

*hli*

*JD*



*CCMA*

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 January 1986

*Dear Julian*

I was fascinated to read your account of your visit to South Africa, and particularly grateful to you for raising with the President the importance of receiving the Eminent Persons Group and the need to avoid cross-border raids. I am sure that your intervention will have carried great weight.

*Yours*

*Raymond*

The Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.

*M*

Spoken to Mr. Amery  
CDP  
7/1

PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA


Julian Amery telephoned this afternoon to say that he would be travelling to South Africa on Wednesday where he would be seeing President Botha. He wondered whether you had any particular message which you wanted him to convey. He has received a briefing from the Foreign Secretary.

I said that I would consult you. I thought that your main objective was to encourage President Botha to take a reasonably open attitude to the Commonwealth Eminent Persons' Group. I knew that you would also be fascinated to see his report on his visit.

Any other thought which you want to pass on to Mr. Amery?

Charles Powell  
6 January 1986

CDP  
The one Leander Post  
put to me - namely - to hurdle  
try to get a majority of with  
the extreme Members forming  
an alliance of  
Whites  
Indians  
Coloureds  
Zulus  
S. African Swazis  
which together with some  
of the Members would carry  
with them, would give  
him a majority. not



FROM: THE RT. HON. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.

112, EATON SQUARE,  
SW1W 9AA  
TEL: 01-235 1543  
01-235 7409

*Prime Minister*  
*Some interesting points*

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

28th January, 1986

*Here.*  
*I will write to*  
*thank Mr. Amery for*  
*raising the two points - good reception*  
*for the Amey Report and no cross border*  
*rails - which you asked him to pursue*

I was in South Africa from 8 - 19 January. My visit started with a weekend in Durban with Harry Oppenheimer where Van Zyl Slabbert, Leader of the Opposition, was also a guest. Harry then took me to Johannesburg for a dinner with Dr. Leutwiler. De Koch, the Governor of the National Bank, du Plessis and Anton Rupert, the two biggest Afrikaaner businessmen, and the top hamper of Anglo-American were also there.

In Johannesburg I also saw Basil Hersov, the Chairman of Anglo Vaal. Owen Horwood, the former Finance Minister, now Chairman of the NedBank, and Harry Schwarz, the Shadow Minister of Finance (in my view much abler than his Leader).

In Cape Town, besides lunching with our Ambassador, I had meetings with the State President, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Defence and ended a longish day dining with Anton Rupert at Stellenbosch.

I did not see Chief Buthelezi who was on his way to Europe or Bishop Tutu who was in the U.S.

I attach notes of my talks with the State President, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Defence. It would be tedious to try to report the other talks in detail. I have tried instead to set down my main impressions in the more general note which follows.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosures to Geoffrey Howe.

Julian Amery

*Julian*

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

P.S. I have deliberately kept off making any policy recommendations but may write again - much more briefly - when we have heard what President Botha has to say at the Opening of Parliament.

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL NOTE

SECURITY:

The casual visitor to Durban, Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Stellenbosch and the rural Cape, would see no visible signs of an emergency. No military presence, no armoured cars, no road blocks, no special security at airports: difficult even to find a policeman in Pretoria.

The official figures show that about half the fatal casualties have been inflicted by Blacks on Blacks. A substantial part of the other half have been inflicted by police or soldiers trying to protect establishment Blacks - town councillors, policemen or informers - from anti-Government blacks. There is an underlying 'Black-White' confrontation but, on the surface the confrontation is rather between Black "haves" and Black "have nots" laced with tribal rivalries. This arises from a general opinion that the Government will have to do a deal with some blacks. The extremists are determined to sabotage any deal between the Black moderates and the Government. They have accordingly made the intimidation or destruction of the moderates their immediate objective. There are some reminders of the Tito-Mihailovitch conflict here.

THE BLACK LINE-UP:

The ANC, a majority of whose executive committee are, I understand, Communist Party members undoubtedly has considerable influence among the politically conscious urban Blacks. So, to a lesser extent, does their rival AZANIA.

Against these must be set Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha movement which claims over a million registered members and has the backing of most though not all of the five million Zulu tribe. Then there are the leaders of the four independent homelands.

These command substantial traditional support among their tribes and have armed forces of their own. So to a varying extent do the leaders of the autonomous, but not yet independent smaller homelands.

Another influential body is the Church of Zion. This claims a membership of five million, of whom some two million are said to have turned out last Easter to welcome President Botha and his wife. The speech made by their hereditary bishop on that occasion, though not pro-Government, was strongly anti-ANC and anti-violence. The State President has made much of this experience. I have, checked with others who tend to confirm the importance this church especially in the Transvaal. One director of Anglo-American told me that when selecting applicants for a job he would usually give preference to a member of this church.

