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
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WASHINGTON - PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH P W BOTHA: 23 JULY

SUMMARY

1. TWO HOURS WITH P W BOTHA. A DIFFICULT AND AT TIMES HEATED DISCUSSION WITH LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRESSURES IN THE OUTSIDE WORLD. THE PRESIDENT MAINTAINED STRONGLY HIS ACHIEVEMENT AND COMMITMENT TO REFORM AND FAILURE OF WEST TO RECOGNISE THIS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSED NEED FOR MORE URGENT REFORM, AND IN PARTICULAR RELEASE OF MANDELA AND UNBANNING OF ANC. PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD SEE AND DEAL WITH MANDELA IN DUE COURSE IN HIS OWN TIME. HE THWARTED OF RETALIATION AGAINST FLS IF SANCTIONS IMPOSED, AND PROPOSED A HEADS OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL MEETING WITH CERTAIN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE FLS. SECRETARY OF STATE WARNED AGAINST FURTHER RAIDS AGAINST NEIGHBOURS.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT HE WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE PURPOSE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MISSION WAS, AND WOULD NOT HAVE RECEIVED HIM BUT FOR HIS REGARD FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THE PURPOSE OF HIS MISSION. OUR ANXIETY WAS TO SEE A STABLE, DEMOCRATIC, PROSPEROUS, WESTERN-ALIGNED SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AVOIDANCE OF DISORDER AND EVENTUAL COMMUNIST DOMINATION. WE HAD ARGUED AGAINST SANCTIONS, BECAUSE WE THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD HARM, NOT HELP. THERE WAS A WIDESPREAD HOPE THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD RAPIDLY

SANCTIONS, BECAUSE WE THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD HARM, NOT HELP. THERE WAS A WIDESPREAD HOPE THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD RAPIDLY COMPLETE THE CHANGES WHICH HAD BEEN STARTED AND PRODUCE A SYSTEM ACCEPTABLE BY ALL RACES. FOR THIS DIALOGUE WAS NEEDED; THUS THE SPECIFIC EC PROPOSITION FOR THE RELEASE OF MANDELA AND OF THE DETAINEES, AND THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC. OTHERWISE WE FEARED THE PRESSURE FOR FURTHER ECONOMIC MEASURES WAS LIKELY TO BE IRRESISTIBLE.

4. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT THE PRESSURE FOR SANCTIONS, WHICH HE PERCEIVED, WAS A MARCH OF FOLLY. HE HAD ONE MORE THAN ANYONE TO BRING PROGRESSIVE CHANGE TO SOUTH AFRICA AND HAD SPLIT HIS OWN PARTY. IN RETURN FOR THIS HE RECEIVED NO ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, BUT THREATS OF SANCTIONS. EUROPE WAS CLEARLY ATTEMPTING TO INTERFERE DIRECTLY IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY. DOUBLE STANDARDS WERE APPLIED TO SOUTH AFRICA AND TO DICTATORSHIPS IN THE COMMONWEALTH AND COMMUNIST STATES. THE ROOTS OF DISCRIMINATION WENT BACK IN SOUTH AFRICA'S HISTORY BEYOND APARTHEID TO THE DAYS OF BRITISH RULE. SOUTH AFRICA WAS A COUNTRY OF WIDELY VARYING CULTURAL GROUPS.

5. THE EC WANTED POLITICAL REFORM. BUT THIS MUST GO HAND IN HAND WITH A LEVELLING OUT OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FIRST WORLD AND THIRD WORLD ECONOMIES WHICH CO-EXISTED IN SOUTH AFRICA. THIS INVOLVED THE WHOLE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE FRONT LINE STATES WERE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON SOUTH AFRICA.

6. REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA REQUIRED AN ENORMOUS INCREASE IN EDUCATION; THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAD PUT HUGE EFFORTS INTO IMPROVING BLACK EDUCATION.

7. THE WEST SPOKE OF "AUTHENTIC LEADERS" OF THE BLACK POPULATION; IN HIS VIEW MORE THAN HALF THE BLACK POPULATION WERE ALREADY WELL REPRESENTED BY THEIR OWN AUTHENTIC LEADERS, FOR INSTANCE IN THE BANTUSTANS. THE SAME COULD NOT BE SAID OF COUNTRIES SUCH AS ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. HE AGREED THE BLACK URBAN POPULATION WERE NOT YET PROPERLY REPRESENTED, BUT MEASURES WOULD BE TAKEN TO ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR OWN REPRESENTATIVES. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING HARD TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE. THE MAIN REASON FOR FAILURE SO FAR WAS FOREIGN INTERFERENCE.

