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CCFCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

9 May 1986

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL NO. T86 86

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Jean Ih. President.

Thank you for your letter of 30 April suggesting the possibility of a declaration on South Africa at the Tokyo Summit.

I am afraid that it was clear from the outset at Tokyo that there were major practical difficulties in the way of agreeing a statement on South Africa which would be balanced and helpful. It was evident in early discussion between Foreign Ministers that any statement would have to include, at the insistence of others, demands and criticisms of South Africa which would have been far from welcome to you. There was also the important consideration that an unbalanced statement might have greatly complicated the current discussions between your Government and the Commonwealth Group.

We therefore decided to promote the idea that the Japanese Prime Minister should include a short reference to South Africa at the joint press conference with other Heads of Government on 6 May when he summarised the political discussion at the Summit. Discussion between Heads of Government was concerned only with the terms of this statement: in the event he told the press that the seven Heads of Government had agreed on the importance of a


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peaceful solution to the question of apartheid, and, appreciating the various international efforts which had been exerted, had agreed to continue to call on the parties to strive for such an objective. This was less than I had hoped for. But the summary is nevertheless helpful in its emphasis on the need for a peaceful solution and I do not think that it includes anything which might hinder your negotiations with the Commonwealth Group.

I am very pleased that the Group has now decided to return to Southern Africa and will be visiting South Africa for further talks with your Government in the next few days. The initial response of your Government to the Group's "negotiating concept" was most helpful in bringing this about. I know that the Group are hoping to have a detailed discussion which will enable them to take away a more precise idea of the steps your Government would be prepared to take under certain conditions. I am sure that, like me, you will have been struck by the increasing international interest in, and support for, the Group's efforts. I hope that everything can now be done to build on this promising start to their mission and that you will be able to develop your response to the "negotiating concept" so that the momentum can be maintained.

Your scienty

again Lathe





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 May 1986

Dear Charles,

Tokyo Summit: South Africa

Now that the Tokyo Summit is over, the Prime Minister will need to reply substantively to President Botha's letter of 30 April about a statement on South Africa by the Summit (copy enclosed for convenience).


As you know, Sir Patrick Moberly conveyed the Prime Minister's preliminary comments on the letter through the South African Foreign Minister's Office on 2 May. Sir Geoffrey Howe assumes that the Prime Minister will wish to explain to President Botha why it was not possible for the Summit to produce a detailed statement of the sort he was seeking. She may also wish to take the opportunity to encourage President Botha to build on his Government's earlier helpful response to the Commonwealth Group, when the Group goes to South Africa for further discussions on 13 May.

I enclose a draft reply on these lines which has been agreed by the Foreign Secretary.

Tuy Laterning

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq PS/10 Downing Street



(Revised) DRAFT: minus/letter/teleletter/telepatch/nate TYPE: Draft/Final 1+ FROM: Reference Prime Minister DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO: SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TO: Your Reference The Honourable P W Botha DMS MP Top Secret Secret Copies to: Confidential LO3 AMP Restricted 10 0m Unclassified PRIVACY MARKING SUBJECT: Thank you for your letter of 30 April suggesting theIn Confidence possibility of a declaration on South Africa at the Tokyo CAVEAT..... Summit. It was helpful for me and my colleagues at the Summit to have had this first hand account from you of current South African concerns. I am afraid that it was clear from the outset at Tokyo that there were major practical difficulties in the way of agreeing a statement on South Africa which would be balanced and helpful. It was evident in early discussion between Foreign Ministers that any statement would have to include, at the insistence of others, demands and criticisms of South Africa which would have been far from welcome to you. There was also the important consideration that an unbalanced statement might have greatly complicated the current discussions between your Government and the Commonwealth Group. Enclosures—flag(s)..... We therefore decided to promote the idea that the Japanese Prime Minister should include a short reference to South Africa at the joint press conference with other

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