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7/8 (80)

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 1488(1)/86

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OCMIAN 4865
CONFIDENTIAL
DD 070630Z NAIRO
FM FCOLN TO NAIRO
061745Z AUG
GRS 926

JE 021/10.		
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 28		
11 AUG 1986		
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INDEX	PA	Action Taken

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FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI
TELNO 292
OF 061745Z AUGUST 86

SOUTH AFRICA: COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT REVIEW MEETING,
3-5 AUGUST

1. MIPT. FOLLOWING IS TEXT.
BEGINS. I WANTED TO LET YOU HAVE MY IMPRESSIONS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT REVIEW MEETING WHICH ENDED HERE
ON MONDAY EVENING AND TO TELL YOU OF THE ACTION WHICH WE IN
BRITAIN WILL NOW BE TAKING ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION.
YOU WILL, I EXPECT, HAVE SEEN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE FROM THE
MEETING. IN THE WORDS OF THE COMMUNIQUE OUR DISCUSSION WAS
CHARACTERISED BY A SPIRIT OF FRANKNESS IN FRIENDSHIP. THERE WERE
MANY POINTS ON WHICH WE WERE ALL CLOSELY AGREED. ON THOSE WHERE
WE DIFFERED, WE WERE ABLE TO AGREE TO DIFFER AND TO RESPECT EACH
OTHER'S POSITIONS.

FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANTLY WE WERE IN FULL AGREEMENT ON OUR
COMMON PURPOSE, NAMELY, THE DISMANTLING OF APARTHEID AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A NON-RACIAL AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN
SOUTH AFRICA AS A MATTER OF COMPELLING URGENCY. AS I SAID
AFTERWARDS NO ONE CAN CLAIM THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS EASY
ON APARTHEID. IT HAS NOT BEEN AND IT IS NOT GOING TO BE. THE
SYSTEM IS JUST WRONG AND MUST GO.

WE WERE ABLE TO HEAR A PERSONAL REPORT FROM THE TWO CO-CHAIRMEN

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OF THE EMINENT PERSONS GROUP. SIR GEOFFREY HOWE WAS ALSO ABLE TO GIVE A REPORT OF HIS MISSION ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. BOTH THESE REPORTS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAD FAILED TO RESPOND TO OUR CALL FOR A START TO GENUINE DIALOGUE AND WE WERE THEREFORE ALL ABLE TO AGREE THAT SINCE OUR MEETING IN NASSAU THERE HAD NOT BEEN THE ADEQUATE PROGRESS BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT THAT WE HAD LOOKED FOR THERE.

ON THE BRITISH SIDE, WE REITERATED OUR DOUBTS THAT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD IN FACT BRING ABOUT THE INTERNAL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA THAT WE ALL SOUGHT. OTHERS ROUND THE TABLE, HOWEVER, TOOK A DIFFERENT VIEW. THEY WERE BENT ON FURTHER ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA IN THE GENERAL BELIEF THAT ONLY THIS WOULD MOVE PRESIDENT BOTHA. IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR VIEWS AS WELL AS OUR OWN COMMITMENTS AS A MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LONG HYPHEN AND THE COUNTRY NOW HOLDING THE PRESIDENCY OF THAT ORGANISATION LONG HYPHEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DECIDED THAT BRITAIN WOULD NOW TAKE A NUMBER OF FURTHER MEASURES.

FIRST, WE DECIDED THAT IF, NEXT MONTH, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DECIDED TO INTRODUCE THE MEASURES MENTIONED IN THE HAGUE COMMUNIQUE OF 27 JUNE, WE WOULD ACCEPT AND IMPLEMENT THEM. THAT WOULD MEAN THAT WE, ALONG WITH THE EC AS A WHOLE, WOULD BAN IMPORTS OF COAL, IRON AND STEEL. (WE HAVE ALREADY BROUGHT INTO OPERATION THE OTHER MEASURE ENVISAGED BY THE EC, A BAN ON THE IMPORT OF GOLD COINS).

SECOND, WE AGREED NOW TO INTRODUCE A VOLUNTARY BAN ON NEW INVESTMENT LONG HYPHEN THE ONLY OTHER MEASURE MENTIONED IN THE HAGUE COMMUNIQUE LONG HYPHEN AND A VOLUNTARY BAN ON THE PROMOTION OF TOURISM TO SOUTH AFRICA. BOTH OF THOSE MEASURES WERE MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE NASSAU ACCORD.