8. MANY OF THOSE WHO COMMANDED MAXIMUM ATTENTION IN THE WEST WERE NOT REPRESENTATIVE; BISHOP TUTU ONLY REPRESENTED A SMALL PROPORTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN CHRISTIANS.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD MUCH OF PRESIDENT BOTHA'S RESERVATIONS, AND THE PRIDE, INTEGRITY AND COURAGE WITH WHICH HE AND HIS PEOPLE HAD FOUGHT FOR THEIR FREEDOM IN THE PAST. WE DID NOT DISCOUNT THEIR COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC CONCEPTS AND THE RULE OF LAW. BUT THEIR OWN COMMITMENT TO EUROPEAN STANDARDS OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY LED US TO EXPECT THEM TO BE EXTENDED TO ALL THE PEOPLE IN SOUTH AFRICA.

10. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT NO MATTER HOW WE ARGUED THE CASE AGAINST SANCTIONS THE PERCEPTION WAS GAINING AROUND THE WORLD THAT THEY WERE NEEDED BECAUSE THE CENTRAL STRUCTURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION REMAINED INADEQUATE IN THAT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE PLAYED NO PART IN IT. PRESIDENT BOTHA ASKED WHETHER WE WERE DEMANDING ONE MAN ONE VOTE IN A UNITARY STATE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WERE NOT OURSELVES PRESCRIBING A SYSTEM, NOR INSISTING ON THE UNITARY STATE FORMULA. BUT THE COMPONENT WHICH WAS SO FAR MISSING WAS THE NEED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE BASIS OF THE CONSENT OF THE MAJORITY ACCOMPANIED BY THE LEGALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES. HENCE OUR EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR THE RELEASE OF BLACK

MAJORITY ACCOMPANIED BY THE LEGALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES. HENCE OUR EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR THE RELEASE OF BLACK LEADERS, ESPECIALLY MANDELA. BUTHELEZI HAD MADE THIS A CONDITION OF ENTERING INTO DIALOGUE.

11. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT RELEASE ANYONE UNLESS THEY WERE PREPARED TO SAY THEY WOULD NOT COMMIT VIOLENCE AGAIN. THE WORD "ABANDON" IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER WAS THE KEY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT BOTHA HAD HIMSELF ORIGINALLY USED THE WORD SUSPEND; WHATEVER WAS SAID, THERE COULD BE NO GUARANTEE THAT VIOLENCE WOULD NOT RECUR IF NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN.

12. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS CLEARLY INTERESTED ONLY IN THE RELEASE OF MANDELA AND NOT IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC REFORM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DENIED THIS. BUT HE SAID THE REASON WHY SOUTH AFRICA WAS NOT UNIVERSALLY ACCLAIMED FOR ITS ECONOMIC TRIUMPHS WAS THE LACK OF A DEMOCRATIC BASE.

13. PRESIDENT BOTHA REPEATED THE CONDITIONS WHICH HE HAD MADE IN PARLIAMENT FOR THE RELEASE OF MANDELA IF HE RENOUNCED VIOLENCE. MANDELA REMAINED IN JAIL ESSENTIALLY BECAUSE IT SUITED THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY THAT HE SHOULD. MANDELA AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE NOW SAYING THAT THEY WOULD NOT SEE ANY FURTHER VISITORS, INCLUDING THE SECRETARY OF STATE. HE, PRESIDENT BOTHA, COULD NOT AGREE THAT HE SHOULD BE INTERVIEWED FURTHER BY FOREIGNERS OR REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES. SUCH MEETINGS DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE FINDING OF SOLUTIONS AND THE DEGREE OF UNDERSTANDING WITH MANDELA WHICH EXISTED WOULD ONLY BE PREJUDICED BY FURTHER VISITORS. HE HIMSELF WAS FULLY IN CONTROL OF THIS SITUATION AND, BASING HIMSELF ON THE INFORMATION AT HIS DISPOSAL, WOULD DECIDE WHEN TO SPEAK TO MANDELA. ALTHOUGH HE HAD IDEAS ABOUT THIS, HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO SPECIFY THEM AT THIS TIME, AND THE MOMENT WAS NOT YET OPPORTUNE.

14. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECALLED MANDELA'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE EPC NEGOTIATING CONCEPT. SURELY THIS WILLINGNESS SHOULD BE USED. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT THE MATTER MUST BE LEFT IN HIS HANDS. AS FOR RELEASING MANDELA, IT DEPENDED ON HIS REJECTING VIOLENCE.

15. ON THE ANC PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT IT WAS DOMINATED BY COMMUNISTS. HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANYTHING WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY NOW OR IN THE FUTURE. HE BELIEVED SOME ANC LEADERS WERE NOT COMMUNISTS, AND IF THEY WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO THE ABANDONMENT OF VIOLENCE AND TO A PEACEFUL CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS HE WOULD ALLOW THEM BACK TO SOUTH AFRICA. HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO TALK TO THEM WHILE VIOLENCE, MURDERS AND NECKLACINGS CONTINUED.

16. HE WAS CLEAR THAT MANY EUROPEAN LEADERS HAD DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD APPLY SANCTIONS. BEFORE THIS HE TRUSTED THAT THEY WOULD GIVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET AT HEAD OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL, BECAUSE HE HAD SOMETHING TO SAY WHICH HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO REVEAL AT THIS POINT.