It is anybody's guess where the political sympathies of the Black elites - businessmen, doctors, dentists, managers, government officials, homeland officials - lie. Many of them, however, are hardly likely to support the strongly socialist policies of the ANC. They are, however, very subject to intimidation in the Black townships where they have to reside and cannot easily be protected. In this regard the Group Areas Act has boomeranged against the Government.

## THE ECONOMY

South Africa has a short term liquidity problem. But its assets are among the soundest in the world and, but for political pressures, its debts would be rolled over without question. Inflation is running at somewhere between 16% - 18% and may get worse. The fall in the oil price, however, and the rise in the gold price has improved the rand and revived confidence. The mining companies have made enormous rand profits as they sell their gold in dollars. The same is true of most other exporters. The State revenues have benefitted correspondingly. The

importers, of course, have been hard hit but this will not be felt immediately since, apart from luxuries, imports are mainly machinery and spare parts for existing machinery. The greatest danger to the economy comes from disinvestment by some foreign companies, the lack of new foreign investment and the braindrain of some skilled men.

### A BROADENING OF THE GOVERNMENT?

The business community accept the idea of greater participation in government in principle but are sceptical in practice. Some doubt whether the Nationalist caucus would ever allow them to exercise real influence. Others find it more comfortable to criticise the Government from the comfort of the boardroom than to become involved in taking decisions as to what's to be done next week. Interestingly the State President seemed hesitant about the idea, while the Foreign Minister was quite enthusiastic. I suspect this reflects Pik Botha's growing recognition that he depends increasingly on the English speaking vote in the Transvaal where the hardliners have already skimmed off some of the Afrikaaner vote. It may also reflect a personal ambition to emerge as the leader of both Afrikaaner and English speaking South Africans - a new Smuts?

### THE EMINENT PERSONS GROUP

South Africans of all parties are getting rather fed up with foreign visitors and are not looking forward to seeing the Eminent Persons group. Lord Barber is recognised as knowing a good deal about South Africa because of his connection with the Standard Bank, Mr. Malcolm Fraser is regarded as an enemy. Little is known about the others. The Government realise that it is in their interest to give the group a friendly reception and that this would help HMG to resist pressure over sanctions. Both the State President and the Foreign Minister, however, stressed that it would be helpful to them if the eminent persons could come out in two's or three's rather than all together. There may

be an element in this of hoping to play them off against each other. But their main objective is probably to avoid a showdown between the group as a whole and the Government. For all his solid appearance, President Botha has a fairly low boiling point and is easily provoked. A recent meeting with an American group led by Senator Gray ended apparently in a shouting match.

### HOT PURSUIT

The President appreciates our hope that South Africa will not go in for too much 'hot pursuit' in the next few months. He hopes, however, that HMG will also be urging the "front line states" to avoid encouraging or allowing ANC raids into South Africa.

### RUBICON II

The State President gave me no indication of what he will say in his speech at the Opening of Parliament. Dr. Leutwiler, however, whom I saw immediately after his talk with the State President, said that he was very encouraged by it and thought that the American banks could be satisfied by what the State President had to say. My own guess is that there will be a commitment to power-sharing with the Blacks but on terms that the ANC and the UDF will reject. It may be enough, however, to enable the Government to pass from the private talks which they hold fairly regularly with moderate Black leaders and proceed to more formal negotiations.

A major difficulty now is the fear of the moderate Blacks that the Government, under international pressure, will talk to the extremists and so leave them outflanked. According to the President, Buthelizi is not prepared for serious discussions until any question of ANC participation has been clearly excluded. This rings true to me. My experience at the Colonial Office convinced me that moderates are always scared of being outflanked by extremists. This often happened in the British

[You are  
no see  
him  
soon]

[Exactly -  
this will be  
reinforced  
if we talk  
to the ANC]

colonies. The South African whites are made of sterner stuff than were transitory Colonial Governments but the international pressures and the talks held by some of the business community with the ANC are, a constant worry to Black moderates.

### NELSON MANDELA

Mandela is, as much Botha's gaoler as Botha's prisoner. If he could be released and deported, everyone would heave a sigh of relief. If on the other hand he were released and he drew Black crowds in their millions, what would the Government do? Put him back into prison? The official concensus seems to be that he must stay put, at any rate until some deal with the moderates has been arranged.

