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DEDIP

FM CAPE TOWN

TO DESKBY 261900Z FCO

TELNO 294

OF 261600Z MAY 86

ms

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA

1. HE WAS SUMMONED THIS AFTERNOON BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO RECEIVE A TOUGH REPLY FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE OF 22 MAY (YOUR TELNO 151). PMK BOTHA'S OWN REMARKS WERE EQUALLY TOUGH. TEXT OF MESSAGE W/M MIFT. ORIGINAL BY BAG. FOR COMMENTS SEE MY SECOND MFT.
2. PMK BOTHA SAID HE HAD NOTHING TO ADD ABOUT REASONS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN RAIDS TO WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID W/M PARLIAMENT. AS REGARDS TIMING, TO DEFER THE RAIDS WOULD HAVE RISKED THEIR SUCCESS. THEY HAD BEEN PLANNED A LONG TIME AHEAD AND COULD NOT BE HELD BACK JUST BECAUSE OF THE EPG. W/MFACT THE TIMING HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP AT ALL. MOREOVER THE ANC THEMSELVES HAD NOT REFRAINED FROM VIOLENCE WHILE THE GROUP HAD BEEN W/M SOUTH AFRICA. THE W/MINTERNATIONAL REACTION ON THIS SCORE WAS AN EXAMPLE OF L/JACK OF EVEN HANDEDNESS WHICH DEEPLY CONCERNED THE SOUTH AFRICANS.
3. HE HOPED THAT A REPLY WOULD BE READY WITHIN A FEW DAYS TO THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP PROPOSALS. HE DID NOT RULE OUT FURTHER EXCHANGES. BUT _____ BUT THE QUESTION THAT NEEDED TO BE RESOLVED WAS THE ENDING OF VIOLENCE.
4. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE FORESEEN THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAD NOW ARISEN. THAT WAS WHY MESSAGES WERE SENT TO THE GOVERNMENTS PARTICIPATING W/M THE TOKYO SUMMIT. W/MIT WAS AT THAT STAGE THAT THINGS WENT WRONG. HE HAD HOPED THAT THE RESULT WOULD BE A CLEAR AND HELPFUL STATEMENT. BUT W/MIT APPEARED THAT OTHER NATIONS WERE NOT W/MINTERESTED W/M FINDING A SOLUTION WHICH TOOK ACCOUNT OF THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES.
5. PMK BOTHA THEN SAID THAT THE TIME HAD COME TO SPEAK OPENLY. HE COULD NOT ESCAPE THE FEELING THAT THERE WAS A HIDDEN AGENDA W/M LONDON AND ELSEWHERE FOR A STRATEGY WHICH BROADLY ENTAINED THE HANDING OVER OF POWER TO THE ANC WITH W/MITS MAJORITY OF COMMUNISTS. HE BELIEVED THAT THE VIEW BEING TAKEN WAS THAT EVENTUALLY THE BEST HOPE FOR STABLE RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE TO DEAL WITH THE ANC RATHER THAN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OR EVEN A GOVERNMENT OF MODERATE WHITE AND BLACKS. W/MIT SEEMED TO HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES THAT NO MATTER WHAT THEY DID TO W/MINTRODUCE REFORM THEY FOUND NO DIFFERENCE W/M THE WAY SOUTH AFRICA WAS TREATED. THE ABSENCE OF RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE FROM ALL THE TOKYO SUMMIT COUNTRIES EXCEPT BRITAIN HAD EFFECTIVELY PULLED THE RUG FROM UNDER THE FEET OF THOSE WHO WANTED TO PREVENT FURTHER SANCTIONS. W/MIT MIGHT BE BETTER FOR WESTERN GOVERNMENTS TO GO AHEAD AND TRY TO FORCE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO TOE THEIR LINE AND SEE W/MIF W/MIT WORKED. AFTER A YEAR OR TWO THEY COULD PERHAPS TALK AGAIN. THERE

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WAS NO REASON WHY SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD BE A BURDEN TO WESTERN COUNTRIES WHEN THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM SEEMED SO WIDE AS TO BE UNBRIDGEABLE.

6. HE ADDED THAT OTHER COUNTRIES COMPLETELY FAILED TO RECOGNISE THE THREATS FACING SOUTH AFRICA AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WERE NOW IMPEDED BY A LOSS OF SUPPORT AMONGST THEIR OWN FOLLOWERS. MRS THATCHER'S MESSAGE OF 22 MAY HAD STRUCK THE WRONG NOTE WITH THE PRESIDENT AS WAS EVIDENT FROM HIS REPLY. PAK BOTHA COULD NOT SAY MORE ABOUT THE EPG AT PRESENT THAN THAT THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNISED THAT A RESPONSE WAS DUE. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT A RECENT REFERENCE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO 'THE PRETORIA REGIME' HAD BEEN RESENTED. HE MUST BE HONEST. HE FORESAW SEVERE DIFFICULTIES AHEAD IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U K AND SOUTH AFRICA.

7. PAK BOTHA CONCLUDED BY WONDERING WHETHER IT MIGHT HELP MATTERS IF A SMALL NUMBER OF WESTERN LEADERS WERE ABLE TO MEET THE PRESIDENT DIRECT. HE STRESSED THAT THIS WAS HIS OWN PERSONAL IDEA. BUT WAS THERE ANY POSSIBILITY OF MRS THATCHER TAKING A LEAD IN ARRANGING FOR SUCH A MEETING, SAY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND LEADERS OF FOUR LEADING COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY?

8. IN RESPONDING TO ALL THIS HE SAID THAT IT WAS THE MOST DEPRESSING INTERVIEW HE HAD HAD WITH ANY MINISTER DURING MY FOUR AND A HALF YEARS AS AMBASSADOR, FIRST IN ISRAEL AND THEN IN SOUTH AFRICA. HE DID NOT WISH TO CONCEAL THE FACT THAT THERE WOULD BE GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT IN LONDON AT THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S OWN REMARKS.

9. IT WOULD BE CLEAR TO HIM FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE THAT THERE WAS DISMAY IN LONDON AT THE RAIDS AND PARTICULARLY AT THEIR TIMING. WE WERE GENUINELY AT A LOSS HOW TO INTERPRET THE SIGNAL GIVEN BY THE RAIDS IN RELATION TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO THE EPG. AS REGARD HIS EXPLANATION THAT THE RAIDS HAD BEEN PLANNED FOR A LONG TIME, HE FAILED TO UNDERSTAND WHY THEY COULD NOT HAVE BEEN CALLED OFF WHEN IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT THEY WOULD COINCIDE WITH A FURTHER ROUND OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE EPG AND THE GOVERNMENT.

