

Canada

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JD



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 June, 1980.

Dear Gange,

Call by Mr. Trudeau

As you know, the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Pierre Trudeau, called on the Prime Minister yesterday. I enclose a copy of the record of their discussion. I should be grateful if that part of the record recording the discussion about the Venice Summit could be given particularly limited distribution.

I am sending copies of this letter and of the complete record to David Wright (Cabinet Office); with a copy of that part of the record dealing with the Patriation of the Constitution to Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department), and with a copy of that part dealing with Anglo-Canadian Air Talks to Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade).

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Subject,

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*cc Sir M. Callinor
Sir R. Armstrong*

Canada.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. PIERRE TRUDEAU, PRIME MINISTER
OF CANADA - 11.30 AM, 25 JUNE 1980

Present:

Prime Minister
Mr. Nicholas Ridley
Sir John Ford
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander
Mr. B.R. Berry

*Copied to Mackay
also (1) Canada: UK/Canada
relations - May 74.
(2) Econ PSD (Summer)
Policy.*

Mr. Pierre Trudeau
Mrs. Jean Wadds
Mr. H. Breau
Mr. P.M. Pitfield
Mr. K. Goldschlag
Mr. L.A.H. Smith
Mr. R. Fowler

Introduction

The Prime Minister welcomed Mr. Trudeau and said it was good of him to find time to call in before his return to Canada. The Prime Minister and Mr. Trudeau agreed that they would discuss any bilateral questions first, before going on to more general questions.

Patriation of the Constitution

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Trudeau whether the British Government was going to have to enact legislation or not. Mr. Trudeau replied that, as the Prime Minister had got straight to the point, he would try and answer her similarly. He said that he could not give a time as this would depend on work throughout the summer and the results of the conference scheduled for September. If remarkable progress had been made by then, and a unanimous decision had been reached - which, he said, was unlikely - they might decide to work on or to set a deadline of spring or early summer next year. If things did not go well, for example if there were further disagreements with Mr. Levesque, there might be more delay.

Mr. Trudeau said that he could not, at this moment, predict any course of action. But it was not inconceivable that the Canadians would be taking steps towards patriation. He said that he had given a clear undertaking to Quebec and to the other

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provincial premiers to unblock the log jam. They had to move on. He did not wish to give the Quebeckers and others the opportunity to say that he could not obtain any agreement, that they would be stuck for another five years with separatist tendencies or that there were reasons for holding another Referendum. Mr. Trudeau said he was determined on movement, and sooner or later the British North America Act would have to be amended.

Mr. Ridley said that in his view HMG, if asked, would have no choice but to enact the required legislation. Mr. Trudeau asked whether the Minister was hinting that this was what Britain would like to do. The Prime Minister said that HMG did not want to be accused of interfering in any way. HMG could help; and if, for example, queues of Indians knocked on the door of No.10, the answer would be that it was for Canada to decide her future and not HMG. It would of course make it easier for HMG if Canada was united in its approach. Mr. Trudeau replied that HMG would be accused of interfering whichever way things went: as for unanimity, he said that that could be forgotten. The provinces would want to be heard and one or more of them would say they were not getting what they wanted.

The Prime Minister said that her line would be that whether or not the request was with the agreement of all the provinces, a request to patriate would be agreed if it was the wish of the Government of Canada. Mr. Trudeau agreed and expressed the view that HMG would have no choice in the matter. The Prime Minister reiterated that she hoped that she would not have masses of people lobbying in front of No.10. Mr. Trudeau said that he did not want to cause the UK any problems - he would try to make things as easy as possible. He meant to unite Canadians if possible. But he recognised that he might in fact make things worse. He could foresee that Quebec, and perhaps other provinces, would not go along with what he wanted. The greater the degree of support he got the less time it would take to get the measures agreed.

Mr. Ridley pointed out that it was important to get it across in Canada that HMG had no intention of interfering in what was

/Canada's

Canada's internal affair. If protest groups lobbied and publicity was given to them, this should not be misinterpreted as interference. The Prime Minister reiterated that she could not see groups, Indians or others; it was not a matter for her, but for Canada, although she would not wish to be accused of being totally rigid.

Mr. Trudeau agreed that this was the right attitude. If provinces tried to get access to HMG, they had no locus standi. It was important not to encourage speculation about what would happen in this or that situation. He intended to proceed on the basis that unanimity would be achieved. The Prime Minister said that she would avoid answering hypothetical questions about what might happen if the request for patriation was not unanimous. If there were any questions, the answer would be that HMG had not been approached about the problem; that this was a matter for the elected Government of Canada; and that it was apparent the Canadian Prime Minister was trying to achieve consensus in his country on the subject.

