
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TO DESKBY 011100Z FC0
TELNO 243
OF 010840Z MAY 86



MIPT: SOUTH AFRICA: COMGEP AND TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT

1. FOLLOWING AS TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA TO MRS

THATCHER:

BEGINS

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 18 APRIL 1986.

YOU ARE ALREADY IN POSSESSION OF MY FOREIGN MINISTER'S LETTER OF

24 APRIL 1986 TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF

EMINENT PERSONS WHICH CONTAINS THE INITIAL RESPONSE OF MY GOVERNMENT TO THE GROUP'S 'NEGOTIATING CONCEPT'. AS INTIMATED TO YOUR

AMBASSADOR ON 24 APRIL YOUR VIEWS WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE

FORMULATION OF THIS RESPONSE AND IN HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT IT

PROVIDES A BASIS FOR FURTHER POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS.

OF THE HISSUES ADDRESSED IN MY LETTER TO YOU ON 10 APRIL. TWO REMAIN A SOURCE OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN TO ME AND MY GOVERNMENT.

THE FIRST RELATES TO THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OF A CONTINUATION OR ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE ACCOMPANYING MR MANDELA'S RELEASE OR A SUBSEQUENT RESURGENCE OF GENERAL VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRY AS A FORM OF PRESSURE IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

NOT ONLY THE ANC BUT OTHER PARTIES AS WELL, OR ELEMENTS WITHIN THEM, ARE ENGAGED IN A CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE AND WE NEED TO BE SATISFIED THAT AT LEAST THEIR LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS THE ANC LEADERSHIP WILL HONOUR COMMITMENTS TO SUSPEND THEIR VIOLENCE. I DO NOT WANT TO FIND MYSELF IN A SITUATION OF HAVING TO REINSTATE MEASURES IN ORDER TO CONTROL A POSSIBLE RESURGENCE OF VIOLENCE AND DISCOVER AS YOU ACKNOWLEDGE MIGHT HAPPEN, THAT SOME GOVERNMENTS WOULD SEE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, DESPITE OUR ACTING IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHIN REASON, AS AN EXCUSE FOR FURTHER PUNITIVE MEASURES.

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/I ACCEPT

ASSURANCES BUT WE SHOULD LIKE AT LEAST TO HAVE CLARIFICATION
ON A NUMBER OF ASPECTS LINHERENT IN THIS ISSUE. THIS IS WHAT WE
HAVE IN MIND IN SUGGESTING TO THE GROUP THAT WE EMBARK ON FURTHER
DISCUSSIONS.

THE OTHER MATTER AS THAT OF THE AAMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ANC.

NOTE YOUR OWN WELL-KNOWN COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND
OPPOSITION TO COMMUNISM, TERRORISM AND TOTALITARIANISM. GOVERNMENTS
WHICH SHARE YOUR VALUES AND BELIEFS ARE UNFORTUNATELY OUTNUMBERED
BY SUPPORTERS OF THE ANC AND WHAT HT STANDS FOR. THERES IS AN
URGENT NEED FOR GOVERNMENTS WHICH SHARE YOUR VIEWS ON TERRORISM
PUBLICLY TO DENOUNCE THE VIOLENCE OF THE ANC.

IN ADDITION THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT PRESENT AT THE SUMMIT MEETING IN TOKYO IN EARLY MAY COULD PROVIDE MOMENTUM TO CURRENT EFFORTS TO BRING AN END TO VIOLENCE AND FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLIDUING THE EPG'S EFFORTS, BY AFFIRMING

- THEIR SUPPORT FOR A CONSTITUTION WHICH GUARANTEES:
- DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES INCLUDING AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE EQUALITY OF ALL UNDER THE LAW
- PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
- PRIVATE INITHATIVE AND EFFECTIVE COMPETITION
- FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTHES
- THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD ENSURE THAT THERE WILL BE NO POLITICAL DOMINATION BY ANY ONE COMMUNITY OF ANY OTHER
- FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND OF EXPRESSION IN GENERAL
- FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND WORSHIP.
- THAT THEY WELCOME THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S READINESS TO NEGOTIATE A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER BASED ON THE SHARING OF POWER UP TO THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT AND RECOGNISE THAT THE STRUCTURES GIVING EFFECT TO THIS OBJMECTIVE MUST BE JOINTLY AGREED UPON BY SOUTH AFRICANS ALONE.

