

GFO 001/01

DD FCO 011630Z JUN

IMMEDIATE

OO UKDEL NATO

ADVANCE COPY

OO WASHINGTON

OO MODUK

PP BONN

PP BRUSSELS

PP ROME

GRS 500

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 011630Z

FM THE HAGUE 011500Z JUN 84

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 011630Z FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 199 OF 01 JUNE 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON AND MODUK (FOR DS 17)

INFO PRIORITY BONN BRUSSELS AND ROME

YOUR TELNO 72: NETHERLANDS/INF

1. VAN DEN BROEK SAW THE US AMBASSADOR THIS AFTERNOON. HE THEN SAW THE FOUR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OTHER DEPLOYING COUNTRIES. HE SAID THAT THE CABINET HAD JUST REACHED AGREEMENT ON A PLAN FOR THE CONDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THE NETHERLANDS. A LETTER TO THE SECOND CHAMBER SIGNED BY THE PRIME MINISTER, DE RUITER AND HIMSELF WOULD ISSUE LATER THIS AFTERNOON AND THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD THEN GIVE A PRESS CONFERENCE.

2. THE MAIN ELEMENTS IN THEIR DECISION WERE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD -

I) MAINTAIN THE DUTCH COMMITMENT UNDER THE 1979 DECISION TO DEPLOY A PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THE EVENT OF A US/SOVIET AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION :

II) IF THERE WAS NO SUCH AGREEMENT, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD UNDERTAKE TO DECIDE SIMULTANEOUSLY ON 1 NOVEMBER 1985 TO CARRY OUT CONSTRUCTION AND TO DEPLOY 48 MISSILES IN THE EVENT THAT AT ANY TIME THE NUMBER OF SOVIET SS20S ACTUALLY DEPLOYED WAS HIGHER THAN IT IS TODAY.

3. VAN DEN BROEK EXPLAINED THAT AS THERE WAS RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE PLANNING SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION OF THEIR SS20 ARSENAL, THE CABINET COULD NOT SEE HOW DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE AVOIDED. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS HIS SINCERE CONVICTION THAT THIS SOLUTION WAS THE BEST THAT COULD BE DEvised TO SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.

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Hol/Def D
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- /WED

- /News D

Mr Coler N700's

PS (6)

mt

Dir J Bullard

Mr Wright

Mr Jenkins

Mr Cartledge

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THE INTERESTS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.~~

4. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION, VAN DEN BROEK SAID THAT LUBBERS WAS DETERMINED TO DO HIS UTMOST TO GET THIS PLAN APPROVED BY THE SECOND CHAMBER. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE AFFECTED BY A SIMPLE RESUMPTION OF ARMS NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA. THE TIMETABLE WOULD STAND. BUT VAN DEN BROEK ADMITTED THAT THE LATER DATE FOR THE START OF CONSTRUCTION MEANS THAT THE DUTCH WERE STRETCHING THE IOC. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE DATE FOR DECISION WAS FIRMLY FIXED AS 1 NOVEMBER 1985 DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT.

5. VAN DEN BROEK ADMITTED THAT THE FORMULA HE HAD OUTLINED GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE NETHERLANDS WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE CURRENT IMBALANCE IN INF. THIS WAS A WEAK POINT, BUT THE DUTCH WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO EMPHASISE THE NEED FOR A REDUCTION ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE. IT WAS AT LEAST AN IMPROVEMENT THAT THE CRISIS DEPLOYMENT ELEMENT HAD DISAPPEARED. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, VAN DEN BROEK SAID THAT HE EXPECTED SOME EXPRESSIONS OF DISAPPOINTMENT FROM NATO ALLIES. BUT HE HOPED THERE WOULD ALSO BE SOME APPRECIATION OF THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL FOR ANYONE TO SUGGEST THAT THIS DUTCH PLAN AMOUNTED TO 100 PER CENT DEPLOYMENT. THIS WOULD CAUSE DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES.

6. PLEASE SEE MY TWO IFTS.

MANSFIELD

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