



CENTRE FOR POLICY STUDIES

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Prime Minister

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THE COMMONWEALTH AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

It has been obvious for some time that the future shape of the Commonwealth has needed thought. I said this in the speech on the Address in 1984 and the Centre said more or less the same in their report, A Case for Coherence.

Surely it should be possible to divert the meeting of Heads of Government from their rhetorical obsessions with some calm consideration on how the Commonwealth might be used to further, e.g. democracy in Africa, the growth of domestic free markets and free trade, as well as dealing with the problems of agriculture and food supply in Africa. Will it not be possible to create a new ground of argument on some of these themes?

As for sanctions, there is a useful book by two Americans who * have analyzed some eighty uses of economic sanctions since the First World War with great care. You may already have this.

I drew the attention of Stephen Sherborne's office to the article in the London Review of Books by the left-wing philosopher, Richard Wolheim, in which he said that, during a journey in South Africa recently, with visits to most Universities, he did not meet anybody who was in favour of economic sanctions.


I do not know whether you saw the speech by Lord Gladwyn in the House of Lord's debate on South Africa? I rarely agree with my father-in-law on any subject, but on this occasion he made a most sensible statement. It is well worth reading since he served on one of the committees dealing with economic sanctions against Italy over Ethiopia in 1935. There is also, what seems to me, an interesting allusion to the possibilities of transferring responsibility for action to the United Nations. This might be dangerous, but, if we were machiavellian, it might well be profitable to consider this, since once a subject of this nature is raised at the United Nations, it is no doubt easier to use it in the labyrinthian corridors in which it would be inconceivable to imagine a United States vote for e.g. a blockade in which they would have to share responsibility with the Soviet Union.

* Economic Sanctions Re-considered by Garry Hufbauer (Institute for International Economics)- Distributed by the MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1985.

Hugh Thomas

Prime Minister (2)
I have underlined the main points.
I don't think you can 'direct' the August meeting. The only agenda item is the EPC report.
The book B book on sanctions is Renwick which you saw recently.
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[LORD CHALFONT.]
training to assassins, and shelter to hijackers of aircraft and murderers of children.

I am aware that Her Majesty's Government are already giving great attention to this problem together with the governments of other democratic countries. I do not suggest for one moment that nothing is being done. But I suggest that we, the citizens of this country, need to experience a greater sense of urgency. I should like to see the setting up of a really high level inter-departmental task force to consider this problem and to co-ordinate anti-terrorist activities. As part of this we need to abandon our apparently defensive and reactive approach to terrorism. We must not wait passively for the next murderous incident and then simply pursue—not often successfully—the people who have perpetuated it. We must embark on a policy of preventive and pre-emptive action; and this applies to the IRA as much as to any other organisation in the league of terror.

Whenever our intelligence organisations detect preparations for a terrorist attack we should move swiftly and ruthlessly to neutralise the terrorists before they can strike. If, at times, this involves problems of national boundaries or national sovereignty, that may be something we shall have to accept. Those who harbour and give aid and comfort to murderers cannot expect to hide behind the niceties of civilised international behaviour.

I expect that to some people all this may seem draconian and hawkish, but the only alternative is to wait—and we may not have to wait too long—until there is some quite appalling act of terrorist violence in this country or in the country of one of our allies; an assault on our lives and on our senses beside which the bombs at Harrods, Hyde Park and Brighton will pale into insignificance. It will be a little late then to look for the terrorist; indeed, he may have already died with his victims.

This is a war that we can win but which, I fear, we look more and more like losing. In my view, there must be no sanctuary, no freedom of movement and no mercy for the terrorists. If anyone should protest that we are adopting the standards of the terrorist in order to defeat him, I suggest that there is a limit at which forbearance ceases to be a virtue. I remind your Lordships that the pages of history are littered with the chronicles of civilisations which died because they were too civilised to defend themselves.

5.26 p.m.

Lord Thomas of Swynnerton: My Lords, like other speakers I, too, congratulate our two maiden speakers today. In particular, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Moran, on his important description of the difficulties of being a British official during a time of relative national decline. Those of us who had previously admired his life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman were not surprised by his literary qualities, but we could be excused if we were surprised by his eloquence. We look forward to hearing him again.

Trade, tourism and terrorism, to which the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, has just devoted such an effective, timely and important speech; environmental problems; the relation of our ethnic minorities with

their own relations in poorer countries; Europe; the fact that we still, though not a super-power, have major global responsibilities; the fact that we are, as it were, the geographical hinge of freedom lying between Europe and the United States—all these things make an agile and determined foreign policy an essential part of Government activities.

