SECRET

March 12, 1981

THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

1. Warsaw Pact Exercise "Soyuz '81". We lack precise information on the size of next week's Soyuz '81 military exercise affecting Poland. It is not clear whether a maneuver exceeding 25,000 troops will take place, which would require notification under the CSCE Final Act. We want to impress upon the Soviets that their maneuver is itself a cause of increased tension. Our embassy in Moscow will make a bilateral demarche, pointing out that a failure by the Soviet Union and its Allies to notify Soyuz '81 would arouse great concern -- especially because of the tense Polish situation. (C)

2. Pakistan. On Tuesday, Under Secretary Stoessel chaired a senior interdepartmental meeting on Pakistan, with whom we are anxious to establish a new security relationship. The problem is the magnitude of the resources we should supply in FY 82 and beyond. We are preparing a paper for NSC consideration next week. (C)

- 3. Meeting with Senator Tower. Senator John Tower briefed me today in greater depth on his recent trip abroad. He feels that our allies thirst for new direction. Tower observed that virtually every government he visited, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, said that American security assistance had been providing "too little too late." Strongly supportive of our new budget initiatives in this area, Tower will try to reach agreement with Chuck Percy for a joint referral of these initiatives to the Armed Services Committee and Foreign Relations, hopefully strengthening our political position. (S)
- Luncheon with NATO Ambassadors. In a luncheon discussion today with NATO Ambassadors, we noted the striking convergence of allied opinion as revealed in recent talks with leaders from France, Britain, Germany and Canada. The allies were not complacent about the USSR; all wanted to strengthen our defense capabilities; all wanted arms control on the basis of such strength. The Ambassadors were also told of this Administration's support for NATO's 1979 decision to deploy long-range theater nuclear systems, and to negotiate with the USSR on the theater nuclear issue. SALT talks with the Soviets, however, were further off and should be approached on the basis of greater U.S. capabilities. On El Salvador, our allies recognized the need to prevent external aggression in this hemisphere. We also agreed that a political solution leading to free elections, dominated by neither left nor right, is the solution we seek. (C)

RDS 2/3 3/12/01 (HAIG, Alexander M., Jr.)



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The Pasident has seen____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET ATTACHMENT

March 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT:

Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of March 12, 1981.

cc: The Vice President

Ed Meese James Baker

SECRET ATTACHMENT