### SOUTH AFRICAN - AMERICAN RELATIONS

There is universal respect among South African Ministers for President Reagan but diminishing confidence in Dr. Crocker and the State Department. Do the latter already see the President as a lame duck? Are they playing for time? The Soviets are thought to have rearmed the Angola regime in a big way. Proposed American support for Savimbi is dismissed as "peanuts". Could Dr. Crocker be so naive as to believe that if only Savimbi was not there he could persuade Luanda to get rid of the Cubans?

### A MILITARY GOVERNMENT?

I heard more talk of a possible military takeover than on any previous visit. It is not thought that this would be a 'coup' against the GOvernment but undertaken by General Malan at the State President's request. It would have the advantage of enabling the regime to break down discriminatory laws and promote individual Blacks while keeping real power firmly in white hands.

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JULIAN AMERY

28.1.86



CONFIDENTIAL

1.

NOTE of a meeting between General Magnus Malan, Minister of Defence and Mr. Julian Amery, 16th January, 1986, 8 - 9.00 a.m. at the Minister's office, Cape Town.

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No one else present.

I began the conversation by asking how the General saw the line-up of Black Africans. He said that some ten or twelve million still lived in the countryside and were largely non-political. The Zulus had a powerful organisation and although by no means pro-Government were anti-ANC. So were the leaders of the independent homelands. Some of them were more influential than others but ~~all~~ still had some authority over their tribesmen living in the urban areas. He also mentioned the Church of Zion which had given the State President a great reception at Easter time.

We should remember that a large part of the police force were Black and supported the Government. The great majority of Black townships were still run by Black councillors who could be regarded as part of the establishment. Of course the ANC were a powerful force but we should not exaggerate their influence or regard them as representative of even a majority of urban Africans.

I asked the General if there was any danger of a bush war developing such as had happened in Rhodesia. He was confident this could not happen so long as the ANC were not allowed to establish bases on South Africa's borders. This was why the South Africans had, from time to time, to engage in what might be called 'hot pursuit' operations. They had fairly good security co-operation with their neighbours but this really meant that when South African intelligence drew their attention to a particular ANC build-up on their territory, the neighbours simply moved them on. His job, of course, was not too keep them moving

but to destroy them.

He regarded Prime Minister Mugabe as sinister but had to admit that he had kept his side of the bargain in preventing the ANC using Zimbabwe for infiltrating terrorists into South Africa. He feared, however, that, in spite of his previous detachment from the Soviet Union, Mugabe was now moving closer to Moscow. In his new position as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, he would find himself drawn into still closer co-operation. This was a dangerous trend to be watched closely.

I asked what the prospect seemed to be for both Angola and Mozambique.

The General replied that Dr. Crocker had just been on a visit to Cape Town. He had claimed, quite rightly, that his first objective was to get the Cubans out of Angola. He had also said that the United States was going to make some \$70 million dollars worth of "humanitarian" aid available to Savimbi. He had told Dr. Crocker that if that was all they were prepared to give it was "peanuts". The Soviets had already reinforced the Luanda Government with a lot of up to date military kit and he understood several Soviet experts as well. Unless the United States stepped up their aid to Savimbi on a much bigger scale they would be wasting their money. He hoped that when Savimbi went to Washington he would get a more encouraging reception than what Crocker had forecast.

At the back of his mind, he went on, was a question of how serious Crocker really was about helping Savimbi to win or even to get into the political process in Angola. Could it be that he thought it was Savimbi's existence which justified the presence of the Cubans? If Savimbi somehow disappeared would the Cubans then leave? It was a naive idea and yet he feared that it might be in Crocker's mind. Was there also a possibility that Crocker and the State Department already regarded President Reagan as a lame duck President and were more concerned with their own

3.

futures than with carrying out a determined anti-Soviet policy?

On Mozambique he feared there might be an infiltration of Cuban troops into that country which would, of course, be very dangerous for South Africa. The South Africans had tried very hard to bring together Machel and the Renamo movement. So far without success. As matters stood now he thought the Soviets would still pursue their expansionist aims mainly by subversion and through "liberation movements". It was not impossible, however, that, in view of South Africa's isolation from the rest of the world, the Soviets might try to launch a conventional military war against South Africa. Two or three years ago this would have been inconceivable. The West would not have allowed it. Would any country now come to South Africa's aid if the Soviets tried to escalate the conflict from subversion to all out war? It was noticeable that the Soviets had enormously increased their diplomatic and other representation in both Botswana and Lesotho. His intelligence people felt that they were transferring their main operations against South Africa from Lusaka to these two countries.