10. HE SAID THAT THE COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE WAS WIDELY SEEN TO HAVE REACHED A WATERSHED. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE EPG WERE GIVEN SOMETHING POSITIVE TO GO ON IF THEY WERE TO CONTINUE THEIR TASK AS WE HOPED. ALTHOUGH HIS COMMENTS IMPLIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT DOUBTED THE PURPOSE OF FURTHER NEGOTIATING, HE NOTED THAT HE HAD NOT SLAMMED THE DOOR.

11. HE TOOK UP HIS REFERENCE TO TOKYO. THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE HAD REACHED MRS THATCHER AND OTHER SUMMIT LEADERS ONLY ON THE EVE OF THE CONFERENCE, WHICH REDUCED WHATEVER CHANCE THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN OF A POSITIVE STATEMENT. IN ANY CASE MRS THATCHER HAD REPLIED TO PRESIDENT BOTHA (HE APPEARS ALONE AMONG THE SEVEN LEADERS) AND HAD DONE MORE THAN ANYONE TO TRY AND SECURE SOMETHING HELPFUL TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. IT WAS WHOLLY UNREASONABLE TO LAY A LACK OF RESPONSE FROM THE TOKYO SEVEN AT HER DOOR.

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12. FINALLY HE TOOK STRONG EXCEPTION TO HIS SUGGESTION THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD SOME KIND OF HIDDEN AGENDA FOR SOUTH AFRICA IN FAVOUR OF THE ANC. HE WAS SURE DR WORRALL HAD NEVER BEEN GIVEN THE SLIGHTEST REASON TO BELIEVE THIS. ON THE CONTRARY, WE HAD REPEATEDLY DEMONSTRATED OUR SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL NEGOTIATED COMPROMISE WHILE TAKING CARE NOT TO PRONOUNCE ON THE PRECISE SHAPE OF AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT. HE COULD NOT IMAGINE HOW HE SERIOUSLY THOUGHT THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD HAVE MADE SUCH STRENUOUS EFFORTS WITH THEIR EUROPEAN AND COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES IF THEY WERE INTERESTED ONLY IN SOUTH AFRICA BEING HANDED OVER TO THE ANC. HIS TALK OF OUR BEING WILLING TO TURN TO SANCTIONS WAS EQUALLY UNREALISTIC WHEN AT CONSIDERABLE COST TO OURSELVES WE HAD CONSISTENTLY
*
OPPOSED THAT COURSE IN FAVOUR OF DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION. IF BILATERAL RELATIONS WERE NOW LIKELY TO DETERIORATE AS HE SAID, HE DID NOT ACCEPT THAT THIS WOULD BE OF OUR CHOOSING.

13 .AT THIS POINT PMK BOTHA BROKE OFF IN ORDER TO ATTEND A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. HE THEREFORE DELIVERED A CONCLUDING REMARK TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL WHO REMAINED BEHIND: THAT FAR FROM CHOOSING SANCTIONS AS HIS MINISTER HAD IMPLIED , THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S OWN INABILITY TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE EPG COULD PUSH US FURTHER DOWN THAT ROAD. HE REITERATED TO KILLEN THE HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S REPLY TO THE EPG WOULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING THAN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE APPEARED TO SUGGEST.

MOBERLY
LIMITED.

HD. SAFD.
HD. CCD.
PS.
PS|LADY YOUNG.
PS|MRS. CHALKER.
PS|PUS.
MR. DEREK THOMAS.
MR. FERGUSON.
MR. REEVE.

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FM CAPE TOWN

TO DESKBY 261930Z FCO

TELNO 296

OF 261750Z MAY 86

ms

MIPT: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA.

COMMENT

1. THE CONTENT AND THE TONE OF THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY AND FOREIGN MINISTER'S COMMENTS ARE THOROUGHLY DISCOURAGING.

2. THE MINISTER HINTED AND KILLEN AFTERWARDS CONFIRMED TO HEAD OF CHANCERY AND MYSELF THAT THE REPLY WAS PREPARED IN THE PRESIDENT'S OWN OFFICE (UNLIKE PREVIOUS MESSAGES IN THIS SERIES DRAFTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS). PIK BOTHA ALLOWED ME TO DRAW THE INFERENCE THAT HE MIGHT NOT HAVE RESPONDED IN THIS WAY HIMSELF AND RECOGNISED HOW DISHEARTENING THE REPLY WOULD BE. IT MAY BE SIGNIFICANT THAT HE UNDERLINED PRESIDENT BOTHA'S OWN ROLE IN VARIOUS WAYS. IN ADDITION TO THE POINTS REPORTED IN DISCUSSION PIK BOTHA SUGGESTED AT ONE STAGE THAT HE COULD TRY TO ARRANGE FOR ME TO MEET THE PRESIDENT IF WE WANTED FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL VIEWS.

3. IT LOOKS AS IF THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER MINISTERS HAVE DETERMINED TO TAKE A HARD LINE. WE HAVE RECOGNISED THAT IT HAD BEEN LARGELY PIK BOTHA HIMSELF WHO HAS KEPT THE COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE ALIVE HERE SO FAR. THE PROBABILITY IS THAT HE HAS LOST OUT FOR THE PRESENT TO HARD-LINE COLLEAGUES. I HAVE HEARD HIM TAKE A SIMILAR LINE BEFORE ON SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. BUT IN SPEAKING AS HE DID AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE HE WAS LEAVING US WITH LITTLE REASON TO THINK THAT THE COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE CAN BE RESCUED. HE MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN CHASTENED BY HIS CONFRONTATION WITH RIGHT WING EXTRMISTS AT PIETERSBURG LAST THURSDAY.

4. NEVERTHELESS I THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO DO WHAT I COULD TO URGE THAT A FURTHER EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO KEEP THE INITIATIVE ALIVE. THIS IS NOT RULED OUT BY THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER HIMSELF AND PIK BOTHA HAD GIVEN ME THE LEAD BY SAYING THAT HE DID NOT SEE WHY FURTHER EXCHANGES WITH THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE.

