
THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From



to discuss future cooperation. In Namibia, Bill will talk with leaders of several of the political parties. The stop in Zimbabwe, including a meeting with Mugabe, will show our interest in black Africa. (C)

French Concerns About Southern Africa. The French Ambassador told Walt Stoessel today at a Quadripartite lunch that the new French Government was debating the wisdom of further participation in the Namibia Contact Group. are very concerned by the content of the recent leaks on U.S. policy. The Ambassador asked for a commitment that the U.S. would consult with the Contact Group before making a further approach to Pretoria. He indicated that the French particularly if they felt we were not being forthcoming on consultations - might drop out of the Contact Group. The German Charge feared that this could lead the wobbly Canadians -and then eventually his own government--to question their participation as well. We intend to tell the French that we will brief Foreign Minister Cheysson in detail on our views concerning the next steps on Namibia and any consultations with South Africa. Moreover, we shall reiterate that the Contact Group is of great value to us and that we intend to consult closely with the allies on Namibia. (S)

Meeting with the Chilean Finance Minister de Castro. At the behest of President Pinochet, de Castro visited me this morning and asked that we keep the meeting confidential. The Chileans are disturbed that U.S. relations are improving more rapidly with Argentina than with Chile. In the Chilean view, this could give Argentina an advantage over Chile in the Beagle Channel dispute, forcing the Chilean Government to purchase more arms at the expense of economic and social progress. De Castro was assured that we were not biased in favor of Argentina. We also wished to normalize relations with Chile as rapidly as possible. I asked for Chile's ideas on how American public and Congressional opposition to such normalization might be overcome. As for the Beagle Channel dispute, I said that our policy was intended to strengthen the Argentinian moderates (including President Viola); any direct American involvement at this time would not help them. De Castro agreed with my assessment of the internal Argentinian situation. (C)

RDS 2/3 6/03/01 (HAIG, Alexander M., Jr.)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET ATTACHMENT

June 4, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT:

Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Attached is Secretary Haig's Evening Report for June 3, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

SECRET ATTACHMENT

SECRET

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