I asked how the South African conscripts were standing up to their internal security duties? He said there was no problem. The anti-conscription movement was very small. Conscription itself, he thought, was excellent training for the young men involved. Very few white South Africans ever got to know the Black townships. Now the young soldiers would have to serve in them and along side of the Blacks. Some Blacks, no doubt, would regard them as enemies. Others would see them as protectors and make friends with them. When they returned to civilian life they would have a much clearer idea of the situation in the Black townships. They would have had a good political education through their own officers of what South Africa was trying to do for the Black population as a whole. (It is probably true that without 'Apartheid' the South African Government would never have spent so much money on Black education, health etc.)

The General deplored the absence of contact between the South African defence forces and the British. In the old days, Sandhurst and the Imperial Defence College had exercised a great influence over the thinking of the South African military. We had lost that influence. They too had suffered from the loss.

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JA/pt

28.1.86

CONFIDENTIAL

5.

NOTE of a talk between State President P.W. Botha and Mr. Julian Amery at the President's town house in Cape Town, Thursday, 16th January, 1986, 3 - 4.00 p.m.

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No one else present.

After an exchange of greetings - the President had just celebrated his 70th birthday - I referred to our Prime Minister's efforts at the Commonwealth Conference to avoid a confrontation over sanctions. He answered that he held Mrs. Thatcher in the greatest respect. When he had made his European tour most of the European leaders had given him the impression that they were bluffing. She had been absolutely straight forward with him.

I said that I thought she was determined to do her best to avoid an escalation of sanctions. It would, however, be helpful to her if the 'Eminent Persons Group' could be given a friendly reception. There had been a European Community group who had gone back in a much more reasonable frame of mind than they came out. The State President, said that he was getting rather overwhelmed by all these visiting groups. The latest American group led by Senator Gray had been a disaster. He would much prefer it if the 'Eminent Persons' could come out in twos and threes rather than collectively. This would make it easier to avoid a showdown at the end of their visit. He said however that he would do his best to co-operate with the group when they came and in whatever numbers they came.

I went on to say, that it would be helpful if South Africa would show as much restraint as possible in 'hot pursuit' operations outside their own borders. We quite understood the reasons for undertaking these operations; but it would make our task easier if restraint could be shown. The President did not answer this point at once. Later in the conversation, however, he recurred to it. He then said that, while he would do his best to exercise restraint at the request of the British Government, he hoped that the British Government on their side

would be urging the 'front line states' not to harbour terrorists or allow terrorist operations to develop from their territory against South Africa. He didn't say "it takes two to tango" but the implication was clear.

I then asked him, what I'd already asked many people, what African forces existed to counter the ANC? He said there was a lot of misapprehension about this. The great majority of Black Africans; he claimed, might not be pro-Government but were anti-ANC. he listed the Inkatha movement, the independent homelands who followed their tribal leaders, as did a number of the population in the autonomous, but not yet independent homelands. He went on to speak about the Church of Zion. Their bishop had invited him and his wife to a meeting at Easter, last year. It had been, so he said, attended by some two million people. I asked how he had arrived at this statistic. He said there was an elite of some seventy thousand security guards belonging to the Church who had monitored those who had attended and checked them in. This was partly to make sure they were members of the Church of Zion and partly to ensure they did not have tobacco, liquor or drugs with them.

The bishop of the church is a hereditary bishop and had spoken very warmly of the State President. He had invited him to speak to the crowd which he did for an hour or more receiving great applause. The bishop had gone on to deliver a sermon in favour of non-violence and against the ANC.

There were, of course, also many town councillors and other members of the establishment who were still in office and were clearly against the ANC. There were as well many prosperous Black businessmen who could hardly be expected to be socialists. He repeated, "I am not saying these men are pro-Government, I'm saying they're anti-ANC".

I asked how the dialogue with the Blacks was developing. He said it was a continuing process. There were talks between

many different elements and himself, and his Minister of Home Affairs. These were all private talks - talks about talks - and could not yet be called negotiations. Buthelezi had been in the office where we were sitting several times recently. At his last talk he had said to the President quite firmly that he could not really talk seriously until the President had made it clear that he would not deal with the ANC!

I asked the President how he saw American policy towards Southern Africa? He said it was very hard to judge but he would tell me what he had said to Mr. Crocker two days earlier, "I cannot believe that your President is fully informed about matters in Southern Africa. I sympathise with him. He has the whole world to keep in his view. I find it hard enough to keep myself informed about everything to do with South Africa". He then recalled that Dr. Kissinger who had come to dine with him with Mr. Oppenheimer had said to him, "If I had to rely on the State Department for my assessment of things in South Africa I would get no where". General Haig, he added, had said much the same thing to him. He had been deeply shocked by Mr. Crocker's statement that the United States were only proposing to give \$70 million dollars of 'humanitarian <sup>aid</sup> to Angola. This was "peanuts". Yet if the U.S. would put their backs into supporting Savimbi this was one place in the world where, because of the length of communications, the Soviets could be driven out.

