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1)

SECRET AND PERSONAL

TELE-LETTER

GRPS 220

TO

FCO

SECRET AND PERSONAL

DATE

: 29 DECEMBER 198ø

FOLLOWING FOR :

ROBIN FEARN, SOUTH AMERICA DEP, FCO

FROM

ANTHONY WILLIAMS, BRITISH EMBASSY, BUENOS AIRES

I WOULD RATHER GIVE A SUBSTANTIVE ANSWER TO FCO TELNO 25% AFTER I GET BACK FROM THE FALKLANDS ON 3 JANUARY. MEANWHILE, HOWEVER, I SHOULD PERHAPS EMPHASISE MY INTERPRETATION OF CAVANDOLI, THAT HE SEES HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH MR RIDLEY AS ONE OF ADULT AND REALISTIC COOPERATION OVER A DIFFICULT COMMON PROBLEM INSTEAD OF RHITORICAL AND STERILE CONFRONTATION. IF ISLANDER REACTION IS TOO NEGATIVE TO ALLOW OF AT LEAST A FIRST NEGOTIATING ROUND BEFORE THE END OF MARCH, HIS INSTINCT WILL, I THINK, BE TO SEEK AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT ON HOW HE AND MR RIDLEY CAN COORDINATE THE BEST DAMAGE AVOIDANCE POSSIBLE WITHIN THEIR TWO CONSTITUENCIES. THIS IS WHAT HE SUGGESTED THE LAST TIME ROUND, EARLIER THIS MONTH, AND HE WAS VERY HELPFUL AND UNDERSTANDING WHEN HE COULD NOT HAVE WHAT OF REACHE WABTED. A DOOR-SLAMMING NEGATIVE FROM THE ISLANDERS WHICH WOULD DOUBTLESS BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE WOULD MAKE HIS POSITION IN SUCH A TIME ROUND MUCH TRICKIER AND HIS DESIRE TO COORDINATE ALL THE STRONGER. I AM NOT

WHETHER A FORMAL MEETING BEFORE THE END OF MARCH WOULD, IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, BE THE BEST FORMULA. I AM CLEAR HOWEVER THAT WE SHOULD CONSULT WITH CAVANDOLI ON WHAT TO DO AND TRY TO MEET HIM HALFWAY IF POSSIBLE, RATHER THAN TAKE A DECISION AND TELL HIM. MAY I ALSO, INCIDENTALLY, SUGGEST THAT THIS CLASSIFICATION SUFFICES FOR WHAT WE ARE NOW DISCUSSING? GREETINGS.

SIGNED ANTHONY WILLIAMS

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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FM FCO 221800Z DEC 80
TO PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 250 OF 2

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 250 OF 22 DECEMBER

FROM FEARN

MY TEL NO 137 TO PORT STANLEY: FUTURE TACTICS

- 1. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT COUNCILLORS' RESPONSE WILL BE NEGATIVE TO LEASEBACK WE NEED TO CONSIDER HOW TO PLAY THE HAND WITH THE ARGENTINES. THERE MUST CLEARLY BE ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS (WITH ISLANDERS PRESENT). BUT, GIVEN THAT WE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE NO CLEAR NEGOTIATING MANDATE, WE MUST LOOK AT THE ALTERNATIVES ON TIMING.
- 2. BOTH PASTOR AND CAVANDOLI ARE CLEARLY ANXIOUS, AND PERHAPS UNDER INTERNAL PRESSURE, TO JUSTIFY THE APPARENT LACK OF ACTION BY HAVING A FORMAL ROUND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN THE NEW YEAR (PARA 2 OF MY TEL NO 249). WE DO NOT WANT TO SOUR THE RELATIONSHIP ESTABLISHED. A ROUND IN LATE FEBRUARY/EARLY MARCH WOULD ALLOW US TO SOFTEN THE BLOW OF A NEGATIVE RESPONSE: AND TO OBTAIN THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION (AND OF THE JUNTA) TO CONVINCE THEIR SUCCESSORS OF OUR GOOD FAITH. IT COULD ALSO HELP TO BRING HOME TO THE ISLANDERS THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE NEGOTIATING REALITIES. BUT THERE WOULD BE DISADVANTAGES. IT COULD LEAVE US EMPTY-HANDED WITH THE NEW ADMINISTRATION. PRESENTATIONALLY, FOLLOWING A NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM THE ISLANDERS, TO MOVE QUICKLY TO FURTHER TALKS IN THE LAST DAYS OF A LAME DUCK GOVERNMENT MIGHT ALSO LEAD TO MISUNDERSTAND-ING BOTH HERE AND IN THE ISLANDS AND FEED SUSPICIONS OF COLLUSION.
- 3. THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO EXPLAIN THE PRESENTATIONAL DIFFICULTIES TO CAVANDOLI AND TO REAFFIRM PUBLICLY IN THE NEW YEAR OUR WILLINGNESS TO HOLD A ROUND OF TALKS WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT ONCE IT HAD SETTLED IN. THESE MIGHT TAKE THE FORM OF STOCKTAKING AFTER MR RIDLEY'S CONSULTATIONS WITH THE

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ISLANDERS AND AN EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD. THE ADVANTAGES WOULD BE TO KEEP THE BALL IN PLAY LONGER, TO ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEW TEAM AND TO DETER THE LATTER FROM TAKING A HARD-LINE POLICY. THE DISADVANTAGE MIGHT BE THAT THIS MIGHT SEEM A REBUFF TO CAVANDOLI AND MAKE HIS POSITION MORE DIFFICULT.

4. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ADVICE, BEARING IN MIND BOTH RELATIONS WITH PRESENT TEAM AND NEED TO GET IN WITH NEW ONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER MARCH. IF YOUR ADVICE IS FOR A MEETING WITH CAVANDOLI, GRATEFUL FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESSURES ON HIM (PARA 3 OF MY TEL NO 249), NND OF THE JUNTA'S ABILITY TO OBLIGE HIS SUCCESSOR TO FOLLOW THE SAME LINE IN NEGOTIATIONS.

CARRINGTON

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