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PLEASE TRANSMIT TO
THE PLANE



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 May 1986

Dear Charles,

South Africa

You will have received advance copies of P W Botha's latest message to the Prime Minister, together with Sir P Moberly's comments. I attach copies of Cape Town telnos 242 and 243 for ease of reference.

The South Africans appear to have quite unrealistic expectations of what they might hope to achieve by way of a statement from the Tokyo Economic Summit. In line with the Prime Minister's earlier opposition to the idea, the Foreign Secretary tried to ride the South African Ambassador off a statement when they met on 25 April; he argued that it was too late to negotiate a statement, that the agenda was already overloaded, and that the idea was a Pandora's box because there could be no assurance that any statement would be free of points which were unpalatable to the South Africans. Worrall appeared to take the point, but the South Africans have nevertheless gone ahead. It may be that the Americans have encouraged them in this, though we have no evidence to that effect, since they have as you know favoured a discussion and statement from the Summit.

The Foreign Secretary greatly doubts whether there would be a consensus at the Summit in favour of a statement on the lines proposed by the South African State President. There would be real problems over language: for instance the reference to the protection of minority rights in a manner ensuring no political domination by any one community of another, which would be interpreted by some as white insistence on a veto over all important decisions; and the bald statement that a sufficient basis has been established for a transition to negotiations, which is hardly borne out by the facts. As regards the South African wish to have the seven Summit leaders lay down principles governing any future constitution of South Africa, several Summit countries share our view that the South African people themselves must reach a peacefully negotiated settlement and that it is not for outsiders to prescribe particular solutions.

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In the Foreign Secretary's view, the Prime Minister would be best advised to wait until after the Summit before replying to the State President. However Sir Geoffrey Howe sees advantage in our Ambassador at Cape Town being instructed meanwhile to explain to the South African Foreign Minister that although we shall certainly do our best to steer the initiative now launched to a positive conclusion there will be many difficulties inherent in producing a satisfactory statement on South Africa in the short time available, while even if it is possible to negotiate one, the result may not be to the South African Government's taste. I attach a draft telegram of instructions to Sir P Moberly accordingly. You will see that it does not rule out altogether the possibility of a statement, since we do not know what the Americans might be up to. Its main purpose is to lower South African expectations.

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,
Tony Galsworthy*

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification CONFIDENTIAL	Caveat DEDIP	Precedence IMMEDIATE DESKBY
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
TC	2	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEAT	3	DEDIP
FM	4	FM FCO
TO	5	TO IMMEDIATE CAPETOWN DESKBY
TELNO	6	TELNO
OF	7	OF 011700Z MAY 86
AND TO	8	INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)
	9	
	10	YOUR TELNOS 242 AND 243: SOUTH AFRICA: COMGEP AND TOKYO
	11	ECONOMIC SUMMIT
	12	
	13	1. Please seek an early meeting with the South African
	14	Foreign Minister (at all events before the Summit ends on the
	15	evening of ⁵ May).
	16	2. You should tell Botha that the Prime Minister read the
	17	State President's message with great interest. She will be
	18	replying after the Economic Summit. Meanwhile, her preliminary
	19	comments are as follows:
	20	(a) I t is very useful that President Botha should have written
	21	to her and the other Summit leaders. This will help ensure
	22	that when South Africa is discussed her colleagues have a first-
	23	hand account of current South African concerns:
	24	(b) Mrs Thatcher feels she ought to warn the State President
	25	both that there is unlikely to be sufficient time at Tokyo to
///	26	negotiate a satisfactory text: the political agenda is already
//	27	over-crowded; and that it is to say the least unlikely that any
/	28	statement on South Africa would be on the lines he envisages:
	29	some at least of those concerned may well feel that such a



YYYY				Catchword: statement
MAIN	File number	Dept PRIVATE OFFICE	Drafted by (Block capitals) C R BUDD	Telephone no 233 4831
ADDITIONAL	Authorised for despatch by: Initials Date/time			
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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2 statement should include criticism of South Africa and a call for
3 faster progress towards the complete dismantlement of apartheid.
4 (c) That is why the Prime Minister would have preferred nothing
5 at all said in public, or at most a reference by the Japanese
6 chairman in his final summing up to the fact that South Africa
7 had been discussed, that the Summit leaders had welcomed progress
8 made by COMGEP, and so on.

9 3. The main purpose of your talk with Pik Botha is thus to
10 explain that although we shall certainly do our best to steer the
11 South African initiative to a positive conclusion there will be
12 many difficulties in the way of any attempt to secure agreement to
13 a statement at Tokyo. Apart from the problems that others are
14 likely to have over some of the language (eg no political
15 domination by any one community over any other) the suggestion
16 that a sufficient basis has been established for a transition to
17 negotiations is difficult to reconcile with the stage reached in
18 the Commonwealth initiative: a number of those present at the
19 Summit can be expected to be reluctant to endorse in public the
20 view that the South Africans have now done all that is required
21 of them in return for a suspension of violence. More generally,
22 our own consistent position has as you know been that it is not
23 for outsiders to prescribe the shape of a solution, which must be
24 reached through peaceful negotiation by the people of South Africa.

