

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

April 28, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

1. Testimony Before 'Doc' Long's Foreign Operations Subcommittee. My testimony initiated the Subcommittee's consideration of the FY '82 Foreign Assistance Bill. Questioning ranged over general foreign policy issues and was critical of the decision to lift the Soviet grain embargo, events in El Salvador and the proposed Saudi arms sale. (C)

2. Japan's Reaction to Embargo Decision. Press reports indicate Prime Minister Suzuki has been very critical of our "failure" to consult with Japan prior to reaching the decision to lift the grain embargo. He reportedly said that Japan will now reassess its general position on sanctions. We are instructing Ambassador Mansfield to object vigorously to the statements attributed to the Prime Minister. He will restate points already made to the Japanese--that we will maintain our other sanctions against the Soviets and will continue to press for strict control of technology transfer through the COCOM mechanism. We are making the same strong demarche to the Japanese here. (C)

3. Israeli Military Actions in Lebanon. Today, Israeli aircraft moved deep into Lebanon and shot down two Syrian helicopters. This is a clear Israeli signal to the Syrians not to proceed with their seizure of a strategic area from which they can militarily dominate the Lebanese Christian heartland. We have undertaken a major diplomatic effort to get the Syrians to return to the status quo ante; several governments have joined us. The Israeli actions could provoke Syrian countermoves, however, and we are encouraging the Israelis to behave cautiously. We have established a task force to watch the situation. (SECRET/EXDIS)

4. Allies and TNF. In a meeting with Walt Stoessel, the British, French and German Ambassadors urged us to support positive TNF language at next week's NATO Ministerial. The group emphasized that the talks should be within a SALT framework, a point on which the French were especially firm. The German said that once the process of talks started, the West could stick firmly to its position on deployment. The European public could accept interminable talks, but could not accept an unwillingness to negotiate. Stoessel replied that we would take their views into account, but that the Europeans must also recognize that the Soviet threat has grown and must be countered, and that the NATO communique must reflect this. (S)

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

RDS 2/3 4/28/01 (HAIG, Alexander M., Jr.)

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BY C.Y. NARA DATE 2/3/11

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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WJ

SECRET/EXDIS ATTACHMENT

April 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report for April 28, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker
Michael Deaver

SECRET/EXDIS ATTACHMENT

RW
3/11/83