



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 October 1984

FALKLANDS AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

You wrote to me on 22 October, enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to EC Heads of Government about the Falklands vote at the UN General Assembly.

I propose to put this to the Prime Minister tomorrow evening, after she has discussed the matter with President Mitterrand. But it seems to me already clear that a message to Craxi needs a very different beginning, indeed possibly an entirely different text from that enclosed with your letter. As you will have seen from my record of the Prime Minister's tete-a-tete with Craxi, he gave a clear commitment to an abstention provided the French do the same. A message to Craxi will need therefore to provide an account of what Mitterrand said and urge him to stand by his commitment. I doubt that it will need all the rest of the material, which may be appropriate for other governments.

I agree that we can only tell whether a message to Mitterrand is necessary after the Prime Minister's meeting with him. All one can say, I think, is that the draft enclosed with your letter will not be appropriate.

A final point which will need thought: if Mitterrand gives a commitment on abstention, can we mention this and Craxi's similar commitment in messages to other EC Heads of Government?

(C.D. POWELL)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 October, 1984

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Dear Charles,

Falklands at the General Assembly

As you know, this year's General Assembly vote is expected to take place on 31 October.

The Argentines are circulating a revised version of their draft resolution which virtually brings it back to last year's text though, in an obvious bid to attract the French vote, they have omitted last year's suggestion that 'the maintenance of colonial situations is incompatible with the United Nations ideal of universal peace'. Although our lobbying in other parts of the world has produced reasonably satisfactory results, we are once again having difficulty in pinning down our European Partners. There is a danger that France and Italy could start a movement which could place most of our European partners and some of our other friends in the Argentine camp. (We have been told that the Americans, who voted in favour of the last two resolutions, will vote for the draft now circulating).

Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that the Prime Minister's personal intervention will once again be necessary. The Prime Minister has already spoken to Craxi and will be speaking to Mitterrand on 24 October. Sir Geoffrey recommends that the Prime Minister should send personal messages to the other EC Heads of Government. He suggests that these should be timed for delivery on 26 October in time for weekend boxes and not too far ahead of the vote itself.

I enclose a draft for the Prime Minister's consideration.

In view of the lapse of time between the Prime Minister's conversation with Craxi and the vote itself, Sir Geoffrey suggests that such a message should also be delivered in Rome, with a slightly different beginning. Whether a message should be sent to President Mitterrand can only be decided after the meeting on 24 October. Unless he gives a clear and satisfactory assurance then, some further action will be necessary in Paris, either in the form of a message or as an oral demarche by the Ambassador.

Guswe,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

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[To Craxi / Mitterrand:

We had a word on 19/24 October about the approaching vote in the United Nations General Assembly on a further Argentine draft resolution about the future of the Falkland Islands. As I said to you,]

[To the rest:

We are approaching another vote in the United Nations General Assembly on an Argentine draft resolution about the future of the Falkland Islands.]

President Alfonsin has made it abundantly clear in New York ^{this Autumn} that Argentina continues to seek the rapid absorption of the Islands into her territory regardless of the wishes of the inhabitants, whose recollections of the cruel events of 1982 are still vivid. I know that the Argentines are particularly anxious to persuade our European partners to vote with them and that is why I am writing to you now.

As you know, we mean to stand by the people of the Falkland Islands. We shall uphold their right to live under a government of their own choosing, a right which is not diminished by their geographical circumstances. We cannot negotiate their future with Argentina over their heads and despite their clear wishes.

We have nevertheless made a major effort this year to establish a dialogue with the Argentines and rebuild

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relations of confidence with them. It is most regrettable
- through no fault of our own -
that these efforts have not so far borne fruit. I am
convinced that such a dialogue represents the only possible
way forward; and I am most anxious that Argentina should
not be encouraged to believe otherwise. It cannot be good
for the cause of democratic government in Argentina, which
all of us wish to strengthen, for the Argentines to persist
on their wholly unrealistic course

This is a matter of great importance to us in Britain.
As before, we do not ask that you should actually vote with
us and diametrically opposite to Argentina. But I do ask
you most earnestly not to vote with Argentina and
diametrically opposite to us.

22 OCT 1984