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/S. KILLEN

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5. KILLEN TOLD US THAT HE THOUGHT HIS MINISTER'S ACCUSATION ABOUT A HIDDEN AGENDA WAS TRIGGERED BY WESTERN FAILURE TO RESPOND TO PRO-WESTERN PRINCIPLES DECLARED BY PRESIDENT BOTHA AS ESSENTIAL TO ANY SETTLEMENT. IF SO, IT JUST SHOWS HOW SENSITIVE THESE PEOPLE ARE TO WHAT THEY REGARD AS LACK OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF THE WEST.

6. THE KEY ISSUE IS BEING PRESENTED AS THE NEED TO WORK FOR THE PERMANENT RATHER THAN TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE. ONE INTERPRETATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY IS THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ARE NO LONGER INTERESTED IN ANY COMPROMISE WITH THE ANC. HOWEVER THE ONLY SMALL CHINK WE CAN SEE WOULD BE IF THE GROUP WERE TO COME HERE AGAIN AND DEAL SKILLFULLY WITH THE ISSUE OF ENDING VIOLENCE. ANYTHING MORE WE CAN SAY TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND TO THE EPG MIGHT PERHAPS FOCUS ON THIS POINT.

MOBERLY

LIMITED.

HO. SAFD.

HO. CCD.

PS.

PS | LADY YOUNG.

PS | MRS. CHALKER.

PS | AUS.

MR. DEREK THOMAS.

MR. FERGUSSON.

MR. REEVE.

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See Page 1/4 .

W E E K E N D W O R L D

Sunday, 25th May, 1986

Brian Walden interviews:

- | | | |
|--------------------|---|--|
| WISEMAN KHUZWAYO | - | Special Correspondent
'African Concord' |
| NICHOLAS ASHFORD | - | Diplomatic Correspondent
'The Times' |
| JESMOND BLUMENFELD | - | Lecturer in Economics
Brunel Univeristy |
| FLEUR de VILLIERS | - | Assistant Editor
'Sunday Times', South Africa |
| WILLIE BREYTENBACH | - | Professor of Politics
Stellenbosch University |
| GERRIT OLIVIER | - | Professor of Politics
Rand Afrikaans University |
| RAPH UWECHUE | - | Publishing Editor
'Africa Magazine' |
| PATRICK KEATLEY | - | Lecturer in International Relations
University of the West Indies |



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Hello and good afternoon.

Last week the turbulence in South Africa entered a new and potentially more dangerous phase.

For months the violence in the townships between Black and Black, and Black and White has been worsening.

But Thursday night's disturbance in which White demonstrators broke up a White political meeting, was unprecedented in recent times. Now concern is growing that this riot could signal the development of more extremism and violence in the White community. And ultimately conflict between the races could be intensified.

So today we're going to examine the causes and consequences of Thursday's riot. We'll be looking at why it happened, what its implications could be, and how this new South African phenomenon might affect the difficult search for peace in that troubled land.

First though, let's hear the latest news headlines from ITN and Alastair Stewart.

ITN NEWS HEADLINESBRIAN WALDEN

It was always probable that at some point South Africa would see not just Black unrest but increasing White unrest as well. It's this man, who more than anybody else, has provoked the recent episode of White protest.

President P.W. Botha has tried to bring about change in South Africa since he first became the country's leader in 1978. Under the separate development or apartheid system, South Africa's majority 24 million Blacks, were denied political and other rights in 86 per cent of the country.

This 86 per cent, by far the richest part, was preserved for the Whites. Only in the remaining 14 per cent, the so-called Homelands, would Blacks exercise political rights. This system Mr Botha has long tried to reform. But he's faced increasing opposition from amongst his fellow Whites. It's from members of his own Afrikaaner community, decendants of Dutch-speaking settlers, that this opposition has mainly come from. Within his own party, the Nationalists, President Botha is known as a Verlichte , an enlightened one.

BRIAN WALDEN (contd)

But he's faced criticism from Nationalist . Verkramptes the hard-liners. Outside the Nationalist camp, Dr. Andreas Treuernicht, known as Dr. No, has built up a significant following amongst Afrikaaners. A former member of Mr Botha's own party, the Nationalists, Dr. Treuernicht has formed a new party, the Conservatives. And at the grass roots, the Afrikaaner Weerstandsbeweging or AWB, a neo-Nazi White supremacist group, has been building up support. This sort of opposition has acted as a break on reform. So Blacks have become increasingly frustrated. In 1984 a Tricameral or three-house parliament was set up, in which elected representatives of the country's Asian and Coloured communities had seats. And a commitment was given that some form of national political representation for Blacks would eventually be provided. But far from easing Black dissatisfactions, President Botha's reforms have merely served to stoke them up.

JOHN BATTERSBY

LONDON CORRESPONDENT

SOUTH AFRICAN MORNING NEWSPAPERS

Well instead of responding in the way that President Botha had hoped, Blacks have in fact become more radicalised and his reforms have unleashed a new wave of expectations which is the inevitable result I would argue from 20 or 30 years of Nationalist rule and repression; the lid has blown off the pressure cooker, and instead of appeasing the Blacks in fact President Botha is facing a new, more radicalised political agenda from them.

BRIAN WALDEN

So Black revolt has steadily grown, damaging South Africa, both internally and externally. Some Blacks have been more reluctant than others to press for radical change.

The Inkatha Movement, based on the Kwazulu homeland, is led by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. He's set his sights, at least for the interim, on a federal South Africa, in which Whites would control some areas and Blacks others.

But other groups have demanded swift progress to one-man, one-vote majority rule.

BRIAN WALDEN

From bases outside the country the long established African National Congress has started to wage a guerrilla war. Inside the country the ANC's partner, the United Democratic Front, has brought many smaller Black organisations together in protest. And more recently new more shadowy gangs of young Black revolutionaries, nicknamed the Comrades, have emerged. The result has been chaos and blood-shed in the townships where most Blacks live. Sometimes Conservatives and Radicals have clashed with bloody results. The shanty town of Crossroads near Capetown, was the scene last week of just such a conflict. In the last 20 months some 400 or so are estimated to have died in Black-on-Black violence. But more often Black protest has been repressed by the South African police and army. About 1,000 lives are thought to have been lost this way; 10,000 Blacks have been arrested but the result has only been to increase the pressure for change. South African industry and commerce has felt heavy pressure, and not just as a direct result of the turmoil in the townships. To grow, South African companies rely on loans and investments from abroad, but they've been finding these harder and harder to obtain as South Africa's image abroad has deteriorated.