Anglo/Canadian Air Talks

Mr. Ridley said that the talks in Ottawa last week, in which HMG had been negotiating with the Canadians over Air Canada's monopoly on air services into Western Canada, had broken down again. The UK negotiators had been withdrawn at the weekend of 21/22 June. HMG hoped that the two sides could get together again soon. Mr. Trudeau said he was unaware of the breakdown. Sir John Ford described the background to the problem since Mr. Trudeau and his colleagues appeared to be unfamiliar with the details.

The Prime Minister said it was important that negotiations should be restarted in the interests of freer trade. Mr. Trudeau said that he would take this message home with him. He was not really conscious of the problem. He wondered whether letting British Airways into the West Coast would open the floodgates for other airlines. He undertook to familiarise himself with the issues and either get the talks restarted or explain, if positions were too

far apart, why the Canadians did not feel able to continue. It was agreed that, in principle, both sides would look for ways to re-open the talks as soon as possible.

Venice Summit

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Trudeau for his impressions. Mr. Trudeau said he was pleased and a bit surprised by the leaders' willingness to discuss political issues. Economic talks were important and had in the past helped to limit disarray among the participants in tackling economic problems. Perhaps the political talks would have the same result. Although each country had different answers to questions such as the Olympics, at least airing the difficulties avoided the differences becoming unmanageable. No-one had considered the break-up of the alliance. Discussion of the post-Afghanistan situation made it less likely that divergent solutions to the problem would be adopted. His general impression was good. Was the Prime Minister more pessimistic?

The Prime Minister said that she and Herr Schmidt had been keen to have the political discussion. For the first time since the Forties a totally independent country had been invaded by Russia. Western strategy post-Afghanistan had been strengthened at Venice. The pressure needed to be kept up on the non-aligned countries. This had been agreed.

But the Heads of Government had not got down to as much detail as she would have liked. What could be done if, for example, Pakistan or Turkey or Saudi Arabia fell apart? The world was full of trouble spots. There were two world ideologies and the free world should be putting its case much more strongly. It was clear that the detailed planning and discussion of how to manage world crises could not be carried out in the atmosphere of a Venice Summit, when the leaders were hounded all the time by journalists etc. She was disappointed that they had not been able to get to grips with details, but perhaps in the circumstances not much more could have been done. There was always the danger of leaks and misinformation.

/Mr. Trudeau

Mr. Trudeau said he fully agreed and suggested that in future the seven Heads of Government might be better served if there were no Communique but only a statement from the Chair endorsed by the other participants. The Prime Minister said that next time she would prefer not to have a Communique previously prepared by Personal Representatives. She and the other Heads of Government had been imprisoned by the draft Communique. On her return to this country she had been pilloried on an issue (the doubling of coal production by 1990) which, although in the Communique, had never been mentioned by the Heads of Government.

Mr. Trudeau said he agreed with all the Prime Minister's views. In the event that he chaired the next meeting he would be seeking to change the approach adopted at the summit and to find different ways of preparing the ground. He thought that more bilaterals were needed. Perhaps he or his Personal Representative could meet with each of the other participants in advance. The aim would be to establish what economic and political subjects seemed ripe for discussion. If a limited number of topics - say four or five - could be identified; a consensus achieved on what sort of outcome could be expected e.g. whether action was envisaged or not; and a timetable established in advance, then a fruitful discussion should be possible. Everyone in Venice had seemed willing to envisage improved procedures. The Prime Minister expressed some scepticism about what would be achieved but agreed that the effort should be made. The best discussions were those which were limited to the seven Heads of Government. Public cover for presentation would be needed to ensure that details of the real talks did not leak. Mr. Trudeau said that next year might be easier as by that time the various impending national elections would have been got out of the way.

The Prime Minister said that it was important for people to realise crises had been solved during the past six months. Cautious optimism, as Mr. Trudeau had said in Venice, was the right note to strike. The problems of the Communist World were far worse than was generally recognised. Mr. Trudeau commented on the close partnership between Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard that had been in evidence in Venice. For obvious historical reasons this was in general to be welcomed. But it was important that it should not become too

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strong, e.g. after the forthcoming elections. The other participants would not welcome being sidelined. Agreeing, the Prime Minister commented on the helpful stance being adopted at present by the Japanese Government. She wondered whether the time was approaching when the question of an increase in Japanese defence spending might be broached.

As the meeting was ending Mr. Trudeau remarked that he had been very glad to note in Venice the importance which the Prime Minister obviously attached to the question of relations with the developing countries.

The discussion ended at 12.50.

Handwritten signature

25 June 1980