My noble friend Lord Young of Graffham, in a maiden speech a week or two ago, alluded to the increasingly hostile world in which British traders have to operate. We know that in order to change that increasingly hostile world in a way that we should wish, to our benefit and to theirs, towards encouragement of free trade, towards respect for contracts and the establishment of good bases for investment, our own economy would have to recover more than it has as yet done. Nevertheless, even now we know that we are expected, and we ourselves expect our Government, to support the idea of good government in other countries: that good government which alone in the long run, as we all know, can prevent such tragedies which are now being seen in Ethiopia from occurring, to which reference has naturally been made.

All these aspects of our political life make it surprising that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is not required, and in fact does not wish, to prepare annually a statement on foreign policy rather on the lines of the annual White Paper on defence. Such a paper would relate the smaller questions, and the bigger ones, to the larger purposes—Henry Kissinger's phrase—against which all foreign policy is played out.

It might even be that if such a White Paper were annually prepared the Foreign and Commonwealth Office might sustain the case that it should have a larger annual budget than the £600 million which it now receives; and it might even sustain an argument that there should be more than one Minister in the Cabinet to discuss foreign and international affairs—as, after all, noble Lords will remember used always to be the case when there was a Secretary of State for India, for the Commonwealth and for the Colonies a relatively short time ago. Furthermore, we all know that to have to put things together in some conceptual form always helps us to keep our priorities in the right order; and, who knows, this might assist the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to have an even wider, and even wiser, range of foreign policy decisions.

Let me explain what I mean. It is obvious that during the next Session noble Lords from all sides of the House will put a bewilderingly large number of questions to my noble friend and her colleagues on subjects as various as, for example, the reason why Government seem to have greater partiality than previously expected for multilateral rather than bilateral aid, whereas all the evidence is that multilateral aid is more difficult to monitor. Noble Lords will wish to question the reasons for a major diplomatic defeat which we (that is to say, the West) have met in UNESCO in allowing it to remain in the state in which it now is, whether or not we are within the organisation at all.

Other noble Lords will wish to press my noble friend even further on questions of the relation between the European Community and defence than she

gratifyingly went in her speech today. Still other noble Lords will perhaps suggest that the character of the war in Afghanistan merits a greater international or United Nations investigation than it has received. Some noble Lords may remember that after the war—at the time of the Greek civil war, for example—there was a United Nations commission on the Balkans which drew attention to the atrocities perpetrated by the Communists, including the kidnapping of children, and which was of importance in bringing that war to the successful end that actually occurred.

Still other noble Lords will press the Minister on such questions as whether the conventional wisdom which used to apply in the Middle East—that if the Arab-Israeli quarrels could only be resolved the major source of Middle East troubles would be out of the way—should be re-examined. All these important questions will no doubt be put, and they will be courteously and expertly answered. But I suggest that it would be easier for the Government to give answers to all these and other questions if they did that against a coherently worked-out—conceptualised—foreign policy, which they would put forward annually in this and in another place.

This paper could also discuss and go further into the questions of what the Government hope to achieve in the future—not what has happened in the recent past, but what they would like to see occur in the immediate, and perhaps in the long-term, future. For example, we are members of a large number of international organisations. How do the Government see some of those evolving in future? What, for example, is our policy towards the Commonwealth? We are members of this, and the gracious Speech alludes to the importance of that membership. Do we wish to expand membership of the Commonwealth so that it will one day embrace all ex-colonies or ex-dependencies of the British Empire? Do we want perhaps to use it in order to promote our other foreign policies—our disposition in favour of free trade, and our expectation that representative government is the best bet for most societies? Surely we should strive to give this important association a specific purpose. Furthermore, we could debate whether the Commonwealth might not itself consider expelling members which became Marxist, as Grenada did last year and in the months before. That certainly might save a recurrence of that particular type of crisis, which caused such heart-searching 12 months ago.

Then there is the question of Europe. The noble Baroness referred to the future development of the European Community, as indeed does the gracious Speech. But what exactly in the gracious Speech does "development" really mean, and what does it really lead to? Let us assume, for example, that we have done all the short-term things which the Government would like to do; that we have in fact achieved the united Common Market, including a common market in services. Let us suppose that we have brought in successfully Spain and Portugal. Let us suppose that, indeed, we have done as the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, suggested should be done in that context, and let us suppose that we have resolved the question of Gibraltar. What then would happen? What will our long-term and important question, and one to which

we should address ourselves. What we want to be certain about is whether we can continue to partake of the benefits of an increasingly politically self-conscious Common Market and customs union without at the same time creating within the European Community an even larger national state at the Brussels level, of which we have had such bad experiences in our own national lives in the twentieth century.

Then there is the question of the Soviet Union, to which a lot of attention has been paid during the course of this debate, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, who seemed to me in some of his remarks to be suggesting that the Soviet Union was more like a misunderstood whale than an adversary—a large enterprise, certainly, but with very inadequate jaws for dealing with the rest of its neighbours. This would suggest that he has abandoned the view that the Soviet Union is interested in imperialism as well as in ideology. We should like to see in such a Government White Paper as I am suggesting some consideration of how the Government see the interrelation between ideology and imperialism in the Soviet Union.

We should like to know whether, in welcoming Mr. Gorbachev next week and Mr. Gromyko next year, the Government feel that they, and indeed any other foreseeable Soviet leader, can be expected to think of the West in a different way from that which they have in the past. Hitherto we have all assumed that the Soviet Union looked on other states which were not a part of the Soviet world as, in the first instance, capitalist states anxious to attack them, and, in the second instance, states which are in a transitional stage, on their way to becoming Soviet states of their own; and with those states (that is to say, with us) the Soviet Union would not naturally be able to make any firm agreements, since, after all, agreements in the Soviet ideology are mere halts on the route—short-term arrangements, to be altered when the correlation of forces, as they put it, becomes favourable to Moscow. The noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, has given a different picture of the Soviet Union. That is the picture which we are more accustomed to think is valid.

These are some of the questions to which I feel the Government might well devote attention in a White Paper on foreign policy. There are other, even more important, even more difficult and even more interesting questions, and it is upon some of these that I suggest and hope that the noble Baroness might persuade her colleagues in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to brood in future.

5.41 p.m.

Viscount Falkland: My Lords, I too should like to pay tribute to the two maiden speakers tonight: the noble Lord, Eden of Winton, and the noble Lord, Lord Moran. Being myself a recent maiden speaker, and without the quite clear experience that these two speakers have, I am full of admiration for the forceful and elegant way in which they delivered their speeches. I look forward, as I am sure do all of your Lordships, to hearing the noble Lords again.

I was puzzled first by the very brief reference in the gracious Speech to the amount of aid which was going to be maintained. I considered it slightly ambiguous. I did not quite understand what maintaining substantial aid really meant. I can only put the very best

The Commonwealth

B

The extent to which the Commonwealth should figure in any current discussion of Britain's external relations is a matter on which disagreement is possible. The defenders of the Commonwealth still point to it as a vehicle for the exercise of Britain's influence over the globe—a shadowy substitute for a vanished Empire—and advocate for that reason measures for strengthening ties between Britain and other Commonwealth members in trade, higher education, and so forth. The difficulty is that Britain's ability to do this is impaired by the obligations of the European Community. Thus, for instance, students from countries of the Community pay the same fees as British students while students from Commonwealth countries are treated as foreigners. Other defenders of the Commonwealth system see the use of it to lie in the fact that its membership bridges the alleged gap between the developed and the developing world, so providing a forum where leaders and officials from member countries of the two groups can talk to their mutual advantage.

From the point of view of the poorer countries which form the majority of Commonwealth countries, the picture is quite other. The cross-links between Commonwealth countries other than Britain are neither numerous nor important, apart from Canada's contributions in development, but the Commonwealth does provide a forum from which pressure can be brought to bear upon Britain in such matters as overseas aid and immigration and on political topics such as apartheid in South Africa. The 'Gleneagles Agreement', so damaging to British cricket, was the fruit of such pressure.

In considering the future one can rule out two suggestions canvassed in the past but no longer viable. One is the expansion of the system to include countries never under the British flag: for which no demand exists (the re-admission of Pakistan at some future date is not excluded should circumstances change). The other idea, that of a two-ring Commonwealth with an inner core of like-minded mainly white democracies, and an outer ring of the rest, would also no longer find serious adherents. The strength of the non-aligned movement makes political co-operation or defence co-operation on a Commonwealth basis inconceivable.

There is, however, one problem that may have to be resolved and that is the ambiguous position of the monarch. The British monarch is

head of state in only a limited number of Commonwealth countries—Australia, Canada, New Zealand and some smaller territories—but is also 'Head of the Commonwealth'. The monarch is bound on all things political by the advice of the cabinet in the country in which she is present—normally Britain; but it could be, for instance, Canada or Australia (though the prospect of Australia becoming a republic is a real one). When in a foreign country the British sovereign is treated as monarch of the United Kingdom so no constitutional problem arises. When in a Commonwealth country which is not a republic, presumably the same rule applies. But if, as in her 1984 Christmas broadcast, the Queen speaks as Head of the Commonwealth, she may say things which have policy implications. The importance of the issue lies perhaps in the view that keeping the Commonwealth together is regarded as an important function of the royal family and some support for the very institution of monarchy. The issues of Zimbabwe and Grenada both brought up these matters: both appear to have been affected by the consideration that the monarch had interests.

