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INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA  
INFO PRIORITY HARARE, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS  
INFO PRIORITY NAIROBI, TOKYO, PARIS, LUANDA

FROM SAFD

TALKS WITH CROCKER

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD 45 MINUTES OF TALKS WITH CROCKER  
ON THE AFTERNOON OF 1 SEPTEMBER. THESE FOLLOWED DISCUSSIONS  
AND LUNCH WITH FERGUSSON EARLIER IN THE DAY. FOLLOWING ARE  
THE MAIN POINTS.

2. PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT  
WE REMAINED SCEPTICAL WHETHER RECENT LETTERS FROM STATE  
PRESIDENT BOTHA TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT REAGAN  
SIGNIFIED A REAL SHIPT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION. CROCKER  
SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD NOT YET REPLIED BUT WOULD  
PROBABLY DO SO THIS WEEK. THE REPLY WOULD POINT TO THE NEED  
FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION ON A NUMBER

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OF ISSUES. THE AIM WOULD BE TO AVOID CLOSING DOORS. IT WOULD IN ANY CASE BE DIFFICULT TO DO SERIOUS BUSINESS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS UNTIL THE CURRENT SANCTIONS ROUND HAD BEEN COMPLETED. BUT (IN CONFIDENCE) SECRETARY SHULTZ WAS LIKELY TO PAY A VISIT TO THE REGION, INCLUDING SOUTH AFRICA, IN OCTOBER.

3. CROCKER ADDED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD UPPED THE LEVEL OF THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE ANC. SHULTZ HAD INDICATED THAT HE WAS READY TO SEE TAMBO. THE AMERICANS WERE NOT CHASING THE ANC BUT WANTED AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLORE THEIR POSITION. A MEETING WITH SHULTZ MIGHT CAUSE RIPPLES VIZ A VIZ THE SOUTH AFRICANS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HIMSELF HOPED TO SEE TAMBO LATER THIS MONTH. HE WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESS THE CASE AGAINST VIOLENCE AND FOR THE AFRICANS TO MAKE THE RUNNING ON AN EPG TYPE FORMULA (WHICH WOULD HAVE THE DOUBLE ADVANTAGE OF MAKING CLEAR PUBLICLY THAT THEY WERE NOT IRREVOCABLY COMMITTED TO VIOLENCE AND OF PUTTING THE SAG ON THE SPOT). CROCKER AGREED THAT THERE WAS A CASE FOR URGING THE ANC TO TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVE RATHER THAN JUST SIT AND WAIT.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE RANGE OF SOUTH AFRICANS HE HAD MET, INCLUDING FOR EXAMPLE THE HEAD OF THE BROEDERBOND, WHO WANTED PW BOTHA AND HIS SUPPORTERS TO MAKE A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT OF POSITION. BUT THERE WAS LITTLE SIGN OF A CHANGE OF HEART BY THE STATE PRESIDENT HIS FEELING WAS THAT EVEN IF THE ANC AGREED TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEMAND FOR A FORMULA COMMITTING THEM TO ABANDON RATHER THAN SUSPEND VIOLENCE, THIS WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH FOR PW. IT WAS NOT JUST A QUESTION OF SEMANTICS. THE RIGHT FORMULA COULD ONLY BE SERVED AS A BRIDGE ONCE THE WILL TO NEGOTIATE WAS THERE. HE THEREFORE WAS PERSONALLY VERY CAUTIOUS. WE WERE NOT IN ANY EVENT FREE AGENTS BECAUSE OF OUR PRESIDENCY OF THE EC. THERE WAS NOT MUCH ENTHUSIASM AMONG OUR PARTNERS FOR MORE EXPLORATION FOR THE SAKE OF EXPLORATION. EVENTS OF THE PAST NINE MONTHS HAD ENHANCED THE VIEW IN EUROPE THAT WE WERE IN FOR A LONG HAUL AND IT WAS BETTER TO TAKE THINGS IN SLOWER TEMPO.

