

# CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 220

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM WASHINGTON  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 1763  
OF 022350Z JULY 86  
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

WASHINGTON TELNO 1748: SOUTH AFRICA: US/UK CONSULTATIONS

1. JENKINS CALLED ON CROCKER ON 2 JULY FOR A FURTHER DISCUSSION ON SOUTH AFRICA INTERNALS, THE US POLICY REVIEW AND THE PROSPECTS FOR US/UK AND WESTERN COORDINATION. DETAILS ARE CONTAINED IN MIFTS.

2. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ALSO RAISED SOUTH AFRICA WITH SHULTZ ON 2 JULY, STRESSING THE CONCERN EXPRESSED IN YOUR MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO 1177) ABOUT LEAP-FROGGING MEASURES. SHULTZ AGREED WHOLE-HEARTEDLY ON THE NEED FOR COORDINATION, AND EMPHASISED THE PRESIDENT'S CONTINUED OPPOSITION TO PUNITIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. BUT SHULTZ ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT, IF THE ADMINISTRATION WERE TO MANAGE THE CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES AND TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE HERE, THEY WERE LIKELY TO HAVE TO INCLUDE SOME RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN THE POLICY STATEMENT NOW IN PREPARATION.

WRIGHT

SOUTH AFRICA  
LIMITED  
S AF D  
C AF D  
UND  
ECD(E)  
NEWS D  
LEGAL ADVISERS  
PLANNING STAFF  
CCD  
CONS D  
SCD  
PUSD  
DEF D

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MRS CHALKER  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR FERGUSSON  
MR REEVE  
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:-  
GS SEC(2) MOD  
ASSESSMENTS STAFF CABINET OFFICE  
MR MALLABY CABINET OFFICE

# CONFIDENTIAL

X25

SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS  
PS/MRS CHALKER.  
PS/PJS  
MR FERGUSSON

MR CLG MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE

PS | SJS. MOD

FR REEVE

ED/SAPD  
ED/CAFD  
ED/UND  
ED/NEWS DEPT  
ED/NAD

I am sorry about  
the quality of the  
reproduction

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM WASHINGTON  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 1764  
OF 022355Z JULY 86  
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICA: US/UK CONSULTATIONS  
SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

1. CROCKER SAID THAT HE WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PRESENT MOOD WITHIN THE SAG. THERE HAD BEEN A SEA-CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICAN THINKING SINCE THE TOKYO SUMMIT, IF NOT BEFORE. P W BOTHA NOW APPEARED TO BE MAKING ALL THE DECISIONS, AT BEST, CONSULTING ONLY A FEW HARD-LINERS SUCH AS NEUMANS. HE WAS EVIDENTLY DETERMINED TO DEMONSTRATE AT HOME AND ABROAD WHO WAS BOSS, AND TO TRY TO BREAK THE BACK OF THE BLACK RESISTANCE WHILE ENHANCING HIS STANDING AMONG WHITE CONSERVATIVES. HE APPEARED TO HAVE DECIDED THAT HE COULD RIDE OUT WHATEVER THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION MIGHT BE. HE HAD CLOSED HIS EARS TO THE MODERATE VOICES IN HIS GOVERNMENT. P W BOTHA, IN PARTICULAR, SEEMED TO BE KEPT OUT OF THE GAME.

2. CROCKER SAID THAT, AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, HE (AND AMBASSADOR NICKEL) FEARED THAT IT COULD BE SOME TIME BEFORE THE QUOTE PRICE TAG UNQUOTE OF CURRENT POLICIES BECAME APPARENT TO BOTHA. IT WAS VERY HARD TO FIND A SOUTH AFRICAN INTERLOCUTOR WITH ANY INFLUENCE WHO REALLY UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS AT STAKE. US/SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS REMAINED AT A LOW EBB. RECENT EXCHANGES HAD BEEN ACERBIC AND P W BOTHA'S MANNER DISOBLIGING. BOTHA HAD JUST REFUSED TO SEE CY VANCE, FOR WHOM HE HAD PREVIOUSLY ENTERTAINED SOME REGARD. AND HE STILL SEEMED DETERMINED TO HARBOUR UNREALISTIC ILLUSIONS ABOUT CONTINUING SUPPORT FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN. FURTHER REPRESSION SEEMED ALL TOO LIKELY, AND THERE WAS AN EVER-PRESENT RISK OF MORE CROSS-BORDER MILITARY ACTION.