I went on to say that far from being driven back into the laager the South African Government had inherited the mantle of Rhodes and Smuts. They were extending their influence beyond their northern borders and were relying increasingly on the English speaking vote. I then put to him the idea that it might be worthwhile to bring businessmen into the Government with a view to giving more confidence to the City of London and Wall Street and, perhaps, even to some of the Black leaders. He said that he already had the business community deeply involved in a number of the committees he had set up. Obviously Harry Oppenheimer, Anton Rupert and du Plessis could not be expected to

find the time for this sort of work but he had people from their stables who were co-operating with him. He also added that he had many aspirants to office on his own backbenches and given the emergence of a right wing opposition he had to have their ambitions in mind.

I went on to ask whether there would be any point in having a Constitutional Commission on the lines of the Worrall Commission. This had led to the involvement of the Coloured and Asian populations. Was there anything to be said for a similar process where the Blacks were concerned? He said it was worth thinking about but he thought that his Minister who was responsible for these things, Dr. Huiness, was probably in the best position to prepare the ground for negotiations.

I would add that the President seemed in excellent health. There was nothing in his appearance or conversation to substantiate the rumours of an early resignation.

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JA/pt  
28.1.86



NOTE of a talk between Foreign Minister "Pik" Botha and Mr. Julian Amery at Mr. Botha's office in Cape Town, January 16th 1986, 5.30 p.m. - 6.20 p.m.

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A secretary was present throughout the talk.

Minister Botha seemed rather harrassed but very friendly. He began with a good deal of regrets about past mistakes made by the Nationalist Government. But now they had taken the great decision. They were going in for power sharing with the Blacks. I would see when the President made his speech at the Opening of Parliament how far they were prepared to go.

He gave me an analysis of the anti-ANC forces among the Black Africans though he did not attach as much importance to the Church of Zion as the State President and General Malan had done.

He repeated the President's view that it would be helpful if the 'Eminent Persons' could come out in twos or threes instead of all together. He viewed Mr. Malcolm Fraser with the greatest suspicion.

I asked him what he thought about the idea that, in the present situation, where the South African Republic was pushing its influence north and depending increasingly on the English speaking vote at home, they should enlarge the Government to bring in representatives of business. He received this with something like enthusiasm saying "I'll buy that one, I'll buy that one tomorrow". He went on to explain that he was chairman of, I think it is, the west Transvaal area, which includes twelve constituencies. He says that already half his meetings had to be conducted in English because of his increasing reliance on the English speaking vote. Had I put this idea of mine to the President? I said that I had but that he'd received it politely but unenthusiastically. "Oh!" he said, "I don't know about that but I'd buy it, I'd buy it now".

I then asked him about a possible constitutional commission on the lines of the Worrall Commission. I'd been led to believe that he might be interested in this as there was some talk of Worrall superceding him as Foreign Minister but he rather brushed the idea aside.

He confirmed that the President and General Malan had rejected Mr. Crocker's proposals for \$70 million worth of humanitarian aid to Savimbi as "peanuts". All the same he said, one shouldn't underestimate the importance of Savimbi's visit to Washington. It would certainly frighten the Communists in Luanda and boost Savimbi's stock in Angola. He hoped very much that he would be seen by the President as well as by Schultz. If there was anything we could do to facilitate such a meeting, it would be a help.


He recognized very clearly that one of the difficulties about the Groups Areas Act was the difficulty of protecting pro-Government or anti-ANC Africans when they went home to Soweto or wherever to spend the night. "All this will have to change" he said.

The Minister was less critical of Dr. Crocker than the State President and the Minister of Defence had been but nevertheless he was inclined to think that Crocker was playing for time and might be under the naive illusion that if Savimbi disappeared the chances of getting the Cubans out would improve.

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JA/pt  
28.1.86



IN CONFIDENCE

NOTES ON DISCUSSIONS WITH MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION WITH ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE NKOMATI ACCORD

1. Mr RF Botha, accompanied by senior officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs held discussions in Maputo on 16 September 1985 with President Samora Machel at his invitation. Senior Ministers of the Mozambique Government were also present.
  