OUR READINESS TO TAKE THESE STEPS WAS INTENDED TO DEMONSTRATE BRITAIN'S COMMITMENT BOTH TO THE COMMONWEALTH AND TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

OTHERS WERE PREPARED TO GO FURTHER. BUT IT SHOULD BE RECOGNISED THAT THE SCALE BRITAIN'S INVOLVEMENT, TOGETHER WITH THAT OF EUROPE, IN SOUTH AFRICA MEANS THAT EVEN A RELATIVELY FEW MEASURES

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TAKEN BY THE EC IMPART A SHARPER SHOCK THAN A MUCH LONGER LIST OF MEASURES TAKEN BY THE COMMONWEALTH AS A WHOLE.

MOREOVER THE PARTICULAR MEASURES IDENTIFIED BY THE EC WHICH WE HAVE NOW SAID WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT AND IMPLEMENT, ARE VERY SIGNIFICANT. THEIR IMPACT IS LIKELY TO BE AS GREAT IF NOT GREATER THAN THAT OF THE MEASURES IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE NASSAU ACCORD. SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS OF COAL, FOR EXAMPLE, REPRESENT 7 PER CENT OF ALL SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TAKES AROUND HALF OF THESE. SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS OF IRON AND STEEL REPRESENT A FURTHER 5 PER CENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS, OF WHICH EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TAKES 10 PER CENT. BY COMPARISON EVEN A WORLDWIDE BAN ON THE IMPORT OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, AS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE NASSAU ACCORD, WOULD INVOLVE ONLY SOME 5 PER CENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS. I SHOULD POINT OUT ALSO THAT THE VOLUNTARY BAN ON NEW INVESTMENT WHICH WE HAVE AGREED TO ADOPT NOW HAS A CONSIDERABLE SYMBOLIC AND PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE, GIVEN BRITAIN'S HISTORICAL ROLE AS THE LARGEST SINGLE PROVIDER OF INVESTMENT CAPITAL FOR SOUTH AFRICA. NO COMMONWEALTH COUNTRY EVEN BEGINS TO APPROACH BRITAIN IN THIS REGARD AS AN INVESTMENT SOURCE. SIMILARLY THE VOLUNTARY BAN ON TOURISM MEANS MUCH MORE IN THE CASE OF BRITAIN THAN OF ANY OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRY SINCE TRADITIONALLY FAR MORE PEOPLE FROM BRITAIN GO TO SOUTH AFRICA FOR HOLIDAYS.

I HOPE THEREFORE THAT YOU WILL RECOGNISE THE FULL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE UNDERTAKINGS WHICH BRITAIN HAS NOW GIVEN TO OTHER COMMONWEALTH LEADERS.

OUR OBJECTIVES IN ALL THIS REMAIN UNCHANGED FROM THE NASSAU ACCORD. WE WANT, ABOVE ALL, TO BRING ABOUT THE PROMOTION OF DIALOGUE AND THE SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES. IT IS ONLY THROUGH NEGOTIATION THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEM CAN FINALLY BE RESOLVED.

LASTLY, I AM GLAD TO SAY THAT WHILE WE ALL AT THE MEETING REGRETTED THE ABSENCE OF FULL AGREEMENT WE NEVERTHELESS TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY, AS THE COMMUNIQUE RECORDS, TO RENEW OUR FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND TO THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES WHICH HAVE GUIDED IT OVER THE YEARS. ENDS.

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NEWS DEPT

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MR E FERGUSON

MR REEVE

MR DEREK THOMAS

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MRS CHALKER

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TELNO 291
OF 061745Z AUGUST 86

SOUTH AFRICA: COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT REVIEW MEETING,
3-5 AUGUST

1. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE DATED 6 AUGUST FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MOI. PLEASE DELIVER IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 August 1986

Dear Robert,

**SOUTH AFRICA: PRIME MINISTERIAL MESSAGES TO THE
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA AND KENYA**

Thank you for your letter of 6 August enclosing draft messages from the Prime Minister to the Heads of Government of Nigeria and Kenya about the outcome of the Commonwealth Review Meeting on South Africa.

As your letter makes clear, despatch of these messages is urgent. But I am not in a position to consult the Prime Minister about them. I assume that the Foreign Secretary has personally approved them. Since they follow very largely the Prime Minister's own remarks at her subsequent press conference, I agree that they should be despatched telegraphically in the Prime Minister's name.

BF ||
for copies

Yours sincerely,
Charles Powell

(CHARLES POWELL)

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

P.S. I gave you on the telephone

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two important amendments.