- THEIR REJECTION OF VIOLENCE AS A MEANS TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES SEMI COLON
- THAT NOW IS THE THME TO SUSPEND ALL VIOLENCE AND ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS TO THIS END SEMI COLON
- THAT A SUFFICIENT BASHS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR A TRANSMITION TO NEGOTIATIONS.

WE HAVE ADVANCED SUFFICIENTLY FAR ALONG THE ROAD OF REFORM TO

JUSTIFY ACCEPTANCE BY BLACK LEADERS IN GENERAL OF THE URGENT NEED

TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL

DESPENSATION.

HOPE YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES WILL FEEL ABLE TO ACT ON THESE SUGGESTIONS.

SIMILAR COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE SENT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE TOKYO SUMMIT.

YOURS SINCERELY
P W BOTHA
ENDS

MOBERLY

LIMITED.

HO. SAFD.

HD. PLANNING STAFF.

HO. ERD.

PS.

PS MRS. CHALKER.

PS PUS.

MR. DEREK THOMAS.

MR. E. FERGUSSOND

MR. MAUD.

MR. REEVE

N° 10 DOWNING ST.

GRS 600

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
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ENDS

MOBERLY

LIMITED.

HO. SAFD.

HD. PLANNING STAFF.

HO. ERD.

PS.

PS MRS. CHALKER.

PS PUS.

MR. DEREK THOMAS.

MR. E. FERGUSSONO

MR. MAUD.

MR. REEVE

Nº 10 DOWNING ST.

GRS 350

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DEDIP

FM CAPE TOWN

TO DESKBY 011000Z FC0

TELNO 242

OF 010815Z MAY 86

SOUTH AFRICA: COMGEP AND TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMENT

1. FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME YESTERDAY EVENING TO HAND OVER
A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA TO THE PRIME MINISTER. TEXT IN
MIFT. ORLGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

- 2. THE LETTER AS AN TWO PARTS. THE FIRST DEALS WITH POINTS RAISED BY THE PRIME MANUSTER AN HER LAST MESSAGE ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP. THE SECOND GOES ON TO PROPOSE THAT THE TOKYO SUMMANT MEETING SHOULD ASSUE A STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA SUPPORTING AN END TO VIOLENCE AND TRANSITION TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION BASED ON DEMOCRATIC VALUES. SIMILAR LETTERS CONCERNING THIS PROPOSAL HAVE BEEN SENT TO ALL SEVEN SUMMANT LEADERS.
- 3. PHK BOTHA SAID THAT THE APPEAL TO SUMMIT GOVERNMENTS TOOK ACCOUNT OF YOUR DISCUSSION WITH WORRALL ON 25 APRIL. HE DREW MY ATTENTION TO A PHRASE IN THE LETTER MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR A STATEMENT AT TOKYO WAS INTENDED TO REINFORCE THE EPG'S EFFORTS.
- 4. HE ADDED 'INT IT COMES OFF, THIS WILL DO IT'. IT ASKED HIM
 TO BE MORE EXPLICIT. HE SAID THAT A STATEMENT ON THESE LINES BY
 THE SEVEN WOULD GIVE A MAJOR IMPETUS TO A PROCESS INVOLVING RELEASE
 OF MANDELA AND OTHER STEPS TO FACILITATE AN END TO VIOLENCE AND
 OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS AS OUTLINED BY THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP.
 THIS WAS POSSIBLY THE MOST IMPORTANT MESSAGE WHICH PRESIDENT BOTHA
 HAD EVER SENT TO OTHER LEADERS.