To dissolve the Commonwealth, which would presumably need general agreement, or unilaterally to withdraw appear to be exercises too radical for a government to undertake. On the other hand, to make more of the Commonwealth than at present is unrealistic in the light of our other commitments. It may be recalled that the Holy Roman Empire went on for a very long time with little discernible content; its princes seldom met except, as a rule, for war, hunting or marriage.

Diary

Every morning as I woke up I reached for my radio. A cheerful Home Counties voice announced: 'Sunny skies in Buenos Aires, Toronto, Calgary and Tokyo; overcast in Dublin, Rome and Ankara; rain in London, Athens, Nairobi and Frankfurt.' As South Africa gets the weather, so it gets its news: in gobbets of fact, fragmented beyond all hope of comprehension.

There are items that the news loves. They are, top, world disapproval of South Africa, then corruption in black countries, sporting events of all kinds in all countries, speeches on terrorism by foreign politicians; internally, the collapse of a strike whose beginning was never reported, the opening of a trial of which nothing more will be heard. When news turns to comment, anonymously delivered, cheerfulness gives way to the rasping tones of common sense. 'South Africa, whose feet have now been set irrevocably on the path of reform, will not be deflected by extremists either of the right or of the left.' The word 'certain' carries most opprobrium: 'certain groups', 'certain interests', 'certain persons for reasons best known to themselves', 'certain ideologues of a Marxist or Westminster persuasion'. A correspondent from London regrets the decay of the relative clause in the speech and writing of the young. Songs punctuate the news to unpremeditated effect: Frank Sinatra, Petula Clark, Victoria de los Angeles, and, one morning, Yves Montand singing the favourite song of the Italian Communist partisans. It is difficult to exclude the external world if you cannot recognise it.

I was in a position to think these thoughts because back in the late Seventies two South African lecturers had come to visit me. They had been friends of the legendary Rick Turner, a brilliant young philosopher who, having gone to Paris to study Sartre and Marx, had returned to teach, had eventually been banned by the authorities, and, answering the front-door bell one morning, had been shot dead. That had been a year or so earlier. They talked to me of the isolation of the Left and the reinforcement of the Right by touring lecturers from Baptist colleges in the Southern States of America. If I ever had the chance, would I please go? When I went last month I was not prepared for what I found: for the splendours or for the miseries.

Superficially the University of Cape Town is like a Californian campus. It has a magnificent site, which it has done quite a bit to spoil. The faculty have been to foreign universities. The students are intelligent and eager and believe in showing it. The ideas that circulate come from France and America. Posters advertise protest marches and shared rides home and lectures and water-skiing equipment; they denounce the Police and nuclear energy and conscription. There is more theology than there would be in England. Out of ten thousand students, two to three thousand (I was told) are radical, five hundred, of whom next to nothing is heard, support the Government, and the rest are in the centre and occupied with life's ordinary ambitions. Fifteen per cent are non-white. But if all this approximates to California, there are two big differences. For the first difference you would have to imagine the airport functioning, say, one day a month. People do come and go, but with a meagreness which is out of keeping with the modern world. Students carry around not books but xeroxes of chapters of books that by now no one can afford to buy. And the second difference is that the more amusing-looking students, the elegant kids, who don't give the impression of having just come off the sports field, who wear a touch of ethnic clothing or T-shirts demanding the release of Mandela and gold and silver chains and bracelets, whose hair is slightly longer if they are girls or slightly shorter if they are boys—these students lay, perhaps not their lives, but certainly their safety on the line.

I had the chance of seeing the Police in action on the campus. It was nothing, people tell me, compared with last autumn or ten years ago. It was nothing compared with what I

had seen at Minneapolis in 1972. It was the reaction-time that was special. Three or four hundred students had gathered on Jameson Steps to denounce the cross-border raids. After discussing and voting on every issue of tactics, they followed their elected leader, one of the students who had been to see the external ANC, across the edge of a rigger field, down to the verge of the freeway. There they shouted slogans and held up their placards to passing motorists. A police officer in shirt-sleeves, with that walk parodied in *Woza Albert* in which the body bends from the ribcage, strolled over to the central divider and spoke inaudibly through a megaphone. 'Here it comes,' the shout went up barely a minute later and an armoured vehicle raced along the freeway spraying the students and the grass with blue liquid. Tear-gas was fired into the crowd, and police, appearing from behind, where they had been hidden, chased the demonstrators into a narrow area lined with long glass windows. Re-forming, the students vowed to return. But already, drawn up behind an ornamental balustrade, silhouetted against the sky, were the Coloured police, in loose blue fatigues like prisoners, with the monstrous black sjamboks dangling from their hands. Below them a rugby practice continued through the light drifts of tear-gas.

