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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3626 OF 5 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (FOR DUS P) ROUTINE MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO,  
BONN, PARIS

INFO SAVING TOKYO, US CONSULATES GENERAL

MIPT (NOT TO ALL) AND MY TELNO 3485: SHULTZ AT CHEVENING:  
EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

## SUMMARY

1. SOME OPTIMISM, FOLLOWING AGREEMENT ON THE SHULTZ/GROMYKO MEETING ON 7/8 JANUARY. INTER-AGENCY PREPARATORY WORK PROCEEDING, BUT DECISIONS UNLIKELY FOR SOME WEEKS YET. ADMINISTRATION WELL SEIZED OF ALLIES' NEED TO BE KEPT INFORMED.

## DETAIL

2. THERE IS A MOOD OF GUARDED OPTIMISM HERE ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS. THE GENEVA TALKS ARE SEEN AS CRUCIAL: BUT THE US AIM IS SIMPLY TO START A PROCESS WHICH COULD LEAD BOTH TO ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, AND TO AN IMPROVED SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIP ACROSS THE BOARD. WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT INSTANT AGREEMENTS, EXCEPT PERHAPS ON PROCEDURE.

3. INTER-AGENCY PREPARATION IS NOW IN FULL SWING, AT AN UNUSUALLY SENIOR LEVEL, AND UNDER UNUSUALLY FIRM INJUNCTIONS AGAINST LEAKS. SHULTZ IS CLEARLY IN THE DRIVING-SEAT, BUT MACFARLANE HAS EMERGED AS THE PUBLIC SPOKESMAN. NITZE IS NOW ESTABLISHED AS SHULTZ'S SPECIAL ARMS CONTROL ADVISER, AND IS ATTENDING ALL RELEVANT HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS. WHETHER HIS ROLE WILL DEVELOP INTO THAT OF AN "ENVOY" WILL DEPEND ON HOW GROMYKO REACTS IN GENEVA.

4. THE MAIN POINTS NOW UNDER DISCUSSION APPEAR TO BE:-

(A) HOW EXTENSIVE SHOULD BE THE COVERAGE OF THE UMBRELLA. MOST ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS NOW SEEM DETERMINED THAT IT SHOULD FOR THE PRESENT COVER ONLY OUTER SPACE AND OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, WHICH ARE VIEWED AS THE ESSENTIAL ISSUES (THEY ARE ALSO OF COURSE PRIMARILY BILATERAL US/SOVIET ISSUES). THIS INITIAL LIMITATION OF THE DIALOGUE APPEARS ALSO TO REFLECT SOVIET PREFERENCES.

EXTENDING THE COVERAGE TO OTHER AREAS, EG CW, MBFR, AND CDE IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE SOMETHING WHICH MIGHT EMERGE LATER, BUT SHOULD NOT BE ATTEMPTED AT ONCE:

(B) WHAT ASAT CONSTRAINT REGIME (IF ANY) SHOULD THE ADMINISTRATION BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT. THERE IS STILL FIRM AGREEMENT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD NOT ACCEPT A MORATORIUM ON ASAT TESTS BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS GET UNDER WAY. BUT MANY IN STATE BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DECLARED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER, AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, "MEASURES OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT" OUGHT TO BE REFLECTED BY INTER-AGENCY AGREEMENT NOW THAT A TIME-LIMITED MUTUAL MORATORIUM

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SHOULD BE OFFERED EARLY ON. DOD DISSENT, AND THE ISSUE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE YET BEEN FOUGHT TO A FINISH. NOR HAS THE QUESTION OF THE ASAT COMPONENT OF A POSSIBLE OVERALL AGREEMENT. BUT THE IDEA OF GOING FOR A "RULES OF THE ROAD" AGREEMENT APPEARS TO BE LOSING FAVOUR, EXCEPT IN DOD, AS DOES THE IDEA OF A TIME-LIMITED BAN ON ONLY HIGH LEVEL ASAT TESTING. THAT LEAVES A TIME-LIMITED BAN ON ALL ASAT SYSTEMS (HIGH LEVEL AND LOW LEVEL) AS THE STATE DEPARTMENT FRONT RUNNER:

(C) WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION SHOULD BE ON OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. THE PENTAGON APPEAR STILL TO FAVOUR STICKING WITH THE PRESENT START AND INF POSITIONS: WHILE THE STATE DEPARTMENT STILL FAVOUR THEIR "FRAMEWORK AGGREGATES" APPROACH, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE MARRYING LIMITS ON LAUNCHERS WITH LIMITS ON WEAPONS. WE HAVE DETECTED NO SIGNS THAT THE DISCUSSION OF PRECISE NUMBERS (FOR LIMITS ON THE VARIOUS LAUNCHER AND WARHEAD CATEGORIES) HAS STARTED IN EARNEST, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE OF PENTAGON OPPOSITION: AND OUR SOURCES STRESS THAT IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT SUCH A DISCUSSION WILL BE DRIVEN TO A CONCLUSION BEFORE THE GENEVA TALKS. THAT IS SEEN AS UP TO THE PRESIDENT: AND HE HAS NOT YET RULED:

(D) WHETHER TO MERGE THE START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS. IN RECENT MONTHS THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SOME MOVEMENT IN OFFICIAL OPINION IN FAVOUR OF A MERGER IN PROCEDURAL TERMS (IE THE US MIGHT BE READY TO DISCUSS BOTH STRATEGIC AND INF SYSTEMS AT THE SAME NEGOTIATING TABLE. ONE ADVANTAGE, MUCH QUOTED TO US, IS THAT WITH A BIGGER BASKET IT OUGHT TO BE THEORETICALLY EASIER TO PRESENT AN AGREEMENT, WITH NO EXPLICIT PROVISIONS FOR EUROPEAN SYSTEMS, AS CONSISTENT WITH THE AIM OF "EQUALITY". HOWEVER, THERE IS NO CONSENSUS YET ON WHETHER START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIVELY MERGED AND A SYSTEM OF COMMON CEILINGS PROPOSED:

(E) THE OPTIMUM BLUEPRINT FOR POST-GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. THE ADMINISTRATION CLEARLY HOPE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL BE READY TO MOVE ON QUICKLY FROM "TALKS ABOUT TALKS" I.E. OBJECTIVES AND PROCEDURES, BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THEY WILL PROPOSE THAT THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS AT WITZES' LEVEL. (HARTMAN'S POINT THAT IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT FOR THE RUSSIANS TO OPERATE AT THAT LEVEL IS WIDELY QUOTED IN STATE, PARTICULARLY BY THOSE WHO RESENT WITZE'S REAPPEARANCE.)

5. ALL OUR CONTACTS CONFIRM THAT THE IDEA OF A MORATORIUM, IN ADVANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS (OR RATHER NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT), ON INF DEPLOYMENT IS NOT BEING CONSIDERED. MACFARLANE'S STATEMENTS ON

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25 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 3543) REPRESENT AN ALL-AGENCY POSITION. EQUALLY, ALL OUR CONTACTS CONFIRM THAT NO CONSIDERATION IS YET BEING GIVEN TO ANY OUTCOME ON ASATS (EG A TESTING BAN OF INDEFINITE OR LONG DURATION) WHICH MIGHT IMPINGE ON SDI. SDI IS NOT AT PRESENT UNDER ATTACK BY ANY AGENCY.

6. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY AT THIS STAGE HOW MANY OF THE ISSUES LISTED IN PARA 4 WILL IN FACT BE DECIDED BEFORE THE GENEVA MEETING. ARMACOST TOLD ME ON 3 DECEMBER THAT IT WAS LIKELY THAT NO FINAL DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN ON WHAT SHOULD BE SAID TO GROMYKO UNTIL SHORTLY BEFORE SHULTZ'S DEPARTURE, IE IN CALIFORNIA DURING THE PRESIDENT'S POST-CHRISTMAS BREAK (WHEN SHULTZ TOO WILL BE THERE).

7. I (AND MY FRENCH AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES) REMINDED ARMACOST OF THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING BOTH THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, AND THE PRINCIPAL ALLIES IN PARTICULAR, IN TOUCH WITH US DECISION-MAKING. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE FULLY SEIZED OF THE IMPORTANCE OF BOTH POINTS: AND SHULTZ'S LETTERS TO YOU (AND LORD CARRINGTON) OF 28 NOVEMBER (YOUR TELNO 2035, AND UKDEL TELNO 403) SEEM TO SHOW THAT THEY ACCEPT THE NEED FOR PROPER ALLIANCE CONSULTATION.

8. THERE HAS BEEN INTEREST HERE IN GORBACHEV'S VISIT. BOTH THE VICE PRESIDENT AND ARMACOST HAVE ASKED FOR A FULL BRIEFING SOON AFTER THE EVENT: IT WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED BY SHULTZ IF YOU WOULD TELL HIM THAT I SHALL BE AUTHORISED TO PROVIDE THIS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TOKYO

WRIGHT

FCO (PALACE)

NAO

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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