5. CONGRESS. CROCKER BELIEVED THAT BY THE TIME OF THE SECRETARY

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OF STATE'S VISIT MR SHULTZ WOULD BE ABLE TO OFFER A CLEARER PICTURE OF HOW THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSED TO HANDLE THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL MESS. OF THE TWO OPTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN PUT TO THE PRESIDENT (THE WAY THINGS WERE GOING IN CONGRESS, A 'POCKET VETO' APPEARED OUT OF THE QUESTION), A FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER DID NOT APPEAR VIABLE. THE ALTERNATIVE WAS A PRESIDENTIAL VETO COMBINED WITH A STATEMENT OF WHAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PRESIDENT IN A REPACKAGED BILL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED OUR OWN LIKELY TIMETABLE: DISCUSSION AMONG EC FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THE INFORMAL WEEKEND AT BROCKET HALL ON 6/7 SEPTEMBER FOLLOWED BY A POLITICAL DECISION IN THE MARGINS OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL ON 15/16 SEPTEMBER. THE INDICATIONS WERE THAT OUR PARTNERS WOULD WANT TO HOLD TO THE HAGUE PACKAGE. CROCKER SAID THAT THIS WOULD FIT WELL: THE PRESIDENT WAS UNLIKELY TO HAVE TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT BEFORE 19/20 SEPTEMBER, AND IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE EUROPEANS HAD MEANWHILE MOVED FIRST SINCE THEIR POSITION WAS MORE MODERATE.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION. CROCKER SAID THAT AIR LINKS WERE REGARDED AS A MINOR THROW-AWAY ITEM. HE REALISED HOW DIFFICULT THIS ISSUE WAS FOR US, BUT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR ALL WESTERN COUNTRIES TO ADOPT PRECISELY THE SAME MEASURES. THE SENATE BILL WENT WELL BEYOND WHAT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ADMINISTRATION. THE AIM WOULD BE TO TRY TO REDUCE ITS SCOPE. VARIOUS IMPORT BANS WERE PARTICULARLY OBJECTIONABLE BECAUSE OF THEIR IN-DISCRIMINATE NATURE. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO ELIMINATE LAST MINUTE ADDITIONS SUCH AS TEXTILES AND AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS. THEY WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT COAL, LESS BECAUSE OF ITS IMPACT ON US/SA TRADE (THE AMERICANS IMPORTED VERY LITTLE SOUTH AFRICAN COAL) THAN BECAUSE OF ITS GLOBAL IMPACT ON SOUTH AFRICAN EMPLOYMENT AND EXPORT BASE. IF THE EUROPEANS COULD TAKE A DECISION SHORT OF THE FULL HAGUE LIST OF IMPORT BANS, THIS WOULD HELP THE ADMINISTRATION GREATLY. A BAN ON COAL IMPORTS WOULD ALSO CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR JAPAN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT IT MOST

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UNLIKELY THAT ANYTHING COULD BE DONE TO AVERT AN EC BAN ON COAL IMPORTS. HE ASKED ABOUT THE INCLUSION OF URANIUM (AND EXTENSION OF THE BAN TO NAMIBIA) IN THE CONGRESSIONAL BILLS. CROCKER INDICATED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD TRY TO HAVE BOTH PUT RIGHT.

