

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30)

PS

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MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

HD/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

HD/DEF D

HD/NEWS D

HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF

MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60

RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 ~~DOWNING ST~~
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

PS/CHANCELLOR)
SIR K COUZENS)
MR LITTLER)
MR HAWTIN) TREASURY
MR PERETZ)
MR ILETT)
MR McINTYRE)

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE

MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE

MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKM IS NEW YORK 300046Z APR 82-

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 606 DATED 29 APRIL 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

FALKLAND ISLANDS AT THE UN

1. I HAVE SPENT MOST OF THE DAY IN THE COMPANY OF ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THERE IS AN ATMOSPHERE AMONGST THEM OF GREAT TENSION AND EXPECTATION EG OF A DRAMATIC MILITARY MOVE BY US ANY DAY NOW, BUT NO SIGN THAT ANY OF THEM ARE CONTEMPLATING CALLING THE COUNCIL. THIS HESITATION MAY DISAPPEAR IF HAIG ANNOUNCES FAILURE AT 10 AM NEW YORK TIME TOMORROW (30 APRIL), HIS ANNOUNCEMENT COINCIDING WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TEZ. COSTA MENDEZ IS NOW IN NEW YORK AND EITHER HE (ACTING DIRECTLY OR THROUGH PANAMA) OR A DO-GOODER MIGHT RUSH TO THE COUNCIL WITH A RESOLUTION CALLING ON US TO HALT ALL MILITARY PREPARATIONS WHILE FRESH NEGOTIATING AVENUES WERE OPENED UP. IN A VERY PRIVATE CONVERSATION, PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOLD ME TODAY THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD CALL THE COUNCIL, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD BACK THE ARGENTINES ONE HUNDRED PER CENT. HE THOUGHT THAT THE LATINS (ARGENTINA OR PANAMA) WERE THE MOST

ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD BACK THE ARGENTINES ONE HUNDRED PER CENT. HE THOUGHT THAT THE LATIN (ARGENTINA OR PANAMA) WERE THE MOST LIKELY TO DO SO. TO SUM UP, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO JUDGE ACCURATELY WHETHER THE NEW SITUATION TOMORROW WILL TRIGGER OFF ACTION BY SOMEONE ELSE IN THE COUNCIL. IF I HAD TO LAY ODDS, I WOULD PUT THEM AT ABOUT SIX TO FOUR AGAINST, UNLESS OF COURSE THERE IS A MAJOR MILITARY INCIDENT (LATEST INFORMATION, AFTER THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED IS THAT THE ARGENTINES DO NOT INTEND TO CALL THE COUNCIL TOMORROW AND THAT COSTA MENDEZ WILL LEAVE NEW YORK TOMORROW EVENING)

2. MY VIEW REMAINS THAT, ONCE WE GET BACK IN THE COUNCIL THERE WILL BE NO WAY OF AVOIDING AN UNACCEPTABLE CALL ON US TO HALT MILITARY PREPARATIONS COMBINED WITH EG GOOD OFFICES ETC. THIS WOULD MEAN A VETO. HENCE, MY STRONG INCLINATION IS FOR US TO CONTINUE TO SWEAT IT OUT AS WE HAVE SUCCESSFULLY DONE NOW FOR NEARLY FOUR WEEKS.

3. HAVING SAID THAT, I AM CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT THERE WILL BE A DIPLOMATIC VACUUM IF HAIG ANNOUNCES FAILURE TOMORROW, AND I HEARD ENOUGH OF TODAY'S HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATE ON A LIVE RELAY IN BIS TO APPRECIATE THAT WE ARE UNDER SOME PRESSURE TO RETAIN THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE, PARTICULARLY IN THE UN (PRECISELY THE PROBLEM OVER WHICH WE HAVE BEEN RACKING OUR BRAINS SO FAR DURING THE PAST FEW WEEKS).

4. IF WE ARE TO BE SEEN TO BE MAINTAINING THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE HERE (PURELY WITH PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION IN MIND AND WITH NO EXPECTATION OF PRODUCING RESULTS) THERE ARE ONLY TWO POSSIBILITIES WHICH I CAN SEE.