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26 HOWE

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29 YYY

30 MAIN

/// 31 LIMITED

// 32 Head of SAFD

/ 33 PS

34 PS/MRS CHALKER



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Catchword:


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DEDIP

FM CAPE TOWN

TO DESKBY 011000Z FCO

TELNO 242

OF 010815Z MAY 86

SOUTH AFRICA: COMGEP AND TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT

1. FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME YESTERDAY EVENING TO HAND OVER A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA TO THE PRIME MINISTER. TEXT IN MIFT. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

2. THE LETTER IS IN TWO PARTS. THE FIRST DEALS WITH POINTS RAISED BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN HER LAST MESSAGE ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP. THE SECOND GOES ON TO PROPOSE THAT THE TOKYO SUMMIT MEETING SHOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA SUPPORTING AN END TO VIOLENCE AND TRANSITION TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION BASED ON DEMOCRATIC VALUES. SIMILAR LETTERS CONCERNING THIS PROPOSAL HAVE BEEN SENT TO ALL SEVEN SUMMIT LEADERS.

3. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT THE APPEAL TO SUMMIT GOVERNMENTS TOOK ACCOUNT OF YOUR DISCUSSION WITH WORRALL ON 25 APRIL. HE DREW MY ATTENTION TO A PHRASE IN THE LETTER MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR A STATEMENT AT TOKYO WAS INTENDED TO REINFORCE THE EPG'S EFFORTS.

4. HE ADDED "WHEN IT COMES OFF, THIS WILL DO IT". HE ASKED HIM TO BE MORE EXPLICIT. HE SAID THAT A STATEMENT ON THESE LINES BY THE SEVEN WOULD GIVE A MAJOR IMPETUS TO A PROCESS INVOLVING RELEASE OF MANDELA AND OTHER STEPS TO FACILITATE AN END TO VIOLENCE AND OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS AS OUTLINED BY THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP. THIS WAS POSSIBLY THE MOST IMPORTANT MESSAGE WHICH PRESIDENT BOTHA HAD EVER SENT TO OTHER LEADERS.

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5. IN A BRIEF SURVEY OF POSSIBLE REACTIONS BY THE SEVEN, PIK BOTHA REFERRED TO A RECENT MESSAGE ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE FROM THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER. MOST OF IT HAD BEEN WHAT PIK BOTHA CALLED USEFUL. BUT ONE PASSAGE HAD COME NEAR TO RUINING EVERYTHING. MR MULRONEY HAD IMPLIED THAT IT WAS SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY TO GOVERN ON THE BASIS OF HAVING REPUDIATED MAJORITY RULE. PIK BOTHA DESCRIBED THIS AS OFFENSIVE, UNCALLED FOR AND WRONG. THIS GAVE ME AN OPENING TO SAY THAT I UNDERSTOOD THERE WAS CONCERN IN LONDON THAT DISCUSSION OF ANY STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA AT TOKYO MIGHT OPEN UP DIFFERENCES OF VIEW AMONG THE SEVEN. HE REPLIED THAT ALL 7 GOVERNMENTS HAD AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER SUBSCRIBED TO PRINCIPLES SIMILAR TO THOSE LISTED IN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. SURELY IT WAS NOT ASKING TOO MUCH THAT THEY SHOULD ENDORSE THEM PUBLICLY AND JOINTLY AT SUCH A KEY MOMENT.

MOBERLY

LIMITED.

HD. SAFD.

HD. PLANNING STAFF.

HD. ERD.

PS.

PS | MRS. CHALKER.

PS | PUS.

MR. DEREK THOMAS.

MR. E. FERGOSSON

MR. MAUD.

MR. REEVE

N° 10 DOWNING ST.

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GRS 600

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DEDIP

FM CAPE TOWN

TO DESKBY 011100Z FCO

TELNO 243

OF 010840Z MAY 86

(T'd above)

MIPT: SOUTH AFRICA: COMGEP AND TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA TO MRS THATCHER:

BEGINS

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 18 APRIL 1986.

YOU ARE ALREADY IN POSSESSION OF MY FOREIGN MINISTER'S LETTER OF 24 APRIL 1986 TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS WHICH CONTAINS THE INITIAL RESPONSE OF MY GOVERNMENT TO THE GROUP'S "NEGOTIATING CONCEPT". AS INTIMATED TO YOUR AMBASSADOR ON 24 APRIL YOUR VIEWS WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE FORMULATION OF THIS RESPONSE AND I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT IT PROVIDES A BASIS FOR FURTHER POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS.

