

SUBJECT
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CAJACE

cc FCO



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

10 DOWNING STREET

SERIAL No. T 30/86

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 February 1986

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 24 January and the copy of your opening address to Parliament on 31 January. I read this with great interest and have been reflecting upon it since.

Let me say how much encouraged I was by your approach to the key issues of reform and dialogue. I see your speech as both constructive and courageous in this respect. The legislative measures which you announced represent concrete steps to implement change, while the statement of principles sets what I see as very important guidelines for the continuing process of reform. Your decision to present all these positive points in a single, comprehensive statement has ensured the maximum impact.

I can understand the political constraints to which you allude in your letter. At the same time I know you are aware of the advantage to be gained by moving ahead resolutely with your programme of reform both for its own sake and to build up wider international understanding for what your government is determined to achieve. For this reason I hope you will be able to take action soon to put into effect the other proposals outlined in your speech, in order to establish a steady momentum towards the successful resolution of South Africa's problems.

JA

If those who now refuse negotiation and instead advocate violence can be brought to accept that the long term interests of all can only be secured by turning away from violence and entering into a process of dialogue then much will have been achieved. You ask what pressures the international community is bringing to bear on the African National Congress (ANC) to do this. My answer is: not enough. But it was precisely so that we could put to the ANC directly and unequivocally our condemnation of violence and our commitment to dialogue that we established a contact at official level with the ANC (while ruling out Ministerial contact). I believe that this message was clearly registered and understood. It is a message that Sir Geoffrey Howe also conveyed to the Foreign Ministers of the Front Line States at their recent meeting in Lusaka; and it is one which we shall continue to impress on those who have an interest in the future of South Africa.

I am encouraged by the successful outcome of the initial contact between your officials and the co-Chairmen of the Commonwealth Group. The difficulties which this initiative faces are obvious and I do not underestimate the political sensitivity for your government. But I do believe that the visit of the Group later this month represents an opportunity to build confidence in the process of dialogue inside and outside South Africa. I repeat my assurance that we shall do all in our power to assist that process to begin.

I was pleased to have your assurance that you remain committed to the success of the Nkomati Accord. As you will know, we have told the Mozambicans that you have left me in no doubt on this score. Unfortunately, the Vaz diaries gave the Mozambicans a shock. It is clear from several discussions with them that they have still not recovered from it, despite the very full account of the affair which you have given them and which you copied to me. The British Government remains willing to help clarify each side's

position to the other, if that would help.

Thank you for your good wishes which once again I should like to reciprocate.

Yours sincerely
Ranganathaiah

The Honourable P.W. Botha, D.M.S.



typed.

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister. ^{Retyped in}
I attach a ^{approved} ^{an}
message to President

Bolta.

I have considerably
amended the FCO
~~draft~~ draft - also
attached - which was
going to be Foreign
Secretary over the
week-end.

If you are
content, I will clear with
to FCO tomorrow. CDA. 9/2

Mr Johnson ✓

B PS/Prime Minister
This has been submitted to
the Foreign Secretary in
parallel.
Resident Clerk

From: A Reeve, SAFD
 Date: 7 February 1986 *rec'd*
 ccs: PS/PUS
 Mr Cullimore, CAFD
 Mr Fergusson
 Mr Houston
 News Dept

8286

LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA


- Flag A 1. The Prime Minister has indicated that she would like to send a message of encouragement to President Botha following his speech to the opening of Parliament. This could be a reply
- Flag B to his letter of 24 January which was delivered with an
- Flag C advance copy of the speech on 30 January.
2. President Botha's letter promised dramatic and far-reaching decisions in his speech. As before, the reality falls somewhat short of the promise though the speech did announce reforms and contained other positive features which the Prime Minister will wish to welcome.
3. Our official level contact with the ANC will not have been welcome to President Botha although there has been no reaction so far to the explanations we have given to his officials in Cape Town and to Ambassador Worrall in London. President Botha's letter complained that the Western countries were not condemning the ANC for its acts of terror or bringing pressure to bear on them to renounce violence. He appealed for a concerted international campaign to end their policy of violence and terror. I believe that the Prime Minister can argue with conviction that our contact with the ANC was aimed carefully and precisely at encouraging them to renounce violence.
4. The two Co-Chairmen and a third member of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons pay their first visit to South Africa at the end of next week. We have cleared the initial hoops without too much difficulty but the main problems may begin to emerge when the Group is in South Africa. I believe that the Prime Minister should use this opportunity to repeat again our firm commitment to the success of this initiative. The major obstacle remains the question of a visit to Nelson Mandela. I have considered whether the Prime Minister should appeal to President Botha not to let this issue ruin the

/Group's

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Group's chance of success. On balance, however, I think it would be better not to raise the subject at this stage.

5. I submit a draft letter for the Prime Minister's signature together with a draft covering letter to PS/No 10. CAFD have contributed the section on Mozambique.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'A. Reeve'.

A Reeve

Southern African Department

7 February 1986

Registry
No.

DRAFT

LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:-

PS/No 10

From

PS

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

SOUTH AFRICA

1. Thank you for your letter of 5 February about a message from the Prime Minister to President Botha.
2. In addition to commenting on President Botha's speech at the opening of Parliament, the Prime Minister's letter to President Botha could refer to the other main issues raised in his letter of 24 January. The Foreign Secretary believes that the Prime Minister may wish to explain the reasons for our recent contact with the ANC, underlining our concern to persuade the ANC to suspend violence and take up the opportunity of dialogue.
3. In view of President Botha's lengthy reference to Mozambique, the Prime Minister may wish to emphasise the importance that we too attach to Nkomati. It also provides an opportunity to seek his assistance in trying to persuade President Banda of Malawi of the need to allay Mozambican suspicions of Malawian support for RENAMO, through negligence if not design. The Mozambican Foreign Minister, Sr Chissano, made their unhappiness very clear to the Foreign Secretary on 4 February in Lusaka.
4. I enclose a draft letter for the Prime Minister's signature.

Registry No.

DRAFT LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret.
- Secret.
- Confidential.
- Restricted.
- Unclassified.

To:-

From
PRIME MINISTER

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

The Honourable P W Botha DMS MP
State President of the Republic
of South Africa

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

your speech

I will refer to both constructive & criticisms in the report.

Thank you for your letter of 24 January and the copy of your opening address to Parliament on 31 January. I read this with great interest and have

been reflecting upon it since.

I was much encouraged by your constructive approach to the key issues of reform and dialogue. The

legislative ~~changes~~ *measures* which you announced represent concrete steps which themselves have important implications for the

future. I also welcome the statement of principles contained in your speech which I see as very important guidelines for the continuing process of reform.

I fully appreciate the political restraints to which you allude in your letter. At the same time I know you are aware of the advantage to be gained by moving

ahead resolutely with your programme of reform. And thus I hope you will be able to act soon on the other

proposals outlined in your speech, thereby setting a course for the successful resolution of the South Africa's problems that South Africa faces.

If those who advocate violence or obduracy can be brought to accept that the prosperity of all can only be secured through turning away from violence and entering into a process of dialogue then much will have been achieved. I am convinced that the new era of which you speak can become a reality.

You asked what pressures the international community is bringing to bear on the African National Congress (ANC)

/to

Your decision to present all these positive points in a single, comprehensive statement has earned the maximum impact.

both for its own sake and to build up wider international solidarity for what your general is determined to achieve

do this. My answer is: not enough, ~~but~~
to suspend violence and to follow the path of
negotiation. I believe the coming months may be
critical in putting momentum behind progress towards
a peaceful solution in South Africa. It was for this
reason that we decided to establish a contact at
official level with the ANC. ^{Let me assure you that}
~~this decision does not represent any weakening of our~~
~~condemnation of the ANC's use of violence; and~~
~~consequently we have ruled out bilateral ministerial~~
~~contact. But only by speaking to the ANC could we bring~~
~~our influence to bear and spell out unequivocally~~
~~our opposition to violence and our commitment to~~
~~promoting dialogue. I believe that this message~~
~~was clearly understood. It is a message that~~ ^{Sir}
~~Geoffrey Howe also conveyed to the Foreign~~
~~Ministers of the Front Line States in Lusaka, and~~
~~one we shall continue to impress on those who have~~
~~an interest in the future of South Africa.~~

This is a time for bold ~~new~~ steps. I am much
encouraged by the successful outcome of the initial
contact between your officials and the co-Chairmen
of the Commonwealth Group. The difficulties ^{which} this
initiative faces are obvious and I do not
underestimate the political sensitivity for your
government. But I do believe that the visit of the Group
later this month represents an opportunity to build
confidence in the process of dialogue inside and outside South
Africa. I repeat my assurance that we shall do all
in our power to assist that process to begin.

I am ^{was} very pleased to have your assurance that
you remain committed to the success of the Nkomati
Accord. As you will know, we have told the Mozambicans
that you have left me in no doubt on this score.
Unfortunately, the Vaz diaries gave the Mozambicans a
shock. It is clear from several discussions with them
that they have still not recovered from it, despite
the very full account of the affair which you have
given them and which you copied to me. The British
Government remains willing to help clarify each side's
position to the other, and I am at your disposal in

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~~this respect. In this context, it would be helpful if you could use any suitable opportunity to stress to President Banda the importance of being seen not to help RENAMO. The Mozambicans are only too ready to assume in the case of Malawi also that where there is smoke it is because governments have allowed a fire to develop.~~

Thank you for your good wishes which once again I should like to reciprocate.

SOUTH AFRICA : Relations. Pt 8

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 February 1986

SOUTH AFRICA

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary agreed this evening that the Prime Minister should send President Botha a very early message of encouragement in the wake of his recent speech.

BF ||

I should be grateful if a draft could reach me before the weekend.

(C.D. Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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