MICHAEL COULSONSOUTH AFRICA ANALYSTPHILIPS & DREW STOCKBROKERS

Last year the South Africans received a bit of a shock when the American banks who were lending them short-term loans, suddenly pulled the plug and said they wanted the money back straight away. The rest of the participants and the short-term market with the South Africans got cold feet, the South Africans found they were very short of liquidity, they couldn't repay the Americans, so basically they said that's it, no, declared a moratorium and since then we've been trying to get this whole matter straight, and these negotiations are likely to go on, I think for another year or so. The critical problem while this goes on is that South African economy really needs these injections of funds to grow at the required rate, which is basically nearer 5 per cent than the current 3 per cent or so. The reason they need the extra 2 per cent is to accommodate the natural increase in population growth amongst the Black South Africans in particular, who are coming into the workforce.

BRIAN WALDEN

But more immediately potent has been the threat of economic sanctions. In the West, criticism of South Africa has mounted. In America, especially, a wave of protest has swept through university campuses and the national capital Washington DC. As a consequence President Reagan has been forced to impose a limited package of sanctions.

PRESIDENT REAGAN

"America's view of apartheid is simple and straightforward, we believe it's wrong."

BRIAN WALDEN

But it's the possibility of economic sanctions imposed by Britain which has always worried the South Africans most. Britain is one of South Africa's biggest trading partners. We import about a billion pounds worth of South African goods each year. Yet Margaret Thatcher has always resisted imposing sanctions. Instead since she met President Botha at Chequers in 1984 she's preferred to use persuasion. She's been in regular correspondence with him, but increasingly Mrs Thatcher's found her position hard to sustain. That's because of Britain's membership of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth leaders have become convinced that action should be taken as the unrest in South Africa has grown. Last October at the Commonwealth Conference at Nassau in the Bahamas they tackled Mrs Thatcher. The strength of the diplomatic pressure led her to make concessions to the sanctions lobby. It was announced that Britain would ban the import of South African Krugerrands. But Mrs Thatcher stressed this was only a token gesture.

MARGARET THATCHERPRIME MINISTER

"Tiny little bit, tiny little bit, do you know how many the value of krugerrands that are imported, half a million pounds." The critical problem while this goes on is that South African economy really needs those injections of funds to grow at the required rate, which is basically nearer 5 per cent than the current 4 per cent or so. The reason they need the extra 2 percent is to accommodate the natural increase in population growth amongst the Black South Africans in particular, who are coming into the workforce.

BRIAN WALDEN

But at the same time, the Commonwealth leaders took a much more significant step. They set up a commission of seven senior figures from various Commonwealth countries. This commission was dubbed the Eminent Persons Group or EPG, and the EPG was asked to monitor progress in South Africa and report back this Summer.

JOHN BATTERSBY

When the Eminent Persons Group was formed at the Commonwealth Summit in the Bahamas last year, there were very low expectations of it, and indeed a great deal of scepticism. As the group has developed and become involved in the negotiating process, it has proved in fact that it is a formidable international negotiating team under the leadership of Malcolm Fraser and General Obasanjo of Nigeria and there's no question now that the group holds the key on sanctions, and unless their report next month is favourable it will greatly increase the pressure for international sanctions and bring the threat much closer.

BRIAN WALDEN

Until very recently it did look as if the EPG might give the South Africans a better report than had been expected. EPG members began to engage in shuttle diplomacy. After talking to ANC leaders in the Zambian capital of Lusaka they talked to President Botha's ministers in Cape Town. There were suggestions that they might just have the makings of a package which could bring Black and White together. But these suggestions appear to have been the last straw for many far right Afrikaners.

BARRY STREEKPOLITICAL WRITER'CAPE TIMES'

The far right believe the Botha Government is betraying them. They believe the Botha Government's reform programme is a sell-out of White interests, they believe it's going to lead in one direction, which is towards Black rule. And the talk that Nelson Mandela may be released has heightened these suspicions. The talk that the ANC may be unbanned has raised more fears. And yet these are precisely the terms of the EPG package as has been reported.

BARRY STREEK (contd)

And the fact that President Botha is prepared to talk to the EPG on these terms has increased their fears that a sell-out of their country is about to take place.

BRIAN WALDEN

Attempts do seem to have been made by President Botha to head off an explosion of far right anger. Last weekend's raids on ANC targets in neighbouring countries appear to have been intended to impress far right opinion. South African commandos blew up an ANC office in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe. An aircraft attacked ANC-owned buildings near Lusaka in Zambia. And other soldiers attacked a building on the outskirts of Gaborone, the capital of Botswana, killing two people. But the attacks don't seem to have fulfilled President Botha's purpose. It was in the town of Pietersburg in the Transvaal last Thursday that the hard-line AWB broke up a meeting. The meeting was to have been addressed by South Africa's Foreign Minister Pik Botha. Encouraged by their leader, Eugene Terreblanche, AWB activists stormed the platform. There were suggestions that the police on duty didn't try very hard to prevent this because many of them had AWB sympathies; eventually the police did use tear gas to suppress the disorder, but by then the meeting had been wrecked. Thus it is that the Pietersburg riot was the culmination of a White backlash against President Botha's reform programme. So what's likely to happen now?

Well the Botha Government may be able to suppress the backlash, using force. Yesterday Louis Legrange, the Government's Law and Order Minister, spoke at a meeting at Elisras in the Transvaal. This was a meeting that the AWB had threatened to disrupt as it did at Pietersburg. At Elisras it failed. But Mr Legrange was only able to go ahead with the protection of hundreds of soldiers, police and plain clothes security men. If this sort of thing became a regular feature of Nationalist political life it might only serve to add to White disaffection. And in the long run this backlash could force the Botha Government to halt the reform process. If that happened there would, of course, be no hope whatsoever of stemming the unrest in the townships. Yet if instead President Botha and his colleagues voluntarily put the reform programme into reverse, the result would be the same. So either development could lead to deepening turmoil.

BARRY STREEK

There are fears in the ruling National Party about the growth of the far right in South Africa. There are even some people who believe that the right wing may be able to put the brakes on the Government's reform programme. The Government does not have to face an election for a number of years, but the right wing is determined to stop the Government in its tracks. If that were to happen, or if the reform programme were to be reversed there's little doubt that Black people would see that as a sign of confrontation, or increased confrontation in which the only solution is through revolution.

