "fait accompli". The clear victory of parties committed to the deployment of Cruise missiles if necessary in general elections in Italy, West Germany and Britain in 1983 proves that NATO policy is accepted by the majority of Western Europeans, despite the noisy protests of the one-sided disarmers.

As for the idea that Cruise missiles could be used to fight a limited nuclear war, no NATO government believes that nuclear weapons could be used to achieve military victory in any meaningful sense. The United States realises that it could not launch a limited nuclear attack against the Soviet Union - from Europe or elsewhere - without putting their own homeland at risk.

8. The Labour Party and Cruise missiles

Labour leaders, and particularly Mr Denis Healey, like to give the impression that they have never supported the Cruise missile programme, and that the decision to deploy them here was entirely the responsibility of the Conservative Government. However, there is every reason to suppose that this is incorrect.

In the debate on nuclear weapons on 24th January 1980, Mr William Rodgers, then Shadow Defence Secretary and a member of the previous Labour government, said in relation to the NATO decision in December 1979 to deploy Cruise and Pershing missiles:

"we accepted the need to move ahead on the proposed timetable. It was the view of the previous government that theatre nuclear modernisation was essential, and that is our view today" (Hansard, Col. 691).

When pressed later in his speech on the degree of opposition support for the modernisation programme, Mr Rodgers said

"I have stated very clearly the view of the Parliamentary Committee (ie the Shadow Cabinet) of the Parliamentary Party" (Ibid. Col. 692).

It seems inconceivable that Mr Rodgers, who was then a very senior member of the Labour Party, although he was to defect to the SDP 15 months later, would have made such categorical state-

ments , unless he had the authority of the Shadow Cabinet, including Mr Healey and Mr Foot.

Furthermore, there is evidence that members of the last Labour government were closely involved in the preliminary discussions, which led to the decision to deploy the missiles. For example, a meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, attended by Mr Frank Mulley, then Labour Defence Secretary, discussed the issue on 24th and 25th April 1979. The communique, published after the meeting said:

"In their consideration of NATO's requirements ... to modernise theatre nuclear forces, Ministers reaffirmed that NATO could not rely on conventional forces alone for credible deterrence in Europe: and that without increasing dependence on nuclear weapons or prejudicing long-term defence improvements in conventional forces, it would be necessary to maintain and modernise theatre nuclear forces".

Despite all this, the Labour party now appears to be unanimously opposed to the deployment of Cruise missiles and committed to having them removed, should Labour win the next General Election.

9. The Alliance and Cruise missiles

The Liberals and Social Democrats have been divided on the issue of Cruise missiles ever since the Liberal Party Assembly voted in September 1981 (against Mr Steel's wishes) against their deployment. The Social Democratic Party has broadly supported Government policy except that they favour a "dual key". The "Liberal Programme" published in August 1982 unconditionally opposed the deployment of Cruise missiles. However, Mr Steel continued to take a different position from that of his party. Thus in the Times of 7th February 1983 he said:

"If we renege on the 1979 NATO decision ... we shall simply hand the Russians everything they want from the present Geneva talks at no cost to themselves" and "the Russians must know that NATO stands united and prepared to deploy unless we get it" (ie a better deal than that offered by Mr Andropov).

The Alliance General Election Manifesto managed to fudge the issue, although the form of words used was closer to the point of view of the Social Democrats. It said that:

"Before deciding whether or not to oppose the deployment of Cruise missiles in Britain, an Alliance government will take account, in particular, of the negotiating position of the Soviet Union and the United States, the attitude of our NATO partners in Europe, and whether arrangements for a double safety-catch system have been agreed".

The failure of the Alliance to oppose Cruise missiles unconditionally annoyed many left-wing Liberals. In the Commons debate on Cruise missiles on 31st October 1983 both Liberal

and Social Democrat MPs voted against the Government, but supported an amendment, which, while calling for the continuation of negotiations, by implication accepted that Cruise missiles should be based in the United Kingdom under certain conditions. However, there is little doubt that the majority of Liberal MPs and activists remain opposed to the deployment of Cruise missiles under any circumstances.

The Alliance European Election Manifesto calls for the suspension "of future deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles to give the Soviet Union an opportunity to come back to the conference table".

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