3. CROCKER SUSPECTED THAT, IF THE SAG CONCLUDED THAT THE ESSENTIAL PURPOSE OF YOUR MISSION WAS TO RESURRECT THE EPG APPROACH, IT MIGHT NOT GET FAR. HE FELT THAT THE EPG HAD GIVEN UP TOO SOON AND THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN READY TO DEPLOY FALL-BACK POSITIONS TO THE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT, IF ONLY TO HAVE EXPLORED FURTHER THE WILLINGNESS OF THE ANC TO MAKE SOME DIFFICULT CHOICES. THE WILLINGNESS OF EITHER SIDE TO NEGOTIATE HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY TESTED. THE AMERICANS ALSO FOUND IT HARD, UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, TO THINK OF WAYS OF PERSUADING P W BOTHA TO ACCELERATE THE REFORM PROCESS. AT BEST, BOTHA SEEMED LIKELY TO TRY TO GO IT ALONE INTERNALLY IN THE SHORT TERM, WITH AN ATTEMPT TO CUT A DEAL WITH BUTHELEZEN AND OTHERS. BUT THIS WOULD NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEMS THE SAG (OR

AND OTHERS. BUT THIS WOULD NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEMS THE SAC (FOR  
THE WEST) FACED. IF HOWEVER THE US, THE UK AND, SAY, THE  
FRG COULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY GENUINELY WANTED TO ADDRESS  
THE COMPLEX ELEMENTS THAT MIGHT IN TIME LEAD TO REAL NEGOTIATIONS,  
THE SAC MIGHT COME TO SEE SOME ATTRACTIONS IN OUTSIDE INVOLVE-  
MENTS BUT THIS WOULD BE A PAINSTAKING PROCESS AND IN CROCKER'S  
JUDGEMENT COULD ONLY BE SOLD TO THE SAC AS A LONG TERM  
EXERCISE.

4. SEE HPTS.

WRIGHT

YYYY

ORWBAN 4624

NNNN

WIGHT BE...  
DEPENDING UPON THE...  
THE...  
TO...  
DELEGATION...  
COMPLETING...  
SUCH...  
REQUIRE...  
MAY...  
CROCKER...  
BOTH...  
THESE...

THIS...  
OF...  
...  
...  
...  
...  
...  
...  
...  
...  
...  
...  
...

IMMEDIATE

SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS  
 PS/TER CHALKER.  
 PS/PJS  
 MR FERGUSSON

MR CLG MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE


PS/SJS MOD

FR REEVE

ED/SAFD

ED/CAFD

ED/UND

ED/NEWS DEPT  
 HD/NAD

CONFIDENTIAL  
 FM WASHINGTON  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELNO 1765  
 OF 022356Z JULY 86  
 INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

MIPT: SOUTH AFRICA: US/UK CONSULTATIONS  
 US POLICY REVIEW

1 CROCKER SAID THAT HIS ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNAL SCENE LED HIM TO CONCLUDE THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO BE THINKING ABOUT US EMISSARIES. THIS VIEW WAS SHARED BY SHULTZ. INSTEAD CROCKER THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL TO SHOW THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT THERE WAS A PAINFUL PRICE TO BE PAID FOR P W BOTHA'S BELIEF THAT HE COULD SOLVE HIS PROBLEMS HIS OWN WAY. THE CRUCIAL POINT WAS TO TRY TO BRING THIS MESSAGE HOME WITHOUT ENGAGING IN ECONOMIC WARFARE (ALTHOUGH THE PRIVATE SECTOR RISKED VOTING WITH THEIR FEET REGARDLESS). THE ONLY APPROPRIATE CARROT WAS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT, SOMEWHERE DOWN THE ROAD, THE US WAS READY AND WILLING TO PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE IF THE SAG GAVE THEM AN OPENING. BUT IN DOMESTIC TERMS, THE ADMINISTRATION NOW NEEDED TO TAKE SOME EFFECTIVE DECISIONS IF THEY WERE NOT TO BE STEAMROLLED BY CONGRESS (SHULTZ SPELT THIS POINT OUT EQUALLY CLEARLY TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL) AND REFERRED ALSO TO THE POSSIBILITY OF UNAVOIDABLE SENATE HEARINGS BEFORE 22 JULY).

2. CROCKER INSISTED (AS DID SHULTZ) THAT NO DECISIONS ABOUT FUTURE US MEASURES HAD YET BEEN TAKEN. BUT, IN ADDITION TO HIS PREVIOUS REMARKS ABOUT AIR LINKS AND VISAS, HE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY

PREVIOUS REMARKS ABOUT AIR LINKS AND VISAS, HE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE US (PARTICULARLY ATTRACTIVE, HE THOUGHT, SINCE THE SADF HAD A LARGE MEASURE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CURRENT CRISIS). CROCKER ALSO MENTIONED STEPS TO CURB THE EASE WITH WHICH SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICIALS HAD ACCESS TO THE US, AND ESPECIALLY TO US TECHNOLOGY. HE WENT ON TO GIVE A CLEAR SIGNAL (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT FURTHER CONTROLS ON US COMPUTER EXPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA WERE UNDER CONSIDERATION. AND HE SPOKE WITH SOME BITTERNESS ABOUT THE CONTINUED COOPERATION OF CERTAIN EC MEMBERS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND COMPONENTS.

