

SUBJECT  
cc MASTER  
OPS

105

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 120F186

TOP COPY

46606 - 1

OCMIAN 6606  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DD 300630Z LUSAK  
DD 300630Z HARAR  
DD 300530Z DAESS  
DD 300730Z LAGOS  
FM PCOLN TO LUSAK  
291945Z JUN  
GRS 1025

JSS 021/7		
RECEIVED		
JUN 17 1986		
INDEX	FILE	CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM PCO  
TO DESKBY 300630Z LUSAKA  
TELNO 198  
OF 291945Z JUNE 86  
AND TO DESKBY 300630Z HARARE  
AND TO DESKBY 292200Z NASSAU, OTTAWA  
AND TO DESKBY 300530Z DAR ES SALAAM  
AND TO DESKBY 300730Z LAGOS

MIPT: SOUTH AFRICA: MESSAGES  
FOLLOWING IS TEXT:  
BEGINS

I AM WRITING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER LAST WEEK'S MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL TO LET YOU KNOW SOMETHING OF OUR THINKING ABOUT THE NEXT STEPS IN RELATION TO SOUTH AFRICA.

LIKE EVERYONE OF OUR COLLEAGUES IN THE COMMONWEALTH I WAS OF COURSE GRIEVOUSLY DISAPPOINTED BY THE BREAKDOWN OF THE COMGEP MISSION. IT IS VERY SAD THAT HAVING ACHIEVED SO MUCH THEY SHOULD AT THE LAST HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED BY THE OB DURACY OF PRESIDENT BOTHA'S GOVERNMENT. THE THREE SOUTH AFRICAN RAIDS ON NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES WERE A SHOCK WHICH ANGERED US ALL.

SINCE THEN WE HAVE, OF COURSE, ALL BEEN CONSIDERING WHAT

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MORE WE CAN AND SHOULD DO TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. SO TOO HAVE OUR COLLEAGUES AT THE HEAD OF EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS. LIKE US THEY BELIEVE, WITH THE SAME PROFOUND CONVICTION, THAT THE OBJECTIVES WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH SET AT NASSAU - TO BRING APARTHEID TO AN END, THROUGH DIALOGUE AND A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES, REMAIN ENTIRELY VALID. AFTER ALL, THOSE WERE THE OBJECTIVES WHICH THE COMMUNITY TOO SET ITSELF AT LUXEMBOURG LAST SEPTEMBER, AND AGAIN AT THE JOINT MEETING WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES IN LUSAKA EARLIER THIS YEAR.

THE QUESTION WE ALL ASKED EACH OTHER ONCE AGAIN AT THE HAGUE WAS THIS: IS THE PROMOTION OF DIALOGUE NOW A QUITE HOPELESS CAUSE, OR IS THERE STILL A CASE FOR TRYING ONCE MORE THE ROAD OF PERSUASION BEFORE WE RESIGN OURSELVES TO THE PROSPECT OF SOUTH AFRICA BEING CAUGHT UP INEVITABLY IN A RISING TIDE OF VIOLENCE?

LET ME STRESS WITH ALL THE SINCERITY AT MY COMMAND THAT LIKE YOU I HAVE BEEN PROFOUNDLY CONCERNED AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE REIMPOSITION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND THE FURTHER INTERNAL MEASURES GOING WITH IT ARE A RECIPE FOR AN EVEN SWIFTER UPWARD SPIRAL OF REPRESSION AND VIOLENCE AND INTER-RACIAL CONFLICT. I AM UTTERLY DETERMINED THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DONE TO AVERT THAT LOOMING CATASTROPHE, AND TO BRING APARTHEID TO AN END BY PEACEFUL MEANS - THAT, I BELIEVE, IS THE QUICKEST WAY - THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND NOT CONFLICT.

THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THAT ROUTE IS STILL POSSIBLE. A CRUCIAL FACTOR MUST BE THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. MY READING OF THE AFRIKANER CHARACTER IS QUITE CLEAR: IF WE ARE TO AVOID SIMPLY DRIVING PRESIDENT BOTHA AND HIS PEOPLE INSIDE THE LAAGER, WITH ALL THE THREAT OF MOUNTING BLOODSHED THAT THAT WOULD IMPLY, THEN IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE SHOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR DISAPPROVAL AND CONDEMNATION OF THE POLICIES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WITHOUT CAUSING THEM TO REACT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO RULE OUT DIALOGUE AND COMPROMISE.

IT WAS WITH THOSE THOUGHTS IN MIND THAT I APPROACHED MY



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MEETING LAST THURSDAY AND FRIDAY WITH MY EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES. AFTER LONG DISCUSSION WE REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE MOST EFFECTIVE ACTION THAT WE COULD TAKE AT THIS STAGE.

WE HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE KEY MOVE THAT WAS NECESSARY TO PROMOTE THE GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE WHICH WE ALL WANT WAS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT UNCONDITIONALLY TO RELEASE NELSON MANDELA AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS AND TO LIFT THE BAN ON THE ANC, PAC AND OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES. DESPITE THE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED WE DECIDED TOO THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO UNDERTAKE ONE MORE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE TO THAT END. IT WAS ACCORDINGLY AGREED THAT GEOFFREY HOWE SHOULD GO NEXT MONTH TO SOUTHERN AFRICA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND WITH THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE COMMUNITY, TO CARRY OUT THIS MISSION.

IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT DURING THE NEXT THREE MONTHS IN SUPPORT OF THAT MISSION THE TWELVE WOULD ENTER INTO CONSULTATIONS WITH THE OTHER INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES ON FURTHER MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE NEEDED, COVERING IN PARTICULAR A BAN ON NEW INVESTMENT AND ON THE IMPORT OF COAL, IRON, STEEL AND GOLD COINS FROM SOUTH AFRICA. THIS DECISION TO CONSULT OTHER INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES ABOUT POSSIBLE FURTHER MEASURES WAS, OF COURSE, INTENDED TO REINFORCE THE POSITION WE IN THE COMMONWEALTH HAVE ALREADY TAKEN. IF MEASURES ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES AS A WHOLE.

I CAN WELL UNDERTAND THAT YOU MUST BE CONCERNED THAT THIS MOVE BY THE COMMUNITY MIGHT CUT ACROSS THE WORK ON WHICH WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED TOGETHER. I SHOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU A VERY STRONG ASSURANCE THAT THE ACTION WE HAVE TAKEN WITH OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS IS VERY MUCH IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF WHAT THE COMMONWEALTH AGREED IN NASSAU. THE MISSION BEING UNDERTAKEN BY GEOFFREY HOWE IS IN NO WAY INTENDED TO SUPERSEDE OR UNDERMINE THE FINDINGS OF THE EMINENT PERSONS GROUP. ITS AIM, ON THE CONTRARY, IS TO BUILD ON THEIR WORK AND FOLLOW THE COURSE WHICH THEY CHARTED, IN PURSUIT OF THE SAME OBJECTIVES.

WE SHALL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS ALL THESE ISSUES

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WHEN WE MEET IN LONDON IN AUGUST TO REVIEW THE COMMONWEALTH ACCORD. MEANWHILE I SHALL ENSURE THAT YOU ARE KEPT CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH THE PROGRESS OF GEOFFREY HOWE'S MISSION. I SHOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU THAT IT IS MOST SERIOUSLY AND SINCERELY INTENDED. IF IT IS TO HAVE A CHANCE OF SUCCESS AGAINST WHAT WE MUST ALL SEE AS VERY LONG ODDS, HE WILL NEED TO HAVE THE CHANCE OF MEETING A WIDE RANGE OF PEOPLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AS WELL AS MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. I DO VERY MUCH HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE WILLING TO GIVE HIM THE BENEFIT OF YOUR HELP. ENDS.