Four students were arrested. Meanwhile, less than ten miles away, a thousand shacks had been destroyed and twenty, twenty-five thousand blacks had been made homeless. I could understand how the children of the middle classes, returning from Crossroads where they did much of the relief work, could resolve to have themselves and their university pilloried and blackguarded and boycotted by the world to the point where their impoverishment, their inner isolation, their humiliation, seemed to approach that which they felt they had connived in imposing on people whom they were not allowed to think of as their fellow-citizens. As far as I could see, in a country which desperately needed ideas not just to effect change but, if it ever came, to consolidate change, this was not the right answer. But it was a response. It showed something that was lacking in the English lecturer who told me that what most worried him about Crossroads was the anarchy.

Everyone by now—everyone, that is, outside South Africa—knows what happened at Crossroads. They know how the authorities, to ingratiate themselves with a compliant and corrupt leader, to get rid of a large and potentially troublesome community, and, as a bonus, to propagate the facile idea that blacks readily show violence to blacks, turned the vigilantes of old Crossroads upon the miserable triangle of shacks and hovels that lay on its periphery.

I went to Crossroads twice. Once was on my way to the elegant campus of Stellenbosch with a friend who had offered to drive me. Talking to me with pride of his radical children, he revealed the anxieties he experienced as a parent. Would the telephone ring and tell him that his daughter had been picked up by the police? Would his son go to jail for six years for refusing conscription? By now we had left the freeway and we were driving along Landsdowne Road first past ramshackle suburbs, and then, with the Portland Cement Factory to our right, we could see to the left, on rising ground, what looked like the embers of an Australian bush fire. Charred wood, broken bits of corrugated iron, grass long trodden to dust, and pools of water the colour of milk chocolate. At regular intervals young fair-haired soldiers peered out of their troop-carriers to see if somewhere in this scene of desolation there was still the threatening presence of life. By the time of my second visit, which was with a social worker three days later, much of the site had been bulldozed and it was now surrounded with barbed-wire and arc lights. Rain had fallen. At one place the coils had been lifted to allow lorries with protective mesh over the windscreen to enter and clear the junk. Boys, old men, young mothers with four, five, six children in tow, slipped in after them and scrambled up what they could lay hands on and carried it out under the expressionless eyes of the police.

What I saw as detritus were the building blocks of the only home they could ever anticipate.

Looking across from where we stood, occasionally jumping back as the police or army drove past swerving through the puddles to splash us with water, I could see the line of trees and bushes that separated Old Crossroads, now in dead ground, from the satellite encampments that had once, a week before, stretched from there up to the road we were now on, and one thing that was clear was that, if the authorities had been concerned to save life and property, if they had merely thought it their duty to maintain law and order, they would have stationed the police, with all the resources that a war economy has placed at their disposal, along that hedge. If—and this is a big if—if the Police are still under control. In South Africa there is much convenient talk about the threat from the right. Foreign media collude in giving the ultra-conservative parties coverage. But, if there really is a threat from the right, it cannot come from these parties, which, in a country where at least five out of six people desire massive change, have been gerrymandered into existence so that a government which has abandoned principle but clings desperately to power can call itself 'moderate'. The threat, if it exists, comes from the security forces, which can be as readily dismantled as a nuclear power station.

Another thing that was made clear, looking out from Mahobe Drive, was that to the black leaders, standing where they stood, amongst the rubble of their houses, looking back at us up the barrels of the guns trained on them, the appeal for moderation, the call to renounce violence, the invitation to engage in meaningful political compromise, if it ever reached them, was likely to seem in a foreign language. Who asked the Maquis to compromise, or called the July Plot an internecine conflict?