2. The meeting and discussions with President Machel were followed by a meeting with Ministers O Monteiro, S Vieira and T Hunguana. During these discussions the Mozambique Ministers verbally translated extracts from the diaries in Portuguese of a Mr J Vaz, Secretary to the President of Renamo, Mr A Dhlakama. According to the Mozambique Government, the diaries came into the possession of the Mozambique Government during the recent raid on the Renamo bases at Gorongosa some two weeks before 16 September 1985. The following allegations of violations of the Nkomati Accord are extracted from the notes made by the South African officials during the discussion between Mr RF Botha and the Mozambique Ministers and were presented to the Investigating Team appointed by State President PW Botha on 16 September 1985 after Mr RF Botha's return from Maputo:

- (i) Message on 20 July 1984 from a Defence Force Officer to Mr A Dhlakama:

Secretary-General with two of our men are leaving with 26 tons of material on 1 August 1984. Drop to take place east of Inhaminga. From there the group will be brought back on 7 August 1984 in an aircraft bringing more

material. You must secure the dropping zone and radio communications before 1 August 1984. It will not be possible to make the drop at Gorongoza. Please confirm the co-ordinates as follows:

35° 26' East  
18° 31' South

Dropping zone is east of the Inhaminga railway line at the same place where Lt Johan jumped in March 1984.

- (ii) Mr Vaz departs Gorongoza on 6 August 1984 and boards a South African ship at 16h00 on 9 August 1984. He arrives at Durban (military port) on 11 August 1984. Met on arrival by a Senior Officer of the South African Defence Force.
- (iii) Meeting between Mr Vaz and Senior Defence Force Officers in Pretoria on 16 August 1984. Advised that SADF have ammunition and AK 47's for Renamo but that they have transport problems. Neither Air Force nor Navy can be used because "we can go to jail because it violates the Nkomati Accord but we will use civilian aircraft".
- (iv) Diary entry of 21 August 1984 (?) lists the following material which will be taken back to Gorongoza:
  - 21 boxes AK 47 ammunition
  - 7 drums of petrol
  - 23 bazookas
  - 3 blankets
  - 2 drums of gasoline

12 boxes of ammunition  
1 large radio transmitter  
2 small radio transmitters  
Plus stationery and compasses

- (v) Diary entry of 22 August 1984. A South African Defence Force Officer will go to Gorongosa to determine the landing zones (for the civilian aircraft). The aircraft must land to achieve better utilization of cargo space as parachute drops would be less cost effective.

As far as equipment for urban guerilla warfare is concerned, South Africa cannot supply all of it because it could compromise the source. Mines with timing devices can be supplied.

- (vi) Entries for 27 August and 29 August 1984 contain lists of Dakota flights.
- (vii) At a meeting on 1 September 1984 between Senior South African Defence Force Officers and Mr Vaz, it was decided that General Enrico (?) would be evacuated by submarine. Another General (name unknown) would enter South Africa by car through the Kruger National Park. General Antonio Pedro would have to walk.
- (viii) At a meeting on 6 September 1984 at 17h00 with Senior South African Defence Force Officers a promise that "humanitarian" aid would be supplied by C130's of the South African Air Force. It was also said that C130 flights to Mozambique would continue.

- (ix) During the period 19 to 22 October 1984 a number of flights are listed including Dakota flights to Gorongosa and Maputo Province and a C130 flight to Inhambane.
- (x) On 5 June 1985 a message was sent to Mr A Dhlakama saying that the energy problem had now been solved and that four "systems" for radio broadcasts were available. He could draw them from stores as it would not be possible to purchase them.
- (xi) Message to Mr Dhlakama on 14 June 1985 reporting on visit to Gorongaza by Deputy Minister Nel. Regret expressed that Mr Nel saw cargo included on his flight and suggested that precautions be taken to avoid a recurrence.
- (xii) In a message of 24 June 1985 Mr Dhlakama acknowledges receipt of a previous supply of equipment and complains that they do not have sufficient arms to resist encirclement by Frelimo.
- (xiii) Messrs Evo Fernandes and Fonseca would be flown in on the aircraft on 17 July 1985 which would evacuate Deputy Minister Nel and his party.

3. The Investigating Team appointed by State President Botha consisted of Dr J Gilliland, Director General, Administration of the House of Delegates, specialist in aviation medicine (Institute of Aviation Medicine), Citizen Force Adviser to the Surgeon General (with the rank of Major General) and Chairman of the Aero Club of South Africa and Lt.-General R Rogers, retired Chief of the South African Air Force. They submitted the follo-

wing report to State President Botha on 18 September 1985:

"(1) The allegations of violations of the Nkomati Accord have been investigated and our findings are as follows:

(a) The allegations made available to us were investigated and found generally to be correct.