FOR LAGOS ONLY. ADDITIONAL FINAL PARAGRAPH AS FOLLOWS:  
BEGINS:

I SHOULD LIKE TO ADD MY OWN PERSONAL TRIBUTE TO THE PART GENERAL OBASANJO PLAYED IN THE COMGEP MISSION. THE INTEGRITY, MATURITY AND STATESMANSHIP WHICH HE CONTRIBUTED IN SUCH FULL MEASURE THROUGHOUT REAPED PRAISE NOT ONLY FOR HIMSELF, BUT FOR NIGERIA. I KNOW THE PART YOU PLAYED IN ALL THIS, AND I THANK YOU MOST WARMLY FOR IT.  
ENDS.

HOWE

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MR REEVE  
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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T120F186

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- Amendment

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OCMIAN 6725  
CONFIDENTIAL  
ZZ LAGOS  
FM FCOLN TO LAGOS  
301530Z JUN  
GRS 75

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FM FCO  
TO FLASH LAGOS  
TELNO 344  
OF 301530Z JUNE 86

MY TELNO 198: SOUTH AFRICA: MESSAGES

1. PLEASE DELETE FROM MESSAGE TO BABANGIDA THE FIRST SENTENCE  
AND THE FIRST WORD OF THE SECOND SENTENCE OF THE PENULTIMATE  
PARAGRAPH:

QUOTE WE SHALL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS ALL THESE  
ISSUES WHEN WE MEET IN LONDON IN AUGUST TO REVIEW THE  
COMMONWEALTH ACCORD. MEANWHILE UNQUOTE.

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TO DESKBY 300630Z LUSAKA

TELNO 197

OF 291700Z JUNE 86

AND TO DESKBY 300630Z HARARA

AND TO DESKBY 292200Z NASSAU, OTTAWA

AND TO DESKBY 300730Z LAGOS

AND TO DESKBY 292300Z CANBERRA

AND TO DESKBY 300030Z TOKYO

AND TO DESKBY 300200Z NEW DELHI

AND TO DESKBY 300530Z DAR ES SALAAM

SOUTH AFRICA: MESSAGES FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

1. MIFT TO LUSAKA, HARARE, NASSAU, OTTAWA, DAR ES SALAAM AND LAGOS CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGES FOR DR KAUNDA, MR MUGABE, SIR LYNDEN PINDLING, MR MULRONEY, PRESIDENT MWINYI AND MAJOR-GENERAL BABANGIDA (WITH AN ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH FOR BABANGIDA ONLY).
2. TELEGRAMS TO TOKYO, CANBERRA AND NEW DELHI CONTAIN TEXTS FOR DELIVERY TO MR NAKASONE, MR HAWKE AND MR GANDHI.
3. ALL MESSAGES ARE FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE DELIVERY TONIGHT OR EARLY TOMORROW.

HOWE

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 June 1986

Dear Resident Clerk,

**EUROPEAN COUNCIL: SOUTH AFRICA**

The Prime Minister has approved, with very minor amendments, the text of the messages to a number of Heads of Governments of industrialised and Commonwealth countries about the outcome of the recent European Council discussions on South Africa. I enclose amended copies. I should be grateful if they could be despatched tonight for the earliest possible delivery on Monday 30 June.

The Prime Minister would also like to send an additional personal message to President Kaunda. I enclose a text. Would you please show it to the Foreign Secretary for any comments before despatch.

Yours sincerely  
C D Powell

C D POWELL

The Resident Clerk,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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## DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO:

- (1) HE Dr Kenneth Kaunda KBE
- (2) The Hon Robert Mugabe MP
- (3) The Rt Hon Sir Lynden O Pindling KCMG MP
- (4) The Rt Hon Brian Mulroney PC, MP, BA, UL, LLD
- (5) President Ali Hassan Murinyi
- (6) HE Mr Shridath Suendranath Ramphal AC, Kt, CMG, QC
- (7) Major-General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, CFR Nigeria

I am writing as soon as possible after last week's meeting of the European Council to let you know something of our thinking about the next steps in relation to South Africa.

Like everyone of our colleagues in the Commonwealth I was of course grievously disappointed by the breakdown of the COMGEP mission. It is very sad that having achieved so much they should at the last have been frustrated by the obduracy of President Botha's Government. The three South African raids on neighbouring countries were a shock which angered us all.

Since then we have, of course, all been considering what more we can and should do to bring about a change in the attitude of the South African government. So too have our colleagues at the head of European governments. Like us they believe, with the same profound conviction, that the objectives which the Commonwealth set at Nassau - to bring apartheid to an end, through dialogue and a suspension of violence on all sides, remain entirely valid. After all, those were the objectives which the Community too set itself at Luxembourg last September, and again at the joint meeting with the Front Line States in Lusaka

/earlier



earlier this year.

The question we all asked each other once again at The Hague was this: is the promotion of dialogue now a quite hopeless cause, or is there still a case for trying once more the road of persuasion before we resign ourselves to the prospect of South Africa being caught up inevitably in a rising tide of violence?

Let me stress with all the sincerity at my command that like you I have been profoundly concerned at recent developments in South Africa. The reimposition of the State of Emergency and the further [redacted] internal measures going with it are a recipe [redacted] for an even swifter upward spiral of repression and violence and inter-racial conflict. I am utterly determined that everything possible should be done to avert that looming catastrophe, and to bring apartheid to an end by peaceful means - that, I believe, is the quickest way - through negotiation and not conflict.

The question is whether that route is still possible. A crucial factor must be the attitude of the South African Government. My reading of the Afrikaner character is quite clear: if we are to avoid simply driving President Botha and his people inside the laager, with all the threat of mounting bloodshed that that would imply, then it is imperative that we should demonstrate our disapproval and condemnation of the policies of the South African Government without causing them to react in such a way as to rule out dialogue and compromise.

/It was

It was with those thoughts in mind that I approached my meeting last Thursday and Friday with my European Community colleagues. After long discussion we reached agreement on the most effective action that we could take at this stage.

We had no doubt that the key move that was necessary to promote the genuine national dialogue which we all want was for the South African Government unconditionally to release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and to lift the ban on the ANC, PAC and other political parties. Despite the obvious difficulties involved we decided too that it was right to undertake one more diplomatic initiative to that end. It was accordingly agreed that Geoffrey Howe should go next month to Southern Africa, in his capacity as President of the European Council of Ministers and with the full support of the Community, to carry out this mission.

It was also agreed that during the next three months in support of that mission the Twelve would enter into consultations with the other industrialised countries on further measures which might be needed, covering in particular a ban on new investment and on the import of coal, iron, steel and gold coins from South Africa. This decision to consult other industrialised countries about possible further measures was, of course, intended to reinforce the position we in the Commonwealth have already taken. If measures are to be effective it is essential that they should have the support of the industrialised countries as a whole.

/I can well



I can well understand that you must be concerned that this move by the Community might cut across the work on which we have been engaged together. I should like to give you a very strong assurance that the action we have taken with our European partners is very much in keeping with the spirit of what the Commonwealth agreed in Nassau. The mission being undertaken by Geoffrey Howe is in no way intended to supersede or undermine the findings of the Eminent Persons Group. Its aim, on the contrary, <sup>is</sup> to build on their work and follow the course which they charted, in pursuit of the same objectives.

We shall have an opportunity to discuss all these issues when we meet in London in August to review the Commonwealth Accord. Meanwhile I shall ensure that you are kept closely in touch with the progress of Geoffrey Howe's mission. I should like to assure you that it is most seriously and sincerely intended. If it is to have a chance of success against what we must all see as very long odds, he will need to have the chance of meeting a wide range of people in Southern Africa, as well as members of the South African Government. I do very much hope that you will be willing to give him the benefit of your help.

FINAL PARAGRAPH TO BE ADDED ONLY TO LETTER TO MAJOR-GENERAL IBRAHIM BADAMASI BABANGIDA'S LETTER:

I should like to add my own personal tribute to the part General Obasanjo played in the COMGEP mission. The integrity, maturity and statesmanship which he contributed in such full measure throughout reaped praise not only for himself, but for Nigeria. I know the part you played in all this, and I thank you most warmly for it.