I drove one long afternoon through the heady sensuous beauty of the countryside. I started at Knysna on the Indian Ocean, drove up through forests filled with giant trees, out along the top of a mountain range, through a deep stony gorge, and then across the scrubby desert, past flocks of sheep and large clumps of cactus and red-hot poker, with the mountains away to the left and right going blue, green, purple, violet-grey as the sun sank, and at nightfall I arrived at the small whitewashed town of Graaf-Reinet, built in a kind of rustic rococo, pressed against the hillside. In half a day's drive I had passed five cars, and at regular intervals a neat bungalow, which was the farmhouse, and then, about a hundred yards further on, on the other side of the road, a few hen-coops where the labour lived. As my car raced along, sending up clouds of pale red dust, black youths poured out of the forest, or single figures materialised, like mirages, in the solitude of the desert. They thumbed a lift. I did not stop. At one moment I felt tired and wanted to sleep on the verge of the road and wake up to a distant view of mountains. I drove on. Reluctantly I admitted why. Fear, and the fear of fear, kept me going. What conceivable reason, I asked myself, could these people give themselves not to rob me, or kill me, or both? What would restrain me if I were in their position? Only the fear which would not let me stop. In the countryside, under the vast skies of the karoo, apartheid, or segregation, or separate cultural development, or mutual respect for national identity, or whatever is the phrase of the moment, seemed a more inhuman, a more deathly, presence.

At Grahamstown my host threw open the french windows. 'He loves this view,' his wife said. From the garden we could see the lights of the town: there the cathedral, there the quiet English-looking university, which now has 20 per cent non-white students, there the leafy, colonial streets. 'And over there,' he said, 'on the hillside the black township. In pitch darkness.' 'Have they never had light?' I asked foolishly. Last autumn they had light. During the unrest the Army stationed itself on the hill opposite, and they beamed searchlights across the town and raked the dirt paths for anyone who stirred. The township had light, night after sleepless night.

The relief was that no one in South Africa said to me: 'We're not as bad as you thought,

are we?' No one said 'we'. They referred to the Government as 'the Government' or 'them'. I remarked on this and someone said to me: 'That is because you've not been to the heart of Afrikanerdom. Even the most radical people there say "we"—say it with shame.'

I never got to the heart of Afrikanerdom. I went to one austere Afrikaans university in the north. There was an exhibition of an incredibly talented black weaver. People asked me how my ideas related to Foucault or Richard Rorty. A painter, Swedish by origin, of great intensity as was his work, talked to me of the problems of South Africa. They were not political problems, he said, they were cultural problems. They were problems of communication and of creativity. The Afrikaner, who could not cry and distrusted his feelings, who was bigoted but without any real conviction, who was submissive to all forms of authority, who felt this hollow in himself, needed the African, but, every time he met one, he was caught up in the same old crude reactions. 'But with time, with education, with more sensitivity...' Then he told me of how every Saturday he and his whole family spent the day in a Coloured township: marriage-counselling, ecology, Bible-reading, teaching crafts. After two years they started to overcome suspicion, and they were still trying to overcome things in themselves. 'You have to be able to reach out to these persons as persons to survive the stench.' It was South Africa's problems, he and his wife said to me, that were its hope. Purged by its torments, it could become the greatest country in the world.

I never met anyone—though everyone was adamant that I very easily might have—who supported economic sanctions. The poor of South Africa could not tolerate much more poverty: the well-off could. What was needed was massive capital spent in ways that bypassed the Government: on education, on health, on training, on agriculture, on urbanisation, on the transfer of power. Some were more definite, some were hazier, about how this could be achieved. All were aware that on the fringe of such a discussion there waited—and for how much longer?—an ever-increasing body of youth who all their lives had been denied privacy, respect, education, work, and their own leaders. All they had picked up was bitterness and the martial arts. Who except those who had shared their fate could tell them to renounce their only two acquisitions?

On my last day I found in a dusty classroom in Witwatersrand University a copy of the now banned *Sowetan*, dated 29 May 1986. There was a report of a treason trial in the course of which the counsel for the defence cross-questioned a security policeman about the video of a funeral which the police had confiscated. They had also arrested the crew.

Mr Bizos: Could it not be that the TV crew wanted to show Germany a bit of the truth about South Africa?

Sgt Mong: Is that not propaganda?

Sgt Mong was quite right. The truth about South Africa is its condemnation, and what I had learnt in the three weeks I had been there was the heroism of many people who try to find out, against massive obstacles, massive blandishments, what is the truth about South Africa, and then try to lead their lives in the light of this truth. Someone told me of the exhilaration he felt as a young conscript sitting in the hills above Luanda and hearing the Foreign Minister solemnly swear that no one member of the South African Defence Forces had crossed the border. Loyalty fell away, like an old unwanted skin. It is a heroism that has to be repeated over and over again, and it requires of different people different things: questioning, teaching, standing together, resisting the demands of the state, exposing its lies, perhaps just keeping the forces of life going. The struggle is to build, within the carcass of the present state, an alternative society. If foreign countries can assist these forces of truth and disorder, then they will find something worth doing.

Richard Wollheim

That... to be a series of signals to the South African Government... saying, "You need not worry too much. You have friends on the other side of the Mediterranean. We shall see to it that you do not come to any serious harm." That is the wrong message to send to the South African Government at present.