17. HE THEN SAID, READING FROM A PREPARED STATEMENT, THAT IT WAS THE SOUTH AFRICAN IMPRESSION THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WAS THREATENING SANCTIONS BECAUSE THE FRONT LINE STATES HAD URGED THEM TO DO SO. HE URGED US TO SUGGEST TO THE FRONT LINE STATES THAT THEY SHOULD THEMSELVES INITIATE COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. THE PROSPERITY AND WELFARE OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION SHOULD BE MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE WHOLE OF THE FREE WORLD AND HE DERIVED NO SATISFACTION FROM THE

SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. THE PROSPERITY AND WELFARE OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION SHOULD BE MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE WHOLE OF THE FREE WORLD, AND HE DERIVED NO SATISFACTION FROM THE KNOWLEDGE THAT SANCTIONS WOULD HURT SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS MORE THAN SOUTH AFRICA. HE WAS THEREFORE READY TO MEET OTHER SOUTHERN AFRICAN LEADERS AS WELL AS LEADERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ANYWHERE AT ANY TIME IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS WHICH AFFLICTED SOUTHERN AFRICA AND TO SEEK SOLUTIONS. SUCH A MEETING WOULD NOT REPLACE OR DETRACT FROM THE INTERNAL REFORM PROCESS, WHICH WOULD CONTINUE. HE HAD SENT MESSAGES TO EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS PROPOSING SUCH A MEETING.

18. SOUTH AFRICA HAD TAKEN PRECAUTIONARY STEPS. THEY WERE CALLING TOGETHER THE CUSTOMS UNION COUNTRIES FOR A STRAIGHT TALK. IF THE FRONT LINE STATES TOOK STEPS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA WOULD RETALIATE. SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS WERE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSPORT.

19. HE WAS OCCUPIED NOW WITH SOCIAL, EDUCATIONAL AND POLITICAL REFORMS WHICH WOULD TURN SOUTH AFRICA INTO A BROADBASED DEMOCRACY, BUT HE WOULD DO IT HIS OWN WAY AFTER CONSULTATION WITH SOUTH AFRICAN LEADERS AND WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDE. WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DETERMINATION OR THE WILL-POWER OF SOUTH AFRICA TO SAFEGUARD ITS OWN RIGHTS.

20. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE IN NOW WAY UNDERESTIMATED THIS, AND OUR OWN OPPOSITION TO SANCTIONS WAS BECAUSE WE SAW FULLY THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THAT COURSE. THE PROPOSALS HE WAS MAKING WERE MADE PRECISELY TO AVERT A DEPARTURE DOWN THIS ROAD. THAT WAS WHY WE ADVOCATED DIALOGUE. HE DID NOT KNOW HOW INDIVIDUAL EC COUNTRIES WOULD REACT TO A PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING. PRESIDENT REAGAN HIMSELF HAD MADE CLEAR IN WASHINGTON THE WEEK BEFORE THE MOUNTING PRESSURES FOR SANCTIONS, AND HAD ADDED THAT ANY FURTHER ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS WOULD MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO RESIST CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE.

21. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT THE FRONT LINE STATES HARBOURED ANC TERRORISTS IN SPITE OF HIS APPEALS TO THEM NOT TO DO SO. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT MANY OF THE FRONT LINE STATES HAD MADE CLEAR TO US THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY DID COOPERATE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS ON SECURITY MATTERS, THOUGH NONE OF THEM WAS PHYSICALLY ABLE TO ENSURE TOTAL COMPLIANCE. PRESIDENT BOTHA MAINTAINED THAT THEY WERE WILLINGLY ALLOWING THE ANC TO OPERATE IN THEIR COUNTRIES.

22. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPEATED THAT OUR WHOLE CASE WAS BASED ON THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE AND NOT VIOLENCE. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT HE DID NOT WANT WAR, BUT IF HE WAS FORCED TO HE WOULD DO THE SAME AS GREAT BRITAIN HAD DONE IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE UNDERLINED THE NEED TO REACH OUT FOR DIALOGUE NOW IN ORDER TO AVERT THAT KIND OF CONCLUSION. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY WANTED TO SEE DIALOGUE ACROSS THE BOARD FOLLOWING A GENERAL RENUNCIATION OF VIOLENCE. HE WAS NOT A RACIALIST AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS KNEW IT. HIS POSITION AT THE MOMENT IN THE WHITE COMMUNITY AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY WAS STRONGER THAN IT HAD EVER BEEN. BUT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO LEAD THE COUNTRY INTO A MESS AND HE WISHED THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND OTHERS TO STOP POKING THEIR NOSES IN.

23. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE MODERN WORLD WAS NOT ONE IN WHICH ANY COUNTRY COULD STAND IN ISOLATION. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT IN THAT CASE SOUTH AFRICA MUST FIGHT SEMI COLON HE WOULD RATHER DO THIS THAN FACE HUMILIATION.

24. FINALLY, PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO

