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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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February 20, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

1. Meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister. Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir and I had a very productive meeting and lunch today. I emphasized your and my friendship for Israel and our desire for the closest cooperation, consultation and coordination with Israel.

As expected, Shamir indicated concern over the current lull in the autonomy negotiations and urged us to revive them as quickly as possible, in particular through the appointment of a new special negotiator. I assured Shamir of our commitment but stressed the need to move cautiously and be sure of our game plan before deciding about a new negotiator. Shamir also raised the issue of a visit to Washington by Prime Minister Begin. I explained your desire to avoid any appearance of interference in the Israeli electoral process. Shamir contended that if Begin were not invited, a visit by Sadat alone in June would be seen in Israel as a direct slap at Begin. He asked that if you planned to invite Sadat and the new Israeli Prime Minister, both invitations should be for after the June 30 elections. I assured Shamir that we will bear this carefully in mind.

On the Sinai negotiations, Shamir made clear that Israel prefers a military force that is largely or entirely American to carry out the provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. He suggested that the US force in Sinai might serve the dual purpose of peacekeeping there while also being an element of an American military presence in the Middle East; it could use the modern Israeli bases in the Sinai. I explained that the realities of the situation would probably require U.S. participation that will be at least partially military and that we could see real strategic benefits from such a result. I cautioned Shamir, however, that our consultations on this point should be kept in strict confidentiality and that leaks could cause serious embarrassment to President Sadat. I made clear we understood the importance of this issue to Israel and to the successful implementation of the Israeli-Egyptian treaty.

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I raised the F-15 enhancement package for Saudi Arabia, noting a final decision had not yet been made, but said it was imminent in view of the urgency of the situation. We were now consulting with our Israeli friends and preparing to consult with the Congress. Until we got this issue behind us with Saudi Arabia, we would be unable to proceed with strategic plans for the area that would also be of great benefit to Israel. I outlined for Shamir the additional assistance that we would be prepared to extend. We did not expect the Israelis to rejoice at the way we were coming out on this, but did expect them to understand the considerations that had led us to it, and hoped they would not make unnecessary difficulties for us in Congress. Shamir said he could not be happy about a decision along these lines, and would have to consult Begin about it. I stressed the urgency of receiving a response on the F-15 issue and expressed our hope to hear from him prior to his meeting with you on Tuesday.

I also stressed that we had, with great difficulty in the face of government-wide budget cutting, preserved the present level of economic and military assistance for Israel. Shamir noted Israel's deepening economic problems and Ambassador Evron alluded to the need for more grant aid. (S)

2. U.S. Mission on El Salvador. Larry Eagleburger will return from his European briefing tour tomorrow. Overall, the mission met our objectives. The Belgian Foreign Minister has already issued a strong condemnation of the clandestine arms supply, and a message to him will be delivered shortly. Signs are also encouraging in West Germany where the Aid Minister had his "ears pulled" by Schmidt for publicly criticizing our Salvador policy.

In summary, the Eagleburger mission has:

- convinced our interlocutors of Soviet bloc complicity;
- made apparent the East-West dimension;
- made clear our intentions to deal firmly with Cuba,
and
- shown our willingness to consult and share information.

On the negative side however:

- most European governments do not want to identify with the Salvadoran government;
- we remain far behind in the propaganda war.

The next steps in El Salvador will be the subject of an NSC meeting next week. (S)

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3. Polish Ambassador's Call. Polish Ambassador Spasowski called on Walt Stoessel today to inform us of the composition of the new Polish government and assure us of the Polish desire for continuity in our relations. Speaking personally, he expressed deep gratitude for the position taken by the US Government which he said had been of great importance to Poland in a difficult time. Stoessel told him that we would take a forthcoming position at the Paris creditors' meeting next week. (We will be informing you by a separate memo of our proposed strategy for that meeting.)

In response to a query by Spasowski, Stoessel said we would very much welcome a visit by First Deputy Prime Minister Jaqielski (an economic specialist) and would work out a good substantive program. You may wish to consider receiving Jaqielski at the White House. (S)

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

February 21, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's evening Report of
February 19, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

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3/8/83

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FROM: RICHARD ALLEN
TO: MIL AIDE OFFICER FOR
THE PRESIDENT
RANCH COMCEN, CA

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