I view the whole situation with profound pessimism. It is possible, either of its own motion or under the increased pressure of sanctions—under its own motion, wildly unlikely, under the pressure of increased sanctions at any rate possible—that the South African Government would move to what could be regarded as a real beginning in the dismantling of apartheid. If so, I shall be greatly and attractively surprised. Unhappily, I see no such process going on at present.

We happen to be debating this matter on the 120th anniversary of the publication of the American Declaration of Independence. I imagine that we are all aware of the opening words of that statement:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal".

Cynics have pointed out that some of those who drafted the statement were slave owners. We should do the founding fathers of the American constitution an injustice if we did not realise that many of them were aware of what was implied by the explosive doctrine that they had set forth. It has not been those words which have been so much in my mind today but the words of another prominent American, Thomas Jefferson, who, writing about the institution of slavery in his state of Virginia, used words that any wise, white South African might well use today:

"I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just".

1.44 p.m.

Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, I shall confine myself to a few general reflections which might conceivably bear on action. I start with a personal experience. At the beginning of 1936, now just over 50 years ago, I was appointed by Mr. Eden, as he then was, to be a member of a League of Nations sub-committee in Geneva set up to consider and make recommendations about the application of sanctions, which was a new term then, taken in principle by the League of Nations against Italy because of the flagrant violation of the Covenants, inherent in her invasion of Ethiopia. It was one of the most futile committees I have ever attended, and that is saying a lot.

As my noble friend Lord Crawshaw has already said, none of the measures that we pored over so long at that time had the slightest effect on Mussolini. Only one sanction would have had any effect and that was agreement, not only by members of the League but by America, to refuse to ship any oil to Italy. That would have meant declaring a blockade and, as we all know, a blockade can only be made effective by the use of force. As there was no agreement to use force, which might have ended in war, and for which at that moment we were totally unprepared, the Duce proceeded, as we all know, on his wicked way.

It is always risky and perhaps unprofitable to seek historic parallels for situations which may be very different. I think, however, we can say with some confidence in the light of experience that sanctions

[LORD GLADWYN.]
against an errant member of the international community are unlikely to induce that member to abandon the policies which give offence, unless the nations applying sanctions are determined, in the last resort, to impose their will by some manifestation of force, for example, by a blockade.

If this judgment is at all acceptable, and it may not be, how might it apply to the insistence that South Africa should not only formally renounce apartheid but should now negotiate a new constitution based on the principle of one man, one vote with representatives of the African National Congress, local nationalists and other groups?

Not having had the opportunity to study the situation on the spot, I may well be wrong. No doubt those who think differently from me may explain later in the debate why that may be so. But from what I have read and have been told—more especially perhaps in the light of what that admirable South African Liberal, Mrs. Suzman, said recently in *The Times*—it seems that none of the sanctions so far contemplated could be counted on to induce the present South African Government to go as far as that. They might conceivably, under the threat of such sanctions, release Nelson Mandela. At the moment that seems pretty unlikely. They might introduce a few more rather superficial reforms—we must not ignore the reforms that they have already accomplished—and they might even do a separate deal with the Zulu chief, Buthelezi, but that would probably be as far as they could be induced to go.

I repeat that I am merely saying what I have heard. If I am wrong, I stand to be corrected. On the other hand, the distress and unemployment in South Africa, which would of course follow drastic economic measures, may in the opinion of some and perhaps in the opinion of many, result in the Pretoria Government losing control and being succeeded by another prepared to do what was demanded of them.

If we are realistic we must assume that, given the unlimited powers now in the hands of a large and well organised police force, that could only be said to be certain if other than economic measures—and they could only be forcible measures—were taken or contemplated by those countries, notably Commonwealth countries, which were determined to impose their will. At least, that is the conclusion that I believe we should be well advised to draw.

It seems likely that severe economic measures would unfavourably affect some of the nations participating in them, notably ourselves, while many of those most eager to apply them would hardly be affected at all. It may be that the effect on this country would not be as unfavourable as some suggest, but it would be considerable. That is obviously one of the reasons why a common policy, even among members of the European Community, is not easy to come by. Against that, it may be recalled that during the American civil war, which after all was fought on a not dissimilar issue, cotton operatives in this country entirely approved of the decision not to trade with the southern states, in spite of the grave distress that this occasioned in Lancashire. It was a question of conscience then and I suppose that any British workers who might find

themselves reduced to the dole or any British companies that might suffer grave loss, or even become bankrupt, would all regard it as a question of conscience now. At least, if severe economic measures are embarked upon, that must presumably be taken for granted.