OF THE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN MY LETTER TO YOU ON 10 APRIL TWO REMAIN A SOURCE OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN TO ME AND MY GOVERNMENT. THE FIRST RELATES TO THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OF A CONTINUATION OR ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE ACCOMPANYING MR MANDELA'S RELEASE OR A SUBSEQUENT RESURGENCE OF GENERAL VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRY AS A FORM OF PRESSURE IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. NOT ONLY THE ANC BUT OTHER PARTIES AS WELL, OR ELEMENTS WITHIN THEM, ARE ENGAGED IN A CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE AND WE NEED TO BE SATISFIED THAT AT LEAST THEIR LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS THE ANC LEADERSHIP WILL HONOUR COMMITMENTS TO SUSPEND THEIR VIOLENCE. I DO NOT WANT TO FIND MYSELF IN A SITUATION OF HAVING TO REINSTATE MEASURES IN ORDER TO CONTROL A POSSIBLE RESURGENCE OF VIOLENCE AND DISCOVER AS YOU ACKNOWLEDGE MIGHT HAPPEN, THAT SOME GOVERNMENTS WOULD SEE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, DESPITE OUR ACTING IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHIN REASON, AS AN EXCUSE FOR FURTHER PUNITIVE MEASURES.

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/I ACCEPT

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WE ACCEPT THAT THE GROUP MAY NOT BE ABLE TO OFFER ABSOLUTE ASSURANCES BUT WE SHOULD LIKE AT LEAST TO HAVE CLARIFICATION ON A NUMBER OF ASPECTS INHERENT IN THIS ISSUE. THIS IS WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND IN SUGGESTING TO THE GROUP THAT WE EMBARK ON FURTHER DISCUSSIONS.

THE OTHER MATTER IS THAT OF THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ANC. WE NOTE YOUR OWN WELL-KNOWN COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND OPPOSITION TO COMMUNISM, TERRORISM AND TOTALITARIANISM. GOVERNMENTS WHICH SHARE YOUR VALUES AND BELIEFS ARE UNFORTUNATELY OUTNUMBERED BY SUPPORTERS OF THE ANC AND WHAT IT STANDS FOR. THERE IS AN URGENT NEED FOR GOVERNMENTS WHICH SHARE YOUR VIEWS ON TERRORISM PUBLICLY TO DENOUNCE THE VIOLENCE OF THE ANC.

IN ADDITION THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT PRESENT AT THE SUMMIT MEETING IN TOKYO IN EARLY MAY COULD PROVIDE MOMENTUM TO CURRENT EFFORTS TO BRING AN END TO VIOLENCE AND FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING THE EPG'S EFFORTS, BY AFFIRMING

- THEIR SUPPORT FOR A CONSTITUTION WHICH GUARANTEES:
- DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES INCLUDING AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE EQUALITY OF ALL UNDER THE LAW
- PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
- PRIVATE INITIATIVE AND EFFECTIVE COMPETITION
- FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
- THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD ENSURE THAT THERE WILL BE NO POLITICAL DOMINATION BY ANY ONE COMMUNITY OF ANY OTHER
- FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND OF EXPRESSION IN GENERAL
- FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND WORSHIP.

- THAT THEY WELCOME THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S READINESS TO NEGOTIATE A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER BASED ON THE SHARING OF POWER UP TO THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT AND RECOGNISE THAT THE STRUCTURES GIVING EFFECT TO THIS OBJECTIVE MUST BE JOINTLY AGREED UPON BY SOUTH AFRICANS ALONE.

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- THEIR REJECTION OF VIOLENCE AS A MEANS TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES SEMI COLON
- THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO SUSPEND ALL VIOLENCE AND ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS TO THIS END SEMI COLON
- THAT A SUFFICIENT BASIS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR A TRANSITION TO NEGOTIATIONS.

WE HAVE ADVANCED SUFFICIENTLY FAR ALONG THE ROAD OF REFORM TO JUSTIFY ACCEPTANCE BY BLACK LEADERS IN GENERAL OF THE URGENT NEED TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL DISPENSATION.

I HOPE YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES WILL FEEL ABLE TO ACT ON THESE SUGGESTIONS.

SIMILAR COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE SENT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE TOKYO SUMMIT.

YOURS SINCERELY
P W BOTHA
ENDS

MOBERLY

LIMITED.

HO. SAFD.
HO. PLANNING STAFF.
HO. ERD.
PS.
PS/MRS. CHALKER.
PS/PUS.
MR. DEREK THOMAS.
MR. E. FERGOSSON
MR. MAUD.
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