BRIAN WALDEN

So both White disaffection and Black frustration could have appalling consequences for South Africa. But will anything or anybody come to the country's rescue?
We'll be back in a moment to find out.

PART TWOBRIAN WALDEN:

Hello again. This weekend South Africa appears to face the prospect of either growing White disaffection or increasing Black frustration. So is there a way these twin threats can be headed off? On the face of it, the prospects do seem bleak. Possibly the only viable course would be reform which was sufficient to satisfy Black aspirations without setting off uncontrollable White revolt. And at present it's President Botha who still has the ball in his court. It might be expected that post-Pietersburg he'd be a more reluctant reformer than he was but at a fundamental level he does still seem to be committed to his previous course. He still appears to appreciate that if he's to have any chance of ending the turmoil in the townships, further change is essential and this must continue, AWB or no AWB.

BARRY STREEK:

The disruption of the Pietersburg meeting was a shock to most Whites and it certainly was a shock to the government. The fact that their own Minister for Foreign Affairs could not address a party meeting without disruption was a real shock and the suspicions that the Police did not act as quickly and as effectively as they might have. Nevertheless President Botha is committed to his reform programme and he seems determined to press ahead and there are very good reasons for this. The violence in the townships has increased rather than dropped off. Black frustration is increasing, the economy is in a mess and the recession seems to be continuing. International isolation is growing, the threat of sanctions is looming. All these reasons they are really are very good reasons for President Botha to continue with his reform programme.

BRIAN WALDEN:

Indeed Denis Worrall, the South African Ambassador for London and a close confidant of Mr Botha re-emphasised the South African President's commitment to reform on Friday. But it's much less certain that the reforms Mr Botha plans will succeed in solving South Africa's problems. Ten days ago he announced plans for a new National Statutory Council. He said the Council would include leading Black figures and they'd help to prepare the new constitution under which Blacks would share power. But these plans may not help to solve the country's problems. It's probable that the far Right will be very critical. The AWB and like-minded

BRIAN WALDEN ... Cont'd

organisations might gain support but the National Statutory Council seems unlikely to placate Black opinion either. The Black leaders involved will be drawn mainly from the government-sponsored local councils in the townships and from the homelands. There seems little likelihood that the constitution they produce will satisfy the aspirations of the supporters of the UDF and the ANC. But if it seems very difficult for Mr Botha to succeed with his initiative, could the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group do better? Earlier this week there were rumours that the EPG mission was among the victims of the South African raids at the weekend. It seemed possible that the Eminent Persons had pulled out in disgust. But since then several of them have denied this. Malcolm Fraser, former Australian Prime Minister and General Obasanjo of Nigeria have both stressed that the work of the group continues. They and their colleagues seem to have decided that their mission is too important to be wrecked in this way. So the EPG has survived. And so has the package deal it was negotiating with the Botha government and the ANC before the raids. Indeed, President Botha and his colleagues have committed themselves to responding to the EPG within the next few days but for the President to accept this package could be very difficult indeed. The main terms have only recently emerged. Under these terms the ANC would suspend its campaign of violence, agreeing a truce with the South African government. But in return President Botha and his colleagues would agree to legalise the ANC and they would also release from prison the veteran ANC leader, Nelson Mandela. It's hoped by the EPG that this deal would set off a dialogue which might ultimately provide some prospect of solving South Africa's problems. But accepting such terms could carry great risks for the Botha government. Earlier this year, President Botha did speak of the possibility of releasing Mr Mandela on humanitarian grounds and for some time now it's been the government's official position that Mr Mandela would be let out and the ANC legalised if the ANC renounced violence. But renouncing is not the same as suspending. Suspending is far less permanent. If Mr Botha were to settle for simple suspension, as proposed in the EPG package, he could face considerable problems. For in the eyes of many South Africans, Nelson Mandela is a dangerous Communist. The ANC are terrorists and EPG are meddling foreigners. The risk is that if President Botha accepted the EPG package, the far Right

BRIAN WALDEN ... Cont'd

would accumulate still greater public support. There could be more Pietersburgs and more hard-line pressure on the government. Yet if Mr Botha and his Ministers did accept the package, that would be far from the end of the story. The ANC would then need to give its agreement. But that might not be readily forthcoming either. Oliver Tambo the President of the ANC and his colleagues in the leadership were rumoured to have looked favourably on the EPG package a couple of weeks ago but that was before last weekend's raids. Now it must be less likely that Mr Tambo and his colleagues would be willing to compromise. Yet even if they were, the international reaction would still be important to the future of South Africa. The response of the Commonwealth as a whole and of international bankers to any agreement would be crucial. Commonwealth leaders are due to meet in London in mid-summer to review the EPG's mission and decide whether sanctions should be implemented. In recent days, some Commonwealth governments have become increasingly impatient. For instance, after last weekend's raids, there were calls from within the Nigerian government for the EPG to be immediately disbanded and sanctions imposed. But if the EPG initiative were successful then such calls would go unheeded. International bankers, however, might be more cautious. They might want to see real evidence that peace had broken out, otherwise they could remain unwilling to extend to South African firms the loans they very badly need. The economy would remain very shaky. And that could leave prospects for long-term stability still looking poor. Thus it is that the path to peace in South Africa appears to be a very tortuous one. So what are the chances that the EPG process will succeed?

BRIAN WALDEN

Well with me in the studio is a group of eight experts on South Africa. Miss de Villiers, Mr Olivier, Mr Breytenbach, let me come to you first because you're all experts on South African government and politics. Let me start with you Miss de Villiers. Obviously Mr Botha has a crucial choice to make at the moment which is whether or not to accept the EPG package. Do you think, after he's considered it, he will accept, meaning by that that as a result of it he will release Nelson Mandela and will in fact legalise the ANC?

FLEUR de VILLIERS, ASSISTANT EDITOR, 'SUNDAY TIMES', SOUTH AFRICA

I think that the release of Mandela is inevitable, whether as part of the EPG package or not is still open to doubt. Certainly pressure has been growing on President Botha for the last two years ever since he put the possibility of Mandela's release on the table and I think Winnie Mandela, one of the few correct things that she has said, is that since then President Botha has become Mandela's prisoner as much as Mandela is President Botha's prisoner. Now whether the release of Mandela will be in response to the EPG initiative or not I think one can only guess. It would certainly be wise for the South African government at this juncture to make it part of its package and to put the burden back on the EPG to produce the other leg of the initiative which is an ANC promise for a moratorium on violence. Recent reports have indicated that although Nelson Mandela himself is prepared to agree to a truce, his comrades in Lusaka are a little more dubious about this, possibly through fear that they would not be able to make such a moratorium stick and their inability to control the violence would show up the fact that they do not in fact own the hearts and minds of all Black South Africans.