7. ARMS EMBARGO. WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT PROCEEDINGS IN THE ARMS EMBARGO COMMITTEE, CROCKER SAID THAT THERE APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN UNCERTAINTY ON BOTH SIDES WHETHER THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH POSITIONS WERE SOLIDLY TOGETHER. THE ANSWER WAS THAT WE WERE. THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTED THE RESTRICTIVE BRITISH POSITION ON THE ARMS EMBARGO COMMITTEE AND HAD HOPED THERE WOULD BE NO NEGOTIATION ON THE WORKING PAPER. HOWEVER, THE TEXT APPEARED TO HAVE IMPROVED BY OSMOSIS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IF THE UK/US VETOED A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH SPELT OUT WHAT EVERYONE ELSE THOUGHT WAS IMPLICIT IN THE ARMS EMBARGO IT COULD BE VERY EMBARRASSING. IT THEREFORE APPEARED IN OUR INTEREST TO TRY TO IMPROVE THE TEXT SO AS TO MAINTAIN AN ELEMENT OF CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY. WE AND THE AMERICANS SHARE THE SAME OBJECTIVES, BUT IT LOOKED AS THOUGH THINGS HAD PASSED THE POINT OF EASY VETO. (FERGUSON ADDED THAT WE CONTINUED HOWEVER TO HAVE MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4 OF THE PRESENT WORKING PAPER.) CROCKER SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE US MISSION, WHICH WERE VERY RESTRICTIVE. SO FAR, THE ISSUE HAD NOT BEEN CONSIDERED ABOVE HIS LEVEL.

8. VOLUNTARY RESOLUTION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT IF WE WERE FACED WITH A RERUN OF SCR 569 THERE MIGHT BE SOME ADVANTAGE IN ACQUIESCING IN A FURTHER VOLUNTARY RESOLUTION, INSOFAR AS IT WAS BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO VETO MANDATORY RESOLUTIONS WHICH INCORPORATED MEASURES WHICH WE WERE ALREADY IMPLEMENTING. CROCKER AGREED THAT SCR 569 CONSTITUTED A PRECEDENT. HE ASKED WHETHER WE HAD DETECTED ANY EVIDENCE OF REASON TO EXPECT HELP FROM THE FRENCH. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THEIR POSITION WAS ENIGMATIC. SCHIRAC HAD SPOKEN ROBUSTLY AGAINST SANCTIONS. BUT THE SCHIRAC/MITTERRAND DOUBLE ACT AT THE HAGUE HAD BEEN VERY IMPRECISE AND OUR SUBSEQUENT



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IMPRESSION HAD BEEN THAT RAIMOND WAS REINING BACK THE FRENCH POSITION FROM SCHIRAC TOWARDS MITTERRAND. FERGUSON SUGGESTED THAT THE FRENCH WERE TRYING TO PLAY BOTH ENDS AGAINST THE MIDDLE, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT HAD BECOME CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO DOMESTIC ADVANTAGE IN STICKING TO THE SCHIRAC LINE.

9. OTHER MATTERS. CROCKER SAID THAT IF AND WHEN THE PRESIDENT VETOED WHATEVER BILL EMERGED FROM CONGRESS HE EXPECTED THE STATEMENT TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING FURTHER ELEMENTS:

A) THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A NEW AMBASSADOR (PERKINS, AS ADVERTISED IN THE PRESS, ASSUMING AGREEMENT WAS FORTHCOMING) TO SOUTH AFRICA.

B) A CHALLENGE TO CONGRESS TO HELP BY PROVIDING FUNDS (AT PRESENT UNAVAILABLE) TO DEVELOP REGIONAL TRANSPORT LINKS IN SOUTH AFRICA, MAINLY VIA MOZAMBIQUE. THE AID DIRECTOR HAD RETURNED FROM THE AREA WITH NEW IDEAS.

ON B), THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE HAD COMMITTED FUNDS BUT SECURITY WAS A PROBLEM. HIS CONCLUSION WAS THAT UNLESS THE SOUTH AFRICANS CURTAILED THE ACTIVITIES OF RENAMO OR PLS DEFENCES IMPROVED, THE WEST HAD REACHED THE LIMIT OF WHAT IT COULD DO TO HELP. CROCKER SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE THAT SECURITY WAS THE ONLY PROBLEM. THERE WAS ALSO A NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS. HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE AN INJECTION OF PRIVATE MONEY (GENERAL MOTORS WERE TALKING ABOUT MOVING FROM PORT ELIZABETH TO BEIRA).

10. FOR INFORMATION ADDRESSEES. THE ABOVE IS STRICTLY FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION.

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