3. CROCKER CONFIRMED THAT WHATEVER STATEMENT ISSUED FOLLOWING THE US POLICY REVIEW WOULD SEEK TO FOCUS ON BOTH THE REFORM OF APARTHEID AND THE NEED TO GET DIALOGUE UNDERWAY (HE CLEARLY FEARED THAT THE EC STATEMENT, LIKE THE EPG EXERCISE, CONVEYED UNREALISTICALLY SHORT-TERM EXPECTATIONS OF PROGRESS ON THE SECOND COUNT). IT WAS ALSO LIKELY THAT THE STATEMENT WOULD SAY SOMETHING ABOUT INCREASED ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS WITH THE ANC. ANY ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESTRICTIVE MEASURES WOULD BE BALANCED BY POSITIVE STEPS. IN THIS CONTEXT THERE WAS SOME US CONCERN ABOUT THE RISK THAT MEASURES SUCH AS TIGHTENING VISA PROCEDURES WOULD LEAD TO A SOUTH AFRICAN DECISION TO CURTAIL US ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS.

4. SEE MIFT.

WRIGHT

YYYY

ORWBAN 4625

NNNN

SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS /  
PS/MRS CHALKER.  
PS/PJS  
MR FERGUSSON

MR CLG MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE

PS / SJS MOD

FR REEVE

HD/SAFD

ED/CAFD

HD/UNB

ED/NEWS DEPT  
HD NAD

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM WASHINGTON  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 1766  
OF 022358Z JULY 86  
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

IMP: SOUTH AFRICA: US/UK CONSULTATIONS

US/UK AND WESTERN COORDINATION

1 CROCKER WAS STILL CONCERNED BY THE FACT THAT THE US, THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE EC RISKED GETTING OUT OF STEP. THE US HAD ONE UNAVOIDABLE SET OF DECISIONS TO MAKE BY 22 JULY (SHULTZ TOLD THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THAT HE HOPED THAT THIS DATE WOULD HOLD). THE UK WAS FACING EARLY AUGUST AND LATE SEPTEMBER DEADLINES. HOW COULD THIS PROCESS BE COORDINATED? THINKING ALOUD, CROCKER WONDERED WHETHER THE AMERICANS COULD GET AWAY WITH TAKING A LIMITED NUMBER OF MEASURES THIS MONTH, AND ANNOUNCING THAT OTHERS (POSSIBLY FROM THE CHOGM LIST), GIVEN THAT THE POTENTIAL EC MEASURES CAUSED THE US CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES) WOULD BE A MATTER FOR URGENT DISCUSSION WITH US ALLIES AND MIGHT, BY IMPLICATION, BE CONTINGENT UPON THE OUTCOME OF YOUR SECOND VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA AND/OR THE COURSE OF THE COMMONWEALTH DISCUSSIONS. HOWEVER, USING YOUR VISIT IN THIS WAY TO STAVE OFF SENATE REPUBLICAN PRESSURE COULD PROVE SOMETHING OF A HOSTAGE TO FORTUNE IF THINGS WENT BADLY. AND BEFORE GIVING FURTHER THOUGHT TO SUCH A BRIDGING TACTIC THE AMERICANS WOULD NEED A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HOW WE EXPECTED THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING TO GO. CLEARLY, THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE US/UK CONSULTATION WOULD BE NEEDED AFTER YOUR FIRST VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA (BUT, CROCKER WARNED, IT COULD PROVE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO GO TO

MEETING TO GO. CLEARLY THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE US/UK CONSULTATION WOULD BE NEEDED AFTER YOUR FIRST VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA (BUT) CROCKER WARNED IT COULD PROVE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO GO TO LONDON DURING THE WEEK BEGINNING 14 JULY, SINCE THE POLICY REVIEW HERE WOULD THEN BE REACHING A CRITICAL STAGE).

2 CROCKER ARGUED THAT THERE WAS ALSO A STRONG CASE FOR CONSULTATION ON POSITIVE MEASURES, IN ORDER TO AVOID A WASTEFUL DUPLICATION OF EFFORT. IN ADDITION, IT SEEMED DESIRABLE FOR THE WEST TO TRY TO AGREE ON WHAT MEASURES, IF ANY, WERE MOST LIKELY IN PRACTICE TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS WE WERE ALL TRYING TO SEE RESOLVED. MOREOVER, WE NEEDED TO CONSIDER HOW BEST TO SIGNAL APPROVAL OF THE SAG DID IN FACT TAKE SOME CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS. FINALLY, THERE WAS A NEED TO AGREE ON OUR RESPONSE IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS DECIDED TO TIGHTEN THE ECONOMIC SCREWS ON THEIR NEIGHBOURS, EITHER OFF THEIR OWN BAT OR IN RESPONSE TO WHATEVER MEASURES THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TOOK. THE ZIMBABWEAN EXPERIENCE HAD PROBABLY ENCOURAGED EXPECTATIONS THAT THE WEST WOULD AT LEAST PROVIDE SOME EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE. THERE WOULD DOUBTLESS BE MUCH DOMESTIC PRESSURE ON US TO THAT END. CROCKER SAID THAT THESE POINTS MIGHT USEFULLY BE DISCUSSED WITH REEVE AND OTHERS DURING REEVE'S VISIT HERE NEXT WEEK.

WRIGHT

YYYY

ORWBAN 4626

NNNN