My own rather tentative proposal—I only throw it out as an idea—is that if sanctions with the declared object of forcing (I repeat "forcing") the South African Government to end apartheid in the way proposed are taken at all, they might best be taken by the Security Council of the United Nations as a result of a formal vote under Chapter VIII of the charter in accordance with which the five permanent members of the council, along with all other members of the United Nations (because such a decision would be binding on everyone) would have to take, jointly, all measures including, if necessary, military measures, designed to oblige the South African Government to conform with what might, I suppose, be considered to be the common conscience of mankind. True, such action could only be taken legally under the charter if it was held that South Africa had committed the equivalent of an act of aggression—that is charter language—which might, I suppose, be considered to be inherent in the bombing of the capitals of neighbouring states. If an actual revolution was then in progress in South Africa it might, I imagine, also be argued that the South African Government were in effect indulging in aggression against a large majority of their own people.

My main conclusion in any case is that far-reaching economic measures (I repeat "far-reaching economic measures") are only likely to achieve the result that we all desire if they are taken with more or less universal consent—for otherwise, the whole operation would be plagued by leaks—and with the firm intention not so much to persuade but actually to oblige the South African Government to abandon the position to which they are at present committed even if this means organising something that may in the last resort be the equivalent of a second Boer War. Things might not, of course, come to such a pass. Probably, they would not. The Boer government might well surrender well before then. But the government would have to be somehow convinced that their position was entirely hopeless.

If such a firm and generally held intention is not for any reason present—I would regard the attitude of the United States and Japan as being the most important in such circumstances—then, although some additional measure seem now to be inevitable, no extreme measures will presumably be taken in the pretty confident hope that no government of South Africa will be able to resist both external indignation and internal pressure increasingly to modify the present system in the sense desired, so as ultimately to arrive at something not far off one man, one vote, or its broad equivalent.

Whatever course is followed—I am only trying now to indicate what I personally believe to be the broad choices—let us not be under any illusion. It was difficult enough, as other noble Lords, I believe, have said, to arrive at such a solution in Rhodesia, where the whites numbered only 2 or 3 per cent. of the population. It will be much more difficult to do that in the Union where they number 24 or 25 per cent, and where there are substantial Indian and coloured

groups. We must assume that such considerations are present in the minds of the leaders of all those civilised and democratic nations who undoubtedly agree on one thing, namely, that the evil system known as apartheid must be completely abandoned in South Africa if peace is to prevail, even if the process of replacing it by a more civilised system may take rather longer than is sometimes now thought. By all means, let us hope—it is perhaps a rather forlorn hope—that the projected mission of Sir Geoffrey Howe will be successful in furthering this end. If it is not, surely it is high time that we all agreed on the best practical means of overcoming the rather fundamental difficulties that would still be in the way of achieving what all reasonable people most sincerely desire. That will not be easy.

1.56 p.m.

Lord Saint Brides: My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, reminded us, it was an ill day for South Africa and for the world when in 1948 the National Party with its racist ideas replaced the Smuts Government and introduced an avowedly white supremacist regime. It was underpinned, as we all know, by creating the system of institutionalised injustice which we know and abhor as apartheid. It has taken the Nationalists all this time to realise into what a blind alley they then led their country, and to begin to dismantle some of apartheid's less essential but still iniquitous manifestations, like the Mixed Marriages Act, the pass laws and now, it seems perhaps also the Group Areas Act.

But, of course, the heart and core of apartheid is the exclusion of the blacks from political power. So far, the Nationalists have not been able to conceive of a way to bestow some political power on the blacks without their diminishing severely or indeed forfeiting their own. Nevertheless, events both inside and outside South Africa are visibly and, indeed, remorselessly, pointing in this direction. To that extent, South Africa stands again today, as it did in 1948, at a crossroads. It is a matter of concern to the whole world that this time it should choose the right direction and not the wrong one, as it did 38 years ago.

No other nation has shared as we British have in shaping South African history. And no other nation today possesses the collective knowledge that we do of that complex country. It follows that we are, or should be, uniquely well qualified to gauge—to the extent that this can be done from outside the country—what needs to be done to put right what has gone wrong there; and uniquely well qualified to judge how best our own still considerable influence and that of the world at large can be used in support of this objective.

Of course, we must respect the depth and sincerity of the feelings and views of our EC and Commonwealth partners. But we ought not to feel inhibited from telling them how we view the situation in South Africa from our own standpoint of greater involvement and greater knowledge. We shall find, moreover, that recognising this, countries the world over are likely to follow our lead.

At Nassau, as the noble Lord, Lord Barber, reminded us, the Commonwealth called on Pretoria to initiate a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion with a view to establishing a non-