(b) We are convinced that, with one exception, no weapons or ammunition were supplied to Renamo. The exception is the Dakato flight on 21 August 1984 when a small quantity of weapons and ammunition were flown in, mainly for the protection of our team of workers who prepared the landing strip at Gorongosa.

(c) The main reason for the flights was to bring about the negotiations and the implementation of a possible ceasefire agreement between Renamo and Frelimo.

(d) These flights were also used to provide humanitarian aid to Renamo (for example, medical supplies, seed, soap, food and fuel).

2. According to the provisions of the Nkomati Accord, violations did occur. We are, however, convinced that the overriding motive for these violations was to bring about negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo."

4. This report was read to Ministers Monteiro, Vieira and Hunguana by Mr RF Botha during a meeting held at Komatipoort on 19 September 1985. Dr Gilliland also



furnished the Mozambique delegation with the following detailed report based seriatim on the document prepared after the discussions on Monday, 16 September 1985 (paragraph 2 above).

paragraph i): The Secretary-General of Renamo, Mr Fernandes, and two other persons were dropped at the co-ordinates given. The reference to an earlier jump of Lt. Johan was also probably correct. The message about 26 tons of material was incorrect since the record reflected a cargo of 6 tons. The flight took place on 3 August 1984 and not on 1 August 1984. There was no planning for a flight to take out the group on 7 August 1984. The group left by sea on 9 August 1984 in an assault craft carrying no cargo. The group had been dropped to discuss and plan the peace talks between Frelimo and Renamo which were to be held in Pretoria. The cargo dropped at the time had consisted of food, seed, radios, camping equipment and medicines. The radios were to be used by Renamo to contact its field commanders in case of a cease-fire. The rest of the cargo was an effort to persuade Renamo to participate in the peace talks. The leader of Renamo, Mr Dhlakama, had decided to send Mr Vaz and Mr Mateus to assist Mr Fernandes. The two members of the SADF present were there to arrange the return of the group by sea.

paragraph ii): The dates were not entirely correct. It was impossible to leave Gorongosa on 6 August 1984 to reach the coast by 9 August 1984 since the distance required ten to fourteen days walk. The craft left at 24h00 and not at 16h00 as indicated. It was not met by Defence Force Officers.

paragraph iii): The two Defence Force Officers never held meetings with Mr Vaz. The latter was however present at several meetings with Mr Dhlakama such as the meeting on 16 August 1984. Renamo often made requests for military equipment to the SADF during such meetings. The officer in

question had stated that he could not discuss the question of military assistance at these meetings. It was not Government policy and this was explained to Renamo. It was also made clear that private aircraft could not be used for cargo drops in contravention of Government policy.

paragraph iv): The Committee had had access to flight manifests and lists of cargo. The flight on 21 August 1984 had been used to return Mr Fernandes, Mr Vaz and two SADF members to Gorongosa by DC-3 aircraft - a Dakota. They were dropped by parachute in order to inform Mr Dhlakama about the negotiations in progress in Pretoria. The two SADF members were present to prepare a landing strip to facilitate future flights which were to be used in support of the peace negotiations. Cargo dropped on the same occasion weighed 1 500 kg and consisted of the following:

- 6 boxes of AK 47 ammunition used for the protection of the SADF team on the ground;
- 2 AK 47 rifles as personal weapons of the two SADF members;
- two high frequency radios and camping equipment;
- food and equipment bought by the Renamo members in Pretoria, (personal property);
- 2 drums of diesel fuel;
- 1 drum of petrol (to be used for petrol-driven chain-saw);
- construction equipment such as picks, shovels and a chain-saw;
- a small quantity of stationery and medicines;

It would have been impossible to include bazookas and radio-transmitters in the cargo. For such cargo 3 aircraft would have been required.

paragraph v): The diary entry of 22 August 1984 probably referred to the operation of 21 August 1984 when a SADF officer was one of the two SADF members to be dropped at Gorongoza for the preparation of a landing-strip. The SADF had to consider the cost-effectiveness of flights connected with the peace efforts and consequently decided to prepare a landing-strip. No mines or timing-mechanisms or other equipment for urban terrorism had been delivered or promised.

paragraph vi): The Committee had investigated the list of Dakota flights but found no evidence of any flights over the period 27 August 1984 to 29 August 1984. MINISTER BOTHA added that the investigation had been based on the information available. If further information became available, it would be investigated.

paragraph vii): A meeting on 1 September 1984 could have taken place in connection with the withdrawal of Renamo Commanders from the field for the purposes of the peace-talks. The withdrawal of a Commander by the Kruger National Park had taken place by foot and not by car. Other entries were probably correct and concerned the request by Mr Dhlakama for the withdrawal of his Commanders from the field to Gorongoza for a briefing and to get a mandate from his people for the planned discussions with Frelimo. The plan was also to co-ordinate arrangements for a likely cease-fire. The Committee obtained further details in this regard, i.e. the northern commander walked to Gorongoza; the southern commander was moved by submarine on 17 September 1984 from Inhambane; the Maputo Province commander was met on the Mozambique / Kruger National Park border.

