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
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e PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

FALKLANDS/ARGENTINA

The Prime Minister has noted without comment the Foreign Secretary's minute of 1 November about this year's debate on the Falklands in the United Nations General Assembly.

 (Charles Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PM/85/92

PRIME MINISTER

There is a Prime Minister
 risk of our losing
 considerable support
 this year, unless
 we pull out all the
 stops. You will want
 to discuss with Kohl &
 Hittner at the summit.
 CDP

CDP
3/11

Falklands/Argentina

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1. This year's debate and vote on the Falklands in the General Assembly is now some three weeks away. We have been keeping a careful eye on Argentina's efforts to attract the votes of our European partners as well as others in the Commonwealth and elsewhere who have declined to support them. To illustrate the extent of these efforts, I attach as an annex to this minute a list of the main Argentine/European contacts in recent months.

2. It has long been on the cards that as part of this campaign Argentina would water down their text. We have not yet seen their draft resolution this year, but we heard last week from the Americans that the Argentines are planning to introduce some changes for this purpose. Specifically, they are apparently proposing to omit

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references to earlier UN resolutions (some of which refer to decolonisation): drop any reference to sovereignty: and instead call for negotiations on "all aspects of the future of the Islands". In other words they would deal or appear to have dealt with many of the objections we raised on their text last year.

3. The Argentines start with a number of advantages in their search for more votes. They will have American support - as they have had for the last three years. There is widespread support for Alfonsin as the man who restored democracy to Argentina, and admiration for his courage in combatting Argentina's daunting economic problems, particularly inflation. They now have Spain - a traditional ally - participating in European Community consultations. And they have succeeded in winning over the leaders of the main opposition parties in this country.

4. My Italian colleague foreshadowed to me last weekend the possibility of movement on the Argentine resolution. Now I have received a letter from my French colleague implying (though not stating explicitly) that if Argentina produced such a watered down resolution this year, France would move to a vote in favour of it.

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5. The French are the first of the Europeans to forewarn us of their intentions: but it could equally have been one of several other European countries. The risk now is that most of the other Europeans will join the Spaniards in a vote against us. That could well lead to considerable further erosion in support for our position, for example from the Commonwealth Caribbean.

6. We have already taken a number of steps to counter this threat. As soon as we heard that the Argentines were thinking of watering down their text we sent briefing to a wide range of posts so that they could deal promptly with any suggestion that such changes marked a change of substance in the Argentine position and hence justified a change in voting at the UN. We have now sent a further telegram to posts telling them to be even more alert for any sign that their host governments were the subject of lobbying by the Argentines. I am sending a response to Dumas setting out our position and urging him to reconsider his. If that fails we will need to consider whether we can gain anything from initiating consultation in the Community, given the solid position of the Ten on the issue in the last two years. Meanwhile we have told the French that we regard Dumas' letter as a

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private communication and that we hope they will too, although the risk of a leak must be high. Publicity for the French move would destroy any chance that they can be persuaded to change their mind.

7. When we see the text of the Argentine resolution we shall need to decide our tactics in New York. We are working on a number of options and consulting Sir John Thomson. One possibility we shall need to think about is whether to try to turn the resolution against the Argentines by putting forward amendments of our own that they cannot accept, for example a reference to the wishes of the Islanders and the right to self-determination. I shall let you have my recommendations on this shortly.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe'.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1 November 1985

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VISITS BY DR CAPUTO AND PRESIDENT ALFONSIN TO EUROPE AND
NORTH AMERICA

FRG	(Caputo)	6-9 February
France	(Caputo)	5-6 May
Italy	(Caputo)	8-9 May
France	(Caputo)	20-21 July
Yugoslavia	(Alfonsin and Caputo)	13-15 September
FRG	(Alfonsin and Caputo)	15-18 September
France	(Alfonsin and Caputo)	18-21 September
USA (UNGA)	(Caputo)	22-?28 September
Ottawa	(Caputo)	29 September-1 October
Madrid	(Alfonsin)	5-6 October

VISITS BY EUROPEANS TO ARGENTINA

M. Cheysson		2-4 March
President Partini & Foreign Minister Andreotti		9-11 March
King and Queen of Spain		14-17 April
Finnish Foreign Minister Vayrynen		11-14 May
President Pertini		21-22 May
French Vice-Defence Minister Blanc		4-? July
Italian Defence Minister Spadolini		5-10 September
FRG Interior Minister Zimmerman		18-25 October