BRIAN WALDEN

Okay. Mr Breytenbach, supposing the State President did in fact decide to do what Miss de Villiers has suggested. Could he carry White opinion with him?

WILLIE BREYTENBACH, PROFESSOR OF POLITICS, STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY

Right now the name of the game is stopping the violence and I think South Africans and also people who've got an interest in what is going on in South Africa share this common perception. Now, as far as outside interests are concerned, the EPG represents a very important initiative but it's not the only show in town. There is still the American initiative which

WILLIE BREYTENBACH (cont'd.)

is divided between two kind of strategies, that is the Sullivan Code signatories, and they are very prominent nowadays in South Africa in calling on government to make its reforms more visible and to expedite the process, and then obviously also the twelve wise men appointed by President Reagan last year almost simultaneously when the EPG group was appointed to look into alternatives as far as the constructive engagement policy was concerned and then as far as Africans are concerned themselves there are various groups in South Africa who've got a vested interest in reform going on but also violence stopping, violence in the townships ...

BRIAN WALDEN

Sure.

WILLIE BREYTENBACH

... and also White/Black violence.

BRIAN WALDEN

Sure. Let's for the moment stick with the EPG though it really it's the same question for all the others. What I'm putting to you is this. Supposing Botha says 'Okay, I'll release Mandela and I might be prepared to legalise the ANC.' Can he take White South African opinion with him in doing that?

WILLIE BREYTENBACH

It depends very much on what Mr Mandela will do should he be released or what his intentions will be after he's released because I think here one can draw some comparisons between two other not unrelated incidents as far as this particular instance is concerned, and one is the release of some time ago, a couple of years ago, of Mr Herman Toivo Ja Toivo who has been a political prisoner for many years. He's been a leader of Swapo, a Namibian nationalist organisation, he's been in Robben Island for many years, and he was released and he simply dissipated into oblivion but then there is the other possibility, the other scenario, and that is of the Ayatollah Khomeini. When he returned to Iran in the late 70s his return unleashed new violence and a new thrust of politics and I think Mr Mandela's parallel, should there be a parallel

WILLIE BREYTENBACH (cont'd.)

between any of these two, would rather be on the Ayatollah Khomeini lines rather than on the Ja Toivo lines and this could open up a new can of worms and obviously then violence wouldn't stop.

BRIAN WALDEN

Let me come to you Mr Olivier. Obviously there will be a worry, not simply in terms of world opinion but what probably matters more to South Africans in Nationalist Party circles themselves about the strength of the Right. Let me ask you, how seriously do you take, for instance, the AWB?

GERRIT OLIVIER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICS, RAND AFRIKAANS UNIVERSITY

Oh the AWB is very vociferous, it's very obvious, according to what we have seen earlier in the programme, that they take very serious action against Mr P W Botha's reform programme but they are from the rural areas, they are highly organised and the ...

BRIAN WALDEN

Are there are a lot of them in the rural areas?

GERRIT OLIVIER

Well there are many in the rural areas but you see the strength of the electorate is really these days in the cities, so I think this gives you a wrong image of what is really happening on the political scene in South Africa. These meetings, you know, which we referred to took place and this gave them a chance to show their strength and show their organisation but I think in terms of the total picture, things taken in general, they are not so strong.

BRIAN WALDEN

Miss de Villiers, let me put to you a point very, very often made sometimes in South Africa, but even more frequently outside it, that the Nationalist Party has always placed enormous stress on Afrikaaner unity, political unity. A lot of people say 'But look, you see, if Botha goes ahead with any reform package and certainly if he releases Mandela and does some sort of deal with the ANC, that's the end of Afrikaaner unity, you'll never get it, so it is a tremendous sanction against him going down that road,' what do you think?

FLEUR de VILLIERS

Afrikaaner hegemony is not about to disappear, it disappeared very effectively three years ago when President Botha took his first hesitant steps down the reform path. I mean, he introduced a constitution which, however defective and flawed it may appear, introduced the idea of power-sharing with people of a different shade of pale for the first time in South Africa. That split the Afrikaanerdome fundamentally and permanently and what we are seeing now is perhaps a growth in the Right wing, a growth aggravated, one must say, by economic recession, because the parties of the far Right are also populist parties, but the idea, the dream, that Afrikaaner hegemony can be restored is not being lost today it was lost three years ago. Botha now knows that he can only carry White South Africa with him if he forgets about the extreme Right, and then he will be able to carry not only the young urban professional Afrikaaner but also the English-speaking vote.

BRIAN WALDEN

All right. Then would it be an unfair summary if I said that certainly as far as you're concerned Miss de Villiers and I suspect the same is true of you Mr Olivier, and maybe Mr Breytenbach too, that what you really anticipate is that President Botha will in fact go some way, if not the whole way, to accept the EPG package, that he will release Mandela, that he would, if the ANC were prepared to suspend violence, legalise the ANC and that though there will be objections from the AWB and the Conservatives and particularly amongst rural Afrikaaners, those objections can be overcome and will be? Is that about right?

GERRIT OLIVIER

Well it depends how the EPG package coincides with what's happening in South Africa in terms of the total process. As Professor Breytenbach explained, you know, the EPG group is one role-player among many role-players and it depends on the coincidence of solutions being offered in order to achieve peace and the end of violence in South Africa, so that is the bottom line and depends on what role the EPG is playing in that respect.

BRIAN WALDEN

Miss de Villiers?

FLEUR de VILLIERS

I think you've put an awful lot of different elements into that package. I know that there is a very strong feeling in some government circles that Mandela should be released, whether or not this is under the auspices of the EPG initiative or not, simply to try and demythologise the ANC, to deprive it of its symbolic value, and bring it back into the country where it can battle against other Black political groupings, but that feeling is not necessarily dominant and if the ANC is unbanned, I think President Botha has already indicated that that unbanning would not extend to the South African Communist Party members of the ANC or Umkhonto We Sizwe which is the armed wing of the ANC.