The latter two commanders and their assistants as well as two members of the Renamo negotiating team were dropped at Gorongoza by parachute on 21 September 1984 by two C130 aircraft.

paragraph viii): No senior officer had given an undertaking of continued air supply to Renamo whether "humanitarian" or otherwise. Specific humanitarian aid had been given as indicated which had contributed to the willingness of Renamo to participate in the discussions on a cease-fire together with a personal message from a senior officer to Mr Dhlakama.

paragraph ix): Evidence was found of one DC 3 flight on 21 October 1984 to fetch Renamo Commanders and two SADF members after consultations with Mr Dhlakama. A senior officer had been to Gorongoza to endeavour to convince Renamo to return to the peace-talks in Pretoria. One C160 flight to Maputo Province and one C130 flight to Inhambane took place during the night of 23 / 24 October 1984 to return the field commanders to their areas after the termination of the talks. Ten pallets of equipment which were dropped contained seeds and medicines. The contents were clearly manifested and did not include any arms.

paragraph x): An officer of the SADF had on numerous occasions been asked for a radio-transmission station. He had always indicated that Renamo did not have the facilities to supply power for such a station and he indicated to the Committee that he was convinced that he had not sent a message at any stage about the radio-broadcasting station as alleged.

paragraph xi): The message to Mr Dhlakama that Deputy Minister Nel's visit had proceeded well was confirmed. It had also been explained to Mr Dhlakama in the message that Deputy Minister Nel had been adamant that stationery and

tools for the repair of field cycles could not be considered humanitarian aid.

paragraph xii): During a briefing at the beginning of June 1985 Mr Dhlakama had given the SADF officer a comparison of Renamo's situation before and after the Nkomati Accord. The reference in the diary could be to this occasion. No message had been received from Mr Dhlakama in this connection on 24 June 1985.

paragraph xiii): Mr Fernandes and Mr Fonseca were flown into Gorongosa in a civilian DC 3 on 18 July 1985. Deputy Minister Nel could not have been in Gorongosa in the period 3 July 1985 to 3 August 1985 since he was in Europe.

The Mozambique Delegation thanked Minister Botha for the report and undertook to convey the South African response to the Mozambique Government. They also indicated that they considered the fact that the Government had investigated the alleged violations immediately in a positive light.

5. During the discussions Minister Botha also gave the Mozambique delegation information about the presence of ANC members in Mozambique. The following factual information was given:

- on 18 July 1985 the Swazi authorities had arrested a group of ANC terrorists arriving from Mozambique where they had been paid and equipped for their infiltration into South Africa. The group consisted of Silvester Nkosinathi Mabaso and Thembalilahli Rogers Shange, who had been sentenced to 200 days imprisonment for the illegal possession of arms and ammunition;
- a second group was arrested on 7 August 1985 on their way to Durban from Maputo, where they had been paid and equipped, consisting of ten persons,

four of whom had been militarily-trained (names can be made available);

- on 12 August 1985 a further ANC member, Thembin-kosi Dube, was arrested in Northern Natal on his way to Durban from Maputo. He had also been paid and equipped in Maputo.

Secondly, confirmed information about the presence of ANC members belonging to "Umkhonto we Sizwe" was as follows:

- L G Sedibe, alias September alias E Modisa, Chief of Military Intelligence and Security of the ANC in the Transvaal Provincial Command;
- S Nyanda alias Gebuza, Chief of Staff of the Transvaal Provincial Command;
- B M Ngwenya alias Thami Zulu, Commander of the Natal Provincial Command.

Thirdly, unconfirmed information indicated that there were between 350 and 400 trained ANC members in Mozambique while a further 150 untrained recruits were also present.

The Mozambique delegation undertook to have the matter investigated and expressed their satisfaction with the willingness of South Africa to furnish them with details to facilitate their investigation.

6. If it is found to be necessary, further meetings will be held in Maputo or South Africa.

PRETORIA

20 SEPTEMBER 1985