5. FIRST, I COULD ASK TO BE INSTRUCTED TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (AND LET THIS BE KNOWN) IN ORDER TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF HIS PLAYING A USEFUL ROLE IN TRYING TO SUCCEED WHERE HAIG HAD FAILED. THIS WOULD BUY TIME AND MIGHT DEFUSE THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL DO-GOODERS HERE. BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD FALL INTO THE TRAP. HE AND URQUHART HAVE BEEN SEVERELY BRUISED BY THE BRITISH PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY CONTROVERSY OVER HIS APPEAL A FEW DAYS AGO. THEY HAVE BOTH TOLD ME THAT THEY REALISE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN DRAGGED INTO BRITISH DOMESTIC POLITICS. I AM PRETTY SURE THAT BOTH OF THEM WOULD SUSPECT (RIGHTLY) THAT WE WERE CYNICALLY BUYING TIME IN ORDER TO CONTINUE OUR MILITARY PREPARATIONS WITHOUT BEING BADGERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL; AND THAT WE WERE USING THEM AS TOOLS.

I THEREFORE RAISE THIS POSSIBILITY ONLY TO REJECT IT.

6. THE SECOND OPTION WOULD BE FOR ME TO ASK, SAY, ON 30 APRIL OR OVER THE WEEKEND FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 3 MAY. THIS WOULD KEEP US THE INITIATIVE FOR THE TIME BEING.

I WOULD OPEN THE DEBATE WITH A STATEMENT DELIBERATELY CALCULATED TO BRING AS MANY SPEAKERS TO THE TABLE AS POSSIBLE. I WOULD NOT

TO BRING AS MANY SPEAKERS TO THE TABLE AS POSSIBLE. I WOULD NOT HAVE MUCH DIFFICULTY IN SMOKING OUT A NUMBER OF LATIN AMERICANS, AS WELL AS SOME OF THE NASTIES. I COULD ALSO GET A NUMBER OF OUR SUPPORTERS TO SPEAK. THIS COULD MEAN A DEBATE LASTING SOME DAYS. AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE, I WOULD CIRCULATE A DRAFT RESOLUTION (WITHOUT TRYING TO BULLDOZE IT TO AN IMMEDIATE VOTE) OMITTING ANY CALL ON US TO HALT MILITARY PREPARATIONS, BUT CALLING ON ARGENTINA TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502 BY WITHDRAWING FROM THE ISLANDS, AND PERHAPS CALLING ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO HELP TO BRING ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502, PERHAPS WITH A SHORT TIME LIMIT. I COULD FILL THE DRAFT WITH VERBIAGE IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON IT TOOK AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE. IN THE END, I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT WE WOULD BE DRIVEN INTO THE CORNER OF HAVING TO VETO (PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE), BUT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO BUY A WEEK AND WE WOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN TO HAVE MAINTAINED THE INITIATIVE.

7. BUT THE RISKS OF THIS COURSE WOULD BE APPALLING, AND THE DISADVANTAGES GREAT. I COULD BY NO MEANS GUARANTEE THAT I COULD MAINTAIN CONTROL OF EVENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE ARGENTINES/RUSSIANS/PANAMANIAN HAD ANY SENSE (THIS IS WHAT I WOULD DO IN THEIR PLACE) THEY WOULD SLAP DOWN AN IMMEDIATE RESOLUTION AT THE OUTSET SIMPLY CALLING ON US TO HALT ALL MILITARY PREPARATIONS, THEIR ARGUMENT BEING THAT "THIS WAS AN ESSENTIAL STEP TO TAKE WHILE THE COUNCIL GAVE FULL CONSIDERATION TO THE IMPORTANT PROPOSALS WHICH I HAD ADVANCED" THIS PLOY WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY GET MORE THAN NINE VOTES AND WE WOULD HAVE PRECIPITATED OUR OWN VETO. EVEN IF WE SUCCEEDED IN RETAINING CONTROL AND THEREBY GAINED A WEEK, IT WOULD BE CLEAR TO ALL THE UN PUNDITS HERE THAT WE WERE BUYING TIME AND WERE NOT SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN OBTAINING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE UN. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT WE WOULD FORFEIT THE ADVANTAGE WE AT PRESENT HAVE OF HAVING BEEN SEEN TO PLAY THINGS CORRECTLY FROM THE BEGINNING. EVEN TODAY MANY DELEGATIONS HAVE TOLD ME THAT OUR RECORD HERE IS STILL PERFECT - THE CONSCIENTIOUS NOTIFICATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 51, THE POLITE BUT FIRM RESPONSES TO THE ARGENTINE LETTERS AND SO ON.

8. FROM MY POINT OF VIEW THEREFORE, I WOULD MUCH PREFER TO CARRY ON AS SUGGESTED IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE AND TO FIGHT AS GOOD A DEFENSIVE BATTLE AS I CAN IF AND WHEN I HAVE TO. BUT, IF THE DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS ARE IN YOUR JUDGEMENT OVERRIDING, I THINK THAT PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE IS THE ONLY WAY TO PROCEED.

PARSONS