GERRIT OLIVIER

Does he differentiate between the Nationalists and the Communists in the ANC?

BRIAN WALDEN

All right. Let me know move on to two other gentlemen in our group who also, for obvious reasons, know a great deal about Southern Africa and particularly about feeling within the ANC, Mr Khuzwayo and Mr Uwechue. I wonder if I may start with you Mr Khuzwayo and ask you this. If as at least seems possible and many people think is probable, President Botha does say 'All right, I will accept the EPG package, I will release Mandela, I will make some arrangement to legalise at least sections of the ANC' what would be the ANC's response to that?

WISEMAN KHUZWAYO, SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT, 'AFRICAN CONCORD'

I think they would laugh at it in fact. One, because I mean if Botha was to make that offer it would be completely unrealistic: one, to expect ANC members to defend you know themselves, I mean, their own charge, in terms of are they Communist or not, you know, so who's going to decide who's a Communist? Is it Botha, you know. And secondly, legalising the ANC and saying that members of Umkhonto We Sizwe can't get back to the country, I think it's yet another joke in terms of, you know, the ANC is not the ANC without Umkhonto We Sizwe, you know, so, you know, without the armed wing, you know, then the ANC is finished and the ANC's not likely to

WISEMAN KHUZWAYO (cont'd.)

accept that. I mean, in fact, I can almost predict it's going to be rejected by the ANC.

BRIAN WALDEN

All right. Let me switch to you Mr Uwechue, though I will come back to you Mr Khuzwayo on another aspect of that, but let me come to you now Mr Uwechue. Isn't the ANC worried that if Botha in fact accepts the EPG package and the ANC doesn't, that it's going to have an unfortunate impact on world opinion as far as the ANC's concerned?

RAPH UWECHUE

I wouldn't really put it in that way. I think we get things back into focus. If we look at what the ANC really stands for, this is a multi-racial party which insists on all the people of South Africa in their entirety, not just a group whether large or small, Black, Coloured or White, but all of them together deciding the form of government for the country and who should be entrusted with running that country. If one gets this right it becomes easy to understand that if any proposal comes forward which convinces the leadership of the ANC that the apartheid regime has accepted to dismantle apartheid and is only looking for the mechanics of dismantling, I think within that context there'll be a lot of people in the ANC who would like to look at the package carefully.

BRIAN WALDEN

Do the EPG proposals fall into the category you've just listed?

RAPH UWECHUE

Well, at this point in time what we have is guess-work. None of us really knows ...

BRIAN WALDEN

So you don't know.

RAPH UWECHUE

... the impact of this package.

BRIAN WALDEN:

All right, let me put the thing to you in colloquial terms as I'm sure it would be expressed in the world. You see, it isn't a question of whether the ANC leadership fancies it all that much, what I'm anxious to get from you is what the fall-out will be if the ANC turns it down on world opinion? Won't a lot of people say, well now look, this chap Botha is not as bad as he's painted, here are all these eminent blokes who've been going around and they've suggested a deal to him, and he said yes, but the ANC won't accept it, perhaps Botha's right, perhaps they're a very extremist group. Now, isn't there a danger of that?

RAPH UWECHUE:

I don't think there's that danger, you see what is happening is that we miss the point when we think of Botha granting anything to the ANC or anybody, the issue at stake is whether a minority has any legitimacy in actually governing a country. So, if...

BRIAN WALDEN:

He can't give you that in the package, can he?

RAPH UWECHUE:

Well then, the ANC, if the ANC does reject anything that does not convince them that Botha wants to change apartheid nobody who's reasonable anywhere will blame the ANC for it.

BRIAN WALDEN:

All right.

RAPH UWECHUE:

Because that is the central issue at stake.

BRIAN WALDEN:

All right, let me come back to you, Mr Khuzwayo, on a rather related point. You see, Mr Uwechue says, it's a perfectly simple matter, the White minority has no right to be ruling anyway, and what we want from them is an acknowledgement in fact of one-man one-vote, and Black majority rule. Doesn't what happened in Pietersburg stir in your mind the feeling that you're asking Botha to give you something, that even if he was willing, he couldn't. Even the reforms that he suggested so far, have obviously had a tremendous impact on at least rural Afrikaner opinion. Doesn't that make

BRIAN WALDEN continued:

you rather more sympathetic to Botha's problems ?

WISEMAN KHUZWAYO:

No, not at all, because...

BRIAN WALDEN:

Why ?

WISEMAN KHUZWAYO:

Well, first of all if you look at the root of the problem, it's the constitution that came into existence 3 years ago. It was fool-hardy of PW Botha to come up with such an unworkable constitution, I mean, he decided that he was going to include the Coloureds and Indians and leave out the majority, you know, that is the Africans, so, and in the process he started faltering and all that, and he then decided that he had to play, you know, try and move with the Right, the extreme right with him, and he's fading, it's, I don't think that's the ANC problem, it's Botha's problems, you know. And therefore, it should not be, you know, put alongside the ANC, as you know.

BRIAN WALDEN:

All right, at a later stage, I think I might come back to what I take are the implications of that, but for the moment can I switch to Mr Ashford and Mr Keatley, both experts on Commonwealth opinion. Supposing in fact Botha does accept the EPG package, or at least most of it. What impact do you think that that's likely to have on Commonwealth opinion, Mr Ashford ?

NICHOLAS ASHFORD - DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT - THE TIMES:

Well, obviously if he were to accept the whole package, I mean this would make the Commonwealth have to go back and re-think, but I don't think anybody within the Commonwealth is really expecting this, I think what we will see is a sort of a mixed answer when the South Africans reply this week they will give a little bit and hedge on a lot more. The South Africans are past masters at stringing the international community and international opinion along and what they're going to try and do is just to keep the whole process rolling on a bit longer and give Mrs Thatcher, who is after all the key person within the Commonwealth enough for her to stand up and say, no, I'm not going to go along with sanctions.

BRIAN WALDEN:

All right, Mr Keatley, supposing Mr Ashford is right, and that the South Africans accept part of the package, don't accept other parts of it. Will the sort of scenario that Mr Ashford's painting be enough to fend off the threat of sanctions as far as Britain's concerned?

PATRICK KEATLEY - LECTURER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS - UNIVERSITY OF WEST INDIES:

Well, I think Mrs Thatcher has a in-built resistance anyway, she's got a gut reaction, she just doesn't want to go with sanctions at all, and she said so, and she has a technique of tying her own hands in public, which she's carefully done in this one, and so I would not expect to see the lady do a U-turn, I think she's, you know, tough minded, obstinate if you like, and her reputation is on the line.

BRIAN WALDEN:

All right. Let me now come to you, Mr Blumenfeld, who are an economic expert on South Africa. Suppose that the best happens from South African businesses' point of view, and that there are no sanctions implied by Britain. Does that mean that without sanctions on South Africa's economic problems are fundamentally over, and they'll find it very easy to raise international loans ?

JESMOND BLUMENFELD - LECTURER IN ECONOMICS - BRUNEL UNIVERSITY:

If the South African economy is actually going to be able to deliver the goods to the great majority of people in South Africa, then it has got to do four things, and this would apply whether we were talking about a future Black-led administration as much as it does to the present White-led administration. It would have to grow at a rate faster than the rate of population growth, so that per capita incomes can be increased. It would have to generate a very large number of jobs to absorb the vast increase in the labour force, and hopefully to make some impact on very severe levels of unemployment. It would have to generate very substantial new resources, to give material content to the reform programme, it's one thing to talk about dismantling apartheid, de-racialising the economy, removing discrimination and so on, but if you cannot produce the housing, the schools, the health, the health infrastructure and so on, in order to raise living standards across the board, then that has no content to it at all. And in addition, it has to try and do this in a non-inflationary manner,

JESMOND BLUMENFELD continued:

because within the racially charged atmosphere of South African society, inflation erodes the living standards of Blacks.

BRIAN WALDEN:

You don't sound at all optimistic that it's going to pull off these various feats, is that right ?

JESMOND BLUMENFELD:

Its facing very severe difficulties. It faces the consequences of a long running recession, the consequences of a severe drought, the effect of slow world economic recovery which has reduced for South African exports, the inflationary pressures are very severe, because of excessive government spending, and because of the decline in the Rand which has, which is now standing at about 30% of its value of three years ago.

BRIAN WALDEN:

So it doesn't sound very probable that you're going to get the kind of economic growth that you need that would assist the political reform process, is that right ?

JESMOND BLUMENFELD:

Even without the international pressures, that would be very difficult...

BRIAN WALDEN

All right.

JESMOND BLUMENFELD:

The international pressures add very substantially to that, and if I may say, the international pressures produce this rather curious paradox. On the one hand, they're saying to South Africa you've got to deliver on reform, on the other hand they're denying the country the ability to generate the resources which can give content to that reform.

BRIAN WALDEN:

Fine. Can I now really come to you very generally, I promised that I would do this, to Mr Khuzwayo, in view of some of the things that he said, and I think it's right that we should. Let me come to you first, Professor Breytenbach, and come away from all technicalities. I'll ask you a question I often hear put to me by people who say, look it's impossible. It's irreconcilable. What Botha is trying to do may be good or bad and what the Afrikaners are prepared to concede and indeed, the white population in general, may be generous or ungenerous but the whole position is hopeless, it is inevitably going to lead to conflict and there isn't very much that anybody can do to make an impact on it. Now what would be your answer to that ?

WILLIE BREYTENBACH:

My answer is the middle answer. One could postulate two extremes, total collapse scenario on the one hand and negotiated reform on the other hand. And I think what we've witnessed in South Africa during the last couple of weeks, also this week, is that negotiation and reform are two very difficult objectives to achieve. I think it is more difficult to achieve a negotiated settlement than settlement or reforms in itself, and latching on to the question of Afrikaner unity or not, one does sense an urgency in government circles and also in the private sector in South Africa, that the need for economic growth to underscore the results of the negotiated processes that government is committed to take place, is that that has become a greater priority than Afrikaner unity in the longer run, and this introduces a new equation into the ball game in South Africa.

BRIAN WALDEN:

Mr Khuzwayo, Professor Breytenbach says that negotiated reform and a negotiated agreement is very, very difficult. Do you think this it's possible at all ?

WISEMAN KHUZWAYO:

Well, the ANC has made its conditions very, very clear indeed.

BRIAN WALDEN:

And do, well, let me on that very point. Do you think there is the slightest chance that any White South African government could ever accept it in that form ?

WISEMAN KHUZWAYO:

Well, any South African government has got to be realistic. Right, the ANC did not take to the armed struggle, you know just for the sake of it because it was you know, a question of necessity. Botha has got to be realistic and the aims he has made it very clear, you know, before any negotiations take place, Botha or whatever, whoever's in charge had to got not to make a declaration of intent, you know, that you know, in future they will dismantle apartheid, but they have got to come out and say we're dismantling apartheid and you know, release all political prisoners you know, that's the basis upon which talks can take place. So, Botha is not interested in that, he's just trying to confuse world opinion.

BRIAN WALDEN:

Miss de Villiers, you see the problem of course, don't you that is in my mind ? The statements still don't look to me to be reconcilable, for instance, what Mr Khuzwayo has just said. Do you think that the ANC are bluffing, or do you think that that's really what they want, and if that's really what they want, is there any chance at all that a White government in South Africa can give it to them?

FLEUR de VILLIERS:

I don't think any White government in South Africa is going to meekly hand over the keys of the castle to the ANC and exchange one government for another, one form of oppression for another. I think that, that the future of South Africa has to be achieved through negotiation and consensus. And scepticism may have its uses and its, but it has also become part of a strategy in dealing with South Africa. Certainly South Africa has earned that scepticism by its actions over the past few years, but I believe that the kind of scepticism that we've been hearing today is actually destructive and that there is no way that the Botha could risk the kind of scenes we've seen this week.

BRIAN WALDEN:

Sure. I must move to ask Mr Keatley, are they trying to reconcile the irreconcilable ?

PATRICK KEATLEY:

I think they will resort to the technique, I first it after Sharpeville, two decades ago. The technique has always been that of jam tomorrow as in Alice in Wonderland, you promise a good deal tomorrow and you say that things are in the works right now, hang on, and you buy time.

BRIAN WALDEN:

Well, then why shouldn't it end up, you buy some time, yes, but why shouldn't it end up with it being settled as many things are in this sad world, by force ?

PATRICK KEATLEY:

Because there is an enormous, undefeated, high spirited army which has hardly been tested at all, and if you're presiding over a mighty military machine, as Mr Botha is, you'll feel no need to concede.

BRIAN WALDEN:

Lady and gentlemen, thank you all very much indeed. Thank you

THE END