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cc/c



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 August 1986

Dear Charles

*Authorised for
despatch - ultra time
anecdote - after
discussion with Sir
Peter Crockett*

*CDP
S/P.*

South Africa: Prime Ministerial Messages to the
Heads of Government of Nigeria and Kenya

The Foreign Secretary believes that it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could send messages as soon as possible to President Babangida and President Moi to give them her impressions of the Commonwealth Review Meeting and tell them of the action which HMG will now be taking on the South African question. The Prime Minister was in any case intending to reply to President Babangida's letter of 31 July (your letter of 2 August).

at trap

We do not yet know what the Nigerian and Kenyan reaction will be to the outcome of the meeting. There is a risk that they may decide to react in some way to the difference in position between Britain and the other six governments. We are conscious of what happened over the Commonwealth Games when Nigeria and Kenya both unfortunately played a large role in starting the boycott going among Commonwealth States. If either of these countries were to make some move against us this would risk having a snowball effect. In the case of Kenya there is the sensitive question of British Airways' over-flying rights en route to South Africa.

I enclose draft messages to the two Heads of Government from the Prime Minister.

Yours ever

R N Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

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Draft (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Copies to:

Top Secret

President Moi

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

SUBJECT:

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT

I wanted to let you have my impressions of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Review Meeting which ended here on Monday evening and to tell you of the action which we in Britain will now be taking on the South African question.

You will, I expect, have seen the joint communique from the meeting. In the words of the communique our discussion was characterised by a spirit of frankness in friendship. There were many points on which we were all closely agreed. On those where we differed, we were able to agree to differ and to respect each other's positions.

First and most importantly we were in full agreement on our common purpose, namely, the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial and representative government in South Africa as a matter of compelling

Enclosures flag(s)

urgency. As I said afterwards no one can claim that the British Government is easy on apartheid. It has not been and it is not going to be. The system is just wrong and must go.

We were able to hear a personal report from the two co-chairmen of the Eminent Persons Group. Geoffrey Howe was also able to give a report of his mission on behalf of the European Community. Both these reports made it clear that the South African Government had failed to respond to our call for a start to genuine dialogue and we were therefore all able to agree that since our meeting in Nassau there had not been the adequate progress by the South African Government that we had looked for there.

[In the light of this conclusion we all agreed that it was now necessary to adopt further measures to impress on the authorities in Pretoria the need for urgent change.] On the British side, we reiterated our doubts that [general economic] ~~sanctions~~ sanctions would in fact bring about the internal change in South Africa that we all sought. Others round the table, however, took a different view. They were bent on further action against South Africa in the general belief that only this would move President Botha. In the light of their views as well as our own commitments as a member of the European Community - and the country now holding the Presidency of that organisation - the British Government decided that Britain would now take a number of further measures.

First, we decided that if, next month, the European Community decided to introduce the measures mentioned in the Hague Communique of 27 June, we would accept and implement them. That would mean that we, along with the EC as a whole, would ban imports of coal, iron and steel. (We have already brought into operation ~~the~~^{one} other measure envisaged by the EC, a ban on the import of gold coins).

Second, we agreed now to introduce a voluntary ban on new investment - the only other measure mentioned in the Hague Communique - and a voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa. Both of those measures were mentioned in paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord.

Our readiness to take these steps was intended to demonstrate Britain's commitment both to the Commonwealth and to the European Community.

Others were prepared to go further. But it should be recognised that the scale Britain's involvement, together with that of ~~Europe~~^{the EC}, in South Africa means that even a relatively few measures taken by the EC ~~impart a sharper~~^{will deliver a very} shock ~~than a much longer list of measures taken by the Commonwealth as a whole.~~

Moreover the particular measures identified by the EC, which we have now said we are prepared to accept and implement, are very significant. Their impact is likely to be as great if not greater than that of the measures

in paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord. South African exports of coal, for example, represent 7% of all South African exports and the European Community takes around half of these. South African exports of iron and steel represent a further 5% of South African exports, of which ~~the~~ European Community takes 10%. By comparison even a worldwide ban on the import of agricultural products, as mentioned in paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord, would involve only some 5% of South African exports. // I should point out also that the voluntary ban on new investment which we have agreed to adopt now has a considerable symbolic and practical importance, given Britain's historical role as the largest single provider of investment capital for South Africa. ~~No Commonwealth country even begins to approach Britain in this regard as an investment source.~~ Similarly the voluntary ban on tourism means much more in the case of Britain than of any other Commonwealth country since traditionally far more people from Britain go to South Africa for holidays.

I hope therefore that you will recognise the full significance of the undertakings ~~which~~ which Britain has now given to other Commonwealth leaders.

Our objectives in all this remain unchanged from the Nassau Accord. We want, above all, to bring about the promotion of dialogue and the suspension of violence on all sides. It is only through negotiation that the South African problem can finally be resolved.

Lastly, I am glad to say that while we all at the meeting regretted the absence of full agreement we nevertheless took the opportunity, as the Communique records, to renew our firm commitment to the future of the Commonwealth and to the aims and objectives which have guided it over the years.

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