/5. IN A

REFERRED TO A RECENT MESSAGE ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH MANITURATIVE FROM THE CANADIAN PROME MINISTER. MOST OF ALT HAD BEEN WHAT PACK BOTHA CALLED USEFUL. BUT ONE PASSAGE HAD COME NEAR TO RUHNANG EVERYTHING. MR MULRONEY HAD AMPLIED THAT ALT WAS SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY TO GOVERN ON THE BASES OF HAVANG REPUDIATED MAJORATY RULE. PAK BOTHA DECRABED THAS AS OFFENSAVE, UNCALLED FOR AND WRONG. THAS GAVE ME AN OPENING TO SAY THAT ALL UNDERSTOOD THERE WAS CONCERN AN LONDON THAT DESCUSSION OF ANY STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA AT TOKYO MAIGHT OPEN UP DIFFERENCES OF VALEW AMONG THE SEVEN. HE REPLACED THAT ALL 7 GOVERNMENTS HAD AT ONE TAME OR ANOTHER SUBSCRABED TO PRINCIPLES SIMILAR TO THOSE LASTED AN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. SURELY AT WAS NOT ASKAING TOO MUCH THAT THEY SHOULD ENDORSE THEM PUBLICLY AND JOINTLY AT SUCH A KEY MOMENT.

MOBERLY

LIMITED.

HO. SAFD.

HO. PLANNING STAFF.

HO. ERD.

PS.

PS MRS. CHALKER.

PS PUS.

MR. DEREK THOMAS.

MR. É. FERGUSSONO

MR. MAUD.

MR. RÉÉVÉ

N° 10 DOWNING ST.



15/2 GDB

Tuynhuys Cape Town 29 April 1986

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 18 April 1986.

You are already in possession of my Foreign Minister's letter of 24 April 1986 to the Co-Chairmen of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons which contains the initial response of my Government to the Group's "negotiating concept". As intimated to your Ambassador on 24 April your views were taken into account in the formulation of this response and I hope you will agree that it provides a basis for further positive developments.

Of the issues addressed in my letter to you on 10 April, two remain a source of considerable concern to me and my Government. The first relates to the implications for the South African Government of a continuation or escalation of violence accompanying Mr Mandela's release or a subsequent resurgence of general violence in the country as a form of pressure in the negotiating process. Not only the ANC but other parties as well, or elements within them, are engaged in a campaign of violence and we need to be satisfied that

at least their leadership as well as the ANC leadership will honour commitments to suspend their violence. I do not want to find myself in a situation of having to reinstate measures in order to control a possible resurgence of violence and discover, as you acknowledge might happen, that some Governments would see such a development, despite our acting in good faith and within reason, as an excuse for further punitive measures.

I accept that the Group may not be able to offer absolute assurances but we should like at least to have clarification on a number of aspects inherent in this issue. This is what we have in mind in suggesting to the Group that we embark on further discussions.

The other matter is that of the aims and objectives of the ANC. I note your own well-known commitment to democratic values and opposition to communism, terrorism and totalitarianism. Governments which share your values and beliefs are unfortunately outnumbered by supporters of the ANC and what it stands for. There is an urgent need for Governments which share your views on terrorism publicly to denounce the violence of the ANC.

In addition the Heads of Government present at the Summit Meeting in Tokyo in early May could provide momentum to current efforts to bring an end to violence and facilitate negotiations, including the EPG's efforts, by affirming

- their support for a constitution which guarantees
 - democratic principles including an independent judicial system and the equality of all under the law;
 - private property rights;

Similar communications will be sent to the Governments of the other countries participating in the Tokyo Summit.

Yours sincerely

P W BOTHA

STATE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Right Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON

Republic of South Africa



MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1715 Hendrik Verwoerd Building Cape Town 8001

Tel Ref.:

45-5848 MB 11/31

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24 April 1986

Dear Mr Fraser and General Obasanjo

The South African Government has been giving serious consideration to the salient features of the "possible negotiating concept" attached to your letter of 13 March 1986 which I have been asked to respond to.

You will be aware, from previous statements which the South African State President and other members of the South African Government have made on the issue of the release of Mr Nelson Mandela, that the South African Government's basic concern is that his release should not be accompanied by or result in further violence.

It must be clear that the key to the release of Mr Mandela and similar prisoners, withdrawal of the Security Forces from certain urban areas and lifting of the ban on the ANC and PAC is a suspension of violence.

The question which arises is how this can be put into effect. In your "possible negotiating concept" you suggest that, "in the context of specific and meaningful steps being taken towards ending apartheid", certain additional action by the South African Government and the ANC and others might ensure negotiations and a break in the cycle of violence. Moreover you will recall that during the Group's recent discussions with representatives of the South African Government, the influx control system and pass laws were highlighted by the Group as important issues affecting the daily lives of black people. At that stage the Group was aware of the State President's commitment, made during the opening of Parliament earlier this year, that this situation would be fundamentally altered by 1 July 1986. In line with this commitment the State President announced in Parliament on Friday 18 April 1986, that no further charges would be preferred in terms of the existing legislation; that people who have been convicted in terms of this legislation would be released forthwith, and that those who are being detained pending trial would likewise be released. The Government proposes to repeal or amend no fewer than 34 Acts

and Proclamations to ensure that the movement of people will not be subject to discrimination on the grounds of colour or race.

These additional reform measures testify to the Government's acceptance that no further forced removals in pursuit of a political ideology will take place. The Government has noted with satisfaction in this connection the Group's recognition that positive actions on the part of the South African Government should be matched by corresponding responses by those now opposed to negotiation and committed to violence.

The Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons will understand that if the South African Government does move along the lines suggested in its "possible negotiating concept" and violence continues or increases, the Government may have no alternative but to take appropriate measures to control the violence. The Group will recall that I raised this issue with them during their visit. It is my recollection that it responded that it recognised the responsibility of the Government to maintain order but the question arises whether such action on the part of the Government would not then result in further punitive action against South Africa. This is a most important issue which will require further discussion.

The South African Government continues to believe that the Group can serve a useful purpose and it accordingly proposes, in the light of the foregoing, that the whole Group or representative members of the Group meet with representatives of the South African Government to exchange views on how further to proceed, particularly on the modalities of achieving a suspension of violence and facilitating discussions.

Yours sincerely

R F BOTHA

The Right Honourable Malcolm Fraser General Olusegun Obasanjo Co-Chairmen of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons Marlborough House Pall Mall LONDON SWIY 5HX





COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS

Established pursuant to the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa, Nassau, October 1985

Cables: COMSECGEN LONDON SW1

Telex: 27678

Telephone: 01-839 3411

Marlborough House

Pall Mall

London SW1Y 5HX

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Cape Sun Hotel Cape Town

13 March 1986

The Hon Pik Botha Minister of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs H F Verwoerd Building CAPE TOWN

My dear Foreign Minister

We are enclosing a copy of a note that the Group has left with Minister Heunis. We wish once more to thank you for the courtesy and help which you personally and your Ministry have extended to us throughout our visit and discussions in South Africa.

We would wish to emphasise once again that we are advancing a concept. We really do believe as a result of all our discussions in South Africa and outside, that there is a real chance of establishing productive negotiations about the future of South Africa. We have also indicated that if the Government believes there is some future role for this Group we stand ready to advance the cause of negotiations.

Again many thanks for your courtesy and for the time that you spent with us.

Yours sincerely

Malcolm Fraser

Olusegun Obasanjo



A POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT

The South African Government has declared its commitment to dismantling the system of apartheid, to ending racial discrimination and to broad-based negotiations leading to new constitutional arrangements for power sharing by all the people of South Africa. In the light of preliminary and as yet incomplete discussions with representatives of various organisations and groups, within and outside South Africa, we believe that in the context of specific and meaningful steps being taken towards ending apartheid, the following additional action might ensure negotiations and a break in the cycle of violence.

On the part of the Government:

- (a) Removal of the military from the townships, providing for freedom of assembly and discussion and suspension of detention without trial.
- (b) The release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and detainees.
- (c) The unbanning of the ANC and PAC and the permitting of normal political activity.

On the part of the ANC and others:
Entering negotiations and suspending violence.

It is our view that simultaneous announcements incorporating these ideas might be negotiated if the Government were to be interested in pursuing this broad approach.

In the light of the Government's indication to us that it

- (i) is not in principle against the release of Mr. Nelson Mandela and similar prisoners;
- (ii) is not opposed in principle to the unbanning of any organisations;

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- (iii) is prepared to enter into negotiations with the acknowledged leaders of the people of South Africa;
 - (iv) is committed to the removal of discrimination, not only from the statute books but also from South African society as a whole;
 - (v) is committed to the ending of white domination;
- (vi) will not prescribe who may represent black communities in negotiations on a new constitution for South Africa;
- (vii) is prepared to negotiate an open agenda,

the South African Government may wish